R v Trotta - [2008] SADC 155

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v TROTTA
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
[2008] SADC 155
Ruling and Judgment of Her Honour Judge McIntyre
21 November 2008
CRIMINAL LAW
Defendant charged with aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence and theft - plea of not guilty - defence of mental incompetence raised - election to have investigations into mental competence and elements of offences dealt with by a judge sitting alone - objective elements of the offences established beyond reasonable doubt - whether defendant suffering from a mental impairment at time of offences - whether defendant knew that the conduct was wrong.
Held: Defendant's psychotic symptoms caused by amphetamine intoxication and not by mental illness and hence he did not suffer a mental impairment at time of offence. Further it was not established that the defendant did not know that his conduct was wrong as a consequence of any mental impairment.
Finding: Not established, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant was at the time of the alleged offence mentally incompetent to commit the offences.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1936 Part 8A (Mental Impairment) ss 170(2), 134, 269A, 269B, 269C(b), 269D , referred to.
R v Morrison [2006] SASC 344; King v Porter (1936) 55 CLR 182 at 189; R v W-B (1999) 73 SASR 45, considered.

R v TROTTA
[2008] SADC 155
Introduction

George Michael Trotta was charged on an Information in this Court with one count of aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence contrary to s170(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (“The Act”) and one count of theft contrary to s134 of the Act (“the offences”). The particulars of the offence of aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence are as follows:
George Michael Trotta on the 27^th day of October 2004 at Paradise entered or remained in the place of residence of Baerbel Marguerita McDougal as a trespasser, with the intention of committing an offence therein, namely theft and when Baerbel Marguerita McDougal was lawfully present in the said place and he knew of her presence or was reckless as to whether anyone was in the place.
The particulars of the count of theft are as follows:
George Michael Trotta on the 27^th day of October 2004 at Paradise dishonestly dealt with property namely a handbag and purse and money in the sum of about $5.00 without the consent of Baerbel Marguerita McDougal the owner of that property intending to permanently deprive her of the property.
It was indicated by defence counsel at a directions hearing that the defence of mental competence was to be raised. Reports were ordered to be obtained pursuant to s269WA of the Act.
Background
The accused who was born on 12 June 1981 had, for some years prior to the offences, been addicted to heroin. He went to Perth and was implanted with slow release Naltrexone. He then commenced to use “ice”, an amphetamine. It is unclear on the evidence precisely when he began using “ice”, however it is clear that he commenced using it some time prior to the events of October 2004.
The accused was admitted to Glenside Hospital under detention on 2 September 2004 with a diagnosis of drug-induced psychosis. His condition settled and he was discharged on 5 September 2004. He consumed amphetamines throughout the period from his discharge from Glenside Hospital on 5 September 2004 until the events that are the subject of these charges. It is not entirely clear when precisely he took amphetamines and in what quantities. In any event his psychotic symptoms recurred. He was resistant to treatment. He was made the subject of a community treatment order. On 27 October 2004, a medical team attended at his home address in company with the police to administer medication. The accused ran off. He was observed climbing over the roof of his house and various fences. He was subsequently caught and taken to the Royal Adelaide Hospital.
During the time he was being pursued by the police it appears he entered Ms McDougal’s house. Ms McDougal was at the time having a shower. She had left her rear sliding and screen doors open. Her handbag was on a chair near the door. She heard footsteps in the hallway and thought that it was a friend who did some cleaning. She called out but there was no response. When she got out of the shower and dressed, the police attended. They advised that they were looking for someone and that she should stay inside. Soon after she noticed that her handbag was missing. She called the police. They located the handbag lying by the side of her house. The police noted some blood on a fence and on the handbag. A DNA profile from the blood on the handbag was an identical match to the accused’s DNA profile. The accused was located shortly afterwards and conveyed to hospital by the police. The accused gave evidence that he is unable to remember any of the events at Ms McDougal’s house.
The proceedings
The procedure for an investigation by the Court into an accused’s mental competence to commit an offence is contained within Part 8A of the Act. The defendant elected, pursuant to s269B of the Act, to have the objective elements of the offences and the issue of mental competence dealt with by a Judge sitting alone. The matter came on before me on 17 November 2008.
