Rana v Chief of Army

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rana v Chief of Army [2008] FCA 1554

BANKRUPTCY – appeal against refusal to set aside bankruptcy notice – subsequent to instigation of appeal the appellant becomes bankrupt – whether application to set aside bankruptcy notice and appeal are claims in respect of personal injury or wrong to the appellant so that the appeal may be pursued under s 60(4) Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) when trustee in bankruptcy has purported to discontinue the appeal – held – appeal discontinued

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 60, 60(2), 60(4)

Rana v Chief of Army [2008] FCA 518
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124
Evans v Hi Fert Pty Ltd [2003] SASC 186
Cole v Challenge Bank Ltd [2002] FCAFC 700
Rana v Chief of Army [2005] FCA 1283
Rana v Chief of Army Staff [2006] FCAFC 63
Rana v Kiefel [2008] HCASL 56
Faulkner v Bluett (1980) 52 FLR 115
Griffiths v Civil Aviation Authority (1996) 67 FCR 301
Cox v Journeaux (1935) 52 CLR 713
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) 75 FCR 545
Griffiths v Civil Aviation Authority (1996) 67 FCR 301
Daemar v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (1988) 12 NSWLR 45
Fitzpatrick v Keelty [2008] FCA 35

RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA v CHIEF OF ARMY

SAD 49 OF 2008

MANSFIELD J
20 OCTOBER 2008
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 49 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA
Appellant

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 OCTOBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT DETERMINES THAT:

1.The appeal has been discontinued by the trustee in bankruptcy of the appellant.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 49 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA
Appellant

AND:

CHIEF OF ARMY
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

20 OCTOBER 2008

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This appeal is from a decision of a Federal Magistrate dismissing the appellant’s application to set aside a bankruptcy notice:  Rana v Chief of Army [2008] FCA 518. For present purposes, the appeal presently raises the short point whether, under s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act), the appellant can maintain the appeal. It arises because, after the appeal was instituted, the appellant became bankrupt on 13 August 2008.

  2. Section 60(2) of the Act provides:

    An action commenced by a person who subsequently becomes a bankrupt is, upon his or her becoming a bankrupt, stayed until the trustee makes election, in writing, to prosecute or discontinue the action.

  3. The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, as trustee of the appellant’s estate, discontinued this appeal by notice of 10 September 2008. Hence, subject to the point arising under s 60(4) of the Act, the…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1554
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Rana v Chief of Army concerns an appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court which dismissed the appellant’s application to set aside a bankruptcy notice. The appellant, who had previously been unsuccessful in his judicial review proceedings against the Chief of Army, sought to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the grounds of wanton prosecution, his claim for compensation from the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, a larger claim against the respondent, and unresolved proceedings in the High Court. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the appeal, which was from a decision refusing to set aside a bankruptcy notice, was in respect of any personal injury or wrong done to the appellant within the meaning of s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The court held that the appeal did not fall within s 60(4) because the damages or part of them were not to be estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his mind, body or character and without reference to his rights of property. The court distinguished between claims which were referable to a bankrupt’s financial and property rights and claims which were for damages estimated by immediate reference to injuries sustained by the bankrupt.

The court’s reasoning was based on a review of relevant authorities, including Faulkner v Bluett, Griffiths v Civil Aviation Authority, and Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The court held that the appeal was not preserved by s 60(4) and that the appellant’s bankruptcy had resulted in the discontinuation of the appeal by the trustee. The court rejected the appellant’s attempts to adduce fresh evidence on the hearing of the appeal, holding that it did not inform the application of s 60(4) and that it was not necessary to decide whether the evidence should be received as fresh evidence on the appeal if it were to proceed. The court also rejected the appellant’s contention that the appeal was a collateral attack on the reliability of the delegate of the respondent whose decisions were subject to judicial review in the earlier proceedings. The court held that the material did not inform the application of s 60(4) and that it was not necessary to decide whether the material should be received as fresh evidence on the appeal if it were to proceed.

The outcome of the appeal was that it was dismissed, and the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court was affirmed. The court held that the bankruptcy notice should not be set aside and that the appeal was not in respect of any personal injury or wrong done to the appellant within the meaning of s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The court also held that the appeal was discontinued by the appellant’s bankruptcy and that the trustee had no power to continue it. The court rejected the appellant’s attempts to adduce fresh evidence and to rely on a collateral attack on the reliability of the delegate of the respondent. The court’s decision was based on a careful analysis of the relevant authorities and a rejection of the appellant’s arguments.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

