Razmovski v NIB Health Funds Ltd

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DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY A MEMBER

CITATION:

Razmovski v NIB Health Funds Ltd [2025] NSWPICPD 9

APPELLANT:

Mary Razmovski

RESPONDENT:

NIB Health Funds Ltd

INSURER:

GIO General Limited

FILE NUMBER:

A1-W23173/24

PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:

Deputy President Michael Snell

DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:

7 February 2025

ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:

1.    The Certificate of Determination dated 1 October 2024 is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS COMPENSATION – section 15 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987– ‘disease of gradual process’; determination of date of injury; application of Haddad v The GEO Group Australia Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 135 and Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Thoroughgood [2014] NSWCA 166

HEARING:

On the papers

REPRESENTATION:

Appellant:

Mr L Morgan, counsel

Carroll & O’Dea Lawyers

Respondent:

Mr P Barnes, counsel

Moray & Agnew Lawyers

DECISION UNDER APPEAL:

Razmovski v NIB Health Funds Ltd [2024] NSWPIC 540

MEMBER:

Mr J Isaksen

DATE OF MEMBER’S DECISION:

1 October 2024

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

  1. Mary Razmovski (the appellant) worked for NIB Health Funds Ltd (the respondent) for approximately 31 years. She was a retail centre consultant at the respondent’s Charlestown office. She was initially full-time, but for the last 25 years of the employment she worked five hours per day, five days per week. The respondent provided health insurance, together with travel and CTP insurance. The appellant served customers and dealt with general clerical duties. This included data entry, handling cash, telephone enquiries, file handling, printing and general administrative work.[1] There was much computer work. She developed bilateral wrist and hand pain from about 2017.[2] Dr Burgess, a hand surgeon, performed bilateral carpal tunnel release surgery on 17 September 2019.[3]

    [1] Appellant’s statement, 7/9/22, [10]–[15], Reply to Application to Resolve a Dispute (Reply), pp 2–3.

    [2] Dr Burgess’ report, 2/2/19, Application to Resolve a Dispute (ARD), p 41.

    [3] ARD, p 43.

  2. The appellant stated that her workers compensation claim was accepted and “has been allocated a deemed date of injury of 11 September 2017”.[4] She was off work for about eight weeks following the surgery.[5] She had ongoing problems in her hands and arms. From early 2021 she noticed increased symptoms and her hours were reduced to 15 per week, working 5 hours per day over three non-consecutive days, with restrictions. In early 2021 the respondent moved to shutting down retail premises and reducing staff. The appellant was made redundant on 30 June 2021.[6]

    [4] Appellant’s statement 31/5/22, [6], ARD, p 1.

    [5] Appellant’s statement 7/9/22, [30], Reply, p 5.

    [6] Appellant’s statement 31/5/22, [10], ARD, p 2.

  3. The respondent accepted workers compensation liability for the bilateral carpal tunnel condition. Dr Harrington, an orthopaedic surgeon, assessed the appellant on the insurer’s behalf and reported on 20 December 2022.[7] Dr Harrington considered the appellant’s work duties caused or contributed to the carpal tunnel condition. Dr Harrington identified arthritis at the base of the appellant’s thumbs, which he thought was a constitutional condition. The appellant also complained of left knee pain which she said…

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Details
Case
[2025] NSWPICPD 9
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Razmovski v NIB Health Funds Ltd, the appellant contested the determination of the deemed date of injury under section 15 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. The appellant argued that the date of first economic incapacity should be recognised as 30 October 2019, when the worker first saw her general practitioner and weekly payments began. The worker, however, asserted that the correct deemed date should be 6 April 2023, the date of the claim for permanent impairment. The employer contended that the deemed date should be 30 October 2019, the date of the relevant incapacity.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of section 15 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 and the application of previous case law, particularly Haddad v The GEO Group Australia Pty Ltd and Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Thoroughgood. The court needed to determine the appropriate date of injury when a disease of gradual process causes incapacity and when there is a claim for permanent impairment. The appellant argued that the Principal Member’s decision lacked sufficient detail regarding the nature of the injury and incapacity, and that the reliance on previous case law was misplaced. The court had to assess whether the correct approach was applied in determining the deemed date of injury and whether the evidence supported the Principal Member’s findings.

The court examined the relevant case law and the evidence presented. It noted that the approach in Haddad and Thoroughgood indicates that where a disease injury causes incapacity and gives rise to an entitlement for compensation, the date of injury is deemed to be when the worker suffered incapacity. The court found that the Principal Member correctly applied the principles from Haddad and Thoroughgood but concluded that the evidence did not support a different deemed date of injury. The court held that the Principal Member’s decision was not erroneous and that the deemed date of injury was appropriately determined as 30 October 2019.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal, affirming the decision of the Principal Member. The court found no basis to alter the deemed date of injury and upheld the determination made by the Principal Member.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant says that, in Ellis, there was agreement that the first economic incapacity was on 30 October 2019 when the worker saw her general practitioner and weekly payments commenced. The worker asserted that the correct deemed date was 6 April 2023, the date of the claim for permanent impairment. The employer argued it should have been 30 October 2019, the date of the relevant incapacity. The appellant submits the Principal Member’s discussion included no detail regarding the nature of the injury or incapacity. The appellant submits the Principal Member relied heavily on the analysis, by Griffith AJA, of SAS Trustee Corporation v O’Keefe[31] at [118] to [119].[32] The appellant quotes from Haddad, in a passage which includes:“Whether or not an earlier claim for weekly compensation is relevant or irrelevant depends on the facts, as the differing outcomes in Alto Ford and Berkeley reveal. The subsequent reasoning in Thoroughgood (in which McColl JA also sat) expresses the position more accurately.In my view, the obiter observations in O’Keefe which are relied upon by the appellant here should be confined to the facts of that particular case. The circumstances here are quite different, especially having regard to the evidence which identified that the injury the subject of the s 60 claim had produced incapacity.”[33] (underlining inserted in original)[31] [2011] NSWCA 326 (O’Keefe).[32] Appellant’s submissions, [1.18]–[1.23].[33] Haddad, [118]–[119]. The appellant quotes from Ellis where the Principal Member said:“The correct approach, as discussed in Haddad and Thoroughgood is that where the disease injury causes incapacity and gives rise to an entitlement to compensation (either medical expenses or permanent impairment), the first limb of s 15(1)(a) operates to deem the date of injury to be when the worker suffered incapacity.”[34][34] Ellis, [22]. The appellant submits Griffiths AJA observed that consideration was needed of the particular factual circumstances of any particular claim, which needed to be analysed to identify the nature of the claim and “in particular the nature of the injury, the incapacity and the compensation claimed”. The appellant submits the description of the facts in Ellis was “scant”. It was necessary, dealing with the application of s 15, to identify “the nature of the injury, the incapacity and the claim”.[35] [35] Appellant’s submissions, [1.24]–[1.26]. The appellant refers to the current matter: “the claimant continued in the causative employment until 30 June 2021 when she was made redundant … she did not cease work due to incapacity”. The appellant refers to the facts in Haddad, in which the worker left the causative employment at Villawood Detention Centre in 2001 and worked for various other employers until 2016 when he ceased work due to his psychological condition. The appellant refers to Ellis, in which the Principal Member described Haddad as authority for the following propositions:“(a) The correct position is that where a disease injury causes an incapacity and at the same time gives rise to an entitlement for either medical expenses and/or permanent impairment, the claim is deemed to have occurred at the time when the worker suffered incapacity; and(b) Even if not pleaded the fact that there is an incapacity cannot be ignored but where there is no evidence of incapacity, the second limb of the deeming provision will apply.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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