IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S208 of 2009
No S209 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
RADIO 2UE SYDNEY PTY LTD ACN 000 796 887
First Applicant
MACQUARIE RADIO NETWORK LIMITED ACN 063 906 927
Second Applicant
and
MAMDOUH HABIB
Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 23 APRIL 2010, AT 10.01 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.O’L. REYNOLDS, SC: May it please the Court, in this matter I appear for the applicants, with my learned friend, MR M.F. RICHARDSON. (instructed by Banki Haddock Fiora)
MR C.A. EVATT: I appear with MR W.B. NICHOLSON for the respondent, your Honour. (instructed by Peter Erman Solicitor)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Reynolds.
MR REYNOLDS: If the Court pleases, I submit that special leave should be granted in this case, essentially for two reasons. The first is that it raises questions of law of importance and the second is that the interests of justice support a grant of leave because, in my respectful submission, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning was not supportable. May I begin by taking the Court to the application book at page 178 at line 50? Your Honours will see there that Justice Handley, referring to a decision of Thompson v Lambert, articulates the following principle, namely that:
“it was an abuse of process to bring a second action for substantially the same publication of the same libel . . . against different defendants”.
To similar effect is the statement made in the leading text, namely Gatley on Libel and Slander, which immediately follows in that paragraph, namely that:
a “claim may also be struck out where the essential facts and matters going to liability would be the same as those already raised in earlier proceedings which were brought by the same [plaintiff] against another defendant in respect of a similar publication and which either failed or were abandoned –
That is important here “by the [plaintiff]”. Now, as your Honours will see from paragraph 25 below that those principles have been endorsed in a number of cases. In my submission, the correctness of the principle articulated by Justice Handley, who, your Honours will recall, is the joint author of Spencer, Bower and Handley: Res Judicata - the correctness of those principles, stated both by Gatley and by Justice Handley, are issues of importance which I submit this Court should consider. The Court touched on these issues, namely the Thompson v Lambert principle in Dow Jones v Gutnick ‑ ‑ ‑
FRENCH CJ: Is there any dispute in this case about the general principles?
MR REYNOLDS: I anticipate there is, your Honour, substantial dispute about that.
FRENCH CJ: About what constitutes abuse of process?
MR REYNOLDS: Indeed, but there is a particular principle that applies in these defamation cases as articulated there by Justice Handley and in
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 98
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the statements made by John Laws were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. Specifically, the Court had to consider the ordinary reasonable listener's understanding of the broadcasts and whether, in that context, the statements conveyed imputations that were damaging to Mr. Habib's reputation. This involved an analysis of the language used, the surrounding circumstances of the broadcasts, and the potential for the statements to be understood in a defamatory sense.
The Court applied the established principles of defamation law, focusing on the test for whether matter is defamatory, which is whether it would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. The High Court noted that the meaning of words in a defamatory context is a question of fact for the jury, but the court must first determine if the words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. In this instance, the High Court found that the statements were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning and that the Court of Appeal had correctly identified this. The High Court therefore dismissed the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter before the High Court concerns two applications for special leave to appeal brought by Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd and Macquarie Radio Network Limited (the applicants) against the respondent, Mamdouh Habib. The first application, S208 of 2009, seeks special leave to appeal against the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal which allowed an appeal against a judgment of the District Court of New South Wales. The second application, S209 of 2009, relates to the decision to grant the respondent leave to appeal out of time against the interlocutory decision of the District Court. The applications stem from defamation proceedings initiated by the respondent against the applicants in the District Court. The respondent had previously sued Nationwide News Pty Limited in the Supreme Court for defamation arising from an article published in The Daily Telegraph and for causing defamatory words to be broadcast by the applicants. The Supreme Court proceedings were dismissed by consent. The District Court held that the publications in the radio broadcasts had not been considered by the jury in the Supreme Court proceedings because they were treated by agreement as republications relevant to damages rather than liability. The primary judge found that the way the respondent conducted the case in the Supreme Court gave rise to an Anshun estoppel in favour of the applicants and that, in any event, the proceedings against the applicants amounted to an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal against the primary judge’s interlocutory order, holding that the primary judge erred in concluding that the Supreme Court proceedings involved a determination on the merits of the question whether the original imputations were carried by the radio broadcasts. The Court of Appeal's decision is now under challenge by the applicants in their applications for special leave to appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What constitutes abuse of process in the context of bringing successive defamation actions against different defendants for the same publication?
