Renshaw v Queensland Mining Corporation Limited (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Renshaw v Queensland Mining Corporation Limited (No 2) [2016] FCA 1482

Appeal from: Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw [2016] FCCA 979
File number: NSD 678 of 2016
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 9 December 2016
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY — appeal from the making of a sequestration order — whether primary judge erred in failing to find that act of bankruptcy occurred more than six months before presentation of creditor’s petition — whether time for compliance with notice extended by orders made under s 41(6A) or by operation of s 41(7) —where petitioning creditor lodged caveat over debtor’s land claiming to have security but presented petition as an unsecured creditor, whether primary judge erred in failing to find that petitioner was not an unsecured creditor — where appeal raised alleged errors concerning exercise of discretion under s 52(2) but points not pressed in court below
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 3(1)(c), 5, 40(1), 41(1)(g), 41(6A), 41(7), 43(1), 44, 52

Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 74F(1)

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) (2009) 239 CLR 27

Apollo Shower Screens Pty Ltd v Building and Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corporation (1985) 1 NSWLR 561

Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 459

Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969

Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639

Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389

Guss v Johnstone [2000] HCA 26; 171 ALR 598

Hall v Richards (1961) 108 CLR 84

J & H Just (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Bank of New South Wales (1971) 125 CLR 546

Komesaroff v Law Institute of Victoria [1997] FCA 250

Leros Pty Ltd v Terara Pty Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 407

Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19

Milliman v Rochester Ry Co 3 App Div 109; 39 NYS 274 (1896)

James v Abrahams (1981) 34 ALR 657

Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw (2015) 229 FCR 13

Renshaw v Queensland Mining Corporation Limited [2015] FCCA 1555

Streimer v Tamas (1981) 37 ALR 211

Thomson v Golden Destiny Investments Pty Limited [2015] NSWSC 1176

Thorpe v Bristile Ltd (1997) 80 FCR 330

Wright Designed Pty Ltd v McClymont [2006] FCA 999; 232 ALR 683

Date of hearing: 28 November 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 120
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Baird
Solicitor for the Appellant: Beazley Boorman Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Furlan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Jurisbridge Legal
Counsel for the Intervener: Mr S Balafoutis
Solicitor for the Intervener: Lionheart Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 678 of 2016
BETWEEN:

HOWARD RENSHAW

Appellant

AND:

QUEENSLAND MINING CORPORATION LIMITED

Respondent

PAUL GERARD WESTON AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF HOWARD VICTOR RENSHAW

Intervener

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

9…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1482
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Renshaw v Queensland Mining Corporation Limited (No 2), the appellant, Mr Howard Renshaw, appealed against the making of a sequestration order against his estate. The respondent, Queensland Mining Corporation Limited (QMCL), had successfully petitioned for the sequestration of Mr Renshaw's estate on the basis of an unpaid debt of $363,000. The primary judge found that Mr Renshaw had committed an act of bankruptcy and dismissed his opposition to the petition, which was based on the contentions that the act of bankruptcy occurred more than six months before the presentation of the creditor’s petition, that the petition was an abuse of process due to the failure to disclose security held by the petitioning creditor, and that there was other sufficient cause not to make the sequestration order.

The court was required to determine whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the act of bankruptcy occurred more than six months before the presentation of the creditor’s petition, whether the time for compliance with the notice was extended by orders made under section 41(6A) or by operation of section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the petitioner was not an unsecured creditor. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether the primary judge erred in not finding that there was other sufficient cause not to make the sequestration order.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in his findings and conclusions. The act of bankruptcy was determined to have occurred on 4 June 2015, which was within the six-month period before the presentation of the creditor’s petition. The court also found that the District Registrar’s order under section 41(6A) was not beyond power and that the petitioning creditor satisfied all the conditions under section 44(1)(a), (b), and (c) of the Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, the court concluded that QMCL was not a secured creditor as there was no evidence that trust monies were applied by Mr Renshaw towards the purchase of the land over which the caveat was lodged. Finally, the court found that the primary judge was not required to find other sufficient cause not to make the sequestration order as Mr Renshaw did not contend that he was solvent.

