FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Randall v Chief of the Defence Force [2020] FCA 1327
File number: QUD 300 of 2019 Judgment of: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 17 September 2020 Catchwords: EVIDENCE – objections to applicant’s evidence – judicial review application under Administrative Decisions (Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – previous Restricted Court Martial and determination by Defence Force Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal – where applicant claimed that decision-maker terminated employment of applicant on same or substantially same grounds he was previously acquitted – whether evidence objected to was readily available to decision-maker and centrally relevant to decision – s 91 and s 136 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – issue estoppel – whether materials on which applicant sought to rely were referable to proving a fact in issue in proceeding - costs Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(e), 5(2)
Criminal Code Act 1989 (Qld), Sch 1, s 478.1(1)
Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ss 61
Defence Regulation 2016 (Cth) ss 24(1)(c), 30(1)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) Pt 3.5, ss 91, 92, 93, 136
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(2)
Criminal Code Act 1989 (Qld), Sch 1, s 478.1(1)
Cases cited: Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174
Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 109
Attorney General (NSW) v Martin [2015] NSWSC 1372
Attorney-General (NSW) v Mohareb [2016] NSWSC 1823
Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1934
East Melbourne Group Inc v Minister for Planning (2008) 23 VR 605; [2008] VSCA 217
King v Muriniti [2018] NSWCA 98
Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39
Majindi v The Northern Territory of Australia (2012) 31 NTLR 150; [2012] NTSC 25
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40
Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164; [2019] HCA 25
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; [1998] HCA 11
Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155
Randall v Chief of Army [2018] ADFDAT 3
SZIED v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1347
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2009) 179 FCR 437; [2009] FCA 757
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 43 Date of hearing: 11 September 2020 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D McLure SC and Mr J Streit Solicitor for the Applicant: Turks Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Ms E Longbottom QC Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
QUD 300 of 2019 BETWEEN: PETER ALLEN RANDALL
Applicant
AND: CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 SEPTEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent’s objections to evidence made in written submissions filed on 19 August 2020 and in oral submissions of 11 September 2020 be resolved in accordance with the attached reasons for decision.
2.The respondent pay the applicant his costs of…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1327
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the respondent's objections to the admissibility of the restricted court martial material were not substantiated. It held that the restricted court martial material was relevant to the applicant's claims, particularly in establishing whether the decision-maker failed to take into account information that was readily available and centrally relevant. The court reasoned that the applicant's case that the termination decision was based on the same or substantially the same grounds as those for which he was acquitted in the restricted court martial could only be substantiated if the restricted court martial material was admitted. The court further held that the material could be admitted provisionally for the purpose of assessing the legal unreasonableness ground of the judicial review application. The court also rejected the respondent's argument that the restricted court martial material could not be admitted as evidence of facts in dispute in the restricted court martial. Instead, the applicant relied on the existence of the restricted court martial and the acquittal of the charges as evidence that the termination decision was based on the same or substantially the same grounds.
The court ordered that the respondent's objections to the admissibility of the restricted court martial material be resolved in accordance with the reasons for decision. The court further ordered that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the case management hearing of 11 September 2020.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s objections to evidence made in written submissions filed on 19 August 2020 and in oral submissions of 11 September 2020 be resolved in accordance with the attached reasons for decision.
2. The respondent pay the applicant his costs of and incidental to the case management hearing of 11 September 2020, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant submitted, in summary:·Contrary to the submissions of the respondent, it is not the applicant’s case that ground 1 hinges on whether ground 2 is accepted. ·In any event, the ADJR Act confines the relevant grounds on which the applicant can rely. ·No reason has been advanced by the respondent why, where the responding party disputes the ultimate issue, the evidence on which the moving party seeks to rely should be admitted on a provisional basis.·The reason the applicant has put forward the RCM material was because the respondent disputed the proposition running through all of the grounds, namely that the termination decision was based on the same or substantially the same grounds on which he was charged and acquitted.·The applicant does not ask the Court to engage in a merits review of the termination decision – rather, the applicant anticipated taking the Court through the RCM material to make good the proposition that the applicant was terminated on the same, or substantially the same, grounds on which he had been tried and acquitted in the RCM proceedings.·In relation to ss 91 and 93 of the Evidence Act, the applicant does not rely on the evidence given in the RCM as evidence of facts in dispute in that court martial (for example, in respect of some particular explanation for why the applicant accessed an email account, or that he had been authorised to do so). Rather, the applicant relies on evidence that there was a RCM, which involved charges that corresponded identically with the grounds of termination and that led to the acquittal of the applicant of those charges.·In relation to the legal unreasonableness ground, it is uncontroversial that the admissibility of the RCM material can be demonstrated if the moving party can establish that the evidence was readily available and centrally relevant. In order for the Court to evaluate the applicant’s contention about that point, the Court needs to have the evidence before it to decide whether the RCM material is centrally relevant.CONSIDERATION In my view the respondent’s objections to the admissibility of the RCM material are not substantiated. I have formed this view for the following reasons. First, I reject the contention of the respondent that the RCM material is irrelevant in the context of the judicial review application before the Court. It is common ground that a decision may be legally unreasonable if the decision-maker failed to take into account information that the decision-maker knew (or ought reasonably to have known) was readily available and centrally relevant. The leading authority on this point appears to be the decision of Wilcox J in Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-170, where his Honour said:I have been unable to find any discussion in the authorities of this question, possibly because the facts will often be clear. Consequently, I express no more than a tentative view. But in principle, as it seems to me, the intermediate position is correct. Under s 5(l)(e) and s 5(2)(g) the court is concerned with the manner of exercise of the power. A power is exercised in an improper manner if, upon the material before the decision-maker, it is a decision to which no reasonable person could come. Equally, it is exercised in an improper manner if the decision-maker makes his decision – which perhaps in itself, reasonably reflects the material before him – in a manner so devoid of any plausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken this course, for example by unreasonably failing to ascertain relevant facts which he knew to be readily available to him. The circumstances under which a decision will be invalid for failure to inquire are, I think, strictly limited. It is no part of the duty of the decision-maker to make the applicant's case for him. It is not enough that the court find that the sounder course would have been to make inquiries. But, in a case where it is obvious that material is readily available which is centrally relevant to the decision to be made, it seems to me that to proceed to a decision without making any attempt to obtain that information may properly be described as an exercise of the decision-making power in a manner so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have so exercised it. It would follow that the court, on judicial review, should receive evidence as to the existence and nature of that information.(Emphasis added.)