RACQ Insurance Limited v Foster

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

RACQ Insurance Limited v Foster [2018] QCA 252

PARTIES:

RACQ INSURANCE LIMITED
ABN 50 009 704 152
(appellant)
v
KAREN FOSTER
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 7600 of 2017
SC No 5017 of 2016

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2017] QSC 135 (Mullins J)

DELIVERED ON:

3 October 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

10 November 2017

JUDGES:

Gotterson and Morrison and Philippides JJA

ORDERS:

1.   The appeal is dismissed with costs.

2.   The cross appeal is dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT – FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURT – IN GENERAL – where the respondent was driving a bus in the course of her employment and a vehicle driven by the first defendant collided with the rear end of the bus – where the first defendant was insured by the appellant who was ordered to pay the respondent’s damages for personal injuries, loss and damage – where the appellant appeals against the primary judge’s finding that the respondent only had a slight residual work capacity – whether the primary judge’s finding that the respondent had a slight residual earning capacity was contrary to the evidence and constituted a misapprehension of the expert medical evidence

DAMAGES – MEASURE AND REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT – MEASURE OF DAMAGES – PERSONAL INJURIES – METHOD OF ASSESSMENT – GENERALLY– where the appellant appeals against the primary judge’s assessment of damages for diminution of earning capacity, for past and future care and for past economic loss – where the respondent cross appeals against the primary judge’s assessment of damages for diminution of earning capacity and the primary judge’s finding that the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) applied to the assessment of damages – whether as a result of the amendment in 2007 to s 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) the test espoused in Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] 1 Qd R 519 and applied in King v Parsons [2006] 2 Qd R 122 is no longer apposite – whether the Court in Farnham v Pruden [2017] 1 Qd R 128 was incorrect in holding that Newberry and King remain the definitive authorities as to the meaning of s 32 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – whether the trial judge erred in holding that the accident did not satisfy the test for injury in s 32 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) and therefore s 5(1)(b) of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) did not operate to exclude the respondent from receiving damages under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld)

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14B
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 5, s 5(1)(b), s 59
Criminal Code and Civil Liability Amendment Bill 2007 (Qld)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 149
Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld),…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCA 252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of RACQ Insurance Limited v Foster, the respondent sought damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, where her bus collided with a car driven by the first defendant. The appellant, RACQ Insurance Limited, insured the first defendant and was ordered to pay the respondent's damages. The appellant contested the decision on several grounds, including the primary judge's findings regarding the respondent's residual work capacity and the assessment of damages. The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the primary judge misapplied the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) in assessing damages and erred in determining the respondent's residual earning capacity.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge's finding that the respondent had only a slight residual work capacity was contrary to the evidence and constituted a misapprehension of the expert medical evidence. Additionally, the court had to decide if the trial judge erred in applying the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) to the assessment of damages and whether the 2007 amendment to s 5 of the Act changed the applicable legal principles. The court also considered if the primary judge's finding that the accident did not satisfy the test for injury in s 32 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) was correct.

The court found that the primary judge's findings were supported by the evidence presented, and there was no basis for the appeal to succeed. The appellant failed to demonstrate that the primary judge's findings were wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts or that the evidence was glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inference. The court held that the primary judge was correct in applying the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) to the assessment of damages and that the 2007 amendment did not alter the relevant legal principles. The court further found that the primary judge did not err in concluding that the accident did not satisfy the test for injury in s 32 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).

Accordingly, the appeal and the cross-appeal were dismissed, with both parties to bear their own costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

