R v Morrison - [2006] SASC 344

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v MORRISON
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
[2006] SASC 344
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Duggan
17 November 2006
CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - INSANITY - DISEASE OF THE MIND, MENTAL DISEASE OR MENTAL INFIRMITY
Accused charged with murdering victim Sheridan (Count 1) and attempting to murder victim Barty (Count 2) - charged with wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm (Count 3) in the alternative to Count 2 - accused made formal admissions that he inflicted stab wounds upon both victims and that, in the case of Sheridan, the wounds caused her death - found, objective elements of offences established beyond reasonable doubt - whether accused mentally incompetent to commit offences - where evidence that accused had consumed large quantities of methylamphetamine and exhibited strange and unpredictable behaviour in days leading up to and on day of offences - where defence argued accused suffering from underlying mental illness, heightened by consumption of methylamphetamine, which resulted in him not knowing conduct was wrong - where prosecution argued any psychotic symptoms exhibited by accused at time of offences due solely to amphetamine intoxication - found, accused's psychotic symptoms caused by amphetamine intoxication and not by mental illness - presumption of mental competence not displaced.

CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - VOLUNTARINESS - GENERALLY
CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - INTOXICATION - GENERALLY
Trial proceeded to subjective elements of offences - findings that accused consciously and voluntarily stabbed both victims - finding that that accused stabbed Sheridan at least intending to cause grievous bodily harm - finding that accused stabbed Barty intending to cause grievous bodily harm - not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that accused stabbed Barty intending to kill her - accused found Guilty of murder on Count 1, Not Guilty of attempted murder on Count 2 and Guilty of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm on Count 3.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 269A, 269C, 269D, 269G; Mental Health Act 1993 ., referred to.
The Queen v O'Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182, discussed.

R v MORRISON
[2006] SASC 344
Criminal

DUGGAN J. The accused is charged with the murder of Jaynee Sheridan and the attempted murder of Gwenda Barty at Brahma Drive, Brahma Lodge on 22 October 2004. He is also charged, in the alternative, with wounding Ms Barty with the intention of causing her grievous bodily harm. He elected to be tried by judge alone. The question of the accused’s mental competence to commit the offences was raised by the defence at the commencement of the trial.
The objective elements
At the suggestion of counsel for the prosecution and the defence, I determined to proceed first with the trial of the objective elements of the offence pursuant to s 269G of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (“the Act”).
According to the prosecution case, the accused inflicted fatal stab wounds to Ms Sheridan in the course of an incident which took place in the lounge room of her home at Brahma Lodge. It is also alleged that the accused stabbed Ms Barty during the same incident.
No witnesses were called on the trial of the objective elements of the offences. The accused made formal admissions through his counsel, Mr Braithwaite, to the effect that he inflicted the wounds on the victims and that, in the case of Ms Sheridan, the wounds inflicted by him resulted in her death.
In the light of these admissions, I then recorded a finding that the objective elements of the offences had been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Mental competence to commit the offences
In accordance with s 269GB(1)(a) of the Act, I then embarked on a hearing on the question of the accused’s mental competence to commit the offences.
It is appropriate at this point to summarise the facts established in the course of that stage of the hearing.
Ms Sheridan, who was 58 years of age, was living at 1 Brahma Drive, Brahma Lodge at the time of her death. Also living there was Dennis Comley, aged 56, who had previously been in a relationship with Ms Sheridan. It would seem that Ms Sheridan formed a relationship with the accused in the months leading up to her death. Various people stayed in the house with her at different times, including the accused. There was evidence that the deceased had conducted brothels from time to time in various Adelaide suburbs and that she ran an escort agency. According to the evidence, she sold or supplied drugs, particularly amphetamines. At the time of the alleged offences she was on home detention bail.
Gwenda Barty was a close friend of Ms Sheridan. She had known the accused for approximately two years before the alleged offences. She met Ms Sheridan through the accused. She lived with Ms Sheridan for a time when the latter was released on home detention bail approximately ten months before the alleged offences. On the day before the alleged offences, the accused took Ms Barty’s car from Ms Sheridan’s house on two occasions without Ms Barty’s permission. I will refer to that evidence in some detail later.
Mick Young was a friend of Ms Sheridan and he ran errands for her from time to time. He said in evidence that, on 22 October 2004, Ms Sheridan asked him to pick the accused up and bring him to her house. Mr Young drove his car to Findon, where he picked up the accused and took him to Brahma Lodge. Mr Young could not say what time he arrived at Brahma Lodge with the accused, but other evidence suggests that it was in the early evening. Mr Young did not go inside when he dropped the accused off. Ms Sheridan and Ms Barty were at the house when he arrived.
Ms Barty said in evidence that the accused entered the house, hugged her and apologised for taking her car. According to her evidence, the accused then spoke to Ms Sheridan and said words to the effect, “I suppose all the cameras are on”. Ms Sheridan had installed security cameras outside the house and in the lounge room and these were connected to a monitor in her bedroom. Ms Sheridan told the accused that the cameras were not turned on at this time.
Ms Barty said that she then walked towards the bathroom. She heard Ms Sheridan say on two occasions, “Put the knife down, Gerald”. When she went back to the lounge she saw the accused and Ms Sheridan talking. Ms Sheridan told her to go and make a phone call to Mick Young. The accused was about half a metre away from Ms Sheridan, but Ms Barty did not see him holding a knife.
Ms Barty went outside and rang Mr Young on her mobile telephone. Another person answered the phone and said that Mr Young was at Gawler. Ms Barty went back inside. She heard Ms Sheridan and the accused talking but could not hear what they were saying.
Ms Barty said that, when she returned to the lounge, the accused and Ms Sheridan seemed calmer, and so Ms Barty went to the toilet where she took some methylamphetamine. She then said to Ms Sheridan, “I’m going to go and sit out in the car in the carport. If you need me, scream”.
