SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
RACQ Insurance Limited v Foster [2018] QCA 252
PARTIES:
RACQ INSURANCE LIMITED
ABN 50 009 704 152
(appellant)
v
KAREN FOSTER
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 7600 of 2017
SC No 5017 of 2016DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2017] QSC 135 (Mullins J)DELIVERED ON:
3 October 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
10 November 2017
JUDGES:
Gotterson and Morrison and Philippides JJA
ORDERS:
1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
2. The cross appeal is dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT – FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURT – IN GENERAL – where the respondent was driving a bus in the course of her employment and a vehicle driven by the first defendant collided with the rear end of the bus – where the first defendant was insured by the appellant who was ordered to pay the respondent’s damages for personal injuries, loss and damage – where the appellant appeals against the primary judge’s finding that the respondent only had a slight residual work capacity – whether the primary judge’s finding that the respondent had a slight residual earning capacity was contrary to the evidence and constituted a misapprehension of the expert medical evidence
DAMAGES – MEASURE AND REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT – MEASURE OF DAMAGES – PERSONAL INJURIES – METHOD OF ASSESSMENT – GENERALLY– where the appellant appeals against the primary judge’s assessment of damages for diminution of earning capacity, for past and future care and for past economic loss – where the respondent cross appeals against the primary judge’s assessment of damages for diminution of earning capacity and the primary judge’s finding that the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) applied to the assessment of damages – whether as a result of the amendment in 2007 to s 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) the test espoused in Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] 1 Qd R 519 and applied in King v Parsons [2006] 2 Qd R 122 is no longer apposite – whether the Court in Farnham v Pruden [2017] 1 Qd R 128 was incorrect in holding that Newberry and King remain the definitive authorities as to the meaning of s 32 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – whether the trial judge erred in holding that the accident did not satisfy the test for injury in s 32 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) and therefore s 5(1)(b) of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) did not operate to exclude the respondent from receiving damages under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14B
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 5, s 5(1)(b), s 59
Criminal Code and Civil Liability Amendment Bill 2007 (Qld)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 149
Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld),…
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- Case
- [2018] QCA 252
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge's finding that the respondent had only a slight residual work capacity was contrary to the evidence and constituted a misapprehension of the expert medical evidence. Additionally, the court had to decide if the trial judge erred in applying the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) to the assessment of damages and whether the 2007 amendment to s 5 of the Act changed the applicable legal principles. The court also considered if the primary judge's finding that the accident did not satisfy the test for injury in s 32 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) was correct.
The court found that the primary judge's findings were supported by the evidence presented, and there was no basis for the appeal to succeed. The appellant failed to demonstrate that the primary judge's findings were wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts or that the evidence was glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inference. The court held that the primary judge was correct in applying the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) to the assessment of damages and that the 2007 amendment did not alter the relevant legal principles. The court further found that the primary judge did not err in concluding that the accident did not satisfy the test for injury in s 32 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).
Accordingly, the appeal and the cross-appeal were dismissed, with both parties to bear their own costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
2. The cross appeal is dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent argued that the basic error underlying the appellant’s argument was that it sought to obtain more favourable findings of fact on appeal, without attempting to meet the relevant tests[15] that the appellant must demonstrate the primary judge’s findings of fact were wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony being glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inference. In that regard, reliance was placed on de Jersey CJ’s statements in RACQ Insurance Limited v Brennan:[16]“It should in any event be remembered that an appeal court will be ‘particularly slow to reverse the trial judge on a question of the amount of damages’. Acknowledging that this primary Judge proceeded on a factual basis reasonably open, then proceeding to the next issue, on no view could this particular component be described as ‘a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered’, the criterion to be drawn from Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145, 148 per Gibbs J (quoting from Miller v Jennings (1954) 92 CLR 190, 195-6).”[15]Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679 at [43].[16][2013] QCA 150 at [25].Consideration The appellant referred to the evidence of Dr Johnson, a neurosurgeon, that there was no physical injury preventing the respondent’s return to work but rather it was her stated pain that prevented such a return. Emphasis was placed on his evidence that the respondent could return to work and was likely to be able to return to work (within a three to six month period) after she had undergone further treatment to address her maladaption to the injury actually suffered. However, Dr Johnson also gave evidence (as her Honour noted) that in the respondent’s current clinical state, the respondent “would be unlikely to maintain gainful employment due to her immobility secondary to her neck and back pain”.[17] His recommendation was that the respondent be provided with effective functional movement training to improve her work capacity and return to employment.[18] Dr Johnson’s assessment (which her Honour also took into account)[19] was that the respondent’s lumbosacral spine fell into DRE Lumbar Category 2 (with a six per cent whole person impairment) and the cervical spine fell into DRE Cervical Spine Category 2 (with a six per cent whole person impairment) resulting in a whole person impairment of 12 per cent. While, Dr Johnson accepted in cross examination that, based on the imaging and examination, there was no structural or physical injury of initial significance, he maintained that it was the respondent’s “symptoms of pain that were restricting her return to the workforce”.[20][17]Reasons at [26].[18]Reasons at [26], such a program was suggested as part of the respondent’s reasonable rehabilitation needs, but the appellant declined to fund it.[19]Reasons at [27].[20]Reasons at [27]. The appellant also referred to evidence, which was not rejected by the primary judge, of Dr Pincus, an orthopaedic surgeon, in his report of 13 January 2016 that the respondent’s injuries would not prevent her from working as a bus driver[21] and his rejection of any assertion that the respondent’s alleged pain and disability from pain resulted in an inability to work.[22] The primary judge noted that Dr Pincus accepted that his assessments of DRE categories measured “impairment and not necessarily work disability”.[23] Dr Pincus also accepted that he had not specifically considered the Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads’ requirements regarding the physical capacity of bus drivers when forming his opinion of the respondent’s employability.[24][21]AB at 638.[22]AB at 41.[23]Reasons at [37].[24]AB at 40-41.