FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rana v Chief of Army [2008] FCA 1554
BANKRUPTCY – appeal against refusal to set aside bankruptcy notice – subsequent to instigation of appeal the appellant becomes bankrupt – whether application to set aside bankruptcy notice and appeal are claims in respect of personal injury or wrong to the appellant so that the appeal may be pursued under s 60(4) Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) when trustee in bankruptcy has purported to discontinue the appeal – held – appeal discontinued
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 60, 60(2), 60(4)
Rana v Chief of Army [2008] FCA 518
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124
Evans v Hi Fert Pty Ltd [2003] SASC 186
Cole v Challenge Bank Ltd [2002] FCAFC 700
Rana v Chief of Army [2005] FCA 1283
Rana v Chief of Army Staff [2006] FCAFC 63
Rana v Kiefel [2008] HCASL 56
Faulkner v Bluett (1980) 52 FLR 115
Griffiths v Civil Aviation Authority (1996) 67 FCR 301
Cox v Journeaux (1935) 52 CLR 713
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) 75 FCR 545
Griffiths v Civil Aviation Authority (1996) 67 FCR 301
Daemar v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (1988) 12 NSWLR 45
Fitzpatrick v Keelty [2008] FCA 35RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA v CHIEF OF ARMY
SAD 49 OF 2008
MANSFIELD J
20 OCTOBER 2008
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 49 OF 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA
AppellantAND:
CHIEF OF ARMY
Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 OCTOBER 2008
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT DETERMINES THAT:
1.The appeal has been discontinued by the trustee in bankruptcy of the appellant.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 49 OF 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
RANJIT SHAMSHER JUNG BAHADUR RANA
AppellantAND:
CHIEF OF ARMY
Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
20 OCTOBER 2008
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This appeal is from a decision of a Federal Magistrate dismissing the appellant’s application to set aside a bankruptcy notice: Rana v Chief of Army [2008] FCA 518. For present purposes, the appeal presently raises the short point whether, under s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act), the appellant can maintain the appeal. It arises because, after the appeal was instituted, the appellant became bankrupt on 13 August 2008.
Section 60(2) of the Act provides:
An action commenced by a person who subsequently becomes a bankrupt is, upon his or her becoming a bankrupt, stayed until the trustee makes election, in writing, to prosecute or discontinue the action.
The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, as trustee of the appellant’s estate, discontinued this appeal by notice of 10 September 2008. Hence, subject to the point arising under s 60(4) of the Act, the…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 1554
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court’s reasoning was based on a review of relevant authorities, including Faulkner v Bluett, Griffiths v Civil Aviation Authority, and Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The court held that the appeal was not preserved by s 60(4) and that the appellant’s bankruptcy had resulted in the discontinuation of the appeal by the trustee. The court rejected the appellant’s attempts to adduce fresh evidence on the hearing of the appeal, holding that it did not inform the application of s 60(4) and that it was not necessary to decide whether the evidence should be received as fresh evidence on the appeal if it were to proceed. The court also rejected the appellant’s contention that the appeal was a collateral attack on the reliability of the delegate of the respondent whose decisions were subject to judicial review in the earlier proceedings. The court held that the material did not inform the application of s 60(4) and that it was not necessary to decide whether the material should be received as fresh evidence on the appeal if it were to proceed.
The outcome of the appeal was that it was dismissed, and the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court was affirmed. The court held that the bankruptcy notice should not be set aside and that the appeal was not in respect of any personal injury or wrong done to the appellant within the meaning of s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The court also held that the appeal was discontinued by the appellant’s bankruptcy and that the trustee had no power to continue it. The court rejected the appellant’s attempts to adduce fresh evidence and to rely on a collateral attack on the reliability of the delegate of the respondent. The court’s decision was based on a careful analysis of the relevant authorities and a rejection of the appellant’s arguments.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MANSFIELD J
The proceedings in the High Court, even if they be regarded as an application to set aside the judgment including the costs order referred to in [8] above, were not shown to have strong prospects of success (they have since been dismissed) and were not accompanied by any application to stay the operation of the costs order. So, in the exercise of that Court’s discretion, it was not appropriate to set aside the bankruptcy notice or to extend time to comply with it.CONSIDERATION The appellant has sought to adduce on the hearing of the appeal fresh evidence, presented through two affidavits, exhibiting medical evidence. I do not consider that material can inform the application of s 60(4), although it might otherwise touch upon the appeal if it were to proceed. I do not need to decide that question. He also sought to rely on a further affidavit as supporting a “collateral attack” on the reliability of the delegate of the respondent whose decisions were subject to judicial review in the proceeding referred to in [8] above, and apparently also relating to the prospects of success of the third claim referred to in [17] above. Again, I do not consider that material can inform the application of s 60(4), and I do not need to decide whether – if the appeal were to proceed – it should be received as fresh evidence on the appeal. The appellant’s written outline of submissions did not address the question of whether s 60(4) preserves the appeal, or whether in the light of his bankruptcy the trustee has discontinued it. Nor did he develop oral submissions on the issue other than to describe it as a “smokescreen”, except to refer to Faulkner v Bluett (1980) 52 FLR 115 and Griffiths v Civil Aviation Authority (1996) 67 FCR 301 and to make some observations on those cases. In Cox v Journeaux (1935) 52 CLR 713 at 721 Dixon J said of s 63(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924-1933 (Cth) – which was relevantly in the same terms as s 60(4) of the Act:The test appears to be whether the damages or part of them are to be estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his mind, body or character and without reference to his rights of property (Wilson v United Counties Bank. (1)). Section 60(4) was the subject of the decision of the Full Court (Lockhart, O’Loughlin and Merkel JJ) in Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1997) 75 FCR 545. Lockhart J at 550 said that the categorisation of an appeal depends upon the categorisation of the action itself which gave rise to the judgment. In that case, the appeal was from the summary dismissal of an application which his Honour described (at 554) as related to proprietary claims to property which would pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. In the joint judgment of O’Loughlin and Merkel JJ at 561-564, their Honours reviewed a number of authorities on the scope of s 60(4) of the Act. I respectfully adopt their Honours’ analysis, which included reference to Faulkner v Bluett. As might be expected, the cases recognise a distinction between claims which are referable to a bankrupt’s financial and property rights (so the loss, if established, is to the property or estate of the bankrupt) and claims which are for damages estimated by immediate reference to injuries sustained by the bankrupt. Faulkner v Bluett is an illustration of the first of those categories.