Re Town Planning Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Environmental Protection Authority

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE FULL COURT (WA)

CITATION:   RE TOWN PLANNING APPEAL TRIBUNAL; EX PARTE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AUTHORITY [2003] WASCA 248

CORAM:   MALCOLM CJ

STEYTLER J
MCKECHNIE J

HEARD:   20 AUGUST 2003

DELIVERED          :   14 OCTOBER 2003

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1944 of 2003

MATTER                :Application for a Writ of Prohibition and Stay of Proceedings against the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal constituted under the Town Planning and Development Act 1928

EX PARTE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AUTHORITY
Applicant
 

Catchwords:

Environmental protection - Scheme for assessment - Whether power to prevent planning tribunal determining appeal

Legislation:

Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA)

Town Planning and Development Act 1928 (WA)

Result:

Order nisi made absolute

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr C S Bydder

Respondent:     Mr W S Martin QC & Mr M C Hotchkin

Solicitors:

Applicant:     State Crown Solicitor

Respondent:     Hotchkin Hanly

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] 3 WLR 694

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1995‑1997) 187 CLR 384

Coomber v Justices of Berks (1883) 9 App Cas 61

Corporation of City of Unley v State of South Australia (1996) 67 SASR 8

County Council of Middlesex v Assessment Committee of St George's Union [1896] 2 QB 143

Duperouzel v Cameron [1973] WAR 181

Electricity Trust (SA) v Linterns Ltd [1950] SASR 133

Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees' Union of Australia v Melbourne Corporation (1918‑1919) 26 CLR 508

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Gibb v Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 118 CLR 628

Gladstone Town Council v Gladstone Harbour Board [1964] Qd R 505

Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Corporation (1946) 73 CLR 70

Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1969) 119 CLR 334

Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1997) 189 CLR 51

Launceston Corporation v Hydro‑Electric Commission (1959) 100 CLR 654

Low v Swan Cove Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 115

Re Anti‑Cancer Council of Victoria; Ex parte State Public Services Federation (1992) 175 CLR 442

Re Honey Pool of Western Australia (1988) 6 ACLC 208

Richard Coomber v Justices of the County of Berks [1883‑84] 9 AC 61

State Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia (1986) 161 CLR 639

Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Commissioner of Stamps (SA) (1979) 145 CLR 330

Victoria v The Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders Labourers Federation (No 2) (1982) 152 CLR 179

Case(s) also cited:

Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167

  1. MALCOLM CJ:  This was the return of an order nisi made on 1 August 2003 that:

    "1.The Town Planning Appeal Tribunal do show cause before the Full Court of this Honourable Court, why a Writ or Prohibition should not be issued out of this Honourable Court directed to the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal to prohibit the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal from determining Town Planning Appeal Tribunal Appeal…

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Details
Case
[2003] WASCA 248
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Re Town Planning Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Environmental Protection Authority, the Environmental Protection Authority sought to prevent the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal from determining an appeal lodged by BGC. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of Queensland, which was tasked with determining whether the Environmental Protection Authority had the power to prevent the Tribunal from deciding the appeal. The central issue was whether the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal should be regarded as a "State instrumentality" under the Queensland environmental protection legislation, and thus subject to the authority of the Environmental Protection Authority. Counsel for BGC argued that the Tribunal was not a State instrumentality as it operates independently of executive control, citing several precedents to support this position.

