MR S.R. NORRISH, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR S.J. ODGERS, for the applicant. (instructed by T. Murphy, General Manager, Legal Services, Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales)

MR P.C. BANNON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.P. BOOTH, for the respondent. (instructed by S.E. O’Connor, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)

MR NORRISH: If Your Honours please, this is another matter where an enlargement of time or an order for an enlargement of time is required.

BRENNAN J: What do you say about it, Mr Bannon?

MR BANNON: No, it is not opposed, Your Honour.

BRENNAN J: The time will be extended, Mr Norrish.

MR NORRISH: Yes, thank you, Your Honours. If it please the Court, this application raises matters of importance warranting the grant of special leave in what we would respectfully submit are three areas. Firstly, whether a direction of the type disapproved in Robinson v The Queen and Stafford v The Queen is a fundamental error such as to preclude application of the proviso. Secondly, what is a fundamental error as referred to by the majority of this Court in Wilde v The Queen? Thirdly, whether this Court should resolve any conflict in the judgments between the majority in Glennon v The Queen and the minority, in that case, as to what is a fundamental error such as to preclude the application of the proviso.

In this matter the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the direction complained of ought not to be given and the trial judge was in error and, we would respectfully submit, there can be no doubt, having regard to what this Court said in Robinson and later in Stafford that no direction should be given that asks the jury to assess the evidence by reference to the interest of the relevant witness to the outcome of the proceedings.

BRENNAN J: But, it is a real question, is it not, whether there was any real divergence from what Robinson requires in this case?

MR NORRISH: I am sorry, Your Honour, I did not quite hear.

BRENNAN J: It would be a question, would it not, though I say so with respect to the Court of Criminal Appeal, whether there was any real divergence from the requirement of Robinson in this case?

MR NORRISH: Your Honours, what happened in this case was that - as I understand I was not counsel at the trial - counsel put a submission to the jury that the complainant had a motive to lie or a reason not…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ramey v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Ramey v The Queen [1994] HCATrans 62
Case: [1994] HCATrans 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Ramey, against his conviction for murder. The applicant had been found guilty of murder by a jury in the Supreme Court of Queensland and subsequently appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of Queensland, which dismissed his appeal. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence and the directions given to the jury by the trial judge.

The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of the applicant's prior convictions and whether the judge's directions to the jury regarding the use of this evidence were adequate. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of prior convictions outweighed its probative value, and if so, whether the jury was properly instructed to disregard the prejudicial aspects and consider the evidence only for its limited, relevant purpose.

The High Court held that the admission of evidence of prior convictions was improper and that the judge's directions were insufficient to mitigate the prejudice to the applicant. The court reasoned that the prior convictions were not sufficiently similar to the present charge to be admissible as evidence of a system or pattern, and their admission was likely to have led the jury to infer guilt based on the applicant's past conduct rather than the evidence presented in relation to the current offence. The legal principle applied was that evidence of prior convictions is generally inadmissible unless it possesses a strong probative value in relation to a specific issue in the current trial, and even then, careful directions are required to prevent unfair prejudice.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders