Randall v Chief of the Defence Force

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Randall v Chief of the Defence Force [2020] FCA 1327  

File number: QUD 300 of 2019
Judgment of: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 17 September 2020
Catchwords:  EVIDENCE – objections to applicant’s evidence – judicial review application under Administrative Decisions (Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – previous Restricted Court Martial and determination by Defence Force Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal – where applicant claimed that decision-maker terminated employment of applicant on same or substantially same grounds he was previously acquitted – whether evidence objected to was readily available to decision-maker and centrally relevant to decision – s 91 and s 136 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – issue estoppel – whether materials on which applicant sought to rely were referable to proving a fact in issue in proceeding - costs
Legislation:

 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(e), 5(2)

Criminal Code Act 1989 (Qld), Sch 1, s 478.1(1)

Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ss 61

Defence Regulation 2016 (Cth) ss 24(1)(c), 30(1)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) Pt 3.5, ss 91, 92, 93, 136

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(2)

Criminal Code Act 1989 (Qld), Sch 1, s 478.1(1)

Cases cited:

 Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174

Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 109

Attorney General (NSW) v Martin [2015] NSWSC 1372

Attorney-General (NSW) v Mohareb [2016] NSWSC 1823

Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1934

East Melbourne Group Inc v Minister for Planning (2008) 23 VR 605; [2008] VSCA 217

King v Muriniti [2018] NSWCA 98

Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39

Majindi v The Northern Territory of Australia (2012) 31 NTLR 150; [2012] NTSC 25

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40

Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164; [2019] HCA 25

Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; [1998] HCA 11

Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155

 Randall v Chief of Army [2018] ADFDAT 3

SZIED v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1347

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2009) 179 FCR 437; [2009] FCA 757

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 43
Date of hearing: 11 September 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D McLure SC and Mr J Streit
Solicitor for the Applicant: Turks Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms E Longbottom QC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

QUD 300 of 2019
BETWEEN:

PETER ALLEN RANDALL

Applicant

AND:

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 SEPTEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent’s objections to evidence made in written submissions filed on 19 August 2020 and in oral submissions of 11 September 2020 be resolved in accordance with the attached reasons for decision.

2.The respondent pay the applicant his costs of…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1327
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Randall v Chief of the Defence Force involved an application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Review) Act 1977 (Cth) against a decision by a delegate of the Chief of the Defence Force to terminate the applicant's service in the Australian Defence Force. The applicant, Randall, sought to challenge the decision on various grounds, including that it was legally unreasonable, based on an improper purpose, and failed to take into account relevant considerations. The applicant argued that the decision-maker had terminated his employment on the same or substantially the same grounds for which he was previously acquitted in a restricted court martial. The central issue before the court was whether certain evidence from the restricted court martial was admissible under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and whether it was relevant to the applicant's claims.

The court found that the respondent's objections to the admissibility of the restricted court martial material were not substantiated. It held that the restricted court martial material was relevant to the applicant's claims, particularly in establishing whether the decision-maker failed to take into account information that was readily available and centrally relevant. The court reasoned that the applicant's case that the termination decision was based on the same or substantially the same grounds as those for which he was acquitted in the restricted court martial could only be substantiated if the restricted court martial material was admitted. The court further held that the material could be admitted provisionally for the purpose of assessing the legal unreasonableness ground of the judicial review application. The court also rejected the respondent's argument that the restricted court martial material could not be admitted as evidence of facts in dispute in the restricted court martial. Instead, the applicant relied on the existence of the restricted court martial and the acquittal of the charges as evidence that the termination decision was based on the same or substantially the same grounds.

The court ordered that the respondent's objections to the admissibility of the restricted court martial material be resolved in accordance with the reasons for decision. The court further ordered that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the case management hearing of 11 September 2020.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s objections to evidence made in written submissions filed on 19 August 2020 and in oral submissions of 11 September 2020 be resolved in accordance with the attached reasons for decision.

