R v Watson
[2022] ACTSC 95
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
| Case Title: | R v Watson |
| Citation: | [2022] ACTSC 95 |
| Hearing Date: | 28 January, 18 February, 2 May 2022 |
| Decision Date: | 3 May 2022 |
| Before: | McWilliam AJ |
| Decision: | See [63]-[64] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – aggravated burglary – make demand with threat to kill – joint commission – where offender has drug and alcohol addiction – where no prior criminal history – where prospects of rehabilitation high – Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order made |
| Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 6, 7, 10, 12A, 33, 35, 80W, 80Y, 80Z, 90 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 45, 45A, 312 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 32 Public Health Act 1997 (ACT) s 120 |
| Cases Cited: | GAS v R [2004] HCA 22; 78 ALJR 786 Heard v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 6 Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 Johns v R (1980) 143 CLR 108 McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 130 ALR 26 Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 O’Brien v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 47 |
| R v Bessant [2020] ACTSC 365 R v Bourne; R v Manns [2018] ACTSC 35 R v BS-X [2021] ACTSC 160 R v Crawford (No 1) [2020] ACTSC 245 R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83 R v Goodge [2019] ACTSC 297 R v Hancock [2021] ACTSC 52 R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256 R v Lockwood [2018] ACTSC 288 R v McMahon (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 299 R v Pahl (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 155 | |
| R v Po’oi [2021] ACTSC 151 | |
| R v QH; R v CR [2020] ACTSC 178 R v Shearer [2018] ACTSC 91 | |
| Simonds v the Queen [2013] ACTCA 13 | |
| Parties: | The Queen (Crown) |
| Keona Rosalie Watson (Offender) | |
| Representation: | Counsel |
| C Muthurajah (Crown) K Prasad (Offender) | |
| Solicitors | |
| ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) | |
| Gateway Legal Service (Offender) | |
| File Number(s): | SCC 261 of 2021 |
| MCWILLIAM AJ: |
1. Ms Keona Watson (the offender) is before the Court for sentence, having pleaded guilty on 2 November 2021 to the following offences:
(a)
CC2021/9438: make a demand of another person with a threat to kill that other person, contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes Act) by virtue of s 45A of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code) (joint
commission). The maximum penalty for this offence is 20 years’ imprisonment.
(b) CC2021/8839: aggravated burglary contrary to s 312(a) of the Criminal Code by virtue of s 45 of the Criminal Code (knowingly concerned in the commission of an offence). The maximum penalty for this offence is a fine of $320,000, 20 years’
imprisonment, or both.
2. The offender was arrested in relation to the charges but has subsequently been granted bail on two occasions, the details of which I consider to be immaterial to the present sentencing task. What is relevant is that the offender has spent a total of 133 days in custody referable to the above offences and this will be taken into account.
The facts of the offending
3. A statement of agreed facts was provided to the Court, from which the following summary is taken. In light of the conclusion that I have reached in relation to the manner of the sentence, the facts are set out in perhaps more detail than might otherwise have been the case, with a view to assisting those who are required to deal with the offender on an ongoing basis following her being sentenced.
Make demand with threat to kill
4. Between 8 August 2021 and 13 August 2021, the offender sent a number of encrypted messages to Mr Jesse Kirkwood. The messages concerned a person who
I will refer to as DK. That person was a friend of the offender’s ex-boyfriend, Mr
Joshua Battye. The offender knew that DK spent time at Mr Battye’s house.5. In the text messages the offender advised that she was aware of a plan to conduct a
$13,000 “hit” on DK, and that she knew his address. Mr Kirkwood offered the offender $1,000 cash for DK’s address. The offender agreed to provide the address
and to meet Mr Kirkwood.
6. On 13 August 2021, the offender met up with Mr Kirkwood and the pair drove with another person, Mr Jamie Banks, and an unidentified male to the address of Mr Battye. Upon arrival at the residence, Mr Kirkwood and Mr Banks exited the car. The offender and the unidentified male then left the address.
7. Mr Battye’s housemate, Mr Conan Palmer, was the only person at the address when
the group arrived. Mr Kirkwood and Mr Banks told Mr Palmer they were looking for DK. Mr Palmer told them that he did not know where DK was, that he was not going to let them inside and that he would call the police. Mr Kirkwood and Mr Banks then threatened Mr Palmer, who consequently agreed to drive them in his car to look for DK.