It is common ground that the institution of the appeal from the judgment of the Federal Magistrate is the commencing of an action to which s 60(4) may apply if the appeal is in respect of any personal injury or wrong done to the appellant: see s 60(5), and Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124; Evans v Hi Fert Pty Ltd [2003] SASC 186 at [24] per Duggan J; Cole v Challenge Bank Ltd [2002] FCAFC 700 (Cole). (I mention that the appellant relied on Cole to support his contention that such an appeal as the present falls within s 60(4), but no such issue arose in that case.)Background to the issue On 14 September 2005 a proceeding by the appellant under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1975 (Cth) against the respondent seeking to review two decisions of the respondent was dismissed with costs: Rana v Chief of Army [2005] FCA 1283. The costs of that proceeding were taxed at $7,582.86 and a certificate of taxation issued on 8 December 2005. That decision was affirmed on appeal: Rana v Chief of Army Staff [2006] FCAFC 63. The appellant’s attempts to relitigate the issue arising in that proceeding in the High Court were unsuccessful: Rana v Kiefel [2008] HCASL 56. The challenged decisions of the respondent concerned the recorded ground upon which the appellant was discharged from the Australian Army in 1982. If the appellant had succeeded in having his discharge recorded as related to his physical or mental capacity to perform his duties, then his eligibility to benefits under the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) may have arisen. On the basis of the debt arising from the certificate of taxation of costs at $7,582.86, a bankruptcy notice directed to the appellant was issued on 10 May 2007, and was served on him. On 21 May 2007, the appellant applied to the Federal Magistrates Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice. His application was dismissed by a Registrar of that Court on 10 July 2007. That decision was reviewed by a Federal Magistrate who (as noted above) also dismissed the application. Hence this appeal. The appellant emphasised that this appeal is by way of rehearing. That does not alter its essential character. It is still an appeal from a decision refusing to set aside a bankruptcy notice. Accepting that, on the appeal (if it is alive) the Court’s task is to reconsider, on the materials before the Federal Magistrate, whether the bankruptcy notice should be set aside, the question at present is a more confined one. It is whether the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice, and the appeal on that issue, is in respect of any personal injury or wrong done to the appellant. The grounds of the application of 21 May 2007 were fourfold:(1)“the grounds of wanton (sic) prosecution”;(2)the appellant is seeking compensation from the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (MRCC) for illness which was “significantly contributed” to by his service in the Australian Army “dating back to August 1981”;(3)the appellant has a larger claim against the respondent (disputed by the respondent) than the debt referred to in the bankruptcy notice; and(4)the appellant’s proceedings in the High Court challenging the outcome of the proceedings referred to in [8] above had not been resolved.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

The proceedings in the High Court, even if they be regarded as an application to set aside the judgment including the costs order referred to in [8] above, were not shown to have strong prospects of success (they have since been dismissed) and were not accompanied by any application to stay the operation of the costs order. So, in the exercise of that Court’s discretion, it was not appropriate to set aside the bankruptcy notice or to extend time to comply with it.CONSIDERATION The appellant has sought to adduce on the hearing of the appeal fresh evidence, presented through two affidavits, exhibiting medical evidence. I do not consider that material can inform the application of s 60(4), although it might otherwise touch upon the appeal if it were to proceed. I do not need to decide that question. He also sought to rely on a further affidavit as supporting a “collateral attack” on the reliability of the delegate of the respondent whose decisions were subject to judicial review in the proceeding referred to in [8] above, and apparently also relating to the prospects of success of the third claim referred to in [17] above. Again, I do not consider that material can inform the application of s 60(4), and I do not need to decide whether – if the appeal were to proceed – it should be received as fresh evidence on the appeal. The appellant’s written outline of submissions did not address the question of whether s 60(4) preserves the appeal, or whether in the light of his bankruptcy the trustee has discontinued it. Nor did he develop oral submissions on the issue other than to describe it as a “smokescreen”, except to refer to Faulkner v Bluett (1980) 52 FLR 115 and Griffiths v Civil Aviation Authority (1996) 67 FCR 301 and to make some observations on those cases. In Cox v Journeaux (1935) 52 CLR 713 at 721 Dixon J said of s 63(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924-1933 (Cth) – which was relevantly in the same terms as s 60(4) of the Act:The test appears to be whether the damages or part of them are to be estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his mind, body or character and without reference to his rights of property (Wilson v United Counties Bank. (1)). Section 60(4) was the subject of the decision of the Full Court (Lockhart, O’Loughlin and Merkel JJ) in Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) 75 FCR 545. Lockhart J at 550 said that the categorisation of an appeal depends upon the categorisation of the action itself which gave rise to the judgment. In that case, the appeal was from the summary dismissal of an application which his Honour described (at 554) as related to proprietary claims to property which would pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. In the joint judgment of O’Loughlin and Merkel JJ at 561-564, their Honours reviewed a number of authorities on the scope of s 60(4) of the Act. I respectfully adopt their Honours’ analysis, which included reference to Faulkner v Bluett. As might be expected, the cases recognise a distinction between claims which are referable to a bankrupt’s financial and property rights (so the loss, if established, is to the property or estate of the bankrupt) and claims which are for damages estimated by immediate reference to injuries sustained by the bankrupt. Faulkner v Bluett is an illustration of the first of those categories.