PARTIES: TRACEY ANNE RENEHAN BY HER LITIGATION GUARDIAN GERALDINE RENEHAN
v
LEEUWIN OCEAN ADVENTURE FOUNDATION LIMITED (ACN 009 105 677) AND COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO: 33 of 1998 (9803191)
DELIVERED: 4 April 2005
HEARING DATES: 23-24 March 2005
JUDGMENT OF: MILDREN J
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE – statement of medical witness – statement probably based on privileged reports – whether waiver of privilege of statement waives privilege of attached to reports
Referred to
Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 438; Coles Meyer v Bailey (1991) 1 NTLR 86; Goldberg v Ng & Ors (1995) 185 CLR 83; Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No. 1) (1999) 1 Qd.R 141; Walsham v Stainton (1863) 2 H&M 1; 71 ER 357
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: M. Maurice QC & P. Barr QC
First Defendant: J. Reeves QC & G. Macnish
Second Defendant: L. Silvester & M. Grant
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Cridlands
First Defendant: Ward Keller
Second Defendant: Australian Government Solicitor
Judgment category classification: B
Number of pages: 8
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN
Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd & Anor [2005] NTSC 18
No. 33 of 1998 (9803191)
BETWEEN:
TRACEY ANNE RENEHAN BY HER LITIGATION GUARDIAN GERALDINE RENEHAN
Plaintiff
AND:
LEEUWIN OCEAN ADVENTURE FOUNDATION LTD (ACN 009 105 677)
First Defendant
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Defendant
CORAM: MILDREN J
REASONS FOR RULING
(Delivered 4 April 2005)
[1] This is an application by the first defendant that the plaintiff provide for inspection four medico-legal reports from a psychiatrist, Dr David Kutlaca, dated respectively 22 March 1999, 30 March 1999, 20 April 1999 and 8 October 1999.
[2] The first defendant relies upon the affidavits of Dr Kutlaca, sworn 21 March 2005, and of Mr Grove, the solicitor for the first defendant, sworn 18 March 2005.
[3] The plaintiff maintains that the reports are subject to legal professional privilege as the reports were made on behalf of the plaintiff at the request of the plaintiff’s legal advisors for the purpose of preparing the case for trial. On 24 March 2005, I ruled that the reports were privileged and that the privilege had not been waived. I said I would later publish my reasons. These are those reasons.
[4] It is not in dispute that at the time when those medical reports were prepared and delivered to the plaintiff’s solicitors the reports were subject to legal professional privilege. Clearly medical reports made on behalf of a party to litigation on the advice of that party’s legal advisors and made for the dominant purpose of preparing a party’s case for trial are privileged: see Coles Meyer v Bailey (1991) 1…
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- Case
- [2005] NTSC 18
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the privilege attached to the medical reports was waived when the plaintiff disclosed a draft statement of Dr Kutlaca on February 24, 2000. The first defendant argued that the disclosure of the draft statement amounted to an unqualified waiver of the privilege attached to the earlier reports. The court had to decide whether there was an express or implied waiver of the privilege.
Justice Mildren ruled that there was no express waiver of the privilege attached to the earlier reports. The court then considered whether there had been an implied waiver of the privilege. The court found that there was no unfair advantage gained by the plaintiff in disclosing the draft statement, as it was unsigned and the plaintiff did not intend to call Dr Kutlaca as a witness. The court also noted that the draft statement did not refer to the earlier reports. Applying the fairness test, the court concluded that there was no unfairness in the plaintiff maintaining the privilege and that disclosure would reveal the confidential communications between the plaintiff and her solicitor.
The court ruled that legal professional privilege in the original reports of Dr Kutlaca had not been waived either expressly or impliedly. Therefore, the defendants were not entitled to inspect the reports.
No specific orders were made in this ruling, as it was focused on the issue of legal privilege. However, the court's decision protected the privileged nature of the medical reports and denied the defendants' request for inspection.
Background
Background to the litigation
The facts of the case began with Tracey Anne Renehan's severe injuries sustained from the incident on March 19, 1998. In preparation for her case, Dr David Kutlaca prepared four medical reports on behalf of Tracey Anne Renehan, at the request of her legal advisors, for the dominant purpose of preparing her case for trial. These reports were subject to legal professional privilege. After receiving these reports, Tracey Anne Renehan's solicitors prepared a draft statement for Dr Kutlaca to sign, but he declined to sign the earlier statements as they did not completely reflect his opinions. An unsigned statement dated February 24, 2000, was later discovered by the defendants. However, no claim for privilege was made, and it is not suggested that the lack of a claim for privilege was accidental.