8. During the drive, Mr Kirkwood said words to the effect of “I’m a professional kidnapper and I’ll kill someone for a certain amount of money” and told Mr Palmer stories of how
he had kidnapped people previously and how he would like to kill people. Mr Banks
told Mr Palmer how he would like to grab a gun and shoot someone.9. Mr Palmer was asked to drive to Mr Kirkwood’s house. Upon arrival there, Mr
Kirkwood and Mr Banks got out of the car and told Mr Palmer to stay in the car. Mr Kirkwood attempted to show Mr Palmer a video that he told Mr Palmer showed that they did to the last person they kidnapped. Mr Palmer only saw a person in the car with some other people before looking away. Mr Kirkwood told Mr Palmer that the
last person tried to do a ‘runner’. Mr Palmer was fearful of what would happen if he
tried to escape, and so he remained in the car.
10. Mr Kirkwood retrieved a samurai sword from inside his home. Mr Palmer then drove
to DK’s house with Mr Kirkwood and Mr Banks.
11. When they arrived at DK’s house, one of either Mr Banks or Mr Kirkwood took Mr Palmer’s phone. They then told Mr Palmer to enter the house and get DK. Mr
Palmer went inside DK’s house and spoke to DK’s housemate, who informed him that
DK was not there.
12. Mr Banks then tried to transfer money from Mr Palmer’s account using Mr Palmer’s phone, ostensibly to allow him to make a one-dollar transfer to verify Mr Palmer’s
financial details. This attempt was unsuccessful without a verification code. Mr Palmer told Mr Banks that the verification code would be sent to his laptop which was
back at his house. They decided to return to Mr Palmer’s residence.
13. During this time Mr Banks and Mr Kirkwood told Mr Palmer that there was a $25,000
‘hit’ out on DK, which meant that they were either going to kill DK, or Mr Palmer would
have to pay the $25,000 himself. Mr Palmer said that he would pay the amount to ensure nothing happened, however he had a $1,000 daily withdrawal limit on his bank account.
14. Mr Banks and Mr Kirkwood returned to Mr Palmer’s residence. Mr Palmer obtained
the verification code from his laptop for Mr Banks. Rather than making the aforementioned one-dollar verification transfer, Mr Banks transferred $1,000 from Mr
Palmer’s bank account to Mr Kirkwood’s bank account. Mr Palmer told Mr Banks and
Mr Kirkwood that he would give them money so they would leave and not approach DK. Mr Banks and Mr Kirkwood agreed, and Mr Palmer drove them to the Bendigo Bank.
15. At about 3:50pm, Mr Banks, Mr Kirkwood and Mr Palmer arrived at the Bendigo Bank. Mr Palmer withdrew $1,000 from an ATM and gave it to Mr Banks.
16. Later that day, Mr Kirkwood sent a message to the offender stating “good job got something for you” and asked the offender to send her account details to him. The
offender sent Mr Kirkwood her bank details and Mr Kirkwood transferred $500 to the
offender’s bank account for providing Mr Battye’s address.
17. These events constitute the charge of making a demand of another person with a threat to kill.
Aggravated burglary
18. The charge of aggravated burglary relates to conduct that occurred between 14 and 15 August 2021. On 14 August 2021, the offender and Mr Kirkwood exchanged encrypted messages. In the text messages, the offender asked Mr Kirkwood who
they wanted to ‘hit’ and whether she needed to lure anyone. Mr Kirkwood then asked
her for the location of Mr Battye and/or DK, and told the offender he wanted to see
her before he went back for $10,000. He told the offender that he would “prefer no
loose ends” and that “those boys are going to literally cry begging for their lives”.19. On 15 August 2021 at about 1:21am, the offender sent a message to Mr Kirkwood
stating, “I’m ballied up and got gloves” and sent Mr Kirkwood a picture of herself
standing in head-to-toe black clothing and a black balaclava. The offender told Mr
Kirkwood that she wanted to “get this done before 6” so she could sneak back into
her house. The offender was picked up by Mr Kirkwood shortly after this, but did not
attend Mr Battye’s house. Instead, the offender went to Mr Banks’ residence.
20. While the offender ‘hung out’ at Mr Banks’ residence, Mr Kirkwood and another male attended Mr Battye’s residence and stole a number of items. Mr Battye and Mr
Palmer were not home at the time.
21. Police executed a search warrant at the offender’s residence on 20 August 2021 and the offender’s boyfriend’s residence on 21 August 2021. On 21 August 2021, the
offender participated in a record of conversation with police. During the record of
conversation, the offender stated the following:
(a) She knew that Mr Kirkwood was looking for DK. (b) She knew there was a “hit” out against DK which was worth $13,000. (c) She knew the “hit” meant someone wanted DK dead for $13,000. (d) She offered Mr Kirkwood the address of DK because she needed the money. (e) She deliberately lied to Mr Battye to obtain information from him in regards to them reporting the incident to police and the whereabouts of DK. (f) On 15 August 2021, she got dressed in preparation to attend Mr Battye’s address but subsequently backed out.
(g)
Mr Kirkwood gave her an Xbox and games which he had stolen from Mr Battye.
The pleas of guilty
22. Pleas of guilty were entered to the above offences in the Magistrates Court on 2 November 2021. This was at an early stage of proceedings, being at the third mention, following negotiation of charges and before provision of a brief of evidence.
23. The Crown accepts in their written submissions that the plea was early and had significant utilitarian value, particularly in circumstances where she was then a compellable witness in respect of the charges against Mr Kirkwood and Mr Banks.
24. The matters set out in s 35(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act) have been considered, in particular the seriousness of the offences, the timing of the pleas, and the fact that the victims have been spared the
potential trauma of giving evidence in at least the offender’s trial. There is obvious
utilitarian value of the pleas here, and it is appropriate to discount the sentence which
would otherwise have been imposed by 25% for each offence.
Objective seriousness
25. The sentencing court must consider where the facts of the particular offence and
offender lie on the “spectrum” from the least serious instances of the offence to the
worst category: R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256 at [19].
26. That task is an objective one. It is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending, and without reference to matters personal to the offender: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 at [27].
27. One matter that affects the objective seriousness of the offender’s culpability for each
offence is the joint nature of the offending. The offence of making a demand with threat to kill was committed by joint commission, by virtue of s 45A of the Criminal
Code. The offence of being “knowingly concerned” in relation to the aggravated
burglary charge arises by virtue of s 45 of the Criminal Code. As the Crown submitted, the objective seriousness of an offence committed by virtue of these sections involves consideration of the objective seriousness of the principal offence
as well as the nature and extent of the offender’s involvement.
Make demand with threat to kill
28. In R v Goodge [2019] ACTSC 297, Mossop J dealt with the lesser offence of making a demand with a threat (contrary to s 32(2) of the Crimes Act), an offence with a
maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. His Honour held at [29] that the gravity
of such an offence turns on the following:
(a) The nature of the demand; (b) The manner and circumstances in which the demand is made; and (c) The nature of the threat.
29. The offence in question here is the more serious kind of demand accompanied by threat, in that the threat was to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on a person, as
indicated by the maximum penalty of the offence being 20 years’ imprisonment. With
that extra gravity in mind, the same factors nevertheless arise for consideration.
30. Here, the relevant demand was for $25,000 from Mr Palmer. At the time the demand was made, Mr Kirkwood and Mr Banks had effectively trapped Mr Palmer in the vehicle. They demonstrated both verbally and visually (by way of video footage and bringing a samurai sword into the car) that he would be killed or have grievous bodily harm inflicted if he attempted to escape.
31. It was further stated that DK, a close friend of Mr Palmer, would be killed if Mr Palmer did not comply with their demand.
32. The initial agreement was for Mr Kirkwood to kill DK and pay the offender for her assistance in locating him. Mr Kirkwood and Mr Banks could not find DK. The offence that resulted was for Mr Palmer to pay $25,000 or they would kill DK.
33. Section 45A(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code provides that a person is taken to have committed an offence if the person and at least 1 other person enter into an
agreement, and an offence is committed “in accordance with the agreement”. Subsection 45A(2)(a) then provides that an offence is committed “in accordance with an agreement” if the conduct of 1 or more parties in accordance with the agreement
makes up the physical elements consisting of conduct of an offence of the same type
agreed to.34. As both murder and making a demand with threat to kill are offences against the person (with both located in Part 2 of the Crimes Act), the offence that was agreed to was of the same type as the offence which was in fact ultimately committed: see R v Shearer [2018] ACTSC 91 at [72] and [87].
