Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Meakin v Director of Public Prosecutions & Anor [2011] NSWCA 373 Hearing dates: 26 August 2011 Decision date: 30 November 2011 Before: Allsop P at [1];
Beazley JA at [7];
Basten JA at [99]Decision: The summons is dismissed with costs.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - jurisdictional error - failure to take into account maximum automatic licence disqualification period in Road Transport (General) Act, s 188(4) - whether judge failed to take into account a relevant consideration when imposing a licence disqualification period - whether judge's refusal to re-open sentence proceedings constituted jurisdictional error - licence disqualification period not in issue on the appeal - no error in the sentence imposed by sentencing judge - no jurisdictional error in refusing application to re-open sentence under Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43 - appeal dismissed
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - whether applicant entitled to discretionary relief under Supreme Court Act, ss 65 and 69 - delay in application to reopen sentence under Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43 - discretionary relief refused
CRIMINAL LAW - appeal against conviction and sentence - driving in a manner dangerous to the public and driving with a mid-range prescribed concentration of alcohol - application to reopen the sentence proceedings in respect of licence disqualification period - whether licence disqualification period contrary to law pursuant to Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43(2) - licence disqualification period not in issue on appeal - no error in sentence imposed by sentencing judge - no jurisdictional error in refusing application to reopen sentence under Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43 - appeal dismissedLegislation Cited: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
District Court Act 1973
Road Transport (General) Act 2005
Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999
Supreme Court Act 1970Cases Cited: Application by the Attorney General under Section 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act for a Guideline Judgment Concerning the Offence of High Range Prescribed Concentration of Alcohol Under Section 9(4) of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (No. 3 of 2002) [2004] NSWCCA 303; (2004) 61 NSWLR 305
Boyd v Sandercock; ex parte Sandercock [1990] 2 Qd R 26
Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (No 2) (1991) 22 NSWLR 389
Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163
Director of Public Prosecutions v Emanuel [2009] NSWCA 42; 193 A Crim R 552
Erceg v The District Court of New South Wales & Anor [2003] NSWCA…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Meakin v Director of Public Prosecutions and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2011] NSWCA 373
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the sentencing judge had committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider the maximum automatic licence disqualification period. It also had to consider whether the single judge of the Supreme Court erred in refusing Meakin's application to reopen the sentence proceedings under section 43 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, and whether Meakin was entitled to discretionary relief under sections 65 and 69 of the Supreme Court Act, particularly in light of the delay in making the application to reopen.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the licence disqualification period was not a matter in issue on the original appeal against conviction and sentence, and that there was no error in the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. Consequently, the Court found no jurisdictional error in the refusal to reopen the sentence proceedings under section 43 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Furthermore, the Court concluded that discretionary relief under sections 65 and 69 of the Supreme Court Act was not warranted, primarily due to the delay in the application to reopen.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the summons and ordered that Meakin pay the costs of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
The summons is dismissed with costs.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Background
Background to the litigation
The Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether the judge's failure to consider the maximum automatic disqualification period constituted a jurisdictional error. This error, if found, could potentially render the sentence unlawful. Meakin contended that the judge should have imposed the maximum disqualification period automatically, without needing to consider other factors. However, it is crucial to note that the length of the disqualification period was not an issue in Meakin's appeal against the conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeal examined the arguments made by Meakin and found that there was no error in the sentence imposed by the original sentencing judge. The appeal against the sentence was dismissed as there was no jurisdictional error in the refusal to reopen the sentence proceedings under section 43 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
In addition to the appeal against the sentence, Meakin sought discretionary relief under sections 65 and 69 of the Supreme Court Act, arguing that the delay in applying to reopen the sentence proceedings should not be a barrier to relief. The Court of Appeal considered this application and ultimately refused Meakin's request for discretionary relief. The Court found that the delay in making the application was a significant factor and that Meakin had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to warrant the exercise of the discretionary relief. Consequently, Meakin's application for relief was dismissed, and the appeal was ultimately unsuccessful. The Court ordered that the summons be dismissed with costs.