Not long after she left the house and while she was siting in her car, she heard Ms Sheridan scream. She could hear her calling out, “Stop, Gerald. It’s me, Gerald”. Ms Barty then ran into the house and saw the accused and Ms Sheridan in the vicinity of an archway which leads into the lounge room. Ms Sheridan was on the floor and the accused was standing over her stabbing her with a knife. Ms Barty screamed at him and pushed him away. He was calling Ms Sheridan a “demon”.
Ms Sheridan then crawled towards her bedroom. The accused said to Ms Barty, “We have to go. They’re coming. Gwenda we have to leave, we have to go”.
At about this time, the accused asked Ms Barty to go and check on Ms Sheridan. She went to the bedroom and saw Ms Sheridan lying on the floor. Ms Sheridan said to Ms Barty that she needed help.
Ms Barty then went to the telephone. She said that, while she was doing this, the accused asked her what she was doing. She said she was calling an ambulance and he said, “No”, grabbed the telephone and stabbed her in the back. She fell to the floor. She told the accused that she was going to die. He told her that she was not going to die and to go and sit in the lounge room. She said she wanted to go out and get her cigarettes and he said there would be cigarettes in one of the drawers in the room. She said she wanted to get her own cigarettes and he said “No”. She started to walk backwards towards the front door and he lunged at her and stabbed her in the stomach. She removed the knife from her body and ran to the house next door. While the occupants of the house were attending to her, the accused came towards her, asked if she was alright and asked why she and Ms Sheridan had been fighting.
I refer later to evidence which establishes that Ms Barty consumed a large amount of methylamphetamine at around the time of these events. Although this calls for some care in assessing her evidence, I indicate at this stage that I accept the accuracy of those aspects of her evidence which I have summarised above.
The police and ambulance personnel arrived shortly afterwards. The accused was arrested after a struggle with the police. Ms Sheridan died a short time later.
The alleged offences took place at approximately 6.30 pm. The first ambulance officers arrived at 6.41 pm. Police officers attended a short time later. After apprehending the accused, the police took him to the Lyell McEwin Hospital, where he remained overnight. At 1.25 am on 23 October 2004, a sample of blood was taken from the accused. When analysed, the sample was found to contain 0.24 milligrams of methylamphetamine per litre of blood. Professor White, a pharmacologist, calculated that the level of methylamphetamine in the accused’s blood at the time of the alleged offences would have been approximately 0.39 milligrams per litre of blood. Professor White said this was quite a high level of methylamphetamine, which would have affected the accused to a considerable extent.
Police officers filmed the arrest of the accused at the scene with a video camera, and there was extensive filming of the accused at the hospital while he was kept under observation.
The accused was discharged from hospital at approximately 11.00 am on 23 October 2004. He was conveyed to the Elizabeth Police Station where he was later interviewed. The interview commenced at 3.44 pm on 24 October 2004. There were further conversations with him between that time and 7.49 pm. The interview and the further conversations were video recorded.
The relevant statutory provisions
A person’s mental competence to commit an offence is to be presumed, unless the person is found to have been mentally incompetent to commit the offence: s 269D. In the event that the issue of mental competence is raised, the court must decide whether it has been established, on the balance of probabilities, that the accused was, at the time of the alleged offence, mentally incompetent to commit the offence: s 269GB(3).
Section 269C of the Act provides as follows:
A person is mentally incompetent to commit an offence if, at the time of the conduct alleged to give rise to the offence, the person is suffering from a mental impairment and, in consequence of the mental impairment –
(a)     does not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or
(b)     does not know that the conduct is wrong; or
(c)     is unable to control the conduct.
“Mental impairment” is defined in s 269A(1) as follows:
(a)     a mental illness; or
(b)     an intellectual disability; or
(c)     a disability or impairment of the mind resulting from senility,
but does not include intoxication.
“Mental illness” is defined as meaning “a pathological infirmity of the mind (including a temporary one of short duration)”.
The following explanation appears as a footnote in the Act:
A condition that results from the reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary external stimuli is not a mental illness, although such a condition may be evidence of mental illness if it involves some abnormality and is prone to recur (see R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30).
“Intoxication” is defined as:
A temporary disorder, abnormality or impairment of the mind that results from the consumption or administration of intoxicants and will pass on metabolism or elimination of intoxicants from the body.
It was put on behalf of the accused that, at the time of the alleged offences, he was suffering from an underlying mental illness which resulted in him not knowing that his conduct was wrong. It was claimed that the taking of the methylamphetamine had heightened the symptoms of this mental illness, resulting in a mental impairment which prevented the accused from reasoning whether his acts were right or wrong “with a moderate degree of sense and composure”: R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182 at 189. Accordingly, so it was argued, the accused was mentally incompetent to commit the offences.
The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that, whether or not the accused suffered from an underlying mental illness, any psychotic symptoms exhibited by him at the time of the stabbings were due solely to amphetamine intoxication. Viewed in this light, the accused did not come within the test of mental incompetence laid down in the Act.
The psychiatric evidence
A convenient starting point for a consideration of these arguments is the psychiatric evidence called at the trial.
Dr Penny Roughan was called by the prosecution. She is a qualified psychiatrist who became a member of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists in 1981. She has practised as a psychiatrist in the government and private sectors since that time.
Dr Roughan assessed the accused at an examination at the Lyell McEwin Hospital, which commenced at 9.45 am on 23 October 2004. She said the examination lasted 25 minutes. A medical practitioner had made an order for the detention of the accused under the Mental Health Act 1993 after the accused’s admission to hospital. It was therefore necessary under the Act for a psychiatrist to examine the accused in order to determine whether the detention order should be continued or revoked.
It was Dr Roughan’s understanding that the medical practitioner reported the accused as being in a florid psychotic condition at the time of the earlier examination. Dr Roughan said in evidence that the accused was no longer in that condition at the time he was examined by her, and it was her view that he was fit to be discharged from the hospital and taken into police custody.
Dr Roughan said that, at the time of the examination, the accused was bland and somewhat flat; he did not show any emotion. She said he was drowsy. The accused told Dr Roughan that he had taken a hundred dollars worth of amphetamine on the previous day and that he had also taken heroin and buprenorphine in order to “come down”. She said that he gave a history of events, but he was vague about the period after the taking of the drugs. He told her that he went to a house, but he could not say where because it might incriminate him. However, he said he did not do anything wrong.
