JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: RAPID METAL DEVELOPMENTS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD -v- ANDERSON FORMRITE PTY LTD [No 7] [2010] WASC 351
CORAM: LE MIERE J
HEARD: 17 & 19 AUGUST 2010
DELIVERED : 2 DECEMBER 2010
FILE NO/S: CIV 2446 of 2002
Consolidated by Orders dated 16 December 2002
BETWEEN: RAPID METAL DEVELOPMENTS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 004 304 447)
Plaintiff
AND
ANDERSON FORMRITE PTY LTD (ACN 097 507 652)
First DefendantWARREN PERRY ANDERSON
Second Defendant
FILE NO/S :CIV 1955 of 2002
BETWEEN :RAPID METAL DEVELOPMENTS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 004 304 114)
Plaintiff
AND
WARREN PERRY ANDERSON
Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Springing order - Judgment entered following non-compliance with springing order - Subsequent application to extend time for compliance - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Property Law Act 1969 (WA), s 9
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 3 r 5
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
CIV 2446 of 2002
Consolidated by Orders dated 16 December 2002
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr G T Stubbs
First Defendant : No appearance
Second Defendant : Mr N P Gentilli
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Dwyer Durack
First Defendant : No appearance
Second Defendant : Jackson McDonald
CIV 1955 of 2002
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr G T Stubbs
Defendant: Mr N P Gentilli
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Dwyer Durack
Defendant: Jackson McDonald
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175
Bornecrantz v Queensland Bridge Associate Inc [1999] QSC 58
Caldwell v Treloar (1982) 30 SASR 202
Composite Buyers Ltd v JC Taylor Constructions Pty Ltd [1983] 2 VR 311
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268
Hodak v Bosman (1983) 36 SASR 164
Hytec Information Systems Ltd v Coventry City Council [1997] 1 WLR 1666
Keysen v Gregg (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 288
Lifelong Investments v Karageorge [2008] WASC 86
Link Blocks Pty Ltd v Fullin [1986] WAR 187
Melville v East End Holdings Inc [2003] WASCA 133
Monarch Petroleum NL v Citco Petroleum Ltd [1986] WAR 310
MTQ Holdings Pty Ltd v Lynch [2007] WASC 49
Osgood v Wham [2007] WASCA 178
Rapid Metal Developments (Australia) Pty Ltd v Anderson Formrite Pty Ltd [No 5] [2009] WASC 194
Rapid Metal Developments (Australia) Pty Ltd v Anderson Formrite Pty Ltd [No 6] [2009] WASC 217
Rawcliffe v Bianco Hiring Service Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 430
Re Romer & Haslam [1893] 2 QB 286
Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society v Reg Austin Insurances Pty Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 909
Skahill v Kestral Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) [2000] WASCA 185
Walsh v Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 104 ACTR 30
LE MIERE J: The second defendant by summons dated 18 May 2010 seeks orders that the judgment entered against the second defendant on 29 July 2009 be set aside and that the time for the second defendant…
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- Case
- [2010] WASC 351
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether it had the discretion to grant an extension of time for compliance with the springing order, particularly after judgment had been entered due to the defendant's non-compliance. The legal issues encompassed the interpretation of Rule 3 Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules 1971 (WA), the principles governing case flow management, and the balance of justice between the parties. The court also needed to consider the broader context of the case, including the reasons for non-compliance, the potential prejudice to both parties, and the merits of the defaulting party’s case.
The court exercised its broad discretion, guided by the principles articulated in FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL. It held that while the power to extend time for compliance with a springing order must be exercised cautiously, justice in the specific circumstances of the case necessitated such an extension. The court found that the defendant had a reasonably arguable case on the merits, and the balance of prejudice to both parties, along with other relevant factors, warranted the grant of an extension. Consequently, the court granted the plaintiff's application for an extension of time.
In summary, the court's decision recognised the discretionary nature of extending time for compliance with a springing order, emphasising that justice in each case is the governing consideration. The court granted the application for an extension, recognising the need to balance the interests of both parties and the merits of the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court has a wide discretion to relieve a party of the consequences of non‑compliance with a self‑executing order: FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268. The governing consideration, as in every aspect of practice and procedure, is what justice requires. As stated by Burt CJ in Link Blocks Pty Ltd v Fullin [1986] WAR 187:… all the circumstances must be weighed in the balance and one must not … lose sight of the fact that the justice spoken of is an even-handed justice to [both sides] (190). In relation to the application of O 3 r 5 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) to springing orders, the Full Court comprising Hasluck and Pullin JJ in Melville v East End Holdings Inc [2003] WASCA 133 stated:By O 3 r 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the court may, on such terms as it thinks just, by order extend or abridge the time within which a person is required by any order to do any act in any proceedings. The court may extend any such period, although the application for extension is not made until after the expiration of that period.It has been held that this rule provides authority to extend the time for compliance with a springing order, even after judgment has been entered by its automatic operation. The rule is remedial and confers a broad power upon the court to relieve against injustice: FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268. It has also been held that the principles and objects of case flow management which are contained in O 1 r 4A and O 1 r 4B of the Rules of the Supreme Court must now be taken into consideration: Seaman Civil Procedure at para 3.5.1 [16] ‑ [17]. There are four matters to which the court will normally have regard in deciding whether to extend the time for compliance with a springing order as set out by Master Newnes (as his Honour then was) in MTQ Holdings Pty Ltd v Lynch [2007] WASC 49:… the power to extend time when a springing order has not been complied with is a power to be exercised cautiously and with due regard to the necessity for maintaining the principle that orders are made to be complied with, and not to be ignored: Samuels v Linzi Dresses Ltd [1981] QB 115, per Roskill LJ at 126‑127 [14].…And while no hard and fast rules can be laid down as to the matters to which the Court should have regards, in my view in the exercise of its discretion the court will normally have regards to at least the following matters:(1)the circumstances in which the springing order came to be made;(2)the reason for non-compliance with the springing order;(3)the prejudice to the defaulting party if the time were not extended; and(4)the prejudice to the other party if the time were extended.It will also normally be a relevant consideration whether or not the defaulting party has a reasonably arguable case on the merits ‑ there being no point in resuscitating a case that is devoid of merit ‑ but, on the other hand, the fact that a party has an apparently meritorious case cannot be permitted effectively to act to insulate it from the consequences of a failure to comply with a peremptory order of the court [56] ‑ [57].