R v Yavuz (No. 5) - [2018] NSWSC 1796

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Yavuz (No. 5) [2018] NSWSC 1796
Hearing dates: 20 November 2018
Date of orders: 22 November 2018
Decision date: 22 November 2018
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Davies J
Decision:
The no case application is refused

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – murder – stabbing - no case application – where no direct evidence that fatal wound inflicted by accused – eye-witnesses give evidence only of inflicting of non-fatal wound – where case partly circumstantial – no other cause of death – immediate collapse and blood loss after stabbing –whether evidence capable of sustaining a guilty verdict – application rejected
Legislation Cited: Nil
Cases Cited: Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; [1990] HCA 51
May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; [1955] HCA 38
R v JMR (1991) 57 A Crim R 39
Regina v PL [2012] NSWCCA 31
Texts Cited: Nil
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Crown
John Can Yavuz (Accused)
Representation:
Counsel:
N Williams (Crown)
S Littlemore QC (Accused)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Matouk Joyner Lawyers (Accused)

File Number(s): 2015/335208

Judgment

At the close of the Crown case Mr Littlemore QC for the accused made an application for a directed verdict. He submitted that taken at its highest, the prosecution evidence cannot establish any fact other than that the accused inflicted a non-fatal stabbing injury on the deceased, and thereafter fled the scene.
The principles on which a trial judge should direct a verdict of acquittal are well settled. The question is whether, at the time a no case to answer submission is made, the accused could lawfully be convicted on the evidence as it stood at that time: May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 at 658; Regina v PL [2012] NSWCCA 31 at [31].
In Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; [1990] HCA 51 the High Court said at 212 and 214-215:

There is no doubt that it is a trial judge's duty to direct such a verdict if the evidence cannot sustain a guilty verdict or, as is commonly said, if there is no evidence upon which a jury could convict.
…
It follows that, if there is evidence (even if tenuous or inherently weak or vague) which can be taken into account by the jury in its deliberations and that evidence is capable of supporting a verdict of guilty, the matter must be left to the jury for its decision. Or, to put the matter in more usual terms, a verdict of not guilty may be directed only if there is a defect in the evidence such that, taken at its highest, it will not sustain a verdict of guilty.
It is necessary only to observe that neither the power of a court of criminal appeal to set aside a verdict that is unsafe or unsatisfactory (as to which see Whitehorn, Chamberlain v. The Queen (No.2) [1984] HCA…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Yavuz (No. 5)

Details

AGLC: R v Yavuz (No. 5) [2018] NSWSC 1796
Case: [2018] NSWSC 1796
Decision Date: 22 November 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Yavuz, the respondent faced a charge of murder following the stabbing of a deceased person. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland, where the respondent sought to have the charge dismissed by way of a no case submission. The central dispute revolved around the identity of the person who inflicted the fatal stab wound. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimony of eye-witnesses who observed the respondent inflicting a non-fatal stab wound on the deceased, but could not definitively identify the person who delivered the fatal blow. The evidence presented was largely circumstantial, with no direct evidence linking the respondent to the fatal injury.

The legal issue before the court was whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict against the respondent. The court had to determine if the prosecution had established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the respondent was the person who inflicted the fatal wound. Given the lack of direct evidence and the possibility that another person could have been responsible for the fatal stab, the court was required to assess whether the circumstantial evidence, combined with the absence of any other plausible cause of death, could support a conviction. The court had to consider the weight of the eye-witness accounts, the immediate collapse and resultant blood loss following the stabbing, and whether these factors could reasonably lead to the conclusion that the respondent was the murderer.

In delivering the judgment, the court found that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. The court noted that while there was no direct evidence that the respondent inflicted the fatal wound, the immediate collapse and blood loss following the stabbing, coupled with the absence of any other cause of death, strongly suggested that the fatal injury was inflicted by the respondent. The court concluded that the eye-witness accounts, when viewed in conjunction with the other evidence, provided a coherent narrative that supported the prosecution's case. The no case submission was accordingly rejected, and the respondent was required to enter a plea to the charge of murder.

Orders