35. The offender’s degree of culpability is less than that of the other two persons
involved, but the circumstances of the offending are extremely serious and the role she played in providing the assistance she did could have had dire consequences for DK had he been home.
Aggravated burglary
36. Considerations relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness in respect of a burglary include the nature of the premises, the presence of victims at the time, the
offender’s motivation, whether there was damage to the property, and the level of
premeditation or planning involved: see Simonds v the Queen [2013] ACTCA 13 (Simonds); R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83; R v Pahl (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 155; and R v McMahon (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 299.
37. In R v Hancock [2021] ACTSC 52, Refshauge AJ drew upon a number of authorities before helpfully summarising the approach to be taken to the offence of burglary at
[33] : …the following factors seem appropriate to consider:
(a) whether the property on which the offender trespassed was residential, which would be more serious, although an underground car park in an apartment complex is perhaps not so serious, but not at the level of seriousness of, say, commercial premises;
(b) whether there was damage committed on entry or while the offender was in the premises, unless causing that damage is separately charged, and whether there was vandalism, scattering property of the premises around about and the like;
(c) whether the occupants of the premises were present or the burglary was
committed at a time when they were likely to be present;
(d) the motivation for the burglary;
(e) whether there was premeditation or planning or organisation, especially
professional organisation and execution;
(f) whether there are on the premises, or were likely to be there, elderly, sick ordisable persons, which is especially aggravating if the offender knows this;
(g) whether the offence is committed in a series of repeat incursions into the same
premises; and
(h) the actual trauma suffered by the occupants.
38. The observations of Refshauge AJ in R v Po’oi [2021] ACTSC 151 explain why there
is a distinction made between a residential and commercial premises. His Honour
said at [49]-[51]:49. …a home is a place of security and safety. People are entitled to feel safe in their own
homes, and burglaries, even when the occupants are not present, violate that feeling.
See The Queen v Blundell [2015] ACTSC 383 at [76].50. There is often a likelihood that the offender will enter the premises when one of the occupants is there and, being a residence, that may be a vulnerable person, old or young, disabled or ill, disoriented if aroused from sleep. The home is also a repository of one's personal possessions, items that often have a sentimental or personal value. They will include private papers and records. They will often include items of adornment or decoration which may also have monetary value.
51. A burglary puts these at risk of destruction, loss or damage. These can cause real financial disadvantage, inconvenience or irreplaceable dispossession, as well as unhappiness and anxiety.
Simonds at [54] (cited in Heard v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 6 at [33]) is to similar effect.
40. In the present case, the offence occurred at a residential property. The conduct was aggravated because of the presence of another offender, which had the capacity to increase the risk to any persons on the premises (or in the vicinity), as well as increasing the capacity and commitment to the offence that is to be committed within any premises: R v Crawford (No 1) [2020] ACTSC 245 at [35].
41. The circumstances indicate that the offender’s motivation was either money or greed,
(or perhaps spite). However, I have placed little weight on motivation here as I accept
the underlying motivation was directly related to the offender’s long term drug habit,
but that is dealt with separately as part of the subjective features of the offending.
42. There was clearly premeditation or planning as discussed below, and the actual trauma suffered by the victims is also a factor here, discussed separately below.
43. Again, the offender’s conduct is seen through the lens of her being a party to an
agreement to commit the burglary. This means that:
(a)
The offender is equally liable for the acts constituting this offence: McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 130 ALR 26 per Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ at 30.
(b)
However, being liable to the same punishment as those who committed the burglary (Criminal Code s 45A(9)), the sentence imposed may take into account her actual role in the offending, by reference to her particular conduct: Johns v R (1980) 143 CLR 108 per Stephen J at 117; GAS v The Queen; SJK v The Queen [2004] HCA 22; 78 ALJR 786 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon J at [23]; R v BS-X [2021] ACTSC 160 at [130].
44. While the offender’s degree of culpability in the aggravated burglary charge is less
than that of the other two co-offenders, the extent of her preparations for the anticipated burglary (dressing in all black with balaclava and gloves, indicating to her
co-offenders that she was “ballied up” or ready to go, communicating clear timetables
for the proposed offending) and her knowing receipt of items stolen from Mr Battye, speak to substantial criminality in the offence, notwithstanding her last-minute decision not to engage directly in the conduct.
Victim Impact Statements
45. Two Victim Impact Statements were provided to the court:
(a) Statement of Mr Battye dated 18 January 2022; and (b) Statement of Mr Palmer dated 19 January 2022.
