R v Woodman

[2013] QCA 359

[2013] QCA 359

COURT OF APPEAL

HOLMES JA
MORRISON JA
DAUBNEY J

CA No 228 of 2013
DC No 173 of 2008

THE QUEEN

v

WOODMAN, Daniel Tommy  Applicant

BRISBANE

TUESDAY, 3 DECEMBER 2013

JUDGMENT

DAUBNEY J:  On 8 December 2008, the applicant was convicted, on his own plea of guilty, to one count of having committed grievous bodily harm with intent on 8 April 2008.  The complainant was the applicant’s partner.  He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment.  This offence was committed during the operational period of a partially suspended sentence of two and a half years’ imprisonment, 16 months of which remained unserved.  He was ordered to serve that 16 month period of imprisonment concurrently with the 11 year sentence.  The applicant also pleaded guilty to breaching a domestic violence order on 11 November 2007, for which he was sentenced to 134 days concurrent imprisonment.

On the 15th of January 2009, the applicant filed an appeal against conviction and an application for leave to appeal against sentence.  When those matters came before the Court of Appeal on 3 June 2009, the appeal against conviction was not formally abandoned, but the applicant’s counsel had informed the respondent’s counsel that the applicant was only pursuing the application for leave to appeal against sentence.  On 17 July 2009, the Court of Appeal formally dismissed the appeal against conviction and refused the applicant’s application for leave to appeal against sentence – see R v Woodman [2009] QCA 197. On 3 March 2010, the applicant filed a further application for leave to appeal against sentence and sought an extension of the time to make the application.

That application was refused – see R v Woodman [2010] QCA 162. The grounds for seeking to appeal against sentence were that:

-the sentence was manifestly excessive, the applicant’s cooperation with the authorities was not recognised;

-the applicant’s early plea was not recognised;

-his remorse was not recognised;

-the sentencing judge did not have regard to s 23 of the Criminal Code because the applicant was drinking heavily and there was never any intent “only accident”;

-the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation were not considered; and

-the applicant’s youth was not considered.

The applicant’s application for leave to appeal against sentence was clearly out of time. White JA, with whom McMurdo P and Fraser JA agreed, refused the applicant’s application for an extension of time, saying (omitting citations):

“[20]The overriding principle must be whether the court considers that it is in the interests of justice to grant the extension of time.  As is clear here, this Court has already considered the grounds of appeal now advanced by the applicant.  Nothing fresh has been raised and the application for leave to appeal the sentence and the merits of any appeal have been fully considered.”

The applicant has now filed another application, by which he seemed to be seeking leave to appeal against sentence. I say “seemed” because the confused and confusing submissions made by the applicant refer…