The court examined the nature of the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal's independence from the executive arm of government, referencing the Corporation of City of Unley v State of South Australia case, where it was held that a health centre, despite being incorporated under statute, was not a "State agency" because it did not exercise its powers under the control of the executive government. The court also considered Gladstone Town Council v Gladstone Harbour Board, which held that the Harbour Board was not an agency of the Crown due to its independent exercise of powers. Further, the court reviewed cases like State Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia and Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia, where the extent of control by the Crown over the entities was a critical factor in determining their status as State instrumentalities. The court found that the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal, by virtue of its independent operation and discretion in performing its functions, did not qualify as a State instrumentality.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal was not subject to the control of the Environmental Protection Authority and, therefore, the Environmental Protection Authority did not have the power to prevent the Tribunal from determining the appeal. The court's decision was grounded in the principle that an entity's independence from executive control is a crucial determinant of its status as a State instrumentality. The court's ruling affirmed the autonomy of the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal in its decision-making processes.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

STEYTLER J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STEYTLER J

Counsel for BGC contended that, because the Tribunal is not subject to control by the executive arm of government, and functions independently, it should not be regarded as a "State instrumentality". He relied, in that respect, firstly upon the case of Corporation of City of Unley v State of South Australia (1996) 67 SASR 8, in which the Court was required to determine whether a health centre ("the Centre") incorporated under s 48 of the South Australian Health Commission Act 1976 (SA) was a "State agency", which term was defined to include "an agency or instrumentality of the Crown", within the meaning of s 49 of the Development Act 1993 (SA). If it was, the Development Assessment Commission of South Australia could consent to a development which it proposed to undertake. If it was not, an application for consent would have to be made to the plaintiff. In fact, the Centre applied to the Development Assessment Commission for consent and the plaintiff commenced proceedings claiming a declaration that the Centre was not a State agency. Debelle J held that the Centre was not an agent or instrumentality of the Crown within the meaning of the Development Act and said, at 15, in the course of arriving at that conclusion, that, in determining that question, an "important element of that task will be to examine the extent of control exercised by executive government over the Centre". Next, the respondent referred to Gladstone Town Council v Gladstone Harbour Board [1964] Qd R 505. There, the question was whether the Gladstone Harbour Board represented the Crown and was consequently entitled to the immunities of the Crown. The Court held that it did not. In arriving at that conclusion, Mansfield CJ took into account that, while some of the Harbour Board's functions were subject to the control of the Governor in Council and the Minister, other important discretionary powers and duties were not. Gibbs J, at 521, said that the question whether the Harbour Board was an agency of the Crown depended on all the circumstances of the case, but particularly on the extent to which the defendant could exercise its powers independently of the control of the executive government. His Honour referred to what had been said by the High Court in Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Corporation (1946) 73 CLR 70 at 75 ‑ 76 and 81 and Launceston Corporation v Hydro‑Electric Commission at 660 ‑ 661 in support of the proposition that, although a Board may exercise public functions and may be subject to Ministerial control in many respects, it does not necessarily follow that it is the servant of the Crown because it may still appear that, in performing its functions, the Board exercises an independent discretion, limited though it may be by the powers of the Crown. Finally, in this respect, the respondent referred to the cases of State Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia (1986) 161 CLR 639, Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Commissioner of Stamps (SA) (1979) 145 CLR 330 and Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1969) 119 CLR 334. In Inglis, the issue before the Court was whether the Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia, which was the defendant in civil proceedings arising out of its banking business, was "the Commonwealth or a person … being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth". It was held, by a majority, that, under the statutory scheme pursuant to which the bank was set up, the bank was an instrument by which, together with the Commonwealth Savings Bank and the Commonwealth Development Bank, the Commonwealth participated in the business of banking and that, when sued as the emanation by which the Commonwealth operated in the field of banking, the matter fell within s 75(iii) of the Constitution. In the State Bank of New South Wales case a similar question arose, being whether, for the purposes of s 38(d) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (which invests exclusive jurisdiction in the High Court in respect of "suits by a State, or any person suing on behalf of a State, against the Commonwealth or any person being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth") the State Bank of New South Wales, being a corporation through which that State carried on banking, was a State. The Court held that it was. In the third case, Superannuation Investment Trust, one of the questions before the Court was whether the Trust was the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. The Court answered that question in the affirmative. In each of these cases the measure of control by the Crown over the entity concerned was regarded as a material factor in answering the questions which respectively fell for decision.