46. They are brief but it is clear from what was stated by each of the victims that they have been greatly affected by the offences. Mr Battye lost personal possessions, some of which he has been unable to replace, and he has moved back home, which I take to mean that he has returned to his family home rather than living independently. The offences have affected his relationships and his ability to trust people, in particular because he gave the offender a home in the first place. He evidently perceives that as giving the offender the opportunity to engage in the criminal conduct in respect of him.
47. Mr Palmer also has had to move out of his house and the consequences have been severe. He reports feeling that his life was in danger, that he was intimidated, fearful, anxious, and in a state of panic. He has had ongoing concerns about his safety. He has since moved interstate with a view to feeling safer, in an attempt to start a new life. He now also mistrusts people. It is fair to say that the impact on each of those victims has been significant and ongoing.
Subjective circumstances
48. A Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) was provided to the Court and I have accepted its contents to the extent that it is incorporated in what is set out below. The offender is
currently 21 years old. Apart from a failure to comply with the Chief Medical Officer’s
direction in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic, for which she was fined $500, the offender did not have a criminal history prior to the offences for which she is being sentenced.
49. The offender was born and raised in the ACT, and reported a “challenging childhood”.
While she did not disclose any significant standalone traumatic events, the PSR reports that she moved around the ACT frequently as a child, and her parents separated in her infant years, which exposed her to ongoing tension and verbal conflict between her parents in later years. She remains in a close relationship with her mother, who resides in the ACT, and her father, who resides in Queensland. She has no siblings and no contact with other extended family.
50. Her education was significantly disrupted by frequent changes in school. She completed up to year nine in high school, and has since attempted to obtain her year twelve certificate through the Canberra Institute of Technology (CIT), although she has not yet achieved success in that regard. Recent work experience gave her an interest in childcare, and she has expressed a desire to complete her year twelve certificate in order to study childcare, both at CIT.
51. The most critical subjective feature of the offending is the offender’s extensive history
of substance abuse, commencing with daily cannabis use at fourteen years of age and later progressing to a two-year dependence on MDMA. The catalyst appears to have been use as a coping mechanism for childhood trauma and poor mental health.
52. The offender also reported later alcohol and cocaine dependency following a relationship breakdown, as well as heavy use of prescription anti-depressants and experimentation with methamphetamine prior to being remanded in custody.
53. Since June 2021, the offender has endeavoured to manage her substance abuse problems, through medication for substance withdrawal, and undertaking alcohol and drug counselling.
54. The offender’s view was that her substance abuse impeded her decision-making at
the time she committed the present offences, particularly in that her offending was motivated by a financial incentive to fund her drug and alcohol addiction. She claims to have ceased all substance abuse since she entered custody and intends to continue to abstain from illicit drugs in the future. Significantly, she has managed to obtain a place in the residential rehabilitation program at Arcadia House, to commence on 4 May 2022.
55. During her time in custody, the offender engaged positively and regularly with the Specialist Communities team for counselling, as well as other rehabilitation
opportunities afforded to her at the AMC. Of some concern is the offender’s
continued engagement in self-harm, most recently on 3 January 2022. This is apparently something that the offender has been dealing with since twelve years of age, rather than a response to any specific event. I note that she has been diagnosed by a psychologist as having a Major Depressive Disorder, recurrent with moderate to severe symptoms.
56. The offender has also advised of an unknown amount of debt not exceeding $1000, but she has informed the Court that she would be willing to pay a fine if given sufficient time to do so.
57. The offender was assessed by the PSR author as suitable for a medium level of intervention by ACT Corrective Services, by way of a Good Behaviour Order, with a limited period of supervision to address key areas of dynamic risk. She has also been assessed as suitable for a Community Service work condition, pursuant to s 90 of the Sentencing Act.
Sentencing Practice
58. The parties have assisted the Court by providing cases that may be of some assistance when the Court considers current sentencing practice and patterns (pursuant to s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act). The objective in doing so is not to bind the sentencing court to achieve numerical equivalence with similar sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction: see Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [48].
