R v Williams

Case [2020] QDC 246

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Williams [2020] QDC 246

PARTIES:

THE QUEEN

v

DUDLEY CHANTLER WILLIAMS
(defendant)

FILE NO/S:

DIS 5963/20(9)

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court, Warwick

DELIVERED ON:

28 September 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Warwick

HEARING DATE:

22, 23 and 24 September 2020

JUDGE:

Kefford DCJ

VERDICT:

Count 1 (Burglary, by break, in the night): Not guilty

Alternative Count 1 (Burglary, in the night): Not guilty

Count 2 (Attempted rape): Not guilty

ORDER:

I order that Dudley Chantler Williams is formally discharged in respect of indictment number DIS 5693/20(9).

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – TRIAL HAD BEFORE JUDGE WITHOUT JURY – where the defendant is charged with one count of burglary, by break, in the night and one count of attempted rape – where consideration should be given to mistake of fact – whether the complainant’s evidence was honest and reliable

LEGISLATION:

Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 24, s 348, s 349, s 350, s 418, s 419, s 615B, s 615C

CASES:

Barca v The Queen [1975] HCA 42; (1975) 133 CLR 82, applied

Middleton [2000] WASCA 200; (2000) 114 A Crim R 141, applied

Peacock v The King [1911] HCA 66; (1911) 13 CLR 619, applied

R v Armstrong [2006] QCA 158, applied

R v Baden-Clay [2016] HCA 35; (2016) 258 CLR 308, applied

R v E (1995) 89 A Crim R 325, applied

R v Gibb [2018] QCA 120, applied

R v Makary [2018] QCA 258; [2019] 2 Qd R 528, applied

R v Markuleski [2001] NSWCCA 290; (2001) 52 NSWLR 82, applied

R v McBride [2008] QCA 412, applied

R v Mrzljak [2004] QCA 420; [2005] 1 Qd R 308, applied

R v Perera [1986] 2 Qd R 431, applied

R v O’Loughlin [2011] QCA 123, applied

R v Sunderland [2020] QCA 156, applied

Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573, applied

COUNSEL:

E Kelso for the Crown

J Goldie for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Crown

Clare Hine Lawyers for the defendant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Overview

The elements of the offences and the prosecution’s particulars

Count 1 - Burglary, by breaking, in the night

Count 2 - Attempted rape

Mistake of fact

The evidence adduced by the prosecution

Special witness

Telephone evidence

Tape recording

The defence case

General principles of law

Onus and standard of proof

Separate consideration of the charges

Assessment of evidence

Prior inconsistent statements

Previous Convictions of Witness

Bad Character of Defendant

Circumstantial evidence

Out of court confessional statements

The evidence

The events leading up to the alleged offending

The alleged offending – the burglary

The alleged offending – the attempted rape

The events following the alleged offending

Preliminary complaint evidence

Pretext call

The conversation with Daniel Williams

Has the prosecution proved its case on count 1 beyond reasonable doubt?

Has the prosecution proved its case on count 2 beyond reasonable doubt?

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Details
AGLC
R v Williams [2020] QDC 246
Case
[2020] QDC 246
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Williams, the defendant, Dudley Chantler Williams, was charged with one count of burglary, by break, in the night, and one count of attempted rape. The matter was heard by a judge sitting alone in the District Court of Western Australia. The defendant did not contest entering the complainant's home, but he claimed that he entered to ensure the complainant's welfare and denied any intention to commit rape. The central issue for the court was to determine whether the complainant's evidence was honest and reliable, and whether the prosecution had proven the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

The court found that there were aspects of the defendant's evidence that were implausible, such as his account of prior sexual contact with the complainant. However, the defendant's overall account of his actions after entering the complainant's bedroom was consistent throughout his testimony and cross-examination. The court concluded that there was a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's intent to commit rape as alleged by the complainant. Therefore, the court found the defendant not guilty of the charge of attempted rape.

Additionally, the court considered the burglary charges. Since the defendant admitted to entering the complainant's home, the court needed to determine if the prosecution proved that the defendant broke into the home. The court found that there was not enough evidence to prove the break-in beyond reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant being found not guilty of both burglary charges.

In summary, the court acquitted the defendant of all charges due to reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's evidence and the defendant's account of events. The court formally discharged the defendant from the charges.

Orders

Orders of the court

I order that Dudley Chantler Williams is formally discharged in respect of indictment number DIS 5693/20(9).

