Reches Pty Limited v Tadiran Limited

Link copied
Case Copied 20 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Reches Pty Limited v Tadiran Limited [2001] FCA 415

CONTEMPT OF COURT – breach of undertaking – security for costs – where directors of the applicant undertook not to remove from their residence or disperse certain items of personal property – where the directors may have believed the respondent had no intention of enforcing its legal rights with respect to that property.

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hughes [2001] FCA 38 followed
Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Proprietary Limited (1986) 161 CLR 98 followed
LED Builders Pty Ltd the Eagle Homes Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1213 cited
Mc Nair Anderson Associates Pty Ltd v Hinch [1985] VR 309 followed
Whitlam v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 followed

RECHES PTY LIMITED V TADIRAN LIMITED

NG 606 OF 1996

MOORE J
11 APRIL 2001
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 606 OF 1996

BETWEEN:

RECHES PTY LIMITED
APPLICANT

AND:

TADIRAN LIMITED
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 APRIL 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT DECLARES AND ORDERS THAT:

1.   Isaac and Yael Reches committed a contempt by breaching an undertaking to the Court given on 16 July 1998 and accepted by the Court on 20 July 1998, by removing from unit 12/442 Edgecliff Road, Edgecliff, New South Wales the property listed in the schedule to the bill of sale attached to the undertaking.

2.   The notice of motion is stood over until 9.00am on 27 April 2001 for submissions on penalty, or such other time as the Court may order.

3.   Costs reserved.

4.   Liberty to apply on 2 days notice.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 606 OF 1996

BETWEEN:

RECHES PTY LIMITED
APPLICANT

AND:

TADIRAN LIMITED
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE:

11 APRIL 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. On 17 October 2000 the New South Wales District Registrar (“the Registrar”) of the Federal Court of Australia (“the Court”) filed a notice of motion pursuant to O 40 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules alleging that Mr Isaac Reches and his wife, Mrs Yael Reches were in contempt of the Court and should be punished for the contempt. In the accompanying statement of charge it was alleged that Isaac and Yael Reches had breached their undertaking to the Court, dated 16 July 1998, which obliged them to keep certain property at identified premises as a means of providing security for costs.

    Background

  2. The following is an account of the background leading to the contempt proceedings based on matters of public record or evidence led in those proceedings. The background was, in any event, uncontentious. On 25 July 1995, Reches Pty Limited (“the applicant”) instituted proceedings in this Court against Tadiran Limited (“Tadiran”) seeking, among other things, orders pursuant to s 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Reches Pty Limited v Tadiran Limited and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2001] FCA 415
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Reches Pty Limited v Tadiran Limited concerns a motion brought by the Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia, alleging that Mr Isaac Reches and his wife, Mrs Yael Reches, were in contempt of the Court for breaching an undertaking given to the Court. The undertaking required the Reches to keep certain property at specified premises as a means of providing security for costs. The legal issues before the Court were whether the Reches had indeed breached their undertaking, and if so, whether this breach constituted contempt of the Court warranting punishment.

The Court found that the Reches had breached their undertaking to the Court by removing the specified property from the premises and giving it to others. This action was deliberate and not accidental or unintentional, satisfying the requirement for wilful disobedience. The onus of proving the alleged contempt rested with the Registrar, and the evidence presented met the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Reches' belief that they had been released from their obligations under the undertaking did not provide a defence to the charge.