The accused told Dr Roughan that he was not hearing voices at the time of the examination; nor was he experiencing any unusual sensory experiences. The accused did not give any indication of delusional thinking.
Despite his drowsiness, Dr Roughan said that the accused was quite alert and he made various requests relating to telephone calls and medical attention. She said that, in her opinion, the accused had experienced a psychotic episode on the previous day, but he was settling very rapidly. His cognitive functioning was not obviously impaired. He was orientated, in that he knew where he was and what he was doing. He knew that the police were investigating the events of the previous day.
Dr Roughan formed the view that the previous psychotic condition had resulted from the taking of drugs. She said that methylamphetamine can cause delusions and hallucinations. She said a psychotic episode of this nature usually resolves within a few days if it is simply the result of amphetamine use or is otherwise drug related. She agreed that in the case of a person who has an underlying mental illness, methylamphetamine can bring into being psychotic symptoms associated with that illness. She said that, in those circumstances, the time for the resolution of the florid symptoms can be extremely variable. According to her evidence, it was important in these circumstances to take a “longitudinal” view of the person’s history, examining both the lead-up to the taking of the drugs and the aftermath.
The prosecution also called Dr Craig Raeside. Dr Raeside has practised as a psychiatrist since 1988 in both the public and private sectors. He is a forensic psychiatrist and was consultant forensic psychiatrist to the South Australian Forensic Mental Health Services from 1994 to 2001.
Dr Raeside first interviewed the accused on 3 November 2005 at the Yatala Labour Prison. The interview was at the request of the defence. On 21 November 2005, he prepared a report based on the interview and material which was then available in relation to the offence (P 30). He stated in that report that, in his view, the accused was psychotic at the time of the alleged offences. He referred to the accused experiencing auditory hallucinations and exhibiting confusion, paranoia and disorganised behaviour. He continued:
However, in my view, this constellation of symptoms is more consistent with an amphetamine induced psychosis rather than due to formal psychotic disorder such as Schizophrenia. His ongoing report of occasional voices is not consistent with Schizophrenia and continues to be consistent with either the long term impact of amphetamines, or more likely that they are not true auditory hallucinations at present, but strong thoughts.
Dr Raeside explained in this report that, in his view, the accused was suffering from a psychotic condition produced by the methylamphetamine and not substance intoxication. However, he added this rider:
As indicated, I have not had opportunity to view the police videos in this respect. Whilst the transcript suggests strongly that he was psychotic at the time, for completeness I would be prepared to view the police videos if they could be made available.
Dr Raeside went on to say in his report of 21 November 2005 that, in his opinion, the accused knew the nature and quality of his actions at the time, but that he was unable to reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about the wrongfulness of his actions. He said it was difficult to find evidence to clearly indicate that the accused could not control his conduct. It was Dr Raeside’s view, at the time of writing this report, that the accused had a defence of mental incompetence, but that he was fit to plead to the charges.
Subsequently, the court requested a further report from Dr Raeside. This report is dated 31 March 2006 (P 31). It is clear that, by this time, Dr Raeside had been provided with information which was not available at the time of his first examination, but which was, in his opinion, very significant. In particular, he had available to him Dr Roughan’s report based on her interview with the accused on 23 October 2004.
Dr Raeside explained that other important information available to him at the time of the second report came from viewing the police videos of the accused’s arrest outside the house and his treatment at the Lyell McEwin Hospital. Dr Raeside noted from the videos that there was a steady improvement in the accused’s condition while he was at the hospital, and he stated in his report of 31 March 2006 that this was consistent with simple amphetamine intoxication and not the resolution of a psychotic disorder.

Dr Raeside stated in the second report that, although the accused reported hallucinations at the time of his admission to James Nash House on 17 June 2005, there was little other evidence at that time to suggest an ongoing psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia. Dr Raeside discounted the suggestion that the continuing presence of voices in the accused’s head supported the view that the accused was suffering from a psychotic disorder at the time of the alleged offences; nor did it, in his view, necessarily support a drug induced psychosis. He said that if the accused was suffering from a drug induced psychosis, it would be expected that any hallucinations associated with it would have resolved quickly after the alleged offences. He said this would have taken place within a few days to weeks, but not hours.
Dr Raeside reported his conclusion as follows:
Although I continue to believe that the evidence suggests that Mr Morrison was experiencing psychotic symptoms at the time of the alleged offences I now consider the most likely cause to be amphetamine intoxication rather than amphetamine induced psychosis. Certainly, there is little to suggest that he was suffering from any formal psychiatric illness such as Schizophrenia.
I recognise that throughout the weeks leading up to the alleged offences Mr Morrison’s mental state may have been disturbed. However, there is a history of heavy and recurrent use of amphetamines during that time. He may well have experienced some degree of amphetamine induced psychosis, but with respect to the current matters the quick resolution of many of his psychotic symptoms in the hours after the alleged offences is strongly suggestive of intoxication rather than an induced psychotic state. Therefore, on the balance of probabilities, I do not believe that he was suffering from a mental impairment, as defined in the Act, at the time of the alleged offences.
Further, any impaired reasoning about the wrongfulness of his actions associated with some degree of confusion at the time of the alleged offences is therefore likely to be due to amphetamine intoxication and not the result of any mental impairment. There is also some evidence that he knew the wrongfulness of his actions as evidenced by his apologies and seeking forgiveness. There is also evidence that he knew the nature and quality of his actions. I could find no evidence to suggest that Mr Morrison was unable to control his conduct because of a mental impairment.
Therefore, I would amend my opinion from previously in that I do not believe that Mr Morrison has a mental impairment defence available to him.