The case of Meakin v Director of Public Prosecutions came before the court as an appeal against both conviction and sentence. The appellant, Meakin, was convicted of driving in a manner dangerous to the public and driving with a mid-range prescribed concentration of alcohol. The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge failed to take into account the maximum automatic licence disqualification period under the Road Transport (General) Act, s 188(4), when imposing the licence disqualification period. This appeal followed an earlier application by Meakin to the trial judge to reopen the sentence proceedings in respect of the licence disqualification period, an application that was refused. The appellant then sought discretionary relief from the Supreme Court under the Supreme Court Act, ss 65 and 69, due to the delay in applying to reopen the sentence, but this relief was also refused. The appeal was lodged within the prescribed time limits, and the court considered the procedural fairness and jurisdictional errors alleged by the appellant, ultimately dismissing the appeal on the basis that there was no error in the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge, nor any jurisdictional error in the refusal to reopen the sentence. The court further found that Meakin was not entitled to discretionary relief due to the delay in applying to reopen the sentence.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the judge failed to take into account a relevant consideration under the Road Transport (General) Act, s 188(4) when imposing the licence disqualification period.
2. Whether the judge's refusal to re-open sentence proceedings constituted a jurisdictional error under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43.
3. Whether the applicant was entitled to discretionary relief under the Supreme Court Act, ss 65 and 69 due to the delay in the application to reopen the sentence.
4. Whether the licence disqualification period was contrary to law pursuant to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43(2).
Held
1. The court concluded that the judge did not fail to take into account a relevant consideration under the Road Transport (General) Act, s 188(4) when imposing the licence disqualification period. Appeal dismissed.
2. The court held that the judge's refusal to re-open sentence proceedings did not constitute a jurisdictional error under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43. Appeal dismissed.
3. The court determined that the applicant was not entitled to discretionary relief under the Supreme Court Act, ss 65 and 69 due to the delay in the application to reopen the sentence. Application dismissed.
4. The court found that the licence disqualification period was not contrary to law pursuant to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43(2). Appeal dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Meakin v Director of Public Prosecutions, the court addressed several issues pertinent to administrative and criminal law. Firstly, the court considered whether the sentencing judge had failed to take into account a relevant consideration under the Road Transport (General) Act, s 188(4) when imposing the licence disqualification period. The court noted that the Road Transport (General) Act, s 188(4) mandates the consideration of maximum automatic licence disqualification periods for certain offences. However, the court found that the judge had not overlooked this consideration as the disqualification period was not contested on appeal, and no error was evident in the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. The appeal was dismissed on this ground as the licence disqualification period was not in issue.
Secondly, the court examined whether the judge's refusal to re-open sentence proceedings constituted a jurisdictional error under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43. The court held that there was no jurisdictional error in the judge's refusal to re-open sentence proceedings, as the sentence imposed by the original sentencing judge was not challenged on appeal. The court relied on the principle that refusal to re-open sentence proceedings is not a jurisdictional error if the sentence itself is not under attack. The decision followed established case law which delineates the boundaries of jurisdictional error in sentencing proceedings, ensuring that the refusal to re-open proceedings was within the scope of judicial discretion.
Thirdly, the court deliberated on whether the applicant was entitled to discretionary relief under the Supreme Court Act, ss 65 and 69 due to the delay in the application to reopen the sentence. The court applied the criteria for discretionary relief, which includes consideration of the delay and the reasons for it. The applicant argued for relief due to the delay in applying to reopen the sentence; however, the court found no grounds to grant such relief. The court's decision aligned with the principles of administrative law, which emphasize that discretionary relief is not automatically granted and must be justified by the circumstances of the case.
Lastly, the court considered whether the licence disqualification period was contrary to law pursuant to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43(2). The court found that the licence disqualification period was not in issue on the appeal and, as such, did not constitute an error. The court applied the principle that challenges to the legality of a sentence must be directly related to the sentence itself. The decision departed from any potential error in the application of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43(2), as the disqualification period was not contested on appeal.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the refusal to re-open sentence proceedings under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 43, does not constitute a jurisdictional error if the sentence itself is not under challenge. Additionally, discretionary relief under the Supreme Court Act, ss 65 and 69 is not granted if the delay in the application to reopen the sentence is not sufficiently justified. The court also confirmed that a failure to consider a relevant legislative provision, such as the Road Transport (General) Act, s 188(4), does not amount to an error if the resulting sentence is not contested and appears to be correctly imposed.