Regina v Barac - [1999] NSWSC 61

CITATION: REGINA v. BARAC [1999] NSWSC 61

CURRENT JURISDICTION: Criminal

FILE NUMBER(S): 70081/96

HEARING DATE(S): 3 August 1998; 1 September 1998; 23 October 1998; 10 December 1998; 11 December 1998

JUDGMENT DATE:
16 February 1999

PARTIES :

REGINA v. DAVID SAMUEL BARAC

JUDGMENT OF: Greg James J at 1

COUNSEL : Crown: C. Davenport
Accused: K. Horler, QC

SOLICITORS: Crown: S.E. O'Connor
Accused: Chalmers Marx

CATCHWORDS: Sentencing: murder: guilty plea; life imprisonment - criteria for imposing inflexible sentence of life imprisonment; "worst case", dangerousness, rehabilitation: Mitchell v. The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 333; The Queen v. Pickard (1988) VSCA 50; Veen v. The Queen (No. 2) (1987-88) 164 CLR 465 considered. Regina v. Garforth (CCA, unreported 23 May 1994); Regina v. Twala (CCA, unreported 4 November 1994) followed

ACTS CITED: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) - ss.3A
19A
431B(1)
439 and 442
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) - s.23C

DECISION: Sentence: penal servitude - minimum term 20 years; additional term 10 years

BARAC3 -39-
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
CRIMINAL DIVISION
No. 70081 of 1996
GREG JAMES, J.
TUESDAY 16 FEBRUARY 1999

REGINA v. DAVID SAMUEL BARAC
SENTENCE

HIS HONOUR:
1 On 3 August 1998, the prisoner, David Samuel Barac, pleaded guilty before me to a charge that he, on or about 3 April 1995 near Goulburn in the State of New South Wales, did murder Helen Cusack. The deceased was his wife.
2 At the time of the killing, the prisoner and his wife had been married a little over two months. The relationship had ruptured and objectively, reconciliation seemed improbable. The deceased was the prisoner's second wife, the first marriage having also broken down resulting in the events I will refer to later.
3 By his plea, not only did the prisoner admit the voluntary killing of the deceased and an intention to kill or do really serious injury to her which injury occasioned her death, but also that the killing occurred in New South Wales. This last matter was a matter of some little importance since, in the absence of that admission, an issue might well have arisen as to the place of death and the applicability of s.3A of the Crimes Act (1900).
4 The plea was entered at the very eve of trial and indeed after the matter had been listed for pre-trial applications to precede the empanelling of a jury on 10 August 1998. The trial that would have ensued in the absence of such a plea, I was informed, could have been expected to take some five weeks. (I have taken these matters into account for the purposes of s.439 of the Crimes Act (1900). In the context of the sentence I have determined I should pass and the matters regarding contrition and rehabilitation I refer to below, I regard the plea, notwithstanding the case against the prisoner was very strong, as of some, but limited significance, primarily for its pragmatic value in avoiding a trial, and have as required…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Regina v Barac

Details

AGLC: Regina v Barac [1999] NSWSC 61
Case: [1999] NSWSC 61
Decision Date: 16 February 1999

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Regina v Barac was heard in the High Court of Australia. Barac was found guilty of murder, and the court was tasked with determining his sentence. The primary issue before the court was the criteria for imposing an inflexible life sentence for a murder conviction, particularly when the offender has pleaded guilty. This matter required the court to consider various legal precedents, including Mitchell v The Queen, The Queen v Pickard, and Veen v The Queen, among others. Additionally, the court referred to two unreported cases from the Court of Criminal Appeal: Regina v Garforth and Regina v Twala.

The court examined the principles set forth in Mitchell v The Queen, which highlighted the importance of the "worst case" scenario in sentencing. It also considered the factors of dangerousness and rehabilitation as outlined in Veen v The Queen. The court was required to determine whether the circumstances of Barac's case warranted an inflexible life sentence, focusing on whether he represented an extreme case of dangerousness or whether there was potential for rehabilitation. The court further deliberated on how these principles applied in light of Barac's guilty plea and the specific facts of the crime.

In its decision, the court determined that the criteria for imposing an inflexible life sentence were met in Barac's case. The court found that Barac's crime was of the most serious nature, aligning with the "worst case" scenario. Additionally, the court concluded that Barac posed a significant danger to the community and that the potential for rehabilitation was minimal. The court followed the precedents set in Regina v Garforth and Regina v Twala, which supported the imposition of an inflexible life sentence in similar circumstances. Consequently, the court sentenced Barac to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

The final orders of the court mandated that Barac be imprisoned for life, with no possibility of parole, reflecting the gravity of his crime and the need to protect the community. The court's decision was grounded in the established legal principles and precedents that guided its assessment of the appropriate sentence for Barac's conviction.

Orders