Dr Raeside expanded on these views in his evidence. He explained the advantage, which he had at the time of his second examination and report, of viewing the accused’s behaviour on the videos. He emphasised the speedy resolution of the accused’s condition. He also placed reliance on the examination of Dr Roughan. He stressed the resolution of the accused’s psychotic symptoms overnight at the hospital. He said that a quick resolution of the psychotic symptoms strongly favours the diagnosis of an intoxicated state, rather than a drug induced psychotic state. He and the other psychiatrists who gave evidence explained that amphetamine intoxication can produce a state indistinguishable from a psychotic state caused by schizophrenia or some other psychosis. It is accepted that amphetamine intoxication can lead to delusions, paranoia and the “hearing of voices”. However, he said it was important to look at the history of the accused’s condition both before and after the incident. He continued:
Someone with an acute episode of schizophrenia will tend to take several weeks, at least, for that episode to resolve. The voices will gradually decrease, the paranoia or other delusions will become less intense and their demeanour, their agitation, will gradually settle. That’s obviously including the effect of medication that they might be given during that period of time. It would be extremely rare that that would settle within a few hours of starting. Whereas let’s say an amphetamine-induced psychosis will tend to resolve, perhaps, over one to two weeks after they have stopped taking amphetamines, so it is a quicker resolution, but certainly much longer than simply while the drugs are on board.
Dr Raeside said that, in his view, the accused was not suffering from schizophrenia. In this respect, he said that it was important to have regard to some dealings which the police had with the accused approximately a month before the alleged offences. He said they found that he was co-operative, rational and spoke to them in a logical and calm manner. It was Dr Raeside’s view that if the accused had suffered from schizophrenia that was gradually getting worse leading up to the alleged offences, he would have been displaying signs of it during that period. He said it would be quite unusual for schizophrenia to flare up on the day of the alleged offences and settle down the next day.
Dr Raeside was asked whether the accused suffered from a mental illness:
QAs a result of your two meetings with Mr Morrison and all the material that’s been made available to you, are you able to say whether or not Mr Morrison had, in your opinion, a mental illness on 22 October, albeit not amphetamine-induced psychosis.
AI think he has some chronic depression-type disorder, which I think could qualify as a mental illness, probably a dysthymia, but I think, for the current purposes, that was not a significant issue, other than perhaps leading to his ongoing use of amphetamines to make himself feel better, but I don’t think it was a relevant factor at the time.
QNot contributing, in your opinion, to anything that he is alleged to have done on 22 October 2004?
ANo.
Dr Raeside referred to the fact that the accused was admitted to James Nash House in June 2005. However, he said that there seemed little in the circumstances of the admission to suggest that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia or severe ongoing psychosis. He said the admission was due to a suicide attempt and ongoing depression, rather than psychotic symptoms.
Dr Christopher Branson interviewed the accused on 5 July 2006 at James Nash House. Subsequently, he prepared a report dated 23 August 2006 (P 28). Dr Branson has practised as a psychiatrist since 1986. At present, he has a full-time practice as a general and forensic psychiatrist. He was a visiting specialist in psychiatry at James Nash House from 1992 to January 2000.
The accused told Dr Branson that he did not think he had any contact with psychiatrists until this incident. However, he gave a history of auditory hallucinations over a period of five years. He told Dr Branson that drugs made the voices worse and that this was particularly so with methylamphetamine. He said the auditory hallucinations were louder and more constant over a period of about three weeks before the alleged offences. He said he was using amphetamines almost every day during this time.
The accused told Dr Branson that when he arrived at Ms Sheridan’s house on the day of the alleged offences she gave him a large quantity of methylamphetamine, which he took. He said he “went crazy, like I was possessed”. He did not think he argued with Ms Sheridan, but he claimed to have almost no memory of what happened when the alleged offences took place. He said he had no memory of stabbing Ms Sheridan or Ms Barty and could not understand why he had done so.
Dr Branson was shown the videotapes recording the accused’s arrest, examination at Lyell McEwin Hospital over a period of some hours and the formal police interview with the accused. In Dr Branson’s opinion, the taped incidents establish that the accused was clearly distressed, frightened and disorientated at the time of his arrest and the disorientation continued at the Lyell McEwin Hospital. However, he said that over the next few hours there was a gradual improvement in his condition. According to Dr Branson, the recording made while the accused was being interviewed by the police reveals that he was then in a coherent state of mind and able to take advantage of his right to silence.
Dr Branson formed the view that the accused suffered from a relatively long-term psychotic condition of some type over a number of years. This accounted for persistent auditory hallucinations and occasional paranoid delusional ideas. This condition was of a relatively low grade in terms of severity. He said there was some debate as to the nature of the illness, but, in his view, it was schizophrenia. However, he said it was not relevant to the circumstances of the alleged offences.
Dr Branson stated in his report:
I think this [schizophrenia] needs to be contrasted with the mental state that he was in at the time of the offences. It seems clear that this was predominately a result of severe amphetamine intoxication, together with the greatly heightened level of psychotic symptoms which usually accompany such intoxication.
Dr Branson’s report continued:
This makes the assessment of Mr Morrison’s eligibility for a mental incompetence defence somewhat complicated. I believe that it is clear that he was suffering from a mental impairment at the time of the offences, by which I refer to his long term low grade psychotic condition. It does not matter for the purposes of the legal process whether this is defined as schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorder or a long term psychosis induced by drug use (as opposed to intoxication only). However, I do not believe it is this impairment which in itself caused Mr Morrison to behave in the way he did. He is in fact used to these continuing psychotic symptoms and they present him with relatively little handicap when he is not concurrently using illicit drugs. I therefore do not believe that he is entitled to a defence of mental incompetence on the basis of that mental impairment.
It is very clear that Mr Morrison was heavily intoxicated with amphetamines at the time of the offences. In my view this accounts for his behaviour in murdering his partner Jaynee Sheridan and in stabbing his housemate Gwenda Barty. However, amphetamine (or any other) intoxication is not in itself a mental illness and does not qualify under Section 269C as a mental impairment.
Therefore, I do not believe that Mr Morrison is entitled to a defence of mental incompetence to the charges of murder or attempted murder. Whilst it could be said that his behaviour would not have occurred but for the self induced amphetamine intoxication that he was experiencing, this does not amount to a mental impairment in terms of the Act. On the other hand, whilst he had a chronic low grade mental impairment, I do not believe that this in itself caused the behaviour that resulted in the death of Ms Sheridan and the wounding of Ms Barty.