I determined to proceed under s269G of the Act and to deal with the objective elements of the offences prior to dealing with the issue of mental competence.
Mr Preston, who appeared on behalf of the DPP, tendered by consent the declarations of:
·    Baerbel Marguerita McDougal dated 23 February 2006 and 21 March 2006.
·    Benjamin George Everett dated 24 February 2006.
·    Christopher John Sanders dated 7 June 2006 including exhibit CJS1.
·    Kym Hansen dated 23 February 2006.
·    Julianne Michelle Henry dated 1 March 2006.
Mr Preston outlined the facts that the prosecution relied upon to establish the objective elements of the offences. Mr Mancini, who appeared on behalf of the accused, conceded that the objective elements of the offence were established. Having considered the declarations, and the submissions of counsel, I was satisfied that the objective elements of the offences were established beyond reasonable doubt and I made that finding on 17 November 2008.
I then heard evidence and representations in relation to the question of whether the accused was mentally competent to commit the offences. The accused and his mother gave evidence of the events of 27 October 2004 and the events leading up to them. Three psychiatrists gave evidence concerning the medical issues. The accused called Dr Jules Begg and the DPP called Dr Kenneth O’Brien and Dr Maria Tomasic. In addition, reports prepared by the doctors were tendered as follows:
·Dr Jules Begg reports dated 5 February 2008 and 19 May 2008.[1]
·Dr Kenneth O’Brien dated 30 July 2008.[2]
·Dr Maria Tomasic dated 22 April 2008.[3]
[1] Exhibits D2 & D3.
[2] Exhibit P2
[3] Exhibit P3
Royal Adelaide Hospital notes relating to the accused were tendered by the defence[4] and the accused’s antecedent report was tendered by consent as background material relied upon by Drs O’Brien and Tomasic in reaching their opinions.[5]
[4] Exhibit D1
[5] Exhibit P4
Relevant Statutory provisions
A person’s mental competence to commit an offence is to be presumed unless they are found to have been mentally incompetent to commit the offence.[6] If the issue of mental competence is raised the Court must decide whether it has been established on the balance of probability that the accused was, at the time of the alleged offence, mentally incompetent to commit the offence.[7] The onus for establishing this is on the accused.[8]
[6] Section 269D
[7] Section 269G(b)(3)
[8] R v W-B (1999) 73 SASR 45
Section 269C of the Act provides as follows:
A person is mentally incompetent to commit an offence if, at the time of the conduct alleged to give rise to the offence, the person is suffering from a mental impairment and, in consequence of the mental impairment:
(a)     Does not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or
(b)     Does not know that the conduct is wrong; or
(c)     Is unable to control the conduct.
Mental impairment is defined in s269A(1) as follows:
(a)     A mental illness; or
(b)     An intellectual disability; or
(c)     A disability or impairment of the mind resulting from senility, but does not include      intoxication.
Mental illness is defined:
A pathological infirmity of the mind (including a temporary one of short duration)
Intoxication is defined as:
A temporary disorder, abnormality or impairment of the mind that results from the consumption or administration of intoxicants and will pass on metabolism or elimination of the intoxicants from the body.
Prosecution submissions
Mr Preston submitted that the accused had failed to discharge the onus of establishing that he had a mental impairment for the purposes of Part 8A. Rather, it was submitted, the evidence established that he was intoxicated within the meaning of s269A by reason of his ingestion of amphetamine and was thus excluded from the definition of mental impairment.
In the alternative Mr Preston contended that, if the accused did have a mental impairment within the meaning of the Act, the evidence did not establish that he was mentally incompetent at the time the offences were committed.
Defence submissions
Mr Mancini submitted that the medical evidence established that the accused had a mental illness within the meaning of s 269A being a drug induced psychosis. That was to be distinguished from amphetamine intoxication which causes symptoms such as euphoria, abnormal perceptions, disinhibition and the like. Intoxication is a state of mind induced by ingestion of a drug. On the other hand, it was contended, drug induced psychosis was caused by the effect of the amphetamines increasing the amount of dopamine in the brain leading to production of proteins, cell growth within the brain and abnormal connections between those cells and was properly termed a mental impairment.
Mr Mancini further submitted that the accused’s psychosis constituting the mental impairment substantially caused the conduct constituting the offence. The defence relied upon s269C(b) namely that the accused, in consequence of his mental impairment, did not know that his conduct was wrong.
