JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE FULL COURT (WA)
CITATION: RE TOWN PLANNING APPEAL TRIBUNAL; EX PARTE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AUTHORITY [2003] WASCA 248
CORAM: MALCOLM CJ
STEYTLER J
MCKECHNIE J
HEARD: 20 AUGUST 2003
DELIVERED : 14 OCTOBER 2003
FILE NO/S: CIV 1944 of 2003
MATTER :Application for a Writ of Prohibition and Stay of Proceedings against the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal constituted under the Town Planning and Development Act 1928
EX PARTE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AUTHORITY
Applicant
Catchwords:
Environmental protection - Scheme for assessment - Whether power to prevent planning tribunal determining appeal
Legislation:
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA)
Town Planning and Development Act 1928 (WA)
Result:
Order nisi made absolute
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr C S Bydder
Respondent: Mr W S Martin QC & Mr M C Hotchkin
Solicitors:
Applicant: State Crown Solicitor
Respondent: Hotchkin Hanly
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] 3 WLR 694
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1995‑1997) 187 CLR 384
Coomber v Justices of Berks (1883) 9 App Cas 61
Corporation of City of Unley v State of South Australia (1996) 67 SASR 8
County Council of Middlesex v Assessment Committee of St George's Union [1896] 2 QB 143
Duperouzel v Cameron [1973] WAR 181
Electricity Trust (SA) v Linterns Ltd [1950] SASR 133
Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees' Union of Australia v Melbourne Corporation (1918‑1919) 26 CLR 508
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Gibb v Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 118 CLR 628
Gladstone Town Council v Gladstone Harbour Board [1964] Qd R 505
Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Corporation (1946) 73 CLR 70
Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1969) 119 CLR 334
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1997) 189 CLR 51
Launceston Corporation v Hydro‑Electric Commission (1959) 100 CLR 654
Low v Swan Cove Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 115
Re Anti‑Cancer Council of Victoria; Ex parte State Public Services Federation (1992) 175 CLR 442
Re Honey Pool of Western Australia (1988) 6 ACLC 208
Richard Coomber v Justices of the County of Berks [1883‑84] 9 AC 61
State Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia (1986) 161 CLR 639
Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Commissioner of Stamps (SA) (1979) 145 CLR 330
Victoria v The Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders Labourers Federation (No 2) (1982) 152 CLR 179
Case(s) also cited:
MALCOLM CJ: This was the return of an order nisi made on 1 August 2003 that:
"1.The Town Planning Appeal Tribunal do show cause before the Full Court of this Honourable Court, why a Writ or Prohibition should not be issued out of this Honourable Court directed to the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal to prohibit the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal from determining Town Planning Appeal Tribunal Appeal…
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- Case
- [2003] WASCA 248
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal's independence from the executive arm of government, referencing the Corporation of City of Unley v State of South Australia case, where it was held that a health centre, despite being incorporated under statute, was not a "State agency" because it did not exercise its powers under the control of the executive government. The court also considered Gladstone Town Council v Gladstone Harbour Board, which held that the Harbour Board was not an agency of the Crown due to its independent exercise of powers. Further, the court reviewed cases like State Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia and Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia, where the extent of control by the Crown over the entities was a critical factor in determining their status as State instrumentalities. The court found that the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal, by virtue of its independent operation and discretion in performing its functions, did not qualify as a State instrumentality.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal was not subject to the control of the Environmental Protection Authority and, therefore, the Environmental Protection Authority did not have the power to prevent the Tribunal from determining the appeal. The court's decision was grounded in the principle that an entity's independence from executive control is a crucial determinant of its status as a State instrumentality. The court's ruling affirmed the autonomy of the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal in its decision-making processes.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: STEYTLER J
Counsel for BGC contended that, because the Tribunal is not subject to control by the executive arm of government, and functions independently, it should not be regarded as a "State instrumentality". He relied, in that respect, firstly upon the case of Corporation of City of Unley v State of South Australia (1996) 67 SASR 8, in which the Court was required to determine whether a health centre ("the Centre") incorporated under s 48 of the South Australian Health Commission Act 1976 (SA) was a "State agency", which term was defined to include "an agency or instrumentality of the Crown", within the meaning of s 49 of the Development Act 1993 (SA). If it was, the Development Assessment Commission of South Australia could consent to a development which it proposed to undertake. If it was not, an application for consent would have to be made to the plaintiff. In fact, the Centre applied to the Development Assessment Commission for consent and the plaintiff commenced proceedings claiming a declaration that the Centre was not a State agency. Debelle J held that the Centre was not an agent or instrumentality of the Crown within the meaning of the Development Act and said, at 15, in the course of arriving at that conclusion, that, in determining that question, an "important element of that task will be to examine the extent of control exercised by executive government over the Centre". Next, the respondent referred to Gladstone Town Council v Gladstone Harbour Board [1964] Qd R 505. There, the question was whether the Gladstone Harbour Board represented the Crown and was consequently entitled to the immunities of the Crown. The Court held that it did not. In arriving at that conclusion, Mansfield CJ took into account that, while some of the Harbour Board's functions were subject to the control of the Governor in Council and the Minister, other important discretionary powers and duties were not. Gibbs J, at 521, said that the question whether the Harbour Board was an agency of the Crown depended on all the circumstances of the case, but particularly on the extent to which the defendant could exercise its powers independently of the control of the executive government. His Honour referred to what had been said by the High Court in Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Corporation (1946) 73 CLR 70 at 75 ‑ 76 and 81 and Launceston Corporation v Hydro‑Electric Commission at 660 ‑ 661 in support of the proposition that, although a Board may exercise public functions and may be subject to Ministerial control in many respects, it does not necessarily follow that it is the servant of the Crown because it may still appear that, in performing its functions, the Board exercises an independent discretion, limited though it may be by the powers of the Crown. Finally, in this respect, the respondent referred to the cases of State Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia (1986) 161 CLR 639, Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Commissioner of Stamps (SA) (1979) 145 CLR 330 and Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1969) 119 CLR 334. In Inglis, the issue before the Court was whether the Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia, which was the defendant in civil proceedings arising out of its banking business, was "the Commonwealth or a person … being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth". It was held, by a majority, that, under the statutory scheme pursuant to which the bank was set up, the bank was an instrument by which, together with the Commonwealth Savings Bank and the Commonwealth Development Bank, the Commonwealth participated in the business of banking and that, when sued as the emanation by which the Commonwealth operated in the field of banking, the matter fell within s 75(iii) of the Constitution. In the State Bank of New South Wales case a similar question arose, being whether, for the purposes of s 38(d) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (which invests exclusive jurisdiction in the High Court in respect of "suits by a State, or any person suing on behalf of a State, against the Commonwealth or any person being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth") the State Bank of New South Wales, being a corporation through which that State carried on banking, was a State. The Court held that it was. In the third case, Superannuation Investment Trust, one of the questions before the Court was whether the Trust was the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. The Court answered that question in the affirmative. In each of these cases the measure of control by the Crown over the entity concerned was regarded as a material factor in answering the questions which respectively fell for decision.