59. Those cases included R v QH; R v CR [2020] ACTSC 178 and R v Bourne; R v Manns [2018] ACTSC 35 as being of some assistance in considering sentences for the offence of making a demand with threat to kill. However, the Crown accepted that these are of limited assistance due to the subjective factors involved in the cases. In
respect of the offence of aggravated burglary, the range of circumstances “is so wide that it is difficult to identify, with any reasonable utility, a singular sentencing practice”,
as observed recently by Refshauge AJ in R v Bessant [2020] ACTSC 365 at [37]. His Honour referred (at [40]) to a range for aggravated burglary as generally being
between one year and two years and six months’ imprisonment, citing R v Lockwood
[2018] ACTSC 288 at [49].
Other sentencing considerations
60. In addition to the section 33 factors, which I have already addressed in what has been considered above (to the extent that they have application here), I am guided by the sentencing objectives in sections 6 and 7 of the Sentencing Act. In this case, I
consider that given the offender’s age, lack of criminal history, underlying substance
abuse problem and obvious commitment to rehabilitation in that regard, the promotion of a safe society and protection of the community is best served by immediate targeted attempts at rehabilitating the offender. Those measures are able to start tomorrow and offer the best opportunity for the offender to move away from the serious criminal behaviour that has brought her to engage with the justice system in respect of these two offences.
61. I agree with the parties that, given the nature of the offending, nothing but a sentence of full-time imprisonment is warranted having regard to s 10(2) of the Sentencing Act. However, the rehabilitative component or objective of the sentence can be accommodated by the manner in which such a sentence is to be served.
62. In terms of the structure of the sentence, and noting the principles set out in O’Brien v
The Queen [2015] ACTCA 47 at [26], I consider the sentence should be partially concurrent to ensure an appropriate total aggregate period of imprisonment, but also partially consecutive to reflect the separate criminality of each offence, notwithstanding the proximity of timing between the two.
Conclusion and Orders
63. Accordingly, I make the following orders:
1.
In respect of the offence of making a demand of another person with a threat to kill, contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (CC2021/9438), the
offender is sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment (reduced from 2 years and 4
months on account of her plea of guilty), to commence on 21 December 2021
and end on 20 September 2023.2. In respect of the offence of aggravated burglary contrary to s 312(a) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CC2021/8839), the offender is sentenced to 18
months’ imprisonment (reduced from 24 months on account of her plea of guilty),
to commence on 3 May 2022 and end on 2 November 2023.
3. The total sentence is 1 year 10 months and 13 days commencing on 21 December 2021 and ending on 2 November 2023.
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order
64. Having regard to requirements of s 12A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), which are satisfied, I impose the following sentence:
1.
A Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (Order) under s 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) is made for the offender for 18 months from today (commencing on 3 May 2022 and ending on 2 November 2023 in respect of the primary offence of make demand with threat to kill (C2021/9438), of which she
has been convicted and for which she has been sentenced to 21 months’
imprisonment.
2. That Order is extended to the offence of aggravated burglary (CC2021/8839), which is an associated offence of the primary offence.
3. The convictions and sentences for the primary offence and associated offence are incorporated into the order in the custodial part of the order.
4. The custodial part of the Order is suspended under s 80W of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) from today 3 May 2022, until 2 November 2023.
5. For the treatment and supervision part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order:
(a) The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y and s 80Z(2)(f)-(g) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) are imposed; (b) The offender is to travel to Arcadia House and admit herself to the residential drug rehabilitation program at that facility by 1:00pm tomorrow, 4 May 2022; (c) The offender is directed to complete the residential drug rehabilitation program at Arcadia House, to not leave the facility until she has completed the course and to comply with all the directions of the person in charge of the program and all the rules of the program and the facility; (d) Should the offender leave or be discharged from the program before completing it, she is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4pm on the next business day with a view to having her Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order reviewed; (e) The offender is to undertake any program, treatment or counselling, urinalysis or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team and obey all reasonable directions of any member of that Team about where she resides, with whom she associates and her attendance from time to time; and (f) The offender is to comply with any directions of the Court from time to time about attendance at Court either in person or by electronic means. 6. The offender is directed to appear in Court on Friday 13 May 2022 at 12:30 pm in person or by electronic means as appropriate.
7. The offender is directed to attend the Court Registry before she leaves the Court precincts to sign a sealed copy of this Order and an undertaking to comply with the Order and any obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) for the period that this Order is in force.
8. I direct that written notice of the order, together with a copy of the order, is to be given to the offender.
I certify that the preceding sixty-four [64] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice McWilliam.
Associate:
Date: 3 May 2022
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