Did the accused suffer a mental impairment?
The threshold issue for determination is whether the accused has established that he had a mental impairment for the purposes of Part 8A or alternatively whether he was intoxicated within the meaning of s269A by reason of his ingestion of amphetamine.
There is only limited information as to when the accused took “ice” prior to these events. It is plain that he did but the precise time at which he did so and the quantity that he took is not at all clear. The accused and his mother gave evidence. I am not critical of the accused or his mother but unfortunately their evidence on this topic was not helpful. The accused, has only limited recall of events due to his intake of drugs. His mother was clearly distressed by her son’s condition and had difficulty in providing a clear chronology of events.
The accused, in evidence, said that he took the drug some days prior to these events but was unable to be more precise[9]. He told Dr Tomasic that he had taken “ice” the night before these events and had been awake all night however, she accepted that this was not necessarily correct.[10] He told Drs Begg and O’Brien that he had taken the drug in the days prior to the events in question but was unable to be more precise than he was in his evidence. His mother observed him taking “ice” some days prior to these events but was unable to say precisely when. She thought it was probably a few days before.[11]
[9] Transcript page 20, 25-26
[10] Transcript p104
[11] Transcript p41
The accused said that he was affected by the ice at the time of these events on 27 October 2004. He was sick and unwell. He had paranoid thoughts, he was scared and would “freak out all the time”.[12]
[12] Transcript pp 20-21, 27-28
A urine screening test taken at the hospital following the accused’s admission demonstrated the presence of amphetamine but does not indicate the concentration.[13]
[13] Transcript p117
It is true to say that all three psychiatrists experienced difficulty with the definition of intoxication in s269A. This is best illustrated by Dr O’Brien’s evidence that the end point of intoxication secondary to drugs and psychosis is so similar that he finds the distinction “clinically unhelpful”[14]. When the s269A definition of intoxication was put to Dr O’Brien in the context of the accused’s state of mind at the relevant time, Dr O’Brien responded as follows:
AThat is a very difficult question to answer. The key word is “temporary”. At a very superficial level, if a person is intoxicated or in a drug induced state removal from that environment, removal from access to drugs can certainly decrease the pathology and return the individual to an apparent state of normality but that’s very much at a macro level. At a micro level, at a brain level, its very difficult to understand whether one is dealing with a normal brain that has become psychotic secondary to drug use or whether one is dealing with an abnormal brain, a vulnerable brain, a fragile brain, and the drug use or misuse simply precipitates the psychosis which might also be precipitated by other circumstances, stress or trauma, but in a different time of life and a different way. So that is why the distinction as to whether it is a normal brain or an abnormal brain I find very very difficult to answer.
QAccordingly you find the legislation difficult to deal with.
AThe legislation I believe is difficult to deal with because of that.[15]
[14] Transcript p77
[15] Transcript p77
Later in his evidence Dr O’Brien indicated that the symptoms of methylamphetamine intoxication or psychosis were to all intents and purposes indistinguishable to the acute symptoms of conditions such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or psychotic illness. It was not possible to look at the accused’s symptomatology and clinical presentation and say that it was only a drug induced psychosis. He then went on to say:
AIt may be one day we have a better idea of what is a normal brain and what is an abnormal brain, but at the moment I don’t think our science leads us to that level. We do not know enough about Mr Trotta’s brain to know whether it is a normal brain or a vulnerable brain. We do know that when he takes drugs, and in particular amphetamines, he becomes psychotic, that’s what we do know.
QWe also know when he is withdrawn from those drugs.
