R v Woodford

[1996] QCA 325

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Brisbane	C.A. No. 140 of 1996
[R. v. Woodford]

THE QUEEN

v.

JASON ANTHONY BROOK WOODFORD

(Applicant)

___________________________________________________________________________

Derrington J. Mackenzie J.

White J.

___________________________________________________________________________

Judgment delivered 1 August, 1996
Further reasons for Judgment delivered 16 August, 1996

___________________________________________________________________________

FURTHER REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

__________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:	Mr J. Griffin QC, with him Mr C. Wilson for the applicant. Mrs L. Clare for the respondent.
Solicitors:	Darvalls for the applicant. Queensland Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent.
Hearing date:	1 August 1996

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Brisbane	C.A. No. 140 of 1996
Before Derrington J.

Mackenzie J.

White J.

[R. v. Woodford]

THE QUEEN

v.

JASON ANTHONY BROOK WOODFORD

(Applicant)

FURTHER REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE COURT

Judgment Delivered 1 August 1996

Further Reasons Delivered 16 August 1996

When delivering ex tempore reasons in this matter, passing reference was made to R. v.

Bitossi. Since delivering the reasons the court has become aware that the details relating to the

case in the schedule of sentences for grievous bodily harm presented to the court by the Crown

are erroneous. The sentence of 7 years 4 months shown in the schedule was imposed for a

conviction for attempted murder. The count of grievous bodily harm of which Bitossi was also

convicted attracted a sentence of 5 years 4 months. In each instance about 8 months of pre-trial

custody had been taken into account. In the schedule, it was shown as one of 3 cases where a

sentence of between 7 and 8 years had been imposed for grievous bodily harm.

Although it is apparent from the ex tempore reasons that it is so, the court wishes to

record that the proposition being developed in the relevant passage of the judgment was that the

range of sentences for grievous bodily harm included cases where a higher sentence than the 6

years imposed on the applicant had been imposed. It was the fact that sentences in excess of

that imposed on the applicant could be found, not the precise level of sentence attributed to R. v. Bitossi in the schedule which was central to that part of the court's reasons. The ultimate

decision that the sentence was not manifestly excessive reflected the court's view that the

sentence was within the proper range of sentencing discretion.