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I do not draw any inference as to the defendant’s guilt from the order or the manner in which the evidence was given. The probative value of the complainant’s evidence is not increased or decreased because of those matters. I have not given it any greater or lesser weight because of the order or the manner in which the evidence was given.Telephone evidence On application by the prosecution, I permitted the evidence of Ms Williamson to be given by telephone. On application by the defendant, I also permitted the complainant to give further evidence by telephone. I do not give that evidence any more or less weight, and I do not draw any inference adverse to the defendant, simply because that evidence was given by telephone.Tape recording The prosecution also relies on a tape recording of a conversation said to have been had between the complainant and the defendant. Although a transcript was provided for my assistance, I do not regard it as evidence. It is the sounds that I heard from the tape recording that I regard as the evidence. The defence case The defendant does not deny that he entered the complainant’s dwelling. His evidence is that he entered it because he was concerned for the complainant’s welfare. He also says that he climbed in through an area where louvres were already broken, but that as he climbed in, he accidentally broke an additional louvre by hitting his head on it. He denies attempting to rape the complainant. He says he simply sat on the bed and shook the complainant in an attempt to wake her. The defendant gave evidence and called evidence. While the defendant does not have to give evidence, or call other people to give evidence on his behalf, or otherwise produce evidence, he chose to give evidence and call evidence from his brother, Daniel Williams, and his mother, Miranda Bahr. That he has done so does not mean that he assumed a responsibility of proving his innocence. The burden of proof has not shifted to him. His evidence and that of the other witnesses called for the defence is added to the evidence called for the prosecution. The prosecution retains the burden of proving each of the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, and it is upon the whole of the evidence that I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proved the case before the defendant may be convicted. The issues for determination are not resolved by choosing between the complainant’s evidence and that of the other prosecution witnesses, and the evidence of the defendant and his witnesses. The prosecution case depends upon me accepting that the evidence of the complainant was true and accurate beyond reasonable doubt despite the sworn evidence by the defendant and his witnesses.[20] [20]R v E (1995) 89 A Crim R 325, 330. Where, as here, there is defence evidence, usually one of three possible results will follow. First, if I find the defence evidence is credible and reliable, and it provides a satisfying answer to the prosecution’s case, the verdict will be not guilty. Second, if I find the defence evidence was not convincing, but it nevertheless creates a state of reasonable doubt in my mind as to what the true position was, the verdict will be not guilty.[21] Third, if I find that the defence evidence should not be accepted, that does not lead to an automatic conclusion of guilt. If I find the defence evidence unconvincing, I must set it to one side, go back to the rest of the evidence, and ask myself whether, on a consideration of such evidence as I accept, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proved each of the elements of the offence in question.[22] [21]Middleton [2000] WASCA 200; (2000) 114 A Crim R 141, 145 [13].[22]R v Armstrong [2006] QCA 158, [34]; R v McBride [2008] QCA 412, [29]-[30].General principles of law

Decision

Reasons for decision

There are some aspects of the defendant’s evidence that struck me as implausible, such as his evidence about prior sexual contact with the complainant. His comment in the pretext call that he probably just thought because she had boyfriends that she did not want to have sex with him also causes me pause. However, about that matter, I note the observations that I made in paragraphs [115] and [116] above. In the circumstances, the defendant’s evidence overall leaves me in a reasonable state of doubt as to the true position. This is because his evidence about his conduct after entering the complainant’s bedroom was generally consistent throughout his evidence-in-chief and his cross-examination. It was also, in general, consistent with statements made by him in the pretext call. Conclusion regarding count 2 On the basis of all of the evidence, I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the attempted penetration occurred as alleged by the complainant. It follows the defendant should be found not guilty of count 2. Verdicts In relation to count 1, a charge of burglary, by break, in the night, I find Dudley Chantler Williams not guilty. In relation to the alternative count 1, a charge of burglary, in the night, I find Dudley Chantler Williams not guilty. In relation to count 2, a charge of attempted rape, I find Dudley Chantler Williams not guilty.Order I make the following order:Dudley Chantler Williams is formally discharged in respect of indictment number DIS 5693/20(9)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The prosecution has the onus of establishing each offence charged beyond reasonable doubt.[23] There is no onus on the defendant. The defendant is presumed to be innocent. This means that in order to convict of an offence, I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of every element that goes to make up the offence charged. To convict of the more serious offences alleged, the prosecution must satisfy me of each circumstance of aggravation beyond reasonable doubt.[23]Unless otherwise noted, where I have used words describing the burden on the prosecution such as: prove, establish, demonstrate and the like, they are to be read as meaning “prove beyond reasonable doubt” and so on. Separate consideration of the charges Two charges have been brought against the defendant. I must consider each charge separately, evaluating the evidence relating to that particular charge to decide whether I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proved its essential elements. Subject to the qualification in relation to the circumstances of aggravation that I have set out in paragraph [16] above, I must return separate verdicts for each charge. The evidence in relation to the separate offences is different, as are the elements of the offences. I understand that my verdicts need not be the same. My assessment of the complainant as a witness will be relevant to all counts, but I must consider her evidence in respect of each count when considering that count. If I have a reasonable doubt concerning the truthfulness or reliability of the complainant’s evidence in relation to one of the counts, whether by reference to her particular demeanour or for any other reason, I must take that into account in assessing the truthfulness or reliability of her evidence generally. If I am not sufficiently confident of the evidence of the complainant to convict on one count, I must find the defendant not guilty in relation to that count. That does not necessarily mean I cannot convict of any other count. I have to consider why I have some reasonable doubt about that part of her evidence and consider whether it affects the way I assess the rest of her evidence. I must consider whether my doubt about that aspect of her evidence causes me also to have a reasonable doubt about the part of her evidence relevant to the other count.[24] [24]R v Markuleski [2001] NSWCCA 290; (2001) 52 NSWLR 82.Assessment of evidence In arriving at a verdict, I must act impartially and dispassionately and only on the evidence properly admitted during the trial. The evidence in this case was comprised of photographs of text messages,[25] photographs of the complainant’s house,[26] an audio recording of a conversation between the complainant and the defendant (“the pretext call”),[27] a document setting out the timing and duration of calls made from and received on the complainant’s phone,[28] and the evidence of the seven witnesses.[25]Exhibit 1.[26]Exhibit 2.[27]Exhibit 3.[28]Exhibit 4.