AHe becomes well relatively quickly which does give some support to the notion it’s a more discrete entity compared to many other patients in medico-legal situations I have been in.[16]
[16] Transcript p90
Dr Tomasic gave evidence very similar to Dr O’Brien on this issue. She indicated that there was “a grey area” between psychotic symptoms arising from methylamphetamine intoxication and psychosis. It was possible for a person to have psychotic symptoms such as auditory hallucinations without being psychotic. It was necessary to have a combination of a certain number of symptoms to call it psychosis. She gave evidence as follows:
AThe sort of guidelines that one would use to separate intoxication from a drug induced psychosis including you know how disordered the behaviour is, how out of touch with reality the person is, and how long the symptoms continue. So intoxication would normally settle very rapidly if the person is put in a drug free environment so once the drug use has stopped it settles very quickly even without any mediation. Although he’s always had admissions that I know about, they would have always given him anti-psychotic medication. Nevertheless, a true drug induced psychosis tends to take a couple of days to settle with medication, and sometimes, particularly with amphetamines which cause quite profound symptoms, it can take a good week to settle the symptoms, even though it’s simply a drug induced psychosis and not an underlying psychotic illness such as schizophrenia.[17]
[17] Transcript p100
Dr Tomasic considered that combination of symptoms exhibited by the accused indicated that he had both amphetamine intoxication and a drug-induced psychosis.[18] The accused has never been diagnosed with a chronic psychotic illness such as schizophrenia but he has features of psychosis such as resistance to treatment, lack of insight, resistance to understanding and acceptance of his condition and its proper treatment and extreme behaviour.[19]
[18] Transcript p109
[19] Transcript p108-9
It was put to Dr Tomasic that the accused was assessed on his admission to hospital on 27 October 2004 as having no psychotic features. She was asked whether that was evidence in support of him being intoxicated rather than being subject to a drug induced psychosis she answered:
There is a grey area and I can’t be sure. Usually symptoms of a drug induced psychosis would persist a little longer, but then it may be that the staff didn’t observe all of the symptoms, so I can’t be 100% sure.[20]
[20] Transcript p117
Dr Begg had similar difficulties to the other specialists. The definition in s269A of the Act was put to him and he was asked whether a drug induced psychosis could be properly characterised as a manifestation of intoxication due to the ingestion of amphetamine. He initially agreed that within that definition it could be[21] but later said that the accused’s presentation on 27 October 2004 was a result of mental illness rather than intoxication[22]. He explained this by saying that he did not consider that there was a direct effect of the drug on the mind in the case of a drug-induced psychosis. Rather there was an intervening variable. Specifically, how the person metabolises the drug and the effects of that drug on the brain chemistry, particularly the dopamine levels which cause the psychosis.[23] The drug increases the dopamine in the brain, which stimulates cells to produce certain proteins, which result in cell growth. That cell growth…
…..results in extra connections to other cells and so the nerve conduction, the impulses are heightened or ramped up and that causes the psychosis. It is verified scientifically by the presence of genetic markers in the central spinal, in the cerebrospinal fluid that shows increased cell protein productions has occurred and it’s thought that those extra connections are the problem.[24]
[21] Transcript p63
[22] Transcript p68
[23] Transcript p21
[24] Transcript p71-2
Dr Begg also indicated that the architecture of the brain will, with abstinence from amphetamines, revert to a healthy state over a period of days or weeks depending on how long it has been in an abnormal state[25].
[25] Transcript p72
Dr O’Brien was asked about this issue:
QAnd the causation, as I understand it, perhaps runs along the lines that you take the drug, it creates euphoria, it has an effect on the chemicals in the brain, they then develop their own chemical reaction which leads to things like psychosis; as in Mr Trotta’s case.
AI have had the opportunity, if I may say, of reading Dr Begg’s evidence which I think he described for the court some of the chemical manifestations of illness. In as much as I can read it quickly, that seems to be a fairly accurate representation of what happens in the brain when people are mentally ill.
QThere is not a direct causal relationship between the amphetamine intoxication or use and the psychosis because there’s an intervening causative act.
AThe brain is the most complex organ in the body, nothing is simple with the brain. You can’t go majorly to cause and effect, there is lots of intermediary stages.

It is tempting in the circumstances to adopt Dr O’Brien’s practical approach to the legislation namely to concentrate upon the issue of mental competence under s269C, however caused, without specifically addressing the definition of mental impairment. Unfortunately this is not a course open to me. Notwithstanding the medical and factual difficulties identified above, I must determine this threshold issue as to whether the accused has discharged the onus of establishing that he had a mental impairment at the time of the offences as opposed to being intoxicated by reason of his ingestion of amphetamines. This issue is to be determined on the balance of probabilities. In other words is it more probable than not that the accused had a mental impairment that can be distinguished from amphetamine intoxication?
All three doctors indicated, and accordingly I find, that:
·The accused has not been diagnosed with a chronic psychotic illness such as schizophrenia.