The Court held that the Reches' actions did constitute contempt of the Court and ordered that they be punished for this contempt. The specific orders included the Registrar being directed to commence contempt proceedings against Isaac and Yael Reches, and any further proceedings to be determined in accordance with the Federal Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 17 October 2000 the New South Wales District Registrar (“the Registrar”) of the Federal Court of Australia (“the Court”) filed a notice of motion pursuant to O 40 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules alleging that Mr Isaac Reches and his wife, Mrs Yael Reches were in contempt of the Court and should be punished for the contempt. In the accompanying statement of charge it was alleged that Isaac and Yael Reches had breached their undertaking to the Court, dated 16 July 1998, which obliged them to keep certain property at identified premises as a means of providing security for costs.Background The following is an account of the background leading to the contempt proceedings based on matters of public record or evidence led in those proceedings. The background was, in any event, uncontentious. On 25 July 1995, Reches Pty Limited (“the applicant”) instituted proceedings in this Court against Tadiran Limited (“Tadiran”) seeking, among other things, orders pursuant to s 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (“the TP Act”) varying an agency agreement between the applicant and Tadiran, damages pursuant to s 82 of the TP Act and damages for Tadiran’s repudiation of the agency agreement. The applicant sought, and was granted on 15 August 1996, leave of the Court to serve the application and statement of claim on Tadiran in the State of Israel pursuant to O 8 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules. On 7 April 1997, the Court ordered by consent that the applicant provide security for Tadiran’s costs of the action in the sum of $50,000 and stayed the applicant’s claim until the security was provided. Pursuant to that order the applicant paid the sum of $50,000 to the Registrar of the Court on 8 October 1997. On 8 May 1998 Tadiran applied for additional security in the sum of $70,000 or such other sum as the Court considered fit. On the same day the applicant filed a notice of motion seeking to vacate the earlier order as to security for costs and seeking the return of the $50,000 security. Prior to the hearing of those motions, the applicant filed an affidavit of Isaac Reches dated 11 May 1998. In that affidavit, Isaac Reches explained that the financial position of the applicant was such that a large pre-tax loss was anticipated in the financial year ending 30 June 1998. Isaac Reches then indicated his willingness to offer a personal guarantee for costs. He stated:“10.Both myself and my wife (as the directors of the Applicant) are prepared to offer the Respondent our personal guarantees as security for costs awarded against the Applicant. These guarantees could be supported with our personal assets, being:10.1jewellery to the insured value $83,958. Valuations were provided to the insurer prior to obtaining this insurance; and10.2paintings and sculptures to the insured value of $90,250. Valuations were provided to the insurer prior to obtaining this insurance.10.3Jewish religious artefact to the insured value of $50,000.” The trial judge, Lehane J, gave reasons for judgment in respect of both motions on 11 June 1998 ((1998) 155 ALR 478) and orders were subsequently made on 25 June 1998. The first two orders dealt with a motion of the applicant for a Mareva injunction which was dismissed by his Honour. The remaining orders were:“3.Subject to order 4, the applicant provide further security for the respondent’s costs of this proceeding in the sum of $70,000.4.The obligation of the applicant to provide further security as provided by order 3 may be satisfied by:(a)the directors of the applicant, Isaac Reches and Yael Reches, entering into personal guarantees in favour of the respondent for the payment by the applicant of any costs which the applicant is ordered to pay to the respondents in this proceeding; and(b)the directors of the applicant, Isaac and Yael Reches, entering into a security over the items of personal property referred to in the schedule hereto, securing in favour of the respondent the obligations under the guarantees provided by sub paragraph (a) of this order.Such guarantees and security to be in a form agreed by the respondent, or approved by the court.5. Upon the applicant providing security comprising either: (a) $120,000 in cash; or(b)$25,000 in cash, and the directors of the applicant entering into the guarantees and the security referred to in order 4 hereof, the order for security for costs made on 7 April 1997 be vacated.6.Until the said further security is given, the proceedings on the applicant’s claim be stayed.7.The provision by the applicant of cash security in the amount of $25,000 pursuant to order 5(b) may be satisfied by the applicant providing to the Registrar a direction in writing that $25,000 from the cash security paid into Court pursuant to the orders made on 7 April 1997 be applied in satisfaction of order 5(b) hereof.8.Upon the requirement of order 5(b) being complied with by the applicant, the Registrar to pay the applicant the sum of $25,000 out of the moneys paid into Court pursuant to the orders made on 7 April 1997.9.....The ScheduleThe property referred to in paragraph 10 of the affidavit of Isaac Reches affirmed on 11 May 1998 is the following:(a)jewellery to the insured value of $83,958(b)paintings and sculptures to the insured value of $90,250(c)Jewish religious artefact to the insured value of $50,000.