Raniere Nominees Pty Ltd v Daley

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      RANIERE NOMINEES PTY LIMITED trading as Horizon Motor Lodge v DALEY and Another  [2006]  NSWCA 235

FILE NUMBER(S):
40437/05

HEARING DATE(S):               5 May 2006

DECISION DATE:     24/08/2006

PARTIES:
RANIERE NOMINEES PTY LIMITED trading as Horizon Motor Lodge  (Appellant) 
Helen DALEY  (First Respondent) 
WORKCOVER AUTHORITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES  (Second Respondent) 

JUDGMENT OF:       Spigelman CJ Giles JA Santow JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Workers Compensation Commission

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          WCC 17218/03

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Dr Gabriel Fleming, Deputy President

COUNSEL:
C D JACKSON  (Appellant) 
M J JOSEPH, SC/ D S STANTON  (Second Respondent) 

SOLICITORS:
Roach & Halligan  (Appellant) 
TurksLegal  (Second Respondent) 

CATCHWORDS:
WORKERS COMPENSATION – Commission’s jurisdiction to determine employer’s liability to pay – Indemnity Scheme under which WorkCover has discretion to pay or decline to pay compensation to employee whose employer is uninsured for its liability under the Act – Distinction between schemes under s144 and s145 of Workers Compensation Act – was it a jurisdictional requirement for Commission to hear an employer objection opposing indemnification of WorkCover where the notice required by s145(4) was not given. 

LEGISLATION CITED:
Compensation Court Repeal (Transitional) Regulation 2003, cl 7
Workers Compensation Act 1987, Pt 4 Div 6, s143, s144, s145,
Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2001
Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 s353

DECISION:
Leave to appeal granted.  Appeal dismissed with costs.  See orders at [79].

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40437/05
WCC 17218/03

SPIGELMAN CJ
GILES JA
SANTOW JA

24 AUGUST 2006

RANIERE NOMINEES PTY LIMITED trading as Horizon Motor Lodge v DALEY and Another

Judgment

  1. SPIGELMAN CJ:  I agree with Giles JA and Santow JA. 

  2. GILES JA: Raniere Nominees Pty Ltd (“the employer”) was the employer of Ms Helen Daley (“the worker”). It was not insured for its workers compensation liabilities. The WorkCover Authority made payments to the worker under the Uninsured Liability and Indemnity Scheme constituted and regulated in Pt 4 Div 6 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (“the Act”), and served on the employer pursuant to s 145(1) of the Act a notice requiring reimbursement of the amount of the payments (“the notice”).

  3. Section 145 of the Act relevantly provided -

    “145      Employer or insurer to reimburse Authority

    (1)The Authority may serve on a person who, in the opinion of the Authority, was:

    (a)in respect of an injured worker to or in respect of whom a payment has been made under the Scheme, an employer at the relevant time, or

    (b)…

    a notice requiring that person, within a period specified in the notice, to reimburse the WorkCover Authority Fund an amount (not being an amount exceeding the amount of the payment made) specified in the notice.

    (2)          …

    (3)A person on whom a notice has been served under subsection (1) in respect of an injured worker may, within the period specified in the notice, apply to the Commission for a determination as to the person’s liability in…

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Details
Case
[2006] NSWCA 235
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned a dispute between Raniere Nominees Pty Ltd (Raniere) and WorkCover over the liability for workers' compensation payments made to an injured employee, Ms Daley. Raniere, the employer, was uninsured and therefore Ms Daley claimed compensation under the Uninsured Liabilities Scheme (ULIS), administered by WorkCover. WorkCover paid Ms Daley's claim, and the dispute then arose between Raniere and WorkCover regarding Raniere's reimbursement obligation. The matter came before the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the Workers Compensation Commission had the jurisdiction to hear an employer's objection opposing WorkCover's indemnification where the employer had not been given the notice required by section 145(4) of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* (NSW) within the specified timeframe. This question involved interpreting the scope of the Commission's powers under section 145, particularly concerning applications made "out of time" relative to the notice period.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that proceedings under section 144 of the Act, which relate to reimbursement in worker-initiated actions, are distinct from the reimbursement regime under section 145. Section 145 reimbursement is initiated by WorkCover after it has paid compensation to the worker, and it requires a specific notice to the employer. The Deputy President had rejected Raniere's arguments that the Commission's power under section 145(4) extended to hearing applications made outside the statutory notice period, concluding that the discretion conferred by the section did not permit consideration of an application made after the specified time. The Court of Appeal agreed with this interpretation, finding that the Commission did not have the jurisdiction to hear an application made outside the time specified in the WorkCover notice under section 145.

Orders

Orders of the court

Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed with costs. See orders at [79].

