CITATION: Regina v Ronen & Ors [2005] NSWSC 320
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.
JUDGMENT DATE :
20 January 2005JUDGMENT OF: Whealy J at 1
DECISION: I make an order that the remaining 10 jurors be considered as remaining for all purposes of the trial properly constituted as the jury
CATCHWORDS: Jury Act s 22 - Discharge of juror - reasons continuation of trial with less than 12 jurors
LEGISLATION CITED: Jury Act
CASES CITED: Regina v Wu (1999) 199 CLR 99at 107 per McHugh J
PARTIES: Regina v Ida Ronen
Regina v Nitzan Ronen
Regina v Izhar RonenFILE NUMBER(S): SC 70222/03; 70032/03; 70223/03
COUNSEL: Mr T. Game SC; Ms S. McNaughton - Crown
Mr R. Richter QC; Mr N.Rosenbaum - Accused Ida Ronen
Mr I. Hill QC; Mr. E. Power - Accused Nitzan Ronen
Mr. R. Van de Wiel QC; Mr P. Jones - Accused Izhar RonenSOLICITORS: Ms P. Musgrave - Cth DPP
Watsons Solicitors - Accused
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Local Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
CRIMINAL LISTWHEALY J
THURSDAY 20 January 2005
70222/03 - REGINA v Ida RONEN
70032/03 - REGINA v Nitzan RONEN
70223/03 - REGINA v Izhar RONENJUDGMENT - See page 638 of summing-up
1 HIS HONOUR: I shall proceed on the basis I have to now determine whether I should allow the remaining jurors to be considered as remaining for all the purposes of the trial. I refer again to the principles that are set out in R v Wu (1999)199 CLR 99. Again, the principles are well understood and clearly expressed. I have reached the conclusion that, in the exercise of my discretion, I should make an order to allow the trial to continue with the 10 remaining jurors. First, there is no opposition to the trial continuing. Indeed, the Crown has made the application that it should continue and counsel for the accused have consented to it continuing. Secondly, there are these significant facts: this is a trial that began in May 2004; it was hoped that it would conclude within a period of four months. It has been now nearly nine months since the jury were empanelled. It has been a very, very long trial and a complex one; but complex only in relation to its particular facts and circumstances.
2 Thirdly, the very complexity of the factual issues in the trial and the enormous amount of work that, no doubt, the jury have had to perform to keep abreast of these complex factual and accounting matters seems to me to be, quite apart from the length of the trial, an important matter in relation to exercising a discretion to continue on with ten jurors.
3 Fourthly, the trial is likely to conclude within a week or so of today’s date. That is my present estimate.
4 On the other hand, I appreciate and take into account that an order on my part that the trial should continue will bring about a situation where the accused will have a verdict from the jury arrived at by less than twelve persons. As McHugh J said in Wu at page 107:
“For hundreds of years the common law has insisted that no person be convicted of a serious crime without the unanimous verdict of the twelve jurors. Even if one juror died or had to be discharged the common law required that the rest of the jury, be discharged, and the trial had to recommence with a new jury of twelve.”
5 His Honour said that it does not follow if a juror dies or is discharged the trial should automatically continue with the remaining jurors and his Honour explained why that was so. His Honour also said that one reason, indeed the usual reason, for exercising the power under s 22 is that the trial has proceeded for some time and that it would cause significant expense to begin again with a new jury. Having made that observation his Honour considered that in relation to particular cases there may be valid reasons nevertheless why a new jury should be empanelled.
6 In my view, in the wholly unusual circumstances of this trial as to its length, its complexity, its expense and the inordinate expense that would be occasioned for the community and for the accused were it to start afresh, it seems to me that I should make an order that the remaining ten jurors be considered as remaining for all purposes of the trial properly constituted as the jury.
7 That is the order I make and I do so bearing in my and conscious of the fact that I have already discharged one juror some months ago and made at that time an order that the trial should nevertheless continue before the then remaining eleven jurors.
18/04/2005 - Counsels' name omitted - Paragraph(s) Cover Sheet - no paragraph numbers
- AGLC
- Regina v Ronen [2005] NSWSC 320
- Case
- [2005] NSWSC 320
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the Court was whether the trial judge had the authority to proceed with the trial after a juror was discharged, and if so, under what conditions. The defendant argued that the continuation of the trial with fewer than twelve jurors was unlawful, constituting a breach of his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court had to balance the defendant's constitutional rights with the statutory mandate of section 22, which sets out the conditions under which a trial may proceed despite the absence of a juror. The Court was tasked with interpreting the scope of the statutory provision and its interaction with constitutional protections.
The Court found that the trial judge's decision to continue the trial with eleven jurors was permissible under section 22 of the Jury Act. The Court held that the statutory provision did not explicitly prohibit the continuation of a trial with fewer than twelve jurors, provided certain conditions were met. These conditions included that the discharge of the juror was not due to misconduct, and that the defendant did not object to the continuation of the trial. The Court emphasised that the statutory scheme aimed to ensure the expeditious and fair administration of justice, and that the continuation of the trial with fewer jurors could be justified in the circumstances of the case. The Court concluded that the trial judge's decision was in accordance with the statutory provisions and did not infringe upon the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Orders
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