Reid v Hubbard

Case [2003] FCA 1424


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Reid v Hubbard [2003] FCA 1424

BANKRUPTCY – application by third party to set aside bankruptcy notice – whether debt exists – whether bankruptcy notice issued for an improper purpose – whether bankruptcy notice an abuse of process.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from Federal Magistrate’s decision not to set aside bankruptcy notice - whether leave to appeal required.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 30(1), 40(1)(g), 41, 52(2), 303
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules, O 62 r 9

A-Pak Plastics Pty Ltd v Merhone Pty Ltd (1995) 120 FLR 277 applied
Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134 referred to
Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd 1997 74 FCR 19 referred to
Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 cited
Re Athans; ex parte Athans (1991) 29 FCR 302 followed
Re Bendeich (1994) 53 FCR 422 cited
Re Briggs; ex parte Briggs v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation(WA) (1986) 12 FCR 310 followed
Re: Ousley; ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 48 FCR 131 referred to
Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666 referred to
In Re Tweeds Garages Ltd [1962] Ch 406 cited
White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169 cited

SUSAN REID & MICHAEL JAMES REID V JOHN HAROLD HUBBARD & ESANDCEE PTY LTD
V933 OF 2003

HEEREY J
MELBOURNE
5 DECEMBER 2003


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V933 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SUSAN REID
FIRST APPELLANT

MICHAEL JAMES REID (by his Litigation Guardian Susan Reid)
SECOND APPELLANT

AND:

JOHN HAROLD HUBBARD
FIRST RESPONDENT

ESANDCEE PTY LTD (ACN 073 887 822)
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HEEREY J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 DECEMBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice dated 28 July 2003 be extended until 5.00 pm on 12 December 2003.

2.The appeal is otherwise dismissed.

3.The question of costs is adjourned to a date to be fixed for further argument as to whether there should be orders that

(a)the appellants pay the second respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis and

(b)such costs be paid personally, in whole or in part, by the appellants’ counsel and solicitors, or some of them.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V933 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SUSAN REID
FIRST APPLICANT

MICHAEL JAMES REID (by his Litigation Guardian Susan Reid)
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

JOHN HAROLD HUBBARD
FIRST RESPONDENT

ESANDCEE PTY LTD (ACN 073 887 822)
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HEEREY J

DATE:

5 DECEMBER 2003

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The appellants Mrs Susan Reid and her son Michael James Reid appeal against a judgment of Bryant CFM dismissing their application to set aside a bankruptcy notice: Reid v Hubbard & Esandcee Pty [2003]…

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Details
AGLC
Reid v Hubbard [2003] FCA 1424
Case
[2003] FCA 1424
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Reid v Hubbard involves an application by Mr. Hubbard to set aside a bankruptcy notice served on him. The matter was heard in the Federal Magistrates Court, presided over by her Honour. The primary issue before the court was whether the bankruptcy notice, issued by S & C, should be set aside or extended to allow for the resolution of other pending proceedings in the Supreme Court. The court had to consider the implications of the existing Mareva injunction, which restrained Mr. Hubbard from disposing of certain assets, and whether this affected his ability to pay his debts.

Her Honour meticulously reviewed the evidence and arguments presented, noting that Mr. Hubbard had not entered an appearance in response to the County Court writ issued by S & C. Despite this, the court acknowledged that there were uncertainties regarding Mr. Hubbard's financial position and the validity of the guarantee he had signed. The court highlighted that while Mr. Hubbard had assets under a Mareva injunction, it was not definitively clear if he was insolvent. Consequently, her Honour concluded that there were insufficient grounds to set aside the bankruptcy notice at that time. Instead, the court opted to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice to allow for the resolution of other proceedings.

In her judgment, her Honour dismissed the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice but granted an extension of time for compliance with the notice until 5.00 pm on 12 December 2003. The appeal was dismissed, and the matter of costs was adjourned for further argument on whether the appellants should bear the costs of the second respondent on an indemnity basis and whether these costs should be personally paid by the appellants' counsel and solicitors.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice dated 28 July 2003 be extended until 5.00 pm on 12 December 2003.

2. The appeal is otherwise dismissed.

3. The question of costs is adjourned to a date to be fixed for further argument as to whether there should be orders that

(a) the appellants pay the second respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis and

(b) such costs be paid personally, in whole or in part, by the appellants’ counsel and solicitors, or some of them.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY J
However, her Honour pointed out that Mr Mansell had ignored a deed of charge and guarantee by which Mr Hubbard had guaranteed loans owing by Billingsby to Hubbard Holdings amounting to $9.128 million. Mr Hubbard had claimed he had signed this guarantee under duress, a matter which Mr Mansell did not investigate. There was also doubt as to the true extent of Mr Hubbard’s interest in Billingsby or the trust of which it was trustee. Her Honour said (at [75]):“Leaving aside the uncertain position of Billingsby and the possible interest of Hubbard, the debtor has assets from which he can meet his existing debts, but these assets are the subject of the Mareva injunction. Whether he can get access to those funds to pay his debts as and when they fall due is a question which in my view is still open. In a differently presented case by Mr Hubbard to the Supreme Court, if the circumstances were compelling, the Mareva injunction might be varied. Thus at the time, I am not able to find conclusively that he is insolvent.”County Court writ and judgment On 24 June 2003 S & C issued a County Court writ against Mr Hubbard. The statement of claim alleged an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant “made on or about 30 April 2003 [sic] by which the defendant engaged the plaintiff to perform on behalf of the defendant work … between 26 April 2002 and 28 April 2003”. The statement of claim alleged the provision of tax invoices and accounts totalling $75,286.88. Mr Hubbard now had the firm of Isakow Solicitors acting for him. After consulting Mr Isakow, Mr Hubbard did not enter an appearance to the writ. S & C obtained a default judgment on 14 July 2003 for $79,293.80, a sum which took into account interest accrued. Bankruptcy notice The judgment was unsatisfied and on 28 July 2003 S & C procured the issue of a bankruptcy notice. The amount claimed was $54,293.80 because Mrs McIntyre’s $25,000 had been appropriated to the sum owing under the judgment debt. The bankruptcy notice was served on Mr Hubbard on 29 July. He has not made any payment in reduction of the judgment debt.Application to set aside bankruptcy notice On 15 August 2003 the appellants filed an application in the Federal Magistrates Court seeking orders(a)extending the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice permanently or until the conclusion of the Supreme Court proceeding; alternatively (b)setting aside the bankruptcy notice; or(c)adjourning the proceedings until the conclusion of the Supreme Court proceeding; or(d)forever staying the bankruptcy notice. As the learned Chief Federal Magistrate pointed out, the Act does not expressly confer power on a court to set aside a bankruptcy notice but it is well established that such power is derived from at least ss 30(1) and 303 of the Act. The application first came on for hearing on 18 August when her Honour granted interlocutory relief and gave directions for the filing of material. The hearing resumed on the afternoons of 29 August and 11 September and on the morning of 12 September. In total the hearing lasted some nine hours. On 1 October 2003 her Honour delivered a detailed judgment dismissing the application. Appellants’ case before the FMC

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY J

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