The appeal was dismissed, and Mr Renshaw was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

If, amongst other things, a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy, on a petition presented by a creditor, a court of competent jurisdiction may make a sequestration order against the debtor’s estate. That is what happened to Howard Renshaw. While the court has a discretion not to make the order where the debtor can prove he or she is solvent or there is other sufficient cause, the primary judge declined to exercise the discretion in Mr Renshaw’s favour. At the hearing of the creditor’s petition Mr Renshaw did not contend that he was solvent or that he was not indebted to the petitioning creditor in the amount claimed. He nevertheless opposed the making of the order on three grounds: first, that the act of bankruptcy was committed outside the period in which the creditor was entitled to present the petition; second, that the petition was an abuse of process because the petitioning creditor had failed to disclose that it held security over his property; and third, that, although he could not pay his debts, there was other sufficient cause not to make the order. In this appeal he claims that the primary judge erred in failing to uphold these contentions. Background Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd (QMCL) is a publicly listed company. It was first incorporated as a private company by Mr Renshaw with the intention of acquiring copper and gold mining leases in Queensland: see Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw (2015) 229 FCR 13 (QMCL v Renshaw) at [3]. Mr Renshaw was the managing director of QMCL for a little over eight years until he resigned on 23 October 2012. That day a settlement deed was executed between Mr Renshaw, QMCL, and another company, Butmall Pty Ltd, which was owned and controlled by Mr Renshaw. Under the terms of the deed QMCL made a number of payments, including $270,000 to Mr Renshaw and $264,000 to Butmall. QMCL sued Mr Renshaw, Butmall, and QMCL’s accountants for the recovery of the termination payments on the ground that they were made in contravention of s 200B(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) because they were benefits given in connection with Mr Renshaw’s retirement from the office of managing director without member approval. That action was successful: QMCL v Renshaw. On 5 May 2014 the trial judge, Perry J, made consequential declarations and orders. The declarations included declarations to the effect that Mr Renshaw holds an amount of $270,000 on trust for QMCL pursuant to s 200J(1) of the Corporations Act and, on the same basis, that Mr Renshaw and Butmall hold an amount of $143,333 on trust for QMCL. The effect of the orders so far as it is material is that Mr Renshaw became indebted to QMCL in the amount of $363,000 (how this figure was reached is of no relevant consequence). Mr Renshaw did not repay the debt. The bankruptcy notice On 24 December 2014 a bankruptcy notice (BN 177615) was issued by the Official Receiver, requiring payment, or suitable arrangements for payment, of the judgment debt within 21 days of service. By this time, taking into account post-judgment interest, the debt had risen to $382,273.81.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