Dr Branson explained in evidence that the effects of intoxication are short-term, so that it would be expected that, if symptoms are predominantly or entirely the result of intoxication, they would resolve quickly in the absence of continuing use of the intoxicant. Accordingly, he saw particular relevance in the improvement in the accused’s condition over the period of time occupied by the tapes. He said there is no reason why a mental illness would suddenly get better in this way. Symptoms of this type caused by mental illness would persist until appropriate treatment was instituted.
Dr Branson stated that the symptoms of any underlying psychosis of an ongoing nature which the accused may have had were “completely overtaken and overwhelmed by the level of intoxication that was occurring at the time.”
Dr Czechowicz was called to give evidence for the defence. He is a psychiatrist who is at present the Director of Inpatient Services at James Nash House. He was a consultant psychiatrist at James Nash House when the accused was admitted there on 17 June 2005. He has practised psychiatry since 1972. Previously, he was superintendent of both Hillcrest and Glenside Hospitals. Since 2003, he has been Director of the Inpatient Service at James Nash House.
Dr Czechowicz had contact with the accused until 26 August 2005, when the accused was returned to Yatala Labour Prison. The accused has been readmitted to James Nash House subsequently and Dr Czechowicz has had further contact with him during this period. In addition to this contact, Dr Czechowicz conducted two interviews with the accused on 27 March 2006 and 13 April 2006 for the purposes of a report which was tendered (D 3). Dr Czechowicz interviewed the accused when he was an inpatient at James Nash House on 15 July 2005.
In his report, Dr Czechowicz expressed the view that the accused suffers from schizophrenia. He said this condition would be exacerbated by the taking of amphetamines. He said that the accused was psychotic during the events of 22 October 2004 and that, in this condition, he did not know the nature and quality of his conduct; nor did he know that his conduct was wrong. He also said that he believes the accused was unable to control his conduct.
Dr Czechowicz said in evidence that the most important indication that the accused was psychotic during the relevant events was the material in the recorded videos.
The witness said that the most likely situation was that the schizophrenic condition of the accused was “fired up” by methylamphetamine intoxication. He said the schizophrenia played a significant part in the accused’s conduct at the relevant time. In other words, it was an important cause of the events which took place at the time. He said the accused’s schizophrenia would have continued and, although no action was taken to transfer the accused for treatment from October 2004 until June 2005, it was felt in June that he needed treatment for his mental state.
In cross-examination, Dr Czechowicz agreed that the rapidity with which the symptoms diminish assists in determining whether they were caused by amphetamine intoxication or a psychotic illness. He said that, in this respect, it was appropriate to look at the period of time over which symptoms of hallucinations and delusions took place in an acute form as a guide to whether they resulted from intoxication or an underlying mental illness. He agreed that if the acute phase of the psychosis passes within a matter of days or a week, that is a strong indicator that the episode resulted from intoxication rather than mental illness.
When asked about the opinion expressed by Dr Roughan, to the effect that the accused was not psychotic at the time she saw him in the Lyell McEwin Hospital, Dr Czechowicz pointed out that Dr Roughan’s notes record that it was not a complete assessment.
Dr Czechowicz was cross-examined on the fact that no psychotic symptoms were reported from the date of the offence until June 2005:
QIf it were the case that, in the days following 22 October 2004, Mr Morrison was not in an acute psychotic phase, would that not suggest that it was far more likely that any problems he was experiencing on 22 October 2004 were the result of methylamphetamine intoxication, rather than a psychotic mental illness or mental impairment?
AYes, that’s correct. I have, however, made assumptions that there have been psychotic features that were not noted in the time between October 2004 and when I first saw him in June 2005.
QThose assumptions are exactly that; assumptions –
AYes.
Q- not based upon any evidence?
AThat’s correct.
Dr Czechowicz said that the accused was given the drug Lorazepam, a sedative, at the Lyell McEwin Hospital and this may have assisted in reducing the accused’s symptoms. He was cross-examined on this issue:
QThe resolution or the decretion of the acute hallucinations and delusions in that very short period of time can’t be explained by the doses of Lorazepam at the Lyell McEwin Hospital, can they?
ANot entirely.
QSo, doesn’t that mean that it’s more probable that, at the time of the alleged stabbings, what was active on the mind of Mr Morrison, if anything, was methylamphetamine intoxication, rather than a florid phase of any mental illness that he may have had at that time?
AOn the balance of probabilities, as put like that, probably what you say is correct. My thinking is that there was a heavy influence of methylamphetamine intoxication. I still can’t discount my knowledge and my total experience of people who have schizophrenia who are under the influence of psychoactive medication, so I have a doubt that it could be sheeted home entirely to intoxication. I am answering your question in this way: that, yes, the intoxication did play a significant part, but I can’t discount the significant contribution of the underlying schizophrenia.
QDoesn’t the evidence that we have, being the videos taken by the police and the improvement in that period, suggest that the far more likely thing acting on his brain, or his behaviour, is the methylamphetamine intoxication and not the underlying mental illness becoming florid.
AOn balance, yes. I am impressed by what I saw for myself, as portrayed in the videos. I don’t have a similar level of evidence of what happened afterwards. I know that my colleagues noted various things, but those colleagues were looking at resolving other issues and may not have completely recorded how the whole picture looked at that time. So, I don’t think that I can be certain about that evidence that’s actually written, I don’t know, but I still have my doubts that he was as resolved in his psychosis as is actually apparently written in the case notes.
Dr Czechowicz went on to say that the video recording of the police interview with the accused on 24 October 2004 suggested that the accused was psychotic at that time. He said he did not have a direct recollection of what was said during the interview, but he said the overall impression he received was that the accused was showing signs of psychosis. Dr Czechowicz said that he formed the impression that the accused was not able to respond in a logical way to questions asked of him by the police.
As to his opinion that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his acts at the time of the stabbings, Dr Czechowicz nevertheless agreed that the accused would probably have known that he had a knife in his hand and that he was using it to stab the deceased and injure Ms Barty. However, he saw significance in the fact that the accused referred to Ms Sheridan as a demon when he was stabbing her.
