Ren v Strata Corporation 12753 Inc

Link copied
Case Copied 18 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

REN v STRATA CORPORATION 12753 INC

[2024] SASCA 120

Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bleby  (ex tempore)

9 October 2024

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT - HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA - APPELLATE JURISDICTION - PROCEDURE - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS - PENDING SPECIAL LEAVE APPLICATION

Application for a stay pending an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia.

On 29 August 2024, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from a single Judge of the District Court under the Strata Titles Act 1988 (SA).

The dispute relates to the appellant’s conversion of a one-bedroom unit into a five-bedroom apartment over which she granted leases or licences for parts therein. The trial Judge found the erections of walls for this purpose were ‘prescribed works’ for which the appellant failed to obtain the requisite authorisation. This lack of necessary authorisations extended to her granting of leases or licences over parts of the unit.

The trial Judge ordered the applicant to restore the unit to its original state, to refrain from carrying out any further prescribed works without authorisation, to give notice to any tenants that they would be required to vacate, and to refrain from entry into any leases or licences over any part of the unit.

The Court on Appeal upheld the substance of those orders while extending their timeframe; the applicant was given from 9 December 2022 until 28 September and 28 October 2024 to give the requisite notice of lease or licence termination to her tenants and restore the unit to its original condition, respectively.

The applicant now applies for a stay of those orders pending an application of special leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal to the High Court. The respondent sought the costs of defending that application.

Held, refusing the application for a stay of the orders pending the application for special leave to appeal:

1.There is little prospect that the judgment of the Court of Appeal will attract a grant of special leave to appeal.

2.As to the balance of convenience, the burden to the applicant of having to remediate now cannot be said to be greater than the burdens to the respondent Strata Corporation of the applicant not doing so for a few months more.

3.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the stay application by way of lump sum, fixed at $7,000 in lieu of an order for indemnity costs.

Strata Titles Act 1988 (SA) ss 29, 29(1)(b), 41A(9), 44(2)(b)(ii); Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 35A, referred to.

Jennings Construction Ltd v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd [No 1] (1986) 161 CLR 681, applied.

Ren v Strata Corporation 12753 Inc [2024] SASCA 106; Strata Corporation 12753 Inc v REN [2022] SADC 134, discussed.

REN v STRATA CORPORATION 12753 INC

[2024] SASCA 120

Court of Appeal – Civil

  1. BLEBY JA (ex tempore): This is, in substance, an application to stay…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ren v Strata Corporation 12753 Inc and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] SASCA 120
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bleby Ex Tempore J considered an application for a stay of orders made by the Court of Appeal, pending an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. The applicant, Ren, sought the stay against Strata Corporation 12753 Inc. The dispute concerned whether the erection of internal walls within a unit constituted "prescribed work" under section 29 of the relevant Act, requiring authorisation from the strata corporation. The Court of Appeal had previously found that the internal walls were indeed prescribed work and that the applicant had breached the Act by carrying them out without the necessary special resolution.

The primary legal issue before Bleby Ex Tempore J was whether to grant a stay of the Court of Appeal's orders. This required an assessment of the applicant's prospects of success on her special leave application to the High Court, balanced against the potential burdens on both parties. The applicant argued that the internal walls did not alter the external appearance of the building and were temporary, thus not constituting a "structure" or "alteration of a building" as defined by section 29.

Bleby Ex Tempore J reasoned that the Court of Appeal had correctly interpreted section 29, holding that permanency was not a requirement for work to be considered an alteration or erection of a structure. The Court of Appeal had found that the installation of stud walls was sufficient to constitute prescribed work, and that there was overwhelming evidence of a breach of the Act. Consequently, Bleby Ex Tempore J concluded that the applicant's prospects of success on her special leave application were negligible, and this factor strongly outweighed any considerations favouring the applicant, such as the burden of immediate remediation.

