FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Boart Longyear Limited, in the matter of Boart Longyear Limited [2019] FCA 62
File number(s): NSD 1898 of 2018 Judge(s): FARRELL J Date of judgment: 1 February 2019 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application to approve a scheme pursuant to s 411(4)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – scheme designed to effect re-domiciliation of target company to Canada – where the scheme was approved by more than 75% of votes cast at scheme meeting but did not pass the headcount test under s 411(4)(a)(ii)(A) of the Corporations Act – whether the Court should exercise its discretion to dispense with the headcount requirement and approve the scheme – whether a communication sent by a shareholder to members of the company prior to the scheme meeting affected the integrity of the vote – where the Court indicated that it would not exercise its discretion to approve the scheme unless the company conducted a further poll of members with corrective disclosure and the scheme satisfied both statutory majorities – second court hearing adjourned
CORPORATIONS – minority shareholders asserted that they would be unfairly prejudiced by approval of the scheme – where minority shareholders had ongoing oppression proceedings against the company in the Supreme Court of New South Wales – whether approving the scheme would deprive those shareholders of their standing to seek relief under s 234 of the Corporations Act – interpretation of the Superior Lawns cases – scheme would not deprive minority shareholders of standing – company proffered a satisfactory undertaking designed to preserve shareholders’ standing
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 15AB
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 232, 233, 234, 411, 459A, 459P, 1319
Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Bill 2007 (Cth)
Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 (Cth) r 2.13
Companies Act 1961 (NSW) s 181Cases cited: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41
Capilano Honey Limited, in the matter of Capilano Honey Limited [2018] FCA 1568
Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Adelaide Brighton Cement (2004) 139 FCR 147; [2004] FCAFC 183
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Complete Liquid Transport Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1067
Emanuele v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 188 CLR 114; [1997] HCA 20
In the matter of Boart Longyear Limited (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 1105
Jebb v Superior Lawns Australia Pty Ltd (2017) 123 ACSR 388; [2017] WASC 335
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
pSivida Limited v New pSivida, Inc; in the matter of pSivida Limited [2008] FCA 627
Re Centro Retail Limited [2011] NSWSC 1321
Re MIM Holdings Limited (2003) 45 ACSR 559; [2003] QSC 181
Re Norfolk Island & Byron Bay Whaling Co [1970] 1 NSWR 221
Re NRMA Ltd (No 2) (2000) 34 ACSR 261; [2000] NSWSC 408
Re Plantic Technologies Ltd [2010] VSC 484
Re PR Finance Group Limited(No 2) [2013] FCA 633
Re PR Finance Group Limited (No 3) [2013] FCA 704
Re PR Finance Group Limited…
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- AGLC
- Re Boart Longyear Ltd [2019] FCA 62
- Case
- [2019] FCA 62
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court held that it would not exercise its discretion to approve the scheme unless the company conducted a further poll of members with corrective disclosure and the scheme satisfied both statutory majorities. The Court found that a communication sent by a shareholder to other members of the company prior to the scheme meeting did not affect the integrity of the vote. The Court also held that approving the scheme would not deprive minority shareholders of their standing to seek relief under section 234 of the Corporations Act. The company proffered a satisfactory undertaking designed to preserve shareholders’ standing.
The Court approved the communication sent by BLY to its shareholders concerning the Snowside letter and the court’s decision related to the Oppression Proceedings. The Court adjourned the application and listed the matter for case management on 7 February 2019.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be adjourned to a date to be fixed.
2. The matter be listed for case management on Thursday, 7 February 2019 at 11.00 am.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Snowside parties submitted that this would not be an appropriate case for the Court to make final orders approving the scheme because: (1)It would be inappropriate for this Court to form a view about the prospects of success of the Oppression Proceedings. In November 2018, an amended statement of claim was filed (and is in evidence in these proceedings) and the Court does not have evidence before it sufficient to form a view;(2)This is not a case where the scheme is proposed as an alternate to insolvency, it is merely proposed pursuant to a contractual obligation;(3)There is no clear and quantified benefit to BLY; the claimed benefits are merely speculative and the Snowside parties’ rights should not be prejudiced without it being clear that a benefit would be derived by BLY;(4)No satisfactory endeavour was made by BLY to ameliorate the impact of the implementation of the scheme on the Oppression Proceedings. While BLY may be prepared to proffer an undertaking not to raise the standing issue, there are other parties who would not be bound by the undertaking;(5)The implementation of the scheme would undermine the policy objectives of Part 2F.1 of the Corporations Act; it would be a curious outcome if a claim of oppression made by a minority shareholder could be defeated by virtue of a scheme approved by the majority; and(6)A court whose jurisdiction is regularly invoked should not summarily decide issues except in the clearest of cases, relying on Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41.Consideration I accept BLY’s submission that the Superior Lawns decisions need to be considered in the context in which they occurred:·Trafalgar was a shareholder in Superior Lawns at the time the proceedings were commenced;·Mr Jebb wished to be substituted as plaintiff;·Although it might be questioned whether Trafalgar itself voluntarily transferred the shares in Superior Lawns to Mr Jebb as the transfer followed a change of trustees, it is plain that Martin J viewed the transfer as voluntary and as part of a scheme by Trafalgar’s guiding mind (Mr Jebb) to allow Mr Jebb to appear in the proceedings.·Justice Martin considered that the likely most appropriate remedy if Trafalgar were to be successful was a buyout of its Superior Lawns shares, a remedy which would be meaningless if Trafalgar was not the registered holder of the shares. In (2017) 123 ACSR 388 at [151]-[152], Martin J summarised the “assessment” he rendered in a number of the Superior Lawns decisions. His Honour’s finding at [151] that “in order to viably prosecute a statutory oppression action under Pt 2F.1 of the Corporations Act to a trial, a plaintiff needs, as a matter of necessary standing, to fall within one or other of the specified categories under s 234 of the Corporations Act and then to remain so until completion of the action” (emphasis added) reflects an ambiguity which I find in much of the language used in the Superior Lawns decisions. It is not clear whether by using the term “viable” (or similar words such as “legitimate” used elsewhere in the Superior Lawns decisions) his Honour is indicating that where a shareholder commences proceedings and then voluntarily disposes of the shares there is a resulting loss of standing (which is what is suggested by the words “as a matter of necessary standing”) to bring the action or that it is unlikely that a court would make the order sought under s 233 as a matter of discretion.