Rana v Chief of Army (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rana v Chief of Army (No 2) [2008] FCA 1555

RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA v CHIEF OF ARMY

SAD 124 OF 2008

MANSFIELD J
20 OCTOBER 2008
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 124 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA
Appellant

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 OCTOBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal against the making of a sequestration order over the estate of the appellant on 13 August 2008 is dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 124 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA
Appellant

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

20 OCTOBER 2008

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant was made bankrupt by order of a Federal Magistrate on 13 August 2008:  see Chief of Army v Rana (No 2) [2008] FMCA 1134. This is an appeal from that decision.

  2. The sequestration order was made on the petition of the respondent, and based upon an act of bankruptcy involving a failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice served upon him in respect of a debt of $7,582.86.  That sum represented the costs of the respondent in an earlier action in this Court in which the appellant’s application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act) to review two decisions of the respondent were refused: see Rana v Chief of Army [2005] FCA 1283 (the 2005 decision).

  3. The first of the two decisions which was sought to be reviewed was a decision that, at the time of the appellant’s discharge from the Australian Army on 13 July 1982, grounds did not exist whereby he could have been discharged because of physical or mental incapacity to perform his duties. The second of those decisions was again a decision of the respondent by a delegate by letter of 28 April 2002 not to amend the reason for the appellant’s retirement from the Australian Army in the central Army records. The appellant had asked that his record of discharge be amended pursuant to s 44(2) of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (the Defence Act) as then in force, to have those records altered to record that, at the time of his discharge, he was medically unfit for duties. The appellant was in fact discharged from the Army on the ground of his “retention not being in the interest of Australia or the Army”, pursuant to Australian Military Regulation 176(1)(n). Underlying those applications under the ADJR Act, was the appellant’s desire to be eligible for benefits under the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth).

  4. The 2005 decision was affirmed by the Full Court of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Rana v Chief of Army (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1555
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Rana v Chief of Army (No 2) involves an appeal by the appellant against the making of a sequestration order over his estate by the Federal Magistrate. The dispute centres around the appellant's contention that the sequestration order should not have been made, arguing that the application was an abuse of process and that there were other sufficient causes to dismiss the petition under section 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Magistrate erred in making the sequestration order and whether the appellant's application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal should be accepted.

The court examined the appellant's application to adduce fresh evidence, which included medical reports and affidavits intended to show error on the part of the Federal Magistrate. The court determined that this fresh evidence was not admissible as it could not establish fraud or misleading conduct by the respondent in the decision-making process. The court also reviewed the Federal Magistrate's decision, which was based on the satisfaction that an act of bankruptcy had been committed and that the formal requirements for a sequestration order were met. The Federal Magistrate had considered the appellant's submissions but found them insufficient to dismiss the petition.