Professor Jason White was called by the prosecution. He is the professor of pharmacology at the University of Adelaide. He also trained as a psychologist.
Professor White gave evidence in relation to the effects of taking methylamphetamine. He said that it acts on the central nervous system so that it heightens arousal and, in the event of excessive arousal, the person’s behaviour may become disorganised and irrational. He said it can lead to agitation and aggression. It can also cause symptoms which are indistinguishable from paranoid schizophrenia, so that a person can experience hallucinations and delusions. He said that the effects of taking methylamphetamine can last for about six hours or longer with a larger dose. He said it was difficult to determine by a person’s reaction alone whether the resulting behaviour was due to amphetamine intoxication or psychotic behaviour due to some underlying mental illness. He agreed that symptoms of an underlying mental illness such as schizophrenia persist for much longer than the short-term effects of amphetamine intoxication.
Professor White was asked to assume that the level of methylamphetamine in the accused’s blood approximately seven hours after the alleged offences was 0.24 milligrams per litre. He said this was quite a high level and that significant effects would be expected. He said that at the time of the alleged offences the level would have been about 0.39 milligrams per litre.
Conclusions on mental competence

Three of the psychiatrists expressed opinions on the issue of the mental competence of the accused as at the time of the alleged offences. Drs Czechowicz and Branson were of the view that the accused suffered from schizophrenia and Dr Raeside was of the opinion that the accused suffered from a depressive illness. However, only Dr Czechowicz reached the conclusion that an underlying mental illness was in any way relevant to the accused’s actions and state of mind at the time of the alleged offences.
Dr Czechowicz was of the view that the accused suffered from a mental impairment due to schizophrenia, such that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his conduct; did not know that the conduct was wrong; and was unable to control his conduct. Both Dr Branson and Dr Raeside were of the view that the accused’s psychotic symptoms at the time of the alleged offences resulted from amphetamine intoxication which operated independently of any mental illness. They were also of the view that the accused was aware of the nature and quality of his conduct and that there was no evidence that he was unable to control that conduct. However, both took the view that, due to amphetamine intoxication, the accused could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about the wrongness of his actions. This, of course, did not bring the accused within the definition of mental incompetence because, in their view, any inability to reason about the wrongness of the conduct was not as a consequence of a mental impairment as defined in the Act.
The question of whether a person is mentally competent to commit an offence is a question of fact: s 269A(2). The decision must be arrived at by reference to all the evidence, including such assistance as might be derived from expert witnesses.
I accept that the accused was suffering from an underlying mental illness at the relevant time. The material before the court does not enable me to identify the nature of the illness with confidence. However, I have reached the firm conclusion that any such illness was not the cause of the psychotic behaviour exhibited by the accused at the time of the alleged offences.
It is clear from the psychiatric evidence that the history, both before and after the incident, must be taken into account in determining the cause of the psychotic behaviour.
There is ample evidence that the accused was addicted to drugs and that he was a regular user of methylamphetamine. It is also clear that he had consumed a large quantity of methylamphetamine prior to the incident; the level of the drug in his blood at the time of the offence was very high. It is not in dispute that amphetamine intoxication, of itself, can account for psychotic behaviour including delusions and hallucinations. The hallucinations may be of an auditory nature such as those described by the accused from time to time. Furthermore, the connection between the taking of methylamphetamine and the accused’s behaviour at the relevant time receives support from the accused’s own comment to Dr Branson that he “went crazy” after he had taken methylamphetamine prior to the alleged offences.
I accept that it is important to keep in mind the question of whether the taking of the drug enlivened an underlying mental illness. However, the crucial evidence in examining this causative issue is the steady and relatively rapid recession of the psychotic symptoms as the effects of the drug wore off. The significance of this consideration as an aid to diagnosis emerged strongly from the evidence.
Drs Branson and Raeside placed reliance on Dr Roughan’s examination. It is true that the examination was not lengthy, but it’s purpose was to determine whether the accused was exhibiting psychotic symptoms at the time of the examination. Dr Roughan could not detect any such symptoms and reached the conclusion that the accused was not psychotic when she examined him.
The advantage which the expert witnesses had in this case was not restricted to the benefit of Dr Roughan’s examination. They were also able to view extensive video recorded footage of the recovery. The police officers first commenced filming the accused at Brahma Drive at 6.57 pm on 22 October 2004, shortly after his apprehension. The filming continued during various stages of his admission at the Lyell McEwin Hospital. The interviews at the Elizabeth Police Station were also recorded. The police recordings of the accused took place within a timeframe of approximately 49 hours.
The absence of psychotic symptoms by the time of and throughout the main police interview is clearly evident. I accept the evidence of Drs Branson and Raeside that this evidence supports the conclusion that amphetamine intoxication and not underlying mental illness was the cause of the psychotic behaviour.
Dr Czechowicz agreed that methylamphetamine intoxication, of itself, can cause delusions and hallucinations in the acute phase. He also agreed that the rate at which the symptoms diminish was a diagnostic indicator as to their cause. He agreed in cross-examination that, if the acute phase of psychosis passes within a matter of days or a week, this would be a strong indicator that what was active at the time of the episode was intoxication rather than a mental illness.
However, he said that Dr Roughan’s examination was limited. He also questioned whether the videos supported the assessment of Drs Branson and Raeside:
QThe resolution or the decretion of the acute hallucinations and delusions in that very short period of time can’t be explained by the doses of Lorazepam at Lyell McEwin Hospital, can they?
ANot entirely.
QSo, doesn’t that mean that it’s more probable that, at the time of the alleged stabbings, what was active on the mind of Mr Morrison, if anything, was methylamphetamine intoxication, rather than a florid phase of any mental illness that he may have had at that time?
AOn the balance of probabilities, as put like that, probably what you say is correct. My thinking is that there was a heavy influence of methylamphetamine intoxication. I still can’t discount my knowledge and my total experience of people who have schizophrenia who are under the influence of psychoactive medication, so I have a doubt that it could be sheeted home entirely to intoxication. I am answering your question in this way: that, yes, the intoxication did play a significant part, but I can’t discount the significant contribution of the underlying schizophrenia.