2. The respondent pay the applicant his costs of and incidental to the case management hearing of 11 September 2020, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the hearing before me, the respondent submitted, in summary, as follows:·The respondent had expanded his concession in respect of the admissibility of the RCM material – the entirety of the RCM material could be admitted, pursuant to s 136 of the Evidence Act, for the limited purpose of ground 2. The RCM material was not otherwise admissible in relation to ground 1. However, the RCM material could be admitted provisionally de bene esse and without prejudice in relation to ground 1, so that the Court may later determine its admissibility in this respect, after the benefit or hearing more substantive argument on the application for judicial review.·The effect of Part 3.5 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act) is that evidence of an acquittal is admissible in respect of a claim of issue estoppel, but not as an evidentiary fact. Given that issue estoppel operates as a substantive rule of law, rather than evidence, the RCM material need not otherwise be admitted in respect of ground 1. ·Issue estoppel, as a substantive rule of law, may have an impact on ground 1. To the extent to which the applicant relies on the fact of his acquittal before the RCM as founding the claims in the sub-grounds to ground 1, that will stand or fall with ground 2. If the decision-maker was estopped from terminating the applicant on the same grounds for which he was acquitted, the applicant could say that, for example, in failing to take that into account, there was a failure to take into account a relevant consideration. ·The appropriate course is for the Court to first decide ground 2 (that is, whether as a matter of law, the respondent was precluded from making the termination decision) and that can then inform the Court’s assessment of the other grounds.·Section 91 of the Evidence Act is relevant, and applies to both convictions and acquittals. The RCM material is not admissible as evidence that the applicant was innocent of the DFDA charges. There is a danger that if the RCM material is admitted generally, its use will go beyond the scope of what is permissible in respect of a judicial review application·The approach taken by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in Majindi v The Northern Territory of Australia (2012) 31 NTLR 150; [2012] NTSC 25, is relevant in this context.·It is not necessary for the RCM material to be before the Court for the Court to reach a conclusion about the legal unreasonableness ground (ground 1(b), particular (10)). This ground can be assessed by reference to the evidence that was before the decision-maker and is before the Court, including the termination decision and the DFDAT decision, both of which refer to the acquittals by the RCM.·In respect of the improper purpose ground (ground 1(a), particular (11)), the observation of the Court of Appeal of Victoria in East Melbourne Group Inc v Minister for Planning (2008) 23 VR 605; [2008] VSCA 217 at [312] is relevant in respect of considering material that was before a decision-maker when a statement of reasons has been provided. In such circumstances, a failure to refer to particular matters or give other reasons will justify the inference that such other matters or reasons were not relied upon. To the extent that the decision-maker in this case has not identified the RCM material as being before her, that material is not relevant for consideration by the Court.·In respect of the relevant considerations ground (ground 1(c), 1 particular (13)), what factors a decision-maker is bound to take into account is determined by the relevant statute. It is uncontroversial that the applicant was either acquitted of the DFDA charges by the RCM or had his convictions quashed by the DFDAT. In those circumstances, the RCM material is not relevant to the issues to be decided with respect to this ground.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 16 November 2018, a delegate of the Chief of the Defence Force determined that the applicant’s service in the ADF was to be terminated on 12 December 2018 pursuant to s 24(1)(c) of the Defence Regulation and provided a statement of reasons for that decision (termination decision). The delegate made the following relevant findings of fact:e.Between 29 Dec 13 and 08 Jun 14, you accessed the email accounts of the following personnel on multiple occasions on the ADF Deployed Defence Secret Network (DDSN) and Deployed Defence Restricted Network (DDRN):(1) LTCOL A Duncan;(2) LEUT A Jageillo, RAN;(3) CAPT A Hansen;(4) CAPT P Kimberly; and(5) WO1 C Tuddenham.f.You accessed the email accounts listed at sub-paragraph (e) above when your duties as ISE, ISM or ISSO did not require you to.g.You were charged with various offences as a result of accessing those email accounts and were tried by restricted court martial (RCM) between 31 May 16 and 21 Jun 16. You were found guilty on some, but not all, counts.h.On 10 July 18, the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Tribunal (DFDAT) overturned the RCM convictions on the basis that the absence of authority on your part to access the relevant email accounts could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.i.Not inconsistently with the DFDAT judgment, I find that you were authorised to access the DDSN and DDRN in order to perform your duties as ISE, ISM and ISSO. I further find that you were authorised to access individuals’ email accounts on the DDSN and DDRN in order to perform your duties as ISE, ISM and ISSO without the permission of the individuals to whom the email accounts were assigned.j.I find that that there were various inter-personal tensions within the FCU of which you were a part on OP ACCORDIAN, which on occasion may have hampered various individuals, including you, in the performance of their duties. The sharing of information between individuals comprising the FCU may have also been hampered as a result.k.I find that you accessed the relevant email accounts for purposes outside what was required of you by virtue of your appointments and duties as ISE, ISM and ISSO. In particular, I find that these other purposes were:(1)To obtain documents or information which other members of the FCU declined to provide to you:(1)WO1 Tuddenham’s email account; 15 May 14 at approx. 0344h – ref E, para 109(p);(2) LEUT Jagiello’s email account: 28 May 14 at approx. 0539h – ref E, para 109(r).(2)To track a member’s alleged effort to obtain civilian employment (CAPT Kimberly’s email account; 19 Feb 14 at approx. 1724h – ref E, para 109(h)).(3)To circumvent other processes; specifically, to obtain a password which you understood HQJOC had emailed to LEUT Hansen (LEUT Hansen’s email account; 06 Feb 14 at approx. 1049h – ref E, para 109(e)).(4)Accessing emails which you noticed once already in a member’s email account and of whose existence, prior to accessing the member’s account, you were unaware but in whose subject matter you had an “interest” (LEUT Hansen’s email account; 05 May 14 at approx. 0425h – ref E, para 109(n)).(5)To consider playing a prank (LEUT Jagiello’s email account; 30 May 14 at approx. 0719h – ref E, para 109(t)).(6)To locate a document when the appropriate course of action would have been to ask people for it (LTCOL Duncan’s email account; 4 Jun 14 at approx. 1234h – ref E, para 109(y)).l.I find that accessing the email accounts for purposes outside what was required of you by virtue of your appointments and duties as ISE, ISM and ISSO, as set out at sub-paragraph (k) above, constitutes an abuse of a position of trust. I further find that this behaviour falls substantially short of the standard required of a senior soldier in the Australian Army and is contrary to the Defence values of professionalism and integrity.…

