FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Renshaw v Queensland Mining Corporation Limited (No 2) [2016] FCA 1482
Appeal from: Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw [2016] FCCA 979 File number: NSD 678 of 2016 Judge: KATZMANN J Date of judgment: 9 December 2016 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY — appeal from the making of a sequestration order — whether primary judge erred in failing to find that act of bankruptcy occurred more than six months before presentation of creditor’s petition — whether time for compliance with notice extended by orders made under s 41(6A) or by operation of s 41(7) —where petitioning creditor lodged caveat over debtor’s land claiming to have security but presented petition as an unsecured creditor, whether primary judge erred in failing to find that petitioner was not an unsecured creditor — where appeal raised alleged errors concerning exercise of discretion under s 52(2) but points not pressed in court below Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 3(1)(c), 5, 40(1), 41(1)(g), 41(6A), 41(7), 43(1), 44, 52
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 74F(1)
Cases cited: Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 459
Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969
Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639
Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389
Guss v Johnstone [2000] HCA 26; 171 ALR 598
Hall v Richards (1961) 108 CLR 84
J & H Just (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Bank of New South Wales (1971) 125 CLR 546
Komesaroff v Law Institute of Victoria [1997] FCA 250
Leros Pty Ltd v Terara Pty Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 407
Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 19
Milliman v Rochester Ry Co 3 App Div 109; 39 NYS 274 (1896)
James v Abrahams (1981) 34 ALR 657
Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw (2015) 229 FCR 13
Renshaw v Queensland Mining Corporation Limited [2015] FCCA 1555
Streimer v Tamas (1981) 37 ALR 211
Thomson v Golden Destiny Investments Pty Limited [2015] NSWSC 1176
Thorpe v Bristile Ltd (1997) 80 FCR 330
Wright Designed Pty Ltd v McClymont [2006] FCA 999; 232 ALR 683
Date of hearing: 28 November 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 120 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Baird Solicitor for the Appellant: Beazley Boorman Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Furlan Solicitor for the Respondent: Jurisbridge Legal Counsel for the Intervener: Mr S Balafoutis Solicitor for the Intervener: Lionheart Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 678 of 2016 BETWEEN: HOWARD RENSHAW
Appellant
AND: QUEENSLAND MINING CORPORATION LIMITED
Respondent
PAUL GERARD WESTON AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF HOWARD VICTOR RENSHAW
Intervener
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
9…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1482
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the act of bankruptcy occurred more than six months before the presentation of the creditor’s petition, whether the time for compliance with the notice was extended by orders made under section 41(6A) or by operation of section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the petitioner was not an unsecured creditor. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether the primary judge erred in not finding that there was other sufficient cause not to make the sequestration order.
The court found that the primary judge did not err in his findings and conclusions. The act of bankruptcy was determined to have occurred on 4 June 2015, which was within the six-month period before the presentation of the creditor’s petition. The court also found that the District Registrar’s order under section 41(6A) was not beyond power and that the petitioning creditor satisfied all the conditions under section 44(1)(a), (b), and (c) of the Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, the court concluded that QMCL was not a secured creditor as there was no evidence that trust monies were applied by Mr Renshaw towards the purchase of the land over which the caveat was lodged. Finally, the court found that the primary judge was not required to find other sufficient cause not to make the sequestration order as Mr Renshaw did not contend that he was solvent.
The appeal was dismissed, and Mr Renshaw was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ground 2 should also be rejected.Did the primary judge err in finding that there was no sufficient cause not to make the sequestration order (grounds 3 and 4)? The short answer to the question is “no”. In his written submissions Mr Renshaw contended that the primary judge should have found that there was sufficient cause not to make the sequestration order because of:(1)Mr Tang’s failure to disclosure QMCL’s alleged security in the land;(2)Mr Renshaw’s asset position; and(3)the existence of an offsetting claim he “wishes to establish … against LawCover for damages arising from the deed prepared by his [then] solicitor and any claims he has remaining against [QMCL]”. He also contended that the primary judge’s reasons for not so finding were inadequate. Having regard to my earlier conclusion, the first matter falls away. In relation to the second matter, Mr Renshaw pointed to evidence before the primary judge that the property had a value of $2,000,000 subject to a mortgage to the ANZ Bank of $980,000, thus leaving equity in the property of $1,020,000 of which he, as one of two owners, had a half share. I note that on 17 February 2016 Mr Renshaw deposed that, besides the mortgage, his other debts totalled $156,100. As I mentioned above, the ground of appeal to which this matter relates (ground 4) arises from [15] of the primary judge’s reasons, which Mr Renshaw contends (in ground 5) are inadequate. At [15] his Honour said this:Mr Johnson of counsel on behalf of the respondent [Mr Renshaw] also submitted that the Court should be satisfied in the present case that there was other sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order. Given the position conceded that the respondent is not solvent, I am not satisfied that other sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order has been made. I am satisfied that the respondent is unable to pay his or her debts. I am satisfied that the respondent has committed an act of bankruptcy and I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to exercise the Court’s powers to make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor. At first blush, the relevance of this matter was elusive. Neither in the amended notice of appeal nor in the opening written submissions did Mr Renshaw explain the relevance of his “asset position” in circumstances in which he did not contend that he was solvent. To understand how the matter was put in the court below, it was necessary to go to the transcript: We say your Honour has before you evidence of a value of a property over which a caveat has been lodged, and I’m not going to repeat what I’ve already said about the caveat. You have evidence of the value of that property. You have evidence of the amount secured against that property and the interest of Mr Renshaw in that property. In those circumstances, your Honour would be satisfied that this is not an appropriate means to recover the indebtedness where the very petitioning creditor has sought to restrict use of that property if there is no valid caveat creating a – what I might say – a footprint – I will use the word “footprint” rather than “security interest” – on that property, that they haven’t exercised any of those other rights where there’s evidence of the value. And for that reason, the petition ought be dismissed on that ground.