QDoesn’t the evidence that we have, being the videos taken by the police and the improvement in that period, suggest that the far more likely thing acting on his brain, or his behaviour, is the methylamphetamine intoxication and not the underlying mental illness becoming florid?
AOn balance, yes. I am impressed by what I saw for myself, as portrayed in the videos. I don’t have a similar level of evidence of what happened afterwards. I know that my colleagues noted various things, but those colleagues were looking at resolving other issues and may not have completely recorded how the whole picture looked at that time. So, I don’t think that I can be certain about that evidence that’s actually written, I don’t know, but I still have my doubts that he was as resolved in his psychosis as is actually apparently written in the case notes.
After considering the evidence of Dr Roughan and the video material, I am satisfied that Drs Branson and Raeside were justified in reaching the conclusion that methylamphetamine intoxication was the cause of the accused’s psychotic symptoms and that mental illness did not play a causative role in this respect. Furthermore, I cannot accept Dr Czechowicz’s impression that, in the accused’s final interview with the police, he was unable to respond in a logical way to the questions asked of him. In this respect, I prefer the evidence of Drs Branson and Raeside and my own assessment of the content of the interview.
Dr Roughan did say that, if an underlying mental illness is enlivened or exacerbated by an intake of methylamphetamine, the time taken to resolve the florid psychotic effects can be extremely variable. However, she went on to say that in these circumstances the “longitudinal” approach of looking at the conduct before and after the episode is important. This was the approach adopted by Drs Branson and Raeside.
For reasons which I elaborate on later, I find that the accused knew the nature and quality of his actions and he was able to control his conduct. I accept the evidence that he was unable to reason about the wrongness of his actions with a moderate degree of sense and composure. However, I find that this was due to temporary intoxication and not a mental impairment as defined in the Act.
It has not been established on the balance of probabilities that the accused was, at the time of the alleged offences, mentally incompetent to commit the offences.
It follows that the presumption of mental competence has not been displaced.
The subjective elements
The remaining issue in the case relates to the subjective elements of the offences. “Subjective element” is defined in the Act as meaning “voluntariness, intention, knowledge or some other mental state that is an element of the offence”.
In order for the accused to be found guilty of murder, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that he caused the death of the deceased deliberately and unlawfully while, at the same time, intending to cause death or grievous bodily harm.
In the case of attempted murder, the prosecution must prove that the accused deliberately and unlawfully carried out an act or series of acts with the intention of killing the victim. Those acts must be proximate to the completed offence in the sense that they must amount to more than mere preparation for that offence.
There is no evidence in the case which gives rise to a consideration of self-defence or any other consideration which would render the accused’s acts lawful.
As explained in The Queen v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64, intoxication by drugs is relevant to each of the offences to which I have referred, as well as to the offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, which is an alternative to the offence of attempted murder. It is relevant in deciding whether the accused’s actions were voluntary acts in the sense that they were accompanied by an exercise of the will and whether the accused had the intention to do the physical act or acts charged: O’Connor at 69. It is also relevant as a factor to be taken into account in determining whether the specific intention for the particular offence under consideration has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Although it is not the sole consideration, the level of the accused’s awareness and understanding of his actions at relevant times is a factor to be taken into account in determining whether he acted voluntarily and with the intent required for a particular offence.
It is clear from the evidence, which I accept, that the accused picked up the large knife (P 10) in order to use it as a weapon. He inflicted two deep wounds on the deceased with the knife and a further two wounds on Ms Barty.
Ms Barty described some of the events surrounding the attack on Ms Sheridan and she gave evidence of the circumstances in which she herself was stabbed.
Ms Barty said she consumed methylamphetamine shortly before the attacks. A sample of her blood was taken on her admission to hospital and subsequent analysis revealed a high level of methylamphetamine. This probably accounts for some vagueness in her evidence, and I approach her evidence generally with considerable care.
However, I am satisfied of the accuracy of her evidence in the following respects. I find that, shortly after the accused’s arrival at the house, he gave Ms Barty a hug and apologised for taking her car on the previous day. I accept that he referred to voices in his head when making this apology. I find that the accused also queried whether the security cameras were turned on and that he was told they were not.
Ms Barty is somewhat vague as to when she went to the toilet to take the methylamphetamine, but I find that, at about this time, she heard Ms Sheridan say, “Put the knife down Gerald”. I also find that later, she came in from her car after hearing Ms Sheridan scream and that she saw the accused attacking Ms Sheridan.
I accept her evidence that Ms Sheridan crawled to the bedroom and the accused asked Ms Barty to go and check on her. I find that Ms Barty attempted to use the telephone, that she told the accused she was telephoning for an ambulance and that he said, “No” grabbed the telephone and stabbed her.
It is relevant to consider the stabbings against the background of the relationship between the accused and Ms Sheridan. There appears to have been a sexual relationship between the two and there is ample evidence to establish that Ms Sheridan was supplying the accused with drugs.
Ms Tucker gave more evidence about the relationship between the accused and Ms Sheridan than did the other witnesses. She was obviously very upset about Ms Sheridan’s death. She said she had a very close relationship with the deceased. She said she called her “mum” and that the relationship was akin to that of mother and daughter. She was argumentative in cross-examination and care is called for in the assessment of her evidence.
However, I formed the view that she was, essentially, an honest witness and I am firmly of the opinion that she did not fabricate the evidence which she gave concerning the relationship between the accused and the deceased.
Ms Tucker said that she had known the deceased for about 25 years. She said she had worked in brothels owned by the deceased. For a time, she lived with the deceased.
Ms Tucker said that the accused asked for and was given drugs by the deceased on a regular basis. She said that the accused often asked the deceased for money, the amounts ranging from $500 to $5000.
Ms Tucker gave the following evidence about arguments between the accused and the deceased:
QWhat would Jaynee Sheridan say when the topic of money would be raised?
AShe would never give him money if he asked for it, and if he ever asked for money for heroin, she would always say “No”, because the first time she paid for somebody’s heroin would be the day she put a needle back in her own arm.