·The accused had, at the relevant time, a drug induced psychosis secondary to consumption of amphetamines.
·The drug induced psychosis was temporary.
·A drug induced psychosis would typically settle over a period of days to weeks with abstinence from amphetamines. Administration of anti-psychotic medication was not necessary to achieve this result.
·The brain is a complex organ and the effect of amphetamine upon the brain is a complex process as described by Dr Begg.
In the accused’s case the hospital notes indicate that he was showing no psychotic symptoms after his admission to hospital on 27 October 2004. Whilst I note Dr Tomasic’s reservations about this note I find that, at the least, this indicates that the accused’s psychosis was settling as the psychiatrists indicated was the normal course. It further appears common ground that the accused had amphetamine in his urine when admitted to hospital following these events.
A distinction between drug induced psychosis on the one hand and amphetamine intoxication on the other is unhelpful and leads to a certain circularity of argument. What is plain is that the accused suffered a drug induced psychosis. It’s necessary to look at that condition in the light of the legislative definition of intoxication. I consider that the drug induced psychosis that affected the accused at the time of these offences was a “temporary disorder, abnormality or impairment of the mind”. Further, whatever the chemical process in the brain, the psychosis resulted from the consumption of amphetamine, an intoxicant. To put it another way the accused would not have developed the psychosis in the absence of the amphetamine. The only issue arising from the definition is whether it could be said that the condition would pass on metabolism or elimination of the amphetamine from the accused’s body. The evidence on this topic was equivocal. What is incontrovertible however is that, at the time of his hospital admission, the accused still had within his body some level of amphetamine. It is further clear that abstinence from amphetamine would cause the drug induced psychosis to subside. In those circumstances I consider that the preponderance of the evidence suggests that the accused was, at the time of the offences intoxicated within the meaning of s269A by reason of his ingestion of amphetamines.
I am fortified in this view by reason of the decision in R v Morrison[26] in which the Honourable Mr Justice Duggan found, with similar medical evidence, that the accused in that matter was subject to amphetamine intoxication rather than his psychotic symptoms having being caused by his underlying mental illness. There was no medical evidence of an underlying medical condition affecting the accused in this matter nor was his case put on that basis.
[26] [2006] SASC 344
Did the accused know that his conduct was wrong?
Even if, contrary to my finding, it was accepted that the accused was suffering a mental impairment within the meaning of the Act it is also necessary for him to establish that, in consequence of that impairment, he was mentally incompetent to commit the offences as outlined in s269C of the Act.
Counsel agreed that I need not consider whether the accused knew the nature and quality of the conduct or that he was unable to control the conduct. The issue was agreed to be whether the accused was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions first in entering Ms McDougal’s house as alleged in count 1 and, second, in taking the handbag, purse and money as alleged in count 2.
The test is conveniently set out in King v Porter:[27]
Could this man be said to know in this sense whether his act was wrong if through a disease or defect or disorder of the mind he could not think rationally of the reasons which to ordinary people make that act right or wrong? If through the disordered condition of the mind he could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that he could not know that what he was doing was wrong. What is meant by “wrong”? What is meant by “wrong” is wrong having regard to the everyday standards of reasonable people.
[27] (1936) 55 CLR 182 at 189
In my view it was plainly wrong of the accused to enter Ms McDougal’s house and to take her handbag, purse and money. The question is whether, given his state of mind, he was capable of making that assessment. The accused’s evidence is of limited assistance in determining this issue, as he has no memory of the events in question. He does however give a clear picture of his state of mind immediately prior to the offences. He saw the police and the medical team. He had prior experience of such events. He understood the implications of their attendance. He did not want treatment, indeed, he did not want to be detained or injected. When he ran off he wished to “run away and hide”.[28]
[28] Transcript p20
All three psychiatrists agree that the accused was able to control his conduct. Drs O’Brien and Tomasic consider that the accused would also have known the nature and quality of his conduct and the wrongfulness of his actions whereas Dr Begg considered that he did not at least in respect of the entry into Ms McDougal’s house. Dr Begg was less certain about the theft.