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the hearing of Tadiran’s motion, there was no appearance by the applicant or the Reches. Having considered the evidence before him, his Honour said (at pars 9 and 10):“The respondent, in the circumstances and quite understandably, does not, I have been informed, propose itself to move in the proceeding for the punishment of Mr and Mrs Reches for the contempt which, on Mr Brand’s evidence, appears to have been committed by way of breach of the undertaking. The question necessarily arises, however, whether the Court ought to take action of its own motion. The only action which it is open to the Court to take under the Federal Court Rules is, I think, that contemplated by O 40 r 10. That rule provides:‘1.Where it is alleged, or appears to the Court on its own view, that a person is guilty of contempt of the Court, the Court may, by order, direct the Registrar to apply by motion for, or to commence a proceeding for, punishment of the contempt.2.Sub‑rule (1) does not affect such right as any person other than the Registrar may have to apply by motion for, or to commence a proceeding for, punishment of contempt.’I have no wish unnecessarily to add to the misfortunes which plainly have befallen Mr and Mrs Reches since the conclusion of these proceedings. Inescapably, however, it seems to me that the Court ought not simply overlook what appears, on the basis of evidence given by a solicitor, to be a clear and apparently deliberate breach of undertakings given to the Court by two persons who, at the time they gave the undertakings, must have had available to them advice not only of solicitors but also senior counsel then appearing for the applicant. In other words, there is no reason why I should think it likely that Mr or Mrs Reches had any doubt as to the effect of the undertaking which they gave or as to the possible consequences of breach of it. Again, the evidence is that Mr Brand informed Mr Reches of the possible consequences of what he claimed to have done, and warned Mr Reches that he would bring the matter to the attention of the Court.”Lehane J then ordered that The Registrar commence contempt proceeding against each of Isaac Reches and Yael Reches. It is those proceedings with which the Court is presently concerned.The particular evidence concerning the contempt The conduct said to constitute the alleged breach of the undertaking given to the Court by Isaac and Yael Reches on 16 July 1998 is set out in pars 5 and 6 of the statement of charge as follows:“5.At some date prior to 27 January 2000, Isaac and Yael Reches ceased to reside at unit 12/442 Edgecliff Road, Edgecliff.6.At some time prior to 28 January 2000, the property referred to in the Schedule to the said Bill of Sale was given by Isaac Reches and Yael Reches to persons other than the Respondent.”During the hearing, leave was granted to amend par 6 of the statement of charge to add the words “removed from the premises and” after the word “was.” The primary evidence led by the Registrar in support of the allegations was a series of affidavits of Mr Brand. The most significant of those affidavits for present purposes is the affidavit dated 17 November 2000 in which is set out a conversation between Mr Brand and Isaac Reches that occurred on 28 January 2000. The relevant part of that affidavit is as follows:“I met with Mr Reches on 28 January 2000 for about 55 minutes. During the course of my conversation, Mr Reches said:‘I spoke to Shulman last night, he was in Munich. He said that Chertow had told him again that they only want the $25,000.00 paid into court. He assumes it is part of the procedure to recover the $25,000.00.’I said:‘That is certainly not my instructions. Tadiran has incurred a lot of fees in resisting your claim. They are keen to talk to you to sort out the issue of costs, but I am not aware of any agreement that they only want $25,000.00. It is my understanding that Tadiran relies on the security given by you and Mrs Reches.’Mr Reches said:‘They can’t get anything there. The jewellery had an insured amount that was incorrect. This was to show that we had some property, it was worth less than $10,000.00. After Shulman said Tadiran only wanted the $25,000.00 paid into court, we gave the jewellery to my son and he sent it to my daughter in Israel. Avner Clyne collected everything else, we owe him $28,000.00. We have nothing, all the items have been disposed of.’Mr Reches then told me of his living arrangements and ill health......Towards the end of our meeting, I said to Mr Reches:‘I am surprised by a lot of what you have told me, what can you propose to satisfy Tadiran’s entitlement to recover costs from you?’Mr Reches said:‘Tadiran won, they should be satisfied with that and the $25,000.00 in court. Then they should forget about it.’I said:‘But you gave an undertaking and a personal guarantee which continues, I don’t think Tadiran would be satisfied with your proposal.’Mr Reches said:‘We gave the guarantee because we were 100% sure that we were going to win. The barrister confirmed that. The best solution is for Tadiran to get $25,000.00 and keep the orders pending until better times come. The jewellery was only worth $8,000.00 and the paintings and sculptures $8,000.00. The maximum amount all up was $25,000,00.’”

