Re [Suppressed]

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[2013] QSC 334

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CIVIL JURISDICTION

DALTON J

No 8524 of 2013

[2013] QSC 334

RE:  [SUPPRESSED]

BRISBANE

[SUPPRESSED]

JUDGMENT

[SUPPRESSED]

These are edited reasons for a decision which I gave when a matter came before me in the applications list earlier this year.  The case raises questions which are important substantively.  It also raises the important principle that our justice system is a public one.  I have taken the unusual step of editing the reasons before they are made public because the interests of the child at the centre of the case require that.  I have attempted to minimise this editing, and to show where it has occurred in the text which follows.  The reasons as delivered (ex tempore) are on the Court file but I have made an order that the material on the Court file is not to be inspected without leave of a judge of this Court.  What follows are the edited reasons. 

HER HONOUR:   This is a matter brought by a tertiary hospital in relation to a child patient, A, aged well below the age of majority.  The application is brought in the parens patriae jurisdiction of the court.  A is pregnant in circumstances which I will come to in some detail, and the hospital brought an application in relation to the termination of that pregnancy, primarily on the basis that A lacks capacity to consent to the operation herself, having regard to the test in Gillick which was adopted by our High Court in Marion’s case.

The issues in this matter are quite similar to those in State of Queensland v B [2008] QSC 231, and I gratefully adopt the law set out in that case by Justice Margaret Wilson. She sets out some cases as to the parens patriae jurisdiction. She also sets out the undoubtedly correct proposition that the Court, in its parens patriae jurisdiction in a case such as this, acts to protect the interests of the child, A, and the parens patriae jurisdiction does not extend to the unborn child or foetus which, in Queensland at least, does not have an existence at law. The Court of Appeal set out principles relating to the parens patriae jurisdiction in Christensen, and I’ll give the Butterworth citation, BC 9904473.  Particularly at paragraph 19 of that case, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the jurisdiction is to be exercised in the – along the lines that the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child, and when the jurisdiction is invoked, it must be clear on the material that the order sought is positively in the interests of the child or other person within the Court’s protection.

In relation to those principles, I will just note – or record – that counsel appearing amicus curiae for the Attorney-General raised in argument that the person named as the father of the foetus ought to be heard on the application before me.  He too is a child and the…

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Details
Case
[2013] QSC 334
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved a pregnant minor, A, who sought a termination of her pregnancy in the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Queensland. A was represented by a tertiary hospital, and the application was brought primarily on the basis that A lacked the capacity to consent to the operation herself. The court had to determine whether the termination was in the best interests of A, taking into account her age, psychological vulnerability, and the circumstances surrounding her pregnancy.

The court relied on the principles established in State of Queensland v B, which outlined the parens patriae jurisdiction and the paramount consideration of the welfare of the child. The court found that A's psychological vulnerability, troubled past history, and the potential for future mental illness made it imperative that the termination occur. The court also considered the potential for ostracism and rejection from her peers and the wider community if the pregnancy were to continue. Furthermore, the court found that the child's relatives in loco parentis supported the termination, and A herself expressed her support for the procedure.

In light of the compelling medical evidence and the best interests of the child, the court found that a termination was reasonable and in A's best interests. The court emphasised the importance of the justice system being a public one, but also recognised the need to protect A's identity and privacy. The court ordered that no person publish any details of the court hearing until further order and proposed to deal with the questions of publication at a more leisurely pace.

This decision highlights the importance of balancing the rights of the child with the need to protect their privacy and identity, while ensuring that the best interests of the child are paramount in cases involving the termination of pregnancy for minors.

Background

Background to the litigation

A child patient, A, who is well below the age of majority and pregnant, is the subject of an application brought by a tertiary hospital in the parens patriae jurisdiction of the court. A is unable to consent to the termination of her pregnancy due to her lack of capacity, as per the Gillick test adopted by the High Court. The hospital's application is primarily based on A's inability to consent, given her young age and psychological vulnerability. A's relatives, with whom she lives, support the termination of the pregnancy, and A herself expresses her support for the termination. The hospital has scheduled the termination to occur before A reaches 16 weeks of pregnancy, as advised by medical professionals. The hospital has also reported wider safety concerns regarding A to the Department of Child Safety and the police.

This matter came before the court as an application in the parens patriae jurisdiction, brought by a tertiary hospital concerning a child patient, A. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland, Civil Jurisdiction. The application was heard on an urgent basis, with the court making orders permitting the termination of A's pregnancy and declaring it reasonable in her best interests. The court also made an order that no person publish any details of the court hearing until further order, to protect A's identity and privacy.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the court have the authority to make an order permitting the termination of A's pregnancy despite one of her guardians not being informed of the application?
2. Can the court authorise what would otherwise be criminal conduct under sections 224 and 282 of the criminal law?
3. Is it in the best interests of the child, A, to permit the termination of her pregnancy?

Held
1. The court concluded that it had the authority to make an order permitting the termination of A's pregnancy despite one of her guardians not being informed of the application. The court determined it had sufficient grounds to act in A's best interests, even with incomplete notification to her guardians.
2. The court held that it could not authorise what would otherwise be criminal conduct under sections 224 and 282 of the criminal law. The court acknowledged its limitation in this regard, emphasizing that it could not permit actions that are criminalised by statute.
3. The court found that it was in the best interests of the child, A, to permit the termination of her pregnancy. The court based this decision on the compelling medical evidence presented, which indicated that the termination was necessary to protect A's physical and mental health.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction to decide in the best interests of the child, A, who is under the age of majority. The court relied on principles established in previous cases such as State of Queensland v B and DOCS v Y, where it was recognised that the court can act in the best interests of a child even against the wishes of their guardians, provided it is clearly in the child's interest. The court distinguished the present case from situations where both guardians must be informed, noting that it had good reasons to proceed despite incomplete notification.

In addressing the criminal law implications, the court reiterated the principle that it cannot authorise actions that would otherwise be criminal. This was highlighted in relation to sections 224 and 282 of the criminal law, which pertain to abortion and medical treatment. The court was clear that while it could consider the criminal implications, it could not override them in making its decision.

The court found that terminating A's pregnancy was in her best interests based on the medical evidence. Doctors testified that the risks of carrying the pregnancy to term were significant, including potential psychological trauma and complications from a premature birth. The court accepted that A's psychological vulnerability and the precarious nature of her living situation made the termination necessary for her well-being. The court also considered the views of A herself and her relatives, who supported the termination, further reinforcing the decision. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child, and the court must ensure that any order sought is positively in the interests of the child.