Background

Background to the litigation

There is a difficulty with these contentions. Essentially the difficulty is that the s144 proceedings represent a distinct regime for reimbursement associated with a worker-initiated action. That action, as was determined in an earlier Court of Appeal decision, engages only so much of s145 as is applicable in the circumstances; Raniere Holdings Pty Limited v Daley & Anor [2005] NSWCA 121 at [42], [47] and [48] per Tobias JA. Section 144 proceedings cannot provide the means for satisfying an essential statutory condition for resisting reimbursement under the distinct s145 regime. Under s145, reimbursement is initiated not by the injured worker but by WorkCover giving the s145(1) notice to the employer. It is predicated upon WorkCover having already paid out of the Fund money to the injured worker. The s144 proceedings in the present case could not be treated as themselves determining any reimbursement issue as no determination was ever made on the merits and the proceedings themselves were discontinued by the injured worker. SALIENT FACTS The essential facts are not at issue in this case. The first opponent, Ms Daley, employee of the claimant Raniere, is not participating in the proceedings. She was the injured worker claiming to have suffered her injury at work on 26 September 2000. The matter in dispute between the parties is the liability for payment of $94,120.69 in workers compensation to Ms Daley. Her employer, the complainant, disputes that liability. Because Raniere was uninsured, she made a claim for weekly benefits and medical expenses under the ULIS. The ULIS is created by Div 6 of Pt 4 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; ss138 to 148A. It provides for payment of workers compensation (and ex gratia) payments from the WorkCover Authority Fund. The second opponent, WorkCover, is the administrator of the scheme. There is provision for reimbursement of WorkCover by the employer, which is contestable by the employer in accordance with the provisions of s144 or s145, as applicable. The ULIS makes payments for workers compensation claims by employees against employers who are found to have been uninsured at the relevant time in relation to a claim. Section 143 of the Act gives WorkCover a discretion, expressed in broad terms, as to whether to make the payment of compensation to a worker under the ULIS. WorkCover, following s144 proceedings initiated by the injured worker against WorkCover and Raniere as respondents in the Compensation Court commenced 26 March 2002, exercised that discretion in favour of the worker, so that Ms Daley’s claim was paid by WorkCover. This was by consent orders entered into between WorkCover and the injured worker, without determination of the merits, on 31 July 2003. The original application dated 26 March 2003 by the worker for compensation from WorkCover included seeking an order that Raniere “reimburse the WorkCover Authority such amount … as may be paid out of such [WorkCover Authority] Fund in respect of compensation and costs awarded against [WorkCover] and in respect of the costs of [WorkCover]”; WB, Tab 18.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPIGELMAN CJ
The present proceedings are an application for leave to appeal with a concurrent hearing, the application being bought pursuant to s353 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (“the WIM Act”). Section 353 provides for an appeal in point of law as of right and for other appeals only with leave of the Court. Section 353 is in the following terms: 353 Appeal against decision of Commission constituted by Presidential member (1)If a party to any proceedings before the Commission constituted by a Presidential member is aggrieved by a decision of the Presidential member in point of law, the party may appeal to the Court of Appeal.(2)The Court of Appeal may, on the hearing of any appeal under this section, remit the matter to the Commission constituted by a Presidential member for determination by the Commission in accordance with any decision of the Court and may make such other order in relation to the appeal as the Court thinks fit. (3)A decision of the Court of Appeal on an appeal under this section is binding on the Commission and on all the parties to the proceedings in respect of which the appeal was made.(4)The following appeals under this section may be made only with leave of the Court of Appeal: (a) an appeal from an interlocutory decision,(b) an appeal from a decision as to costs only,(c) an appeal where the amount of compensation in dispute is less than $20,000 (or such other amount as may be prescribed by the regulations),(d) an appeal from a decision made with the consent of the parties.(5)In this section, decision includes an award, interim award, order, determination, ruling, opinion and direction. The Judgment at First Instance I shall here summarise the key conclusions reached by the Deputy President. The first question is whether the Commission could hear an application under s145 of the Act that was “out of time” in the sense that it was after the time specified in the statutory notice, pursuant to s145(3). The claimant advanced two arguments, repeated in this appeal though with some variations. First, it was said that “any such implication” in s145(4) means “an application made to the Commission, whether or not it is within the time specified by WorkCover”. That is to say, the Commission’s power was said to extend to any application whether or not it was brought within the time specified in the notice. Second, it was argued that the broad power to make a determination or order “as the Commission thinks fit” allows the Commission to hear an application on the merits and “in the interests of justice”. The fact that an application was “out of time” in terms of the notice would be a relevant fact in this consideration. The Deputy President rejected these arguments. The Deputy President noted the apparent discretionary matters in s145(4) which provides that the “Commission may hear any such application and may” make a range of orders; Judgment [18]. The Deputy President concluded that this apparently conferred a discretion on the Commission as to whether to hear an application, and was not satisfied that this permitted the Commission to consider an application made outside of the time specified in the WorkCover notice under s145 of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPIGELMAN CJ

Full text does not contain this section.