R v Wilson - [2005] VSCA 78

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 44 of 2003

THE QUEEN

v.

DEAN NORMAN JAMES WILSON

and
No. 48 of 2003

THE QUEEN

v.

TROY ALEXANDER CARMAN

---

JUDGES:

BATT, BUCHANAN and VINCENT, JJ.A.

WHERE HELD:

MELBOURNE

DATE OF HEARING:

29 November 2004

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

13 April 2005

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2005] VSCA 78

---
CRIMINAL LAW – Reckless conduct endangering persons (two counts) during armed robbery – Element of foresight of probability of serious injury (or of danger of serious injury) – Verdicts not supported by evidence as to this element – Convictions quashed and sentences on other counts affirmed – Crimes Act 1958, ss.23, 569(1).
---

APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors

For the Crown
(Both applications) Mr. G.J.C. Silbert Ms K. Robertson, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

For the Applicant Wilson Mr. A. Palmer Lethbridges

For the Applicant Carman Mr. P. Morrissey Ian Polak and Associates

BATT, J.A.:

On 20 January 2003 the applicants, Dean Norman James Wilson, who was born on 16 April 1970, and Troy Alexander Carman, who was born on 1 March 1971, were presented in the County Court at Melbourne on a presentment alleging against them jointly theft (count 2), armed robbery (count 3) and reckless conduct endangering life (counts 4 and 5) and alleging against Wilson two further counts of theft (counts 1 and 6). They pleaded not guilty to all the counts against them respectively. That day a voir dire was commenced, in the course of which various rulings were given. A jury was empanelled on 30 January 2003. At the conclusion of the Crown case counsel for Carman submitted that there was no case to answer in respect of counts 4 and 5. A decision on that was deferred until all evidence was given. The application was renewed almost at the close of the defence cases, when counsel for Wilson joined in it. In his ruling the trial judge upheld the submission for both applicants and took a verdict of not guilty on counts 4 and 5 by direction. However, he left to the jury the statutory alternative (under s.424 of the Crimes Act 1958) of reckless conduct endangering a person (more fully, that places or may place a person in danger of serious injury), contrary to s.23 of the Crimes Act, in respect of each of counts 4 and 5. In due course the jury returned verdicts of guilty against Wilson on counts 1, 2, 3, and 6 and on the statutory alternatives to counts 4 and 5 and verdicts of guilty against Carman on counts 2 and 3 and the statutory alternatives to counts 4 and 5.

Wilson had no prior convictions. Carman admitted two previous findings of guilt and 39 previous convictions from a total of 8 Magistrates’ Court appearances, including convictions for 14 theft-related offences, 6 assault-related offences, 2 offences of reckless conduct endangering a person, 4 of possession of a regulated weapon and 2 of possession of a longarm firearm without a licence.

The maximum…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Wilson

Details

AGLC: R v Wilson & Carman [2005] VSCA 78
Case: [2005] VSCA 78
Decision Date: 13 April 2005

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Wilson, the accused was charged with multiple counts of armed robbery and reckless conduct endangering persons. The incidents occurred during the commission of an armed robbery, where the accused's actions put others at risk. The matter was brought before the court for determination of the accused's criminal liability. The central legal issues in this case revolved around whether the accused's actions during the armed robbery constituted reckless conduct endangering persons under the Crimes Act 1958. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the accused had the requisite foresight of the probability or danger of serious injury to others, as required by the statute.

The court considered the evidence presented, particularly focusing on whether it sufficiently demonstrated that the accused foresaw the probability or danger of serious injury to others during the armed robbery. The prosecution needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had this foresight. After a thorough review of the evidence, the court found that the verdicts on the counts of reckless conduct endangering persons were not supported by the evidence. The court concluded that the prosecution had not established the necessary element of foresight of the probability or danger of serious injury.

Consequently, the court quashed the convictions for reckless conduct endangering persons. However, the court affirmed the sentences on the other counts of armed robbery, as they were sufficiently supported by the evidence. The court's decision was based on a detailed examination of the statutory requirements and the presented evidence, leading to the conclusion that the convictions for reckless conduct endangering persons could not be upheld. The final orders of the court included the quashing of the aforementioned convictions and the affirmation of sentences on other counts.

Orders