At a later time, Tracey Anne Renehan prepared a document entitled "Plaintiff's Expert Reports for Exchange," which was forwarded to the defendants' solicitors by letter on February 26, 2004. This document did not include a copy of any of Dr Kutlaca's reports or refer to the unsigned statement of February 24, 2000. The Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Limited argued that the disclosure of the unsigned statement amounted to an unqualified waiver of the privilege attached to the earlier reports. However, the court ruled that there had been no express or implied waiver of the privilege attached to the earlier reports, based on the principles of fairness.
This case before the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia involves an application by the first defendant, Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd, for the plaintiff, Tracey Anne Renehan, to provide for inspection of four medico-legal reports from Dr. David Kutlaca. The plaintiff contends that the reports are subject to legal professional privilege as they were prepared for the purpose of preparing her case for trial. The court, in the person of Mildren J, had previously ruled that the reports were privileged and would not be waived, and this judgment outlines the reasons for that ruling. The matter came before the court as an application from the first defendant, and the procedural history includes the submission of affidavits by Dr. Kutlaca and the solicitor for the first defendant. The court considered the arguments presented and the relevant legal precedents before reaching its decision on the issue of legal professional privilege.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the disclosure of a draft witness statement from a medical expert amount to an express or implied waiver of legal professional privilege over the underlying medical reports?
2. Are medical reports prepared at the request of a party's legal advisors for the purpose of preparing a case for trial privileged, regardless of their status as medical reports?
3. When, if ever, does the use of privileged material in proceedings amount to an implied waiver of privilege based on notions of fairness?
4. Does the disclosure of a draft witness statement by a party, which does not refer to the underlying privileged reports and is not intended to be used in evidence, amount to an implied waiver of privilege over those reports?
Held
1. The court concluded that the disclosure of a draft witness statement from a medical expert does not amount to an express or implied waiver of legal professional privilege over the underlying medical reports. As a result, the application for inspection of the reports was dismissed.
2. The court held that medical reports prepared at the request of a party's legal advisors for the purpose of preparing a case for trial are privileged, regardless of their status as medical reports. Consequently, the reports in question were deemed privileged.
3. The court determined that the use of privileged material in proceedings does not necessarily amount to an implied waiver of privilege based on notions of fairness. In this case, the court found that there was no implied waiver of privilege, as the disclosure of the draft statement did not result in any advantage to the plaintiff or disadvantage to the defendant.
4. The court found that the disclosure of a draft witness statement by a party, which does not refer to the underlying privileged reports and is not intended to be used in evidence, does not amount to an implied waiver of privilege over those reports. Therefore, the privilege over the original reports was maintained.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd & Anor, Justice Mildren of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory dealt with several key issues regarding legal professional privilege and its potential waiver. The case involved medical reports prepared for a party to litigation and whether the disclosure of a draft witness statement based on these reports constituted a waiver of privilege.
Firstly, the court considered whether the disclosure of a draft witness statement from a medical expert amounted to an express or implied waiver of legal professional privilege over the underlying medical reports. The court found that there was no express waiver as no claim for privilege was made when the draft statement was discovered. The issue then became whether there was an implied waiver. The court relied on the principle that implied waiver is based on notions of fairness, as articulated in Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice. The court held that there was no implied waiver because the plaintiff did not gain any advantage from disclosing the draft statement, and the defendant did not suffer any disadvantage.
Secondly, the court addressed whether medical reports prepared at the request of a party's legal advisors for the purpose of preparing a case for trial are privileged, regardless of their status as medical reports. The court confirmed that such reports are indeed privileged, as they constitute communications made for the dominant purpose of preparing a party's case for litigation. This principle was supported by authorities such as Coles Meyer v Bailey, Walsham v Stainton, and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd.
Thirdly, the court examined when the use of privileged material in proceedings might amount to an implied waiver of privilege based on notions of fairness. The court emphasized that implied waiver occurs when it would be unfair to allow a party to assert privilege after having used privileged material in a manner that benefits them. This was supported by references to Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice and Goldberg v Ng & Ors. In this case, the court found that there was no unfairness in allowing the plaintiff to maintain the privilege over the medical reports.
Lastly, the court considered whether the disclosure of a draft witness statement, which did not refer to the underlying privileged reports and was not intended to be used in evidence, amounted to an implied waiver of privilege over those reports. The court ruled that such disclosure did not constitute an implied waiver, as the draft statement itself was not used in the proceedings, and there was no indication that the plaintiff intended to use it. This reasoning was aligned with the principles in Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice and Walsham v Stainton, which indicate that draft documents prepared with the intention of being disclosed do not lose their privilege upon disclosure of the final version.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the disclosure of a draft witness statement, which does not refer to the underlying privileged reports and is not intended to be used in evidence, does not amount to an implied waiver of privilege over those reports. The court distinguished this case from Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd by noting that the drafts in this case did form the basis of a communication between the expert and the solicitors, unlike in Southcorp. Thus, the court held that legal professional privilege in the original reports was not waived either expressly or impliedly.