SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Williams [2020] QCA 46
PARTIES:
R
v
WILLIAMS, Connie-Lee Rose
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 71 of 2019
DC No 10 of 2019DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Bundaberg – Date of Sentence: 28 February 2019 (Moynihan QC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
17 March 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
5 February 2020
JUDGES:
Sofronoff P and McMurdo JA and Boddice J
ORDER:
The application for leave to appeal be refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of dangerous operation of a vehicle, causing death while adversely affected by an intoxicating substance and excessively speeding – where the applicant was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment with a declaration that she had been convicted of a serious violent offence – where the applicant applies for leave to appeal the sentence on the ground that the consequences of the declaration of a serious violent offence rendered the sentence manifestly excessive – where the applicant engaged in a protracted course of dangerous driving causing the death of two people – where the applicant had no criminal history – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 161B(3)
R v Henderson; Ex parte Attorney-General Queensland[2013] QCA 63, cited
R v Moody [2016] QCA 92, cited
R v Thomas[2015] QCA 20, cited
R v Tout[2012] QCA 296, citedCOUNSEL:
D A Holliday for the applicant
J D Finch for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
SOFRONOFF P: I agree with Boddice J.
McMURDO JA: I agree with Boddice J.
BODDICE J: On 28 February 2019, the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of dangerous operation of a vehicle, causing death whilst adversely affected by an intoxicating substance and excessively speeding.
On 28 February 2019, the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for nine years. It was declared she had been convicted of a serious violent offence, with the consequence that 80 per cent of that nine year term was required to be served before eligibility for parole.[1]
[1]Section 161B(3) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld).
The applicant applies for leave to appeal her sentence. The sole ground of appeal is that the consequences of the declaration she had been convicted of a serious violent offence rendered the nine year sentence manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Background
The applicant was born on 2 April 1984. She was aged 33 years at the time of the offence and 34 years at sentence. She had a limited traffic history and no criminal history.
Offence
On 20 September 2017, the applicant was driving a motor vehicle on the Bruce Highway, north of Gin Gin. The vehicle contained two passengers, the applicant’s husband, aged 41 years, and the applicant’s son, aged five…
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- AGLC
- R v Williams [2020] QCA 46
- Case
- [2020] QCA 46
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in light of the declaration of a serious violent offence. The court considered whether the applicant had demonstrated that the sentence was so markedly different from sentences imposed in comparable authorities that there must have been a misapplication of principle, or that a conclusion could be reached that the sentence was unreasonable and plainly unjust.
The court concluded that the applicant had not established that the sentence imposed for a serious example of protracted dangerous driving, with catastrophic consequences, evidenced a misapplication of proper sentencing principles or resulted in a sentence which could be properly characterised as unreasonable or plainly unjust. The court found that the applicant's dangerous driving involved a protracted course of driving which placed other members of the public at significant risk and involved a deliberate course of driving at excessive speed on the wrong side of a busy highway in areas where there were present double white lines, at a time when the applicant was adversely affected by intoxicating substances and aware that each of her passengers were unrestrained in the motor vehicle. The court considered that a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion for such a serious occasion of dangerous driving would have included a sentence of imprisonment of at least ten years, with the consequence that there would have been an automatic declaration the applicant had been convicted of a serious violent offence. The court held that the imposition of a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment, with a declaration the applicant had been convicted of a serious violent offence, was properly to be characterised as a sentence at the lower end of the sentences applicable to this serious offending and was neither unreasonable nor plainly unjust.
ORDERS:
The application for leave to appeal be refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application for leave to appeal be refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The objective seriousness of the applicant’s offending was such that the sentence imposed cannot be said to be so unreasonable or plainly unjust that it is beyond a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion.Consideration The applicant does not contend the sentencing Judge made any specific error in imposing sentence. Accordingly, her contention that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive will only be established if the applicant can demonstrate that the sentence was so markedly different from sentences imposed in comparable authorities that there must have been a misapplication of principle, or that a conclusion can be reached that the sentence is unreasonable and plainly unjust.[2][2]R v Tout [2012] QCA 296 at [8]. The applicant’s dangerous driving involved not only a protracted course of driving which placed other members of the public at significant risk. It involved a deliberate course of driving at excessive speed on the wrong side of a busy highway in areas where there were present double white lines, at a time when the applicant was adversely affected by intoxicating substances and aware that each of her passengers were unrestrained in the motor vehicle. Such a course of conduct was rightly described as involving an occasion of serious dangerous driving. A consideration of comparable authorities[3] supports a conclusion that a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion for such a serious occasion of dangerous driving would have included a sentence of imprisonment of at least ten years, with the consequence that there would have been an automatic declaration the applicant had been convicted of a serious violent offence.[3]R v Moody [2016] QCA 92; R v Henderson; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2013] QCA 63; and R v Thomas [2015] QCA 20. Whilst Henderson involved an offender with a much more extensive criminal and traffic history, who used the motor vehicle as a weapon, the engaging in a deliberate course of driving at excessive speed on the wrong side of the road for an extended period whilst adversely affected by illicit substances, is rightly to be characterised as an occasion of dangerous driving involving such serious conduct as to warrant a sentence of at least ten years’ imprisonment. Against that background, the imposition of a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment, with a declaration the applicant had been convicted of a serious violent offence, is properly to be characterised as a sentence at the lower end of the sentences applicable to this serious offending. Such a sentence properly reflected the consequences of a declaration that the applicant had been convicted of a serious violent offence. It was neither unreasonable nor plainly unjust. The making of the declaration also fell within a sound exercise of the sentencing decision. The factors identified by the sentencing Judge were relevant to the exercise of that discretion. Having regard to those factors, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the exercise of the discretion to make that declaration miscarried or that the consequence of that declaration rendered the sentence imposed manifestly excessive.Conclusions