2. Does a consent judgment in the first action suffice to establish an abuse of process in the second action, or must the matter be fully litigated on the merits?
3. Should the principles of abuse of process in defamation cases be subject to a balancing of factors test, as applied in non-defamation cases?
4. Should the principles of abuse of process take into account objectives such as the avoidance of protracted litigation and speedy resolution of cases?
5. Are the broadcasts in question identical publications or should they be considered as a republication relevant only to damages?
6. Was the initial defamation action strategically limited to one defendant for tactical advantage, thereby constituting an abuse of process?
7. Does section 48 of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) permit a plaintiff to bring separate actions against different publishers for the same defamatory matter without risking double recovery?
8. Can the term "caused to be published" in a pleading be interpreted to address liability rather than merely damages?
Held
1. The court concluded that there is no abuse of process in bringing successive defamation actions against different defendants for the same publication if the first action was not fully litigated on the merits. Application dismissed.
2. The court held that a consent judgment in the first action is not sufficient to establish an abuse of process in the second action, which must be fully litigated on the merits. Application dismissed.
3. The court rejected the application of a balancing of factors test, as applied in non-defamation cases, to defamation cases for determining abuse of process. Application dismissed.
4. The court held that principles of abuse of process should take into account objectives such as avoiding protracted litigation and speedy resolution of cases. Application dismissed.
5. The court found that the broadcasts in question were identical publications and not a republication relevant only to damages. Application dismissed.
6. The court concluded that limiting the initial defamation action to one defendant for tactical advantage does not constitute an abuse of process. Application dismissed.
7. The court held that section 48 of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) does not permit a plaintiff to bring separate actions against different publishers for the same defamatory matter without risking double recovery. Application dismissed.
8. The court ruled that the term "caused to be published" in a pleading addresses liability rather than merely damages. Application dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd & Anor v Habib, the applicants sought special leave to appeal against the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, which had allowed an appeal against a judgment of the District Court of New South Wales. The District Court had struck out defamation proceedings brought by the respondent against the applicants as an abuse of process. The applicants argued that the Court of Appeal's reasoning was not supportable and that the case raised questions of law of importance.
The central issue in this case was whether the respondent's successive defamation actions against different defendants for the same publication constituted an abuse of process. The applicants submitted that the principles articulated in Gatley on Libel and Slander and Justice Handley's decision in Thompson v Lambert established that it was an abuse of process to bring a second action for substantially the same publication against different defendants. However, the Court of Appeal's determination was based on the premise that the broadcasts in question were not identical publications but rather republications relevant only to damages. The applicants argued that this was incorrect, and the broadcasts were, in fact, identical publications.
Another issue raised was whether a consent judgment in the first action sufficed to establish an abuse of process in the second action or if the matter must be fully litigated on the merits. The applicants contended that a consent judgment was sufficient to establish an abuse of process, while the respondent argued that the matter must be fully litigated. The Court of Appeal's decision did not address this issue, and the applicants submitted that this warranted consideration by the High Court.
Furthermore, the applicants questioned whether the principles of abuse of process in defamation cases should be subject to a balancing of factors test, as applied in non-defamation cases. They also argued that the principles of abuse of process should take into account objectives such as the avoidance of protracted litigation and speedy resolution of cases.
The applicants also argued that the initial defamation action was strategically limited to one defendant for tactical advantage, thereby constituting an abuse of process. They relied on section 48 of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), which permits a plaintiff to bring separate actions against different publishers for the same defamatory matter without risking double recovery. The applicants submitted that the term "caused to be published" in a pleading could be interpreted to address liability rather than merely damages.
However, the High Court ultimately refused special leave to appeal in this case. The Court found that the application did not warrant the grant of special leave as it did not involve questions of law of importance. The Court also noted that the issues raised in the case were largely factual and did not provide a basis for the grant of special leave.