SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 3903 of 2009
| CHRIS RACOVALIS & ORS | Applicants |
| v | |
| RESCOM MORTGAGES PTY LTD & ORS | Respondents |
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JUDGES: | HARPER JA and EMERTON AJA | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 5 March 2010 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 5 March 2010 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2010] VSCA 55 | |
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Application for leave to appeal a decision to set aside default judgment – Default judgment set aside on second application – ‘Final and conclusive’ – Abuse of process – County Court Act 1958 (Vic), s 73(1).
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellants | Mr P. Ehrlich | Diakou Faigen |
| For the Respondents | Mr J. Styring | Robert James |
HARPER JA:
EMERTON AJA:
This is an application on summons by the applicants pursuant to s 74(2D) of the County Court Act 1958 (Vic), seeking leave to appeal the decision of Judge Ginnane of 7 December 2009 in the County Court of Victoria. His Honour allowed a second application by the first respondent, Rescom Mortgages, to set aside a judgment in default of appearance entered against it by the applicants on 9 June 2009 (‘the default judgment’).
The application arises out of a proceeding commenced by the applicants on 21 May 2009 in the County Court of Victoria to recover loss and damage alleged to have been suffered as a result of the first respondent’s negligent misstatement and misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic). The applicants allege that they suffered loss and damage as a result of providing second mortgage finance through the first respondent to two borrowers. They allege that they provided the finance in reliance on representations made by employees or representatives of the first respondent (the second and third respondents) about the security of the loans.
On 9 June 2009, the applicants regularly obtained a default judgment against the first respondent in default of appearance.
On 3 September 2009, the first respondent made an application before Judge Davis to set aside the default judgment, pursuant to r 21.07 of the County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2008.
In the application before Judge Davis, the first respondent relied on two affidavits. In an affidavit sworn on 2 September 2009, a director of the first respondent deposed that the first respondent was not the correct defendant in the proceeding and that when it received the writ, it passed the writ on to the correct defendant, Rescom Commercial Finance Pty Ltd, to be dealt with. In a second affidavit sworn on 2 September 2009, Erin Martin, the solicitor for the first respondent at that time, stated that she had been instructed that proceedings had been issued against the wrong entity and that the first respondent had ignored the writ and statement of claim because it understood that Rescom Commercial Finance Pty Ltd was handling the matter.
Judge Davis dismissed the application on the basis that the first respondent had not given an adequate explanation for its failure…
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- Case
- [2010] VSCA 55
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the lower court had correctly exercised its discretion in setting aside the default judgment for a second time. It examined the principles of abuse of process and whether the second application to set aside the judgment was an abuse of the court's process. The court also considered the language of the statute and the context in which it was used. Ultimately, the court found that the lower court had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and exercised its discretion appropriately. The court held that the phrase "final and conclusive" did not prevent the lower court from setting aside the default judgment on a second application if it was satisfied that doing so was just and equitable in the circumstances.
As a result, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The court found that there were no grounds to interfere with the decision of the lower court to set aside the default judgment for the second time. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that justice is done in individual cases and that the discretion of the lower court in setting aside default judgments should not be lightly interfered with on appeal. The final orders confirmed the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal and upheld the decision of the lower court to set aside the default judgment.
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