FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Repatriation Commission v Crane [2004] FCAFC 86
VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder – exposure to asbestos – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal considered the correct Statement of Principles – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal considered the matters set out in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 – whether the Tribunal put its mind to the connection between the diseases and the veteran’s eligible service
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 5C(1), 5D(2), 5Q(1A), ss 6 to 6F, ss 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 68, 196, Part II, Schedule 2
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 applied
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996)
185 CLR 259 referred toREPATRIATION COMMISSION v JOHN CAMPBELL CRANE
No Q 82 of 2003
SPENDER, RD NICHOLSON and NORTH JJ
BRISBANE
5 APRIL 2004
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 82 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM THE VETERANS’ APPEALS DIVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY DEPUTY PRESIDENT D MULLER
BETWEEN:
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
APPLICANTAND:
JOHN CAMPBELL CRANE
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
SPENDER, RD NICHOLSON and NORTH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
5 APRIL 2004
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 82 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM THE VETERANS’ APPEALS DIVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY DEPUTY PRESIDENT D MULLER
BETWEEN:
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
APPLICANTAND:
JOHN CAMPBELL CRANE
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
SPENDER, RD NICHOLSON and NORTH JJ
DATE:
5 APRIL 2004
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) given on 16 May 2003. The Tribunal set aside a decision of the Veterans’ Review Board of 31 August 2001. Mr Crane (“the veteran”) had applied to the Board for review of a Repatriation Commission (“the Commission”) decision dated 21 August 2000 (as varied by the Veterans’ Review Board decision dated 18 May 2001), which refused a claim for medical treatment and pension for incapacity from major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, on the ground that the conditions were not “service related”. The term “service related” is imprecise and unhelpful, and finds no statutory basis in the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”), apart from indicating a possible connection with any particular service that is relevant under the Act.
The decision of the Board was to ‘affirm the decision under review in relation to major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. This means that the Repatriation Commission’s decision is unchanged in relation to those matters.’
The Tribunal set aside that decision and ‘in substitution determines that John Campbell Crane’s major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder are war-caused with…
Continue reading Repatriation Commission v Crane
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Repatriation Commission v Crane [2004] FCAFC 86
- Case
- [2004] FCAFC 86
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the Board's reasoning and whether it appropriately applied the standard of a 'reasonable hypothesis' to the veteran's claims. The Board had considered the veteran's operational service and the reasonable hypothesis connecting his pleural plaques with his service, but ultimately concluded that his psychiatric conditions were not war-caused. The Board's decision hinged on the evidence presented and whether it raised a reasonable hypothesis as required by the relevant statutes. The court found that the Board had applied the correct legal standard but had reached a conclusion that was supported by the evidence.
Given the evidence and the Board's application of the relevant legal principles, the court upheld the Board's decision. The court found that the Board's determination that Mr Crane's psychiatric conditions were not war-caused was correct and that there was no sufficient ground to conclude otherwise. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Board referred to the fact that its earlier hearings had been adjourned:‘ because any characterisation of the conditions [of the applicant’s pleural plaques as meeting the definition of major illness or of meeting the definition of a respiratory disorder as that term is used in respect of anxiety disorder] as being either war or defence-caused will depend on the status of the condition of pleural plaques …The matter is an important one as the Board is required to determine whether the condition is war-caused under section 9 of the Act or defence-caused under section 70 of the Act.’ The decision to adjourn was so that advice might be obtained as to ‘whether the condition [of pleural plaques] has been accepted as a war-caused or a defence-caused disability.’ The response given to the Board was:‘This is to advise that the decision dated 21 August 2000 relied upon the evidence at folio 36 in which Mr Crane has indicated that he worked on de-lagging during his operational service and eligible service.In making my decision on pleural plaques I am of the view that a reasonable hypothesis of a relationship to operational service had been met as de-lagging had been undertaken during the periods of his operational service which included 20 December 1967 to 3 January 1968, 17 January 1968 to 16 February 1968 and 27 March 1968 to 26 April 1968.’ (Emphasis added) The Board said in par 22 of its reasons:‘This Board also acknowledges that the claims assessor accepted pleural plaques on the basis of a reasonable hypothesis connecting that condition with the veteran’s operational service. On this basis, the Board has determined that the “reasonable hypothesis” standard or proof should be applied to its consideration of major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder thereby attracting Statements of Principles No 58 of 1998 and No 1 of 2000 respectively.’ Having expressed the proper approach to be followed, the Board nonetheless concluded that the veteran’s pleural plaques were not a major illness as defined in the Statement of Principle, and that the onset of the veteran’s psychiatric conditions preceded that of pleural plaques. It is important to note that the basis of the Board’s determination was not on the possible relative contributions of each particular period of the veteran’s naval service. It was fully alive to the requirements for entitlement for major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. The Board concluded:‘Having reviewed the whole of the material before it and for the reasons given above, the Board finds that none of the minimum factors set out in the Statements of Principles is raised by the evidence in this case. The Board is therefore of the opinion that the material does not raise a reasonable hypothesis within the meaning of subsection 120(3). It follows that the Board is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, for the purposes of subsection 120(1), that there is no sufficient ground for determining that the veteran’s depressive disorder and anxiety disorder were war-caused.’