R v Winkelmann

Case [2022] QDC 49


DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Winkelmann [2022] QDC 49

PARTIES:

R

v

ANTHONY JOHN WINKELMANN

(Defendant)

FILE NO:

330/2021

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Ruling

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Maroochydore

DELIVERED ON:

9 March 2022 (Ruling and Sentence); 16 March 2022 (Reasons)

DELIVERED AT:

Maroochydore

HEARING DATE:

14 February 2022 and 9 March 2022

JUDGE:

Long SC, DCJ

RULING:

That a parole release date be fixed pursuant to s 160B(3) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – PAROLE – where the defendant had been released on parole – where the offender was to be sentenced for offences committed after suspension of parole – where prior to sentence he had served his entire liability under his previous period of imprisonment – whether the Court was required to fix a parole release date or parole eligibility date

LEGISLATION:

Corrective Services Act 2006 ss 108, 112, 194, 199, 200, 205, 206, 208B, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215
Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 s 79
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 ss 154, 155, 156, 156A, 158, 159A, 160, 160A, 160B, 160C, 160D, 160E, 160F, 160G

CASES:

Chevathen v Queensland Police Service [2016] QDC 270.
Rule v Commissioner of Police [2016] QDC 64
R v Braeckmans [2022] QCA 25
R v Nagy [2004] 1 Qd R 63
R v Pepper (1999) 104 A Crim R 135
R v Smith [2015] 1 Qd R 323
R v Wilson [2022] QCA 18

COUNSEL:

Stark, A.Q for the Crown
Dixon, M.P for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

Director of Public Prosecutions for the Crown

Legal Aid Queensland for the defendant

Introduction

  1. On 9 March 2022, the abovenamed defendant (“offender”) was sentenced for the offences of assault occasioning bodily harm (committed on 2 October 2019) and robbery with personal violence (committed on 17 December 2019). He was then sentenced to serve a period of 3 years imprisonment, comprised of concurrent terms of 6 months imprisonment for the offence of assault occasioning bodily harm and 3 years imprisonment for the offence of robbery with personal violence. Pursuant to s 159A(3B) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (“PSA”), it was stated that there had been 438 days of pre-sentence custody in relation to these offences, from 26 December 2020 to 8 March 2022, but that only 34 days from 3 February to 8 March 2022 was declared as time already served in respect of the sentence imposed. A parole release date was fixed as 3 May 2022.

  2. These reasons relate to the question which arose as to whether the Court was required to fix a parole release date, or a parole eligibility date for this offender. In particular, the question was as to whether ss 160B or 160C of the PSA applied.[1] It may be noted that pursuant to s 160A(1) and except where ss (6) applies, these provisions apply respectively when a court is imposing a term of imprisonment on an offender for an offence. And further, pursuant…

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R v Winkelmann [2022] QDC 49
Case
[2022] QDC 49
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Winkelmann, the defendant had been released on parole and subsequently committed further offences, leading to his sentencing. The primary legal issue was whether the Court was required to fix a parole release date or parole eligibility date for the defendant, who had already served his entire liability under his previous period of imprisonment. The Court considered whether the earlier pre-sentence custody could be counted towards the new sentence and whether it should be taken into account when fixing the parole release date.

The Court's reasoning involved the interpretation of relevant sections of the Prisoners Sentencing Act, particularly sections 159A(1) and 159A(3B). It concluded that the earlier pre-sentence custody not only counted towards the defendant's liability under his previous period of imprisonment but also needed to be considered in fixing an appropriate head sentence and parole release date for the new sentence imposed. The Court noted that the decision in Kanaveilomani and R v Smith provided some guidance, but the specific circumstances of this case led to a different conclusion regarding the single period of imprisonment to be served.

Ultimately, the Court decided that the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant did not engage section 160B(2) of the PSA because there had been no cancellation of any court-ordered parole order during his period of imprisonment. However, it did engage section 160B(3) of the PSA, meaning the Court was required to fix a parole release date in respect of his period of imprisonment.

The final orders of the Court included the imposition of a sentence of three years' imprisonment, with the effective parole release date being fixed in accordance with the Court's reasoning.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In the circumstances and also having regard to the appropriate common ground that an effective sentence of a period of three years’ imprisonment might then be appropriately imposed, this offender had the benefit of further recognising the factors favouring the prisoner, in effecting or fixing a parole release date for him. Accordingly, and as far as the application of s 159A(3B) was concerned and therefore ordering otherwise than as required under s 159A(1), the effective reasoning for the declaration made was that the earlier pre-sentence custody to which s 159A(1) was applicable, not only counted in respect of the offender’s liability under his previous period of imprisonment but was otherwise taken into account in fixing an appropriate head sentence and parole release date for the sentence which was imposed.Conclusion Before noting the effect of the conclusions reached in this matter, it should be noted that at face value, reference to the decision in Kanaveilomani may be seen as in tension with the conclusion reached here as to the separate period of imprisonment that was to be effected by the sentence imposed by the Court. In the first instance it may be noted that the prosecution expressly disavowed any reliance on the application of s 160C of the PSA. Moreover and quite apart from noting that the particular considerations relating to the definition of “period of imprisonment” which have been noted above,[35] do not appear to have been engaged in Kanaveilomani, it may be noted that neither were the considerations as to the contingent liability arising from the subsequent sentence, as were particularly noted in R v Smith.[36] When the circumstances of Kanaveilomani are considered in that light,[37]even in the absence of any order accumulating the respective sentences, it is apparent that there was a concurrent obligation to serve that contingent liability (albeit only 3 days relating to the period from 25 to 27 January 2009),[38] establishing the necessary nexus with the earlier sentence. Therefore, the conclusion as to a single period of imprisonment is justifiable upon that basis and in accordance with the reasoning set out above.[35] At paragraphs [24]-[27] and [32].[36] [2015] 1 Qd R 323 at [30]-[31].[37] [2015] 2 Qd R 509 at [2] and [31].[38] It may be that the implications as to the potential applicability of s 156A of the PSA were not considered when the subsequent sentence was imposed, as may, particularly since the decision in Smith, be recognised as a usual consideration arising where there has been offending in respect of Schedule 1 offences by a parolee. It was for these reasons that it was concluded that the sentence to be imposed upon this offender on 9 March 2022:(a)did not engage s 160B(2) of the PSA, in that there had been no cancellation of any court ordered parole order during his period of imprisonment, which would be entirely constituted by the terms of imprisonment imposed on and commencing on that date, less the presentence custody declared to be time already served; and (b)Did engage s160B(3) of the PSA, so that the Court was required to fix a parole release date in respect his period of imprisonment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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