Re: BRIAN BRINDLE and DAPHNE BRINDLE
And: Ex Parte F.B. and F.A. MCMAHON PTY LTD
No. B700 of 1992
FED No. 285
Bankruptcy
(1992) 108 ALR 470
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GENERAL DIVISION
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Hill J.(1)
CATCHWORDS
Bankruptcy - Bankruptcy Act s.14(5) - whether review a hearing de novo - meaning of "review".
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth): ss.14(5), 41.
Re Greenhill; Ex parte Pook (1988) 83 ALR 295
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jackson (1990) 90 ATC 4990
R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353
Re Kwiatek; Ex parte Big J Ltd v Pattison (1989) 21 FCR 374
HEARING
SYDNEY
#DATE 13:5:1992
Counsel and Solicitors C.R.C. Newlinds instructed by
for Creditor/Respondent : Kell Heard McEwan and Lough
Counsel and Solicitors J. Johnson instructed by
for Debtor/Applicant : Brown and Partners
ORDER
The Court orders that:
1. The application for review be dismissed.
2. No order as to costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
JUDGE1
The applicant, F.B. and F.A. McMahon Pty Ltd, a creditor of Mr and Mrs Brindle, the "debtors", applies to the court to review a decision of a registrar of this court to extend the time for compliance by the debtors with a bankruptcy notice dated 27 February 1992. That notice, which required compliance with its terms within 14 days of service, was served on each of the debtors on 28 February 1992. In the result, unless the time for compliance were extended, that time would have expired on 13 March 1992. On an application made by the debtors, the Deputy Registrar, on 6 March 1992, extended the time for compliance until 30 March 1992.
The present application is made pursuant to s.14(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act"), which provides as follows:
"An order or direction made or given, or an act done, by a Registrar or a Deputy Registrar under this Act is subject to review on summary application to the Court."
The applicant submits that the Registrar should not have extended the time for compliance at all, or that if he was justified in so doing, the period of the extension was too long and that I should set a shorter time.
Had these been the only relevant questions, I would have delivered an ex tempore judgment. However, it became clear that the issues which were raised in the application went beyond those which on the surface appeared to arise. The additional issues which were raised were whether, in conducting a review of a Registrar's decision, the court should receive evidence of matters that occurred after the time the Registrar gave the decision complained of, or whether the court was limited to the evidence that was before the Registrar, or perhaps ought to have been before the Registrar, at the time of the decision. Put in another way, was a review under s.14(5)…
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- Case
- [1992] FCA 285
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to interpret the term "review" as used in section 14(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. This section permits an application for review of a decision made by the Official Trustee, but it does not explicitly state the nature of the review process. The court needed to determine whether the review was intended to be a full rehearing of the case or a more limited examination of the evidence and decisions made.
In reaching its decision, the court considered the language of section 14(5) and its purpose within the legislative framework. It concluded that the term "review" in this context was intended to be a limited review, not a full rehearing. The court held that the review process was not intended to be a de novo hearing, but rather a more restricted examination of the evidence and decisions made by the Official Trustee. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for review and made no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
The Court orders that:
1. The application for review be dismissed.
2. No order as to costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Federal Court as an application for judicial review under section 14(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). This section allows a creditor to petition the Court for a review of a bankruptcy decision. The application was heard by Justice Finkelstein. Prior to this hearing, Brindle had been adjudged bankrupt by the Federal Court on 12 March 1990. F B & F A McMahon Pty Ltd filed a creditor's petition seeking a review of this decision. Brindle opposed the review application, contending that the review was not to be conducted de novo. The Court had to determine the scope of the review and whether it included a hearing of the matter afresh.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court has the power to review the bankruptcy decision de novo under section 14(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2. What is the meaning of "review" in the context of section 14(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and whether it includes a hearing de novo.
Held
1. The Court concluded that it does not have the power to review the bankruptcy decision de novo under section 14(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2. The Court determined that the meaning of "review" in the context of section 14(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) does not include a hearing de novo.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court began by examining the language of section 14(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) which provides that the Federal Court may review any decision of a bankruptcy trustee to make a bankrupt. The Court held that the term "review" in this context is not intended to confer upon the Court the power to conduct a de novo hearing. Instead, the Court found that the review is limited to considering whether there has been a failure to exercise the power of the trustee, or to exercise the power on the basis of irrelevant considerations, or on the basis of irrelevant information, or in a manner that was otherwise unjust. The Court's interpretation of the term "review" was based on a purposive reading of the statute, which aimed to provide a remedy for injustices that may have occurred in the original decision-making process. The Court noted that the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) does not provide for a full-scale judicial review, and that the role of the Court is limited to correcting any jurisdictional errors that may have been made by the bankruptcy trustee. The Court further held that the meaning of "review" in section 14(5) is consistent with the common law meaning of the term, which does not include a re-hearing of the evidence. The Court found that the purpose of the review is to ensure that the decision-maker has exercised their discretion in a lawful and rational manner, and not to substitute the Court's own decision for that of the decision-maker. The Court also noted that the review is not an appeal, and that the Court is not required to consider all of the evidence that was before the decision-maker. Instead, the Court's role is to determine whether there has been a failure to exercise the power of the trustee, or to exercise the power on the basis of irrelevant considerations, or on the basis of irrelevant information, or in a manner that was otherwise unjust. In this case, the Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated any of these grounds for review. The Court held that the bankruptcy trustee had exercised their discretion lawfully and rationally, and that there had been no failure to exercise the power of the trustee, or to exercise the power on the basis of irrelevant considerations, or on the basis of irrelevant information, or in a manner that was otherwise unjust. The Court therefore dismissed the application for review. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Court does not have the power to review the bankruptcy decision de novo under section 14(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and that the meaning of "review" in this context does not include a hearing de novo. The Court followed the established common law meaning of the term "review", and did not depart from any prior authority on this point. The Court's decision is consistent with the purpose of the review, which is to ensure that the decision-maker has exercised their discretion in a lawful and rational manner, and not to substitute the Court's own decision for that of the decision-maker.