The application for a stay was refused. The respondent sought indemnity costs or a lump sum in lieu, based on a letter from its solicitors warning of an intention to seek indemnity costs if the application was pursued. Bleby Ex Tempore J was satisfied that the letter established a basis for indemnity costs but ultimately ordered the applicant to pay the respondent a fixed sum of $7,000 for the costs of the stay application.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Determination of the application for special leave will likely take a few months at most. I consider that factor, and the burden to the applicant of having to remediate the unit immediately, are considerations that favour the applicant. However, the burden to the applicant of having to remediate now cannot be said to be greater than the burdens to the respondent Strata Corporation of the applicant not doing so for a few months more.Conclusion In any event, for the reasons discussed above, I think that the applicant’s prospects of success on her special leave application are so remote as to be negligible. In the present case, that consideration strongly outweighs any matters that can be said to be either neutral or to some degree in the applicant's favour on the application for a stay. The applicant has not demonstrated that the respondent should be kept from the benefit of its judgments at trial and on appeal on account of the application for special leave. I refuse the application for a stay of the orders of the trial judge as modified by the Court of Appeal. Costs The respondent sought an indemnity costs order or an order for costs as a lump sum in lieu of indemnity costs. The basis for an indemnity costs order lay in a 26 September 2024 letter from Botten Levinson, solicitors for the respondent, to the applicant. By that letter, the solicitors for the respondent advised of their client’s intention to apply for indemnity costs in the event that the application was prosecuted. The letter explained clearly the futility of the application on the basis reflected in these reasons. I am satisfied that on its face, the letter establishes a basis for an indemnity costs order. I would have been satisfied to make such an order had the respondent not now sought the payment of a lump sum in lieu. I am satisfied that a lump sum costs order in lieu of indemnity costs, discounted to a small degree, should be made. The applicant is to pay the respondent a fixed amount of $7,000 for its costs of the stay application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 5 of the appeal complained that the trial judge had erred in finding that the putting up of internal walls constituted the alteration of a building and the erection of a structure and was ‘prescribed work’ for the purposes of s 29 of the Act. Section 29 provides:29—Alterations and additions(1) Subject to subsection (1a), a person must not carry out prescribed work in relation to a unit unless the person is authorised to do so—(a)where all the units comprised in the strata scheme consist of non‑residential premises—under the articles of the strata corporation; or (b)in any case—by special resolution of the strata corporation. (1a) Subsection (1) does not apply to—(a)prescribed work carried out in compliance with a direction under section 23 of the Housing Improvement Act 1940; and(b)prescribed work carried out on a unit in a strata scheme consisting only of 2 units if the work is approved development under the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016.(1b) Where a person carries out prescribed work referred to in subsection (1a)(b), the strata corporation may, by notice in writing to the owner of the unit, require the owner to carry out, within a reasonable period fixed in the notice, specified work to remedy any structural deficiency caused by the work.(2) Where a person acts in contravention of subsection (1), the strata corporation may, by notice in writing to the unit holder, require him or her to carry out, within a reasonable period fixed in the notice, specified work—(a)to remedy any structural deficiency caused by the work; or(b)to restore the unit to its previous state. (6) In this section—prescribed work in relation to a unit means—(a)the erection, alteration, demolition or removal of a building or structure; (b)the alteration of the external appearance of a building or structure. The applicant contended that the putting up of internal walls was not prescribed work as, first, the external appearance of the building was not altered and second, that the internal alterations were temporary and therefore did not meet the definition of a ‘structure’. The Court of Appeal held that there was no legislative requirement that the work must be permanent to constitute the alteration of a building or the erection of a structure. It further held that in any event, as almost any alteration of a building or erection of a structure could be reversed, to import a requirement of permanency would defeat the purpose of the legislation. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the installation of large stud walls adjoining the floor and ceiling constituted the erection of a structure and an alteration of the building and was prescribed work for the purposes of s 29. In circumstances where it was satisfied that there was ‘overwhelming evidence’ that the Strata Corporation had not passed any special resolution authorising the building works, it found that the trial judge had made no error in finding that the applicant was in breach of the Act.The proposed grounds of appeal to the High Court