2. The cross appeal is dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent cross appealed on a number of grounds all of which were abandoned except for the contention that the primary judge erred:1.in finding that the CLA applied to the assessment of damages; and2.in the assessment of damages for diminution of earning capacity.The decision of the primary judge The respondent claimed damages as a result of injuries sustained due to the accident, namely soft tissue injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine and subsequently, a psychological injury being an adjustment disorder. The primary judge set out the respondent’s history. At the time of the accident, the respondent was 50 years of age and had been employed as a bus driver since 2009. She had not performed office roles since before 2000 (other than limited roles in 2012 and in 2014 while performing on a suitable duties plan).[1] The respondent returned to work in December 2014 and undertook light office duties. She was unable to return to driving a bus, as her general practitioner would not certify that she could drive a commercial vehicle and her employment was terminated in March 2015, after which she remained unemployed.[2][1]AB at 53-54 and 102.[2]Reasons at [10]. The respondent undertook various WorkCover and CTP rehabilitation programs. She underwent an 11 month rehabilitation program and a number of psychological counselling sessions with Ms Harrison (a clinical psychologist). In her report of January 2016, Ms Harrison described the respondent’s future prognosis as uncertain; she was continuing to experience chronic pain, but her symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress reduced over the course of the therapy. Ms Harrison was of the opinion the effectiveness of the psychological treatment was restricted because of the respondent’s chronic pain, lack of finances, ongoing sleep disruption and social withdrawal.[3] At her last session in January 2016, Ms Harrison described the respondent as presenting with low mood, reporting ongoing feelings of hopelessness, and describing “poor motivation, insomnia, ongoing pain, social isolation and frequent tearfulness”.[4] On the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales, the respondent scored extremely severe for depression, but normal for anxiety and stress.[5] Her Honour observed:[6]“Despite all the treatment and medication the [respondent] has had since the accident for the pain in her neck and lower back, the pain has persisted and [she] copes by managing her activities to avoid aggravating the pain. As a result, [she] stays at home, and spends a lot of time on her recliner chair.”[3]Reasons at [13].[4]AB at 339.[5]Reasons at [16].[6]Reasons at [17]. While, liability for the collision was admitted, her Honour considered it relevant to record the respondent’s evidence as to the movement of the vehicles in the course of the collision because of the appellant’s submissions as to the respondent’s tendency to exaggerate. The primary judge made the following observations relevant to the issue of the severity of the impact:[7]“The [respondent] described the impact of the first defendant’s sedan striking the bus as ‘very heavy’ and stated that ‘it was hit with high impact that actually pushed the bus to the side.’ The [respondent] estimated the weight of the bus as nine tonne and described that she was ‘holding the steering wheel trying to control the bus to make sure that it didn’t go out of control.’ In the course of the [respondent’s] evidence, the DVD (exhibit 5) that contains the CCTV footage from the bus that recorded the path of the bus, but also the path of the first defendant’s vehicle immediately before the collision, was played. The footage shows the first defendant’s vehicle travelling on the opposite side of the road towards the bus. The moment of impact is identifiable, as the [respondent] moves slightly in her seat and steers the bus closer to the kerb before stopping the bus. In the course of cross-examination, the [respondent] stated her belief that there were two impacts, namely when the vehicle first came across and ricocheted off the gutter hitting the front wheel of the bus and the vehicle then turns on its side and goes down and hits the back of the bus. The photographs in exhibit 3 of the damage to the bus show only damage on the driver’s side between the rear of the bus and the rear wheel. The [respondent] suggested in her evidence that on impact the bus moved sideways about half a metre. The movement of the bus at the point of impact that is identifiable on the footage from the [respondent’s] immediate reaction does not reflect such lateral movement and I would describe it in terms of a slight shudder. The [respondent’s] description of the accident and particularly the effect of the impact of the first defendant’s vehicle was exaggerated.”[7]Reasons at [8].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent argued that the basic error underlying the appellant’s argument was that it sought to obtain more favourable findings of fact on appeal, without attempting to meet the relevant tests[15] that the appellant must demonstrate the primary judge’s findings of fact were wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony being glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inference. In that regard, reliance was placed on de Jersey CJ’s statements in RACQ Insurance Limited v Brennan:[16]“It should in any event be remembered that an appeal court will be ‘particularly slow to reverse the trial judge on a question of the amount of damages’. Acknowledging that this primary Judge proceeded on a factual basis reasonably open, then proceeding to the next issue, on no view could this particular component be described as ‘a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered’, the criterion to be drawn from Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145, 148 per Gibbs J (quoting from Miller v Jennings (1954) 92 CLR 190, 195-6).”[15]Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679 at [43].[16][2013] QCA 150 at [25].Consideration The appellant referred to the evidence of Dr Johnson, a neurosurgeon, that there was no physical injury preventing the respondent’s return to work but rather it was her stated pain that prevented such a return. Emphasis was placed on his evidence that the respondent could return to work and was likely to be able to return to work (within a three to six month period) after she had undergone further treatment to address her maladaption to the injury actually suffered. However, Dr Johnson also gave evidence (as her Honour noted) that in the respondent’s current clinical state, the respondent “would be unlikely to maintain gainful employment due to her immobility secondary to her neck and back pain”.[17] His recommendation was that the respondent be provided with effective functional movement training to improve her work capacity and return to employment.[18] Dr Johnson’s assessment (which her Honour also took into account)[19] was that the respondent’s lumbosacral spine fell into DRE Lumbar Category 2 (with a six per cent whole person impairment) and the cervical spine fell into DRE Cervical Spine Category 2 (with a six per cent whole person impairment) resulting in a whole person impairment of 12 per cent. While, Dr Johnson accepted in cross examination that, based on the imaging and examination, there was no structural or physical injury of initial significance, he maintained that it was the respondent’s “symptoms of pain that were restricting her return to the workforce”.[20][17]Reasons at [26].[18]Reasons at [26], such a program was suggested as part of the respondent’s reasonable rehabilitation needs, but the appellant declined to fund it.[19]Reasons at [27].[20]Reasons at [27]. The appellant also referred to evidence, which was not rejected by the primary judge, of Dr Pincus, an orthopaedic surgeon, in his report of 13 January 2016 that the respondent’s injuries would not prevent her from working as a bus driver[21] and his rejection of any assertion that the respondent’s alleged pain and disability from pain resulted in an inability to work.[22] The primary judge noted that Dr Pincus accepted that his assessments of DRE categories measured “impairment and not necessarily work disability”.[23] Dr Pincus also accepted that he had not specifically considered the Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads’ requirements regarding the physical capacity of bus drivers when forming his opinion of the respondent’s employability.[24][21]AB at 638.[22]AB at 41.[23]Reasons at [37].[24]AB at 40-41.