Decision

Reasons for decision

MOORE J
Counsel for the Registrar also relied on evidence of another letter sent from Layla Chertow to Mr Brand on 7 December 2000 which appears at annexure Z to Mr Brand’s affidavit of 19 January 2000. In respect of that letter and the representations it contains, the Registrar filed, on 19 January 2001, a notice of intention to adduce evidence of a previous representation. As neither Isaac nor Yael Reches objected to the evidence being adduced for the purpose proposed, the letter was admitted as evidence of the truth of the representations contained therein. In that letter Chertow acknowledged that she was contacted by Shulman about the Reches’ situation on two occasions. She wrote that in informal discussions about the costs issue she admitted Tadiran’s reluctance to undergo costly attempts at recovery such as getting Tadiran’s costs taxed or conducting a public sale of pledged assets, especially without first ensuring that the assets were really valuable. However, in the letter she repeatedly denied ever making any promises or waiving Tadiran’s right to collect the costs in any way available by law.Conclusion The onus of proving the alleged contempt by Isaac and Yael Reches rests with the Registrar. Although this case is concerned with civil rather than criminal contempt, the punitive nature of any sanction sought is such that the standard of proof is the criminal standard, beyond reasonable doubt. This point was clearly established by the High Court in Whitlam v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 534 (see also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hughes [2001] FCA 38). Breach of an order or undertaking will expose a person to sanctions for contempt where that breach can be said to represent wilful disobedience. In Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Proprietary Limited (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 113 the High Court explained that “a deliberate commission or omission which is in breach of an injunctive order or undertaking will constitute such wilful disobedience unless it be casual, accidental or unintentional”. Tamberlin J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hughes added further that:“It is not necessary to prove any subjective intent to deliberately disobey the order: see Stancomb v Trowbridge Urban District Council [1910] 2 Ch 190 at 194. However, such intent will be important in determining what is an appropriate penalty: see Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191 at 217-218. An honest belief that a failure to act does not constitute a breach of an injunction is not a defence: see McNair Anderson Associates Pty Ltd v Hinch [1985] VR 309 at 313-314.” The evidence clearly establishes, beyond reasonable doubt, and I find, that certain property has been dispersed by Isaac and Yael Reches in breach of their undertaking to this Court. I find that at a point in time before 28 January 2000 Isaac and Yael Reches removed from the premises referred to in the undertaking, namely Unit 12/442 Edgecliff Road, Edgecliff, New South Wales the property the subject of the undertaking. It was removed to give to others and, as to the jewellery, was not removed for the limited purpose specified in the undertaking. It is unnecessary, at this stage, to address the question of whether the evidence also demonstrates that Tadiran released the Reches from their obligations under the deed of guarantee and bill of sale or at least that the Reches believed they had been released from those obligations. It is presently irrrelevant whether the Reches believed they had been released from their obligations to Tadiran. That is because such a belief does not provide a defence to the charge.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MOORE J

In determining whether Isaac and Yael Reches breached their undertaking to the Court, the court relied on the evidence presented by the Registrar. The court found that the property specified in the undertaking had been removed from the premises and given to others, which constituted a breach of the undertaking. The court emphasized that the standard of proof in civil contempt cases is the criminal standard, beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence clearly established that the Reches had deliberately removed the property in breach of their undertaking, which exposed them to sanctions for contempt.

The court further considered whether the belief that they had been released from their obligations under the guarantee and bill of sale could serve as a defence to the charge of contempt. The court held that such a belief does not provide a defence. The court reasoned that an honest belief that a failure to act does not constitute a breach of an injunction is not a defence to contempt charges. The fact that the Reches believed they had been released from their obligations is irrelevant to the contempt charge. The court emphasized that wilful disobedience of a court order, regardless of the defendant's beliefs or intentions, can lead to contempt charges.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that wilful disobedience of a court order, even if the defendant believed they were released from their obligations, constitutes a breach of the court's undertaking and can result in contempt charges. The court's decision followed established legal principles regarding the standard of proof in contempt cases and the nature of wilful disobedience. The court did not depart from prior authority on these points.