When asked whether he was in a position to deal with the additional ground, Mr Furlan said that he was not. He said that he had not had time to consider the relevant authorities and the legal point it raised. Ultimately, however, the primary judge granted leave to Mr Renshaw to file the amended notice of opposition. The hearing and judgment below Despite the assertion of solvency in the notice of opposition, Mr Renshaw did not contend that he was solvent. Nor did he press his contention that he had an offsetting claim. His opposition to the petition was based solely on the other grounds. The primary judge dealt with the abuse of process argument first. He rejected the argument on the basis that there was no evidence to establish that any trust monies were applied by Mr Renshaw towards the purchase of the land over which the caveat was lodged. He said that Mr Renshaw was in a position to adduce evidence to this effect but he adduced no such evidence and there was “no evidence to support any basis to believe that those funds are traceable into the land the subject of the caveat”. Consequently, his Honour found that QMCL was not a secured creditor. His Honour then turned to consider the question of whether the bankruptcy notice was stale. He found that the act of bankruptcy occurred on 4 June 2015, which was the date he dismissed the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. Dealing with an argument that the District Registrar’s order under s 41(6A) was beyond power, his Honour said:12In relation to the contention that the registrar made an order beyond power, reference was made to the decision in James v Abrahams (1981) 34 ALR 657, relevantly at p.662. That case is clearly distinguishable on the basis that on the circumstances in that case, there had been no application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. And the proceedings in which the Registrar made the order of 9 February 2015, the present case, an application had been made to set aside the bankruptcy notice. 13I should note that even if, contrary to the finding I have made, it was held that there was any excess of power by the Registrar in relation to the making of the order in respect of the extension of time for compliance, it was an order that could have been made under s.33 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, and the erroneous reference, if it be such, to the wrong source of power would be a defect or irregularity within s.306(2) of the Act. 14Further, if this was a case in which there was an issue under s.44(1)(c), the Court has power under s.33 to extend time in relation to the six months identified. And this is a case where in the circumstances the Court would have extended the time under s.33 of the Bankruptcy Act1966 in respect of the requirements under s.44(1)(c). His Honour found that the petitioning creditor satisfied “each of the conditions identified under s.44(1)(a), (b) and (c)” of the Act. Finally, his Honour noted a concession made by Mr Renshaw that he was not solvent and said that he was not satisfied that there was other sufficient cause not to make the order. To the contrary, his Honour said that he was satisfied that this was an appropriate case in which to do so.The grounds of appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 2 should also be rejected.Did the primary judge err in finding that there was no sufficient cause not to make the sequestration order (grounds 3 and 4)? The short answer to the question is “no”. In his written submissions Mr Renshaw contended that the primary judge should have found that there was sufficient cause not to make the sequestration order because of:(1)Mr Tang’s failure to disclosure QMCL’s alleged security in the land;(2)Mr Renshaw’s asset position; and(3)the existence of an offsetting claim he “wishes to establish … against LawCover for damages arising from the deed prepared by his [then] solicitor and any claims he has remaining against [QMCL]”. He also contended that the primary judge’s reasons for not so finding were inadequate. Having regard to my earlier conclusion, the first matter falls away. In relation to the second matter, Mr Renshaw pointed to evidence before the primary judge that the property had a value of $2,000,000 subject to a mortgage to the ANZ Bank of $980,000, thus leaving equity in the property of $1,020,000 of which he, as one of two owners, had a half share. I note that on 17 February 2016 Mr Renshaw deposed that, besides the mortgage, his other debts totalled $156,100. As I mentioned above, the ground of appeal to which this matter relates (ground 4) arises from [15] of the primary judge’s reasons, which Mr Renshaw contends (in ground 5) are inadequate. At [15] his Honour said this:Mr Johnson of counsel on behalf of the respondent [Mr Renshaw] also submitted that the Court should be satisfied in the present case that there was other sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order. Given the position conceded that the respondent is not solvent, I am not satisfied that other sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order has been made. I am satisfied that the respondent is unable to pay his or her debts. I am satisfied that the respondent has committed an act of bankruptcy and I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to exercise the Court’s powers to make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor. At first blush, the relevance of this matter was elusive. Neither in the amended notice of appeal nor in the opening written submissions did Mr Renshaw explain the relevance of his “asset position” in circumstances in which he did not contend that he was solvent. To understand how the matter was put in the court below, it was necessary to go to the transcript: We say your Honour has before you evidence of a value of a property over which a caveat has been lodged, and I’m not going to repeat what I’ve already said about the caveat. You have evidence of the value of that property. You have evidence of the amount secured against that property and the interest of Mr Renshaw in that property. In those circumstances, your Honour would be satisfied that this is not an appropriate means to recover the indebtedness where the very petitioning creditor has sought to restrict use of that property if there is no valid caveat creating a – what I might say – a footprint – I will use the word “footprint” rather than “security interest” – on that property, that they haven’t exercised any of those other rights where there’s evidence of the value. And for that reason, the petition ought be dismissed on that ground.