Re: THE REPATRIATION COMMISSION
And: IAN FRANCIS DOESSEL
No. Qld G62 of 1990
FED No. 508
Veterans' Affairs
12 AAR 291/21 ALD 107
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Lockhart(1), Pincus(1) and Ryan(1) JJ.
CATCHWORDS
Veterans' Affairs - whether respondent eligible to receive benefits - meaning of "allotted for duty" - whether special meaning can be ascribed to "allotted for duty" where Act ambiguous.
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 ss.5(12), 6(1) and (6), 7, 13(1) and 85(5)
Veterans' Entitlements (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 1986 s.19
HEARING
BRISBANE
#DATE 14:9:1990
Counsel for the applicant: Mr. H.G. Fryberg QC and
Mr. J.A. Logan
Solicitors for the applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the respondent: Mr. T.D.O.J. North
Solicitors for the respondent: Cannan and Peterson
ORDER
The appeal be dismissed.
The applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal, to be taxed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
JUDGE1
This is an appeal from a judgment of Spender J. dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The latter decision affirmed decisions of the Veterans' Review Board established under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (called in those reasons "the V.E. Act" or "the Act").
That Board had, in effect, set aside decisions of a delegate of the Repatriation Commission determining that the respondent is not eligible to receive benefits under the Act. It will be noted that the appeal to this Court is the fifth level of consideration of the respondent's claims for benefit under the Act.
The Point at issue is a question of construction, namely the meaning of the words "allotted for duty" in s.6(1)(e)(i) and (ii) of the Act. The appellant says that those words mean "allotted for duty for the purposes of this Act" whereas the respondent denies that the words "for the purposes of this Act" should be read in. The legislative setting in which the question of construction arises is explained below.
The respondent joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1959 and was discharged in 1971. In February 1985, he made a claim for medical treatment and pension for certain conditions, said to be connected with his naval service, and in September 1985 made a further such claim in relation to other conditions. Both these claims were rejected by a delegate of the Repatriation Commission, the former rejection being based upon now repealed legislation and the latter on the current Act. The decision of the Veterans' Review Board setting those delegation decisions aside was given on 17 February 1988, the hearing and the determination by the Board having been governed by the VE Act: see s.19 of the Veterans' Entitlements (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 1986 (the "Transitional Act"). Under s.175 of the VE Act, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had power to review the Board's decision. The appeal from the Tribunal to this Court was based on s.44 of the
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- AGLC
- The Repatriation Commission v. Doessel, I.F. [1990] FCA 508 (12 AAR 291; 21 ALD 107)
- Case
- [1990] FCA 508
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was the interpretation of the term "allotted for duty" as it appeared in the Act. Specifically, the court had to decide whether this term, which was not explicitly defined within the Act, could be given a special meaning in the context of the legislation. The court was also required to consider whether the ambiguity of the term could lead to an interpretation that favoured the respondent.
The High Court examined the plain meaning of the phrase "allotted for duty" and found that it did not have a special meaning that would extend the respondent's eligibility for benefits. The court held that the term should be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning and that no special meaning could be ascribed to it based on the context of the Act. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal were awarded to the applicant, to be taxed in accordance with Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal be dismissed.
The applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal, to be taxed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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