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant submitted, in summary:·Contrary to the submissions of the respondent, it is not the applicant’s case that ground 1 hinges on whether ground 2 is accepted. ·In any event, the ADJR Act confines the relevant grounds on which the applicant can rely. ·No reason has been advanced by the respondent why, where the responding party disputes the ultimate issue, the evidence on which the moving party seeks to rely should be admitted on a provisional basis.·The reason the applicant has put forward the RCM material was because the respondent disputed the proposition running through all of the grounds, namely that the termination decision was based on the same or substantially the same grounds on which he was charged and acquitted.·The applicant does not ask the Court to engage in a merits review of the termination decision – rather, the applicant anticipated taking the Court through the RCM material to make good the proposition that the applicant was terminated on the same, or substantially the same, grounds on which he had been tried and acquitted in the RCM proceedings.·In relation to ss 91 and 93 of the Evidence Act, the applicant does not rely on the evidence given in the RCM as evidence of facts in dispute in that court martial (for example, in respect of some particular explanation for why the applicant accessed an email account, or that he had been authorised to do so). Rather, the applicant relies on evidence that there was a RCM, which involved charges that corresponded identically with the grounds of termination and that led to the acquittal of the applicant of those charges.·In relation to the legal unreasonableness ground, it is uncontroversial that the admissibility of the RCM material can be demonstrated if the moving party can establish that the evidence was readily available and centrally relevant. In order for the Court to evaluate the applicant’s contention about that point, the Court needs to have the evidence before it to decide whether the RCM material is centrally relevant.CONSIDERATION In my view the respondent’s objections to the admissibility of the RCM material are not substantiated. I have formed this view for the following reasons. First, I reject the contention of the respondent that the RCM material is irrelevant in the context of the judicial review application before the Court. It is common ground that a decision may be legally unreasonable if the decision-maker failed to take into account information that the decision-maker knew (or ought reasonably to have known) was readily available and centrally relevant. The leading authority on this point appears to be the decision of Wilcox J in Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-170, where his Honour said:I have been unable to find any discussion in the authorities of this question, possibly because the facts will often be clear. Consequently, I express no more than a tentative view. But in principle, as it seems to me, the intermediate position is correct. Under s 5(l)(e) and s 5(2)(g) the court is concerned with the manner of exercise of the power. A power is exercised in an improper manner if, upon the material before the decision-maker, it is a decision to which no reasonable person could come. Equally, it is exercised in an improper manner if the decision-maker makes his decision – which perhaps in itself, reasonably reflects the material before him – in a manner so devoid of any plausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken this course, for example by unreasonably failing to ascertain relevant facts which he knew to be readily available to him. The circumstances under which a decision will be invalid for failure to inquire are, I think, strictly limited. It is no part of the duty of the decision-maker to make the applicant's case for him. It is not enough that the court find that the sounder course would have been to make inquiries. But, in a case where it is obvious that material is readily available which is centrally relevant to the decision to be made, it seems to me that to proceed to a decision without making any attempt to obtain that information may properly be described as an exercise of the decision-making power in a manner so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have so exercised it. It would follow that the court, on judicial review, should receive evidence as to the existence and nature of that information.(Emphasis added.)