The court concluded that the Federal Magistrate's decision was sound and that the appeal should be dismissed. The fresh evidence was deemed irrelevant to establishing error on the part of the Federal Magistrate, and the existing evidence supported the making of the sequestration order. Consequently, the appeal against the sequestration order was dismissed.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal against the making of a sequestration order over the estate of the appellant on 13 August 2008 is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal against the making of a sequestration order over the estate of the appellant on 13 August 2008 is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There are 14 grounds of appeal in the amended notice of appeal, which the appellant has variously addressed in four written summaries of argument or outlines of contention, and orally at the hearing of the appeal. Those grounds to a significant extent overlap, or are repetitive to a degree, and I shall group them when considering them.FRESH EVIDENCE ON APPEAL Before doing so, it is necessary to address the appellant’s application to adduce fresh evidence on the appeal. The fresh evidence was contained as annexures to two affidavits of the appellant of 5 September 2008 and 2 October 2008. In addition, those affidavits make argumentative assertions as to the basis upon which that material might demonstrate error on the part of the Federal Magistrate in making a sequestration order. The affidavit of 2 October 2008 principally exhibits a medical report of Dr Jha dated 8 September 2008 addressed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and a report of Dr Miller of 10 July 2008. Those reports concern a claim for compensation against the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (MRCC) under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (SRC Act). The MRCC had refused an application for compensation made by the appellant to it in respect of injuries he alleged to have suffered in the course of his employment with the Australian Army. The appellant had sought review of its decision by the AAT. The MRCC had applied to have that application summarily dismissed by the AAT, under s 42B(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) because the appellant had unsuccessfully applied for compensation arising out of his Army service under the SRC Act on two earlier occasions, both to the primary decision maker and to the AAT. That AAT decision given on 1 July 2008 to refuse to summarily dismiss that application provides a basis for one of the grounds of appeal. I do not propose to receive the affidavit of 2 October 2008 containing Dr Jha’s report or Dr Miller’s report. That evidence may be relevant to the AAT proceeding. It may also have been relevant, if available, to the 2005 decision. I make no comment either way on that point. Even if it be assumed that the appellant on this appeal could endeavour to demonstrate that the 2005 decision was procured by the respondent by fraud or by misleading the Court, that medical evidence could not go towards establishing such conduct by the respondent. Its date makes that self-evidently so. The mere fact of different medical opinion now being available to that which was previously available to the delegate of the respondent (assuming it is different medical opinion in any significant degree) does not tend to show of fraud or deliberately misleading conduct in the decision making process or in the presentation of material to the Court leading to the 2005 decision. The other affidavit of 5 September 2008 exhibits a report of Professor Goldney, a psychiatrist, of 4 August 2008 and two reports of Dr Miller of 8 and 10 July 2008. For the same reasons, I do not propose to receive that material on this appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
Accordingly, I reject the appellant’s application to adduce fresh evidence on the appeal.THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE As is apparent from the Federal Magistrate’s reasons, his Honour was satisfied that an act of bankruptcy had been committed, and that the proof of the formal matters required by s 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act) had been established. The notice of opposition of the appellant to the bankruptcy and his submissions and supporting material focused upon enlivening the discretion of the Court under s 52(2) of the Act to dismiss the bankruptcy petition. It relevantly provides that, if the Court is satisfied by the debtor that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made, the Court may dismiss the petition. The Federal Magistrate identified from all of the appellant’s materials that the “other sufficient cause” arose from four circumstances:(1)the existence of other proceedings currently before the Court in actions SAD.111 of 2007 and SAD.12 of 2008 which would justify the Court in not making the sequestration order;(2)the appellant had no assets and there was therefore no utility in making a sequestration order;(3)the application for a sequestration order was an abuse of process; and(4)the application for the sequestration order should be stayed pending resolution of High Court proceedings. The High Court proceedings to which the appellant referred were, according to the Federal Magistrate, an application for special leave to appeal instituted in respect of the decision of the Full Court of this Court given on 12 May 2006 to set aside that decision, that is the decision referred to in [4] above. In fact, on 16 July 2008 that application for special leave to appeal was refused. Consequently, the appellant did not pursue on the appeal the fourth of those matters. In addition to the three other matters which the appellant identified in his notice of opposition to the bankruptcy petition, and in his submissions and affidavit evidence on the notice of opposition, the Federal Magistrate also identified, apparently from the course of submissions, the claim that the sequestration application should not have been made because, in addition to the costs arising from the 2005 decision, there was a later order for costs made against the appellant in favour of the respondent and that both orders for costs should have been included in the bankruptcy notice. That is simply erroneous. A creditor who has obtained a judgment against a debtor, and then a subsequent judgment against a debtor for a different amount, may issue a bankruptcy notice in respect of only one of those judgment liabilities. I do not need to address that contention further. The legal action referred to as ADG.123 of 2007 was an application in the Federal Magistrates Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice. That application had been dismissed by judgment given on 22 April 2008: Rana v Chief of Army [2008] FMCA 518. The appellant appealed from that decision. Following his bankruptcy, the trustee has discontinued that appeal. I have, on the same date as this judgment, ruled that the discontinuance of that appeal has been effective in bringing it to an end. I refer to those reasons for doing so. I also will not repeat the grounds upon which the application to set aside the bankruptcy order was made, and the reasons for the decision of the Federal Magistrate rejecting the claim. They are set out in the Federal Magistrate’s judgment. In the sequestration order proceeding, the Federal Magistrate adhered to the views expressed in his earlier reasons for refusing to set aside the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J