Dr Begg appears, in his report of 19 May 2008, to have confused the concept of wrongfulness and that of the ability to appreciate the nature and quality of conduct by stating as follows:
As a result of this disorder it is my opinion he was not able to reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about the nature and quality and wrongfulness of his actions. I believe he was able to control his conduct.[29]
[29] Exhibit D2 page 7
Dr Begg’s evidence however clarified this somewhat by indicating that whilst the psychotic process may derange a person’s thinking it does not overtake the entire mind except in very severe cases. A person will retain the ability to undertake purposeful behaviour such as driving a car and have some idea what he is doing.[30] Dr Begg stated clearly that his opinion was based on the second limb of s269C of the Act in that he did not consider the accused was able to fully understand the wrongfulness of his actions because he was not able to think clearly as a result of the psychosis. He thought he was in great danger and he fled the scene because of that belief.[31] The accused’s actions in climbing onto a roof, absconding and then somehow getting into another house was not consistent with simply seeking to avoid medical treatment but rather it demonstrated that he was driven by an intense fear.
[30] Transcript p51
[31] Transcript p55
Dr Begg however drew a distinction between the accused’s action in gaining entry to the house and the theft of the handbag. He did not see this as a planned entry into a house to effect a theft. It was part of the accused’s efforts to escape the police and the medical team.[32] There was however no delusional or psychotic belief regarding handbags that would lead him to the conclusion that it was part of a psychosis so Dr Begg considered that it was an opportunistic theft.
[32] Transcript p59
Dr O’Brien, on the other hand, saw no reason to believe that the accused was so subject to mental illness that he was incapable of distinguishing the wrongfulness of his actions in entering the house and taking the handbag[33]. Notwithstanding he was in a psychotic state the accused had sufficient awareness of what he was doing to understand the wrongfulness of his actions. His behaviour was not out of keeping with his established antisocial history. Dr O’Brien further stated that:
We know that drugs and alcohol cause disinhibition in which the normal control exercised by the frontal cortex is diminished or absent, so it’s not an unreasonable explanation to say that by virtue of his intoxication, drug induced state he was disinhibited, there was an opportunity for him in his drug induced state to commit an act of dishonesty and he availed himself of that opportunity. In other words it was an opportunistic offence which is not particularly out of keeping with his antisocial history, so it seems to me that that’s a far more reasonable explanation than stating that by virtue of his intoxication r his psychosis he was incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of what he was doing.[34]
[33] Transcript p89-90
[34] Transcript p79
Dr Tomasic had a similar view to Dr O’Brien. There was nothing in the description of the offences or the accused’s recall of the day of the offences that suggested he didn’t know the quality and nature of his actions. He understood that he ran away, he understood who he was running away from and he gave a reason that sounded reasonable as to why he was doing that. Whilst the accused had no recall of the events involving entering the house or the theft Dr Tomasic couldn’t find any evidence to suggest he did not know the wrongfulness of his actions. She considered the opportunistic behaviour associated with entering the open house and with taking the handbag was consistent with the accused’s past behaviour. There was nothing to suggest that he was acting in a way that was different to his past history or usual nature.[35]
[35] Transcript p102
Having carefully considered the evidence on this point I prefer the evidence given by Drs O’Brien and Tomasic. I have difficulty in accepting the distinction drawn by Dr Begg between the accused’s appreciation of the actions constituting the two offences. I accept Dr Begg’s view that the accused’s fear surrounding the medical treatment was the result of his drug-induced psychosis indeed Dr O’Brien and Tomasic agree with this. However, the accused understood the medical team and the police were present to administer treatment. He did not want treatment and so he determined to escape. This was not an irrational action given his situation. Whilst the manner in which he effected this plan was somewhat extreme I consider that the accused was able to appreciate that it was wrong, first to enter Ms McDougal’s place of residence through the open door and second to take her handbag, purse and money. Both actions to my mind appear opportunistic and to be of such a nature that it is more probable than not that the accused knew that his actions were wrong.
I am not therefore satisfied that it has been established on the balance of probabilities that as a consequence of mental illness the accused was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct in respect of counts one and two on the information.
Accordingly my decision is that it has not been established on the balance of probabilities that the accused was at the time of the alleged aggravated trespass in a place of residence and at the time of the alleged theft mentally incompetent to commit those offences.
I record a finding that the presumption of mental competence has not been displaced. I shall proceed with the trial in the normal way.