QIs that something she said?
AYes.
QWhat was Mr Morrison’s reaction, if any, on occasions when she would say that about supplying money for heroin?
AHe’d end up getting angry because he didn’t like amphetamines, he preferred heroin.
QWhen you say he would be angry, what would he say?
AHe’d start calling her names and tell her that she was the devil, that she was Satan, and he started cursing her and calling her a whore and other names like that and then he’d storm out of the house.
QWhat tone of voice would he use when he would say these things to her?
AHe’d be really angry at her, really angry.
QYou mentioned a moment ago that you heard him use names such as the devil and Satan and other names?
AYes.
QOn how many occasions piror to her death had you heard him call her by the name of devil or demon or anything like that?
AOver the last few weeks before Mum died, he’d use it regularly when they were arguing.
Ms Tucker said in evidence that the arguments between the two got worse in the time leading up to Ms Sheridan’s death. The witness said that on 21 October 2004, she went to court with the deceased. It is an agreed fact that Ms Sheridan was required to attend court on that date.
Ms Tucker said that later in the day she went to Ms Sheridan’s home to speak to her. She arrived at approximately 3.00 pm. She said she knocked on the door, but got no answer. However, she said she could hear Ms Sheridan and the accused arguing in the house. She said the accused was screaming at Ms Sheridan and telling her to give him $5000 for heroin. Ms Sheridan was telling him she would not give him the money.
Ms Tucker said she knocked on the door again and the accused shouted through the door, “Fuck off and leave us alone”. According to the witness, the accused said to Ms Sheridan “that she wasn’t the devil’s spawn, she was the devil himself”.
Ms Tucker said she left without being admitted to the house.
I have taken into account Mr Braithwaite’s submissions concerning Ms Tucker’s evidence and I bear in mind that none of the witnesses saw the accused being violent towards the deceased on previous occasions. No other witnesses referred to violent arguments between the accused and the deceased, although Mr Young said the accused, the deceased and Ms Barty bickered from time to time. Also, Ms Barty gave evidence that, on more than one occasion in the month before Ms Sheridan’s death, she heard arguments between the accused and the deceased about accusations Ms Tucker had made to the effect that the accused was having an affair with another woman. Ms Barty said that although this made the accused “a bit angry”, he would end up walking away.
Ms Tucker said that the accused told her a few days prior to Ms Sheridan’s death that Ms Sheridan had said to him she wanted to “finish everything with him and he wasn’t going to let it happen”. According to Ms Tucker, the accused said that Ms Sheridan thought he was using her and trying to get everything that she had.
I find that in giving the evidence which I have summarised, Ms Tucker was relating events which she had seen and heard.
As I have pointed out, there is no doubt that the accused exhibited psychotic conduct from time to time and that this was observed by some of the witnesses. I have referred to the history of hearing voices. Further, on the day before the alleged offences, the accused took Ms Barty’s car without her permission on two occasions and, on one of these occasions, he reported to the police that there were bodies in the panels of the vehicle.
Despite this, there was evidence of purposive conduct on these occasions. The accused was apparently able to drive the vehicle on each occasion and, on the second occasion, he wired the vehicle so that he could drive it without the ignition key. When Ms Barty found out that the vehicle had been taken, he disconnected the wiring so that she could use her key.
After considering the evidence of the events of the alleged offences, it is clear to my mind that the accused, despite his apparently psychotic conduct, was acting in a number of respects in a purposive manner.
I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he intentionally picked up the knife and that he deliberately stabbed Ms Sheridan twice and Ms Barty twice realising that he was stabbing them. I find that he knowingly used considerable force in inflicting these wounds to the two women. I do not attach a great deal of importance to Ms Barty’s evidence that he called Ms Sheridan a “demon” at the time of the incident. According to Ms Tucker, he had used this or a similar description in reference to Ms Sheridan on a previous occasion. I am satisfied that when he stabbed each women he was aware that he was stabbing a human being.
Further instances of purposive conduct appear from the attack on Ms Barty. The accused stabbed her when he realised she was ringing up for the ambulance. He said, “No” and stabbed her on the first occasion. He then appears to have been unwilling to allow her to go outside when she said she wanted to get cigarettes from her car. He said there were cigarettes in the lounge and he stabbed her again as she was backing out through the front door.
The accused’s awareness is further demonstrated by the fact that, at one stage after the stabbing of Ms Sheridan, he asked Ms Barty how Ms Sheridan was. There is an indication of his awareness of what he had done when, subsequently, he continually asked for forgiveness.

I have made these findings on my own assessment of the evidence, but I note that Dr Raeside saw actions of this nature as indicating a level of the awareness by the accused of his physical actions.
There is a clear distinction between knowledge of the wrongness of actions on the one hand and voluntary action on the other. Nevertheless, when considering whether the accused’s actions were conscious and voluntary, I have taken into account the view of the psychiatrists that the accused was not able to reason about the wrongness of his actions with a moderate degree of calm and composure. However, despite the impairment of his judgment as to wrongness, I have no reasonable doubt about the voluntariness of his actions. I find that when he stabbed Ms Sheridan and Ms Barty he acted consciously and deliberately.
There remains the question of intention. Obviously, intention is not the same as conscious voluntary action. However, the evidence as to awareness and the purposive conduct of the accused is relevant to both issues.
I have recorded my findings that the accused consciously and deliberately stabbed both women. I am satisfied that he did so to inflict harm on them. In the case of Ms Sheridan, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he at least intended to cause her grievous bodily harm. I rely on the evidence as to the number of blows, their location and the force with which they were inflicted.
The same reasoning applies to the charges relating to Ms Barty. There is evidence of the purposive conduct of the accused in his actions and the remarks made by him prior to stabbing her. I am satisfied that the accused intended to cause her grievous bodily harm. I have a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused intended to kill Ms Barty. The accused’s actions in relation to her appear to be a reaction to her use of the telephone and her attempt to leave the house. No other motive is evident.
In assessing whether the accused was acting consciously and voluntarily and, further, whether he acted with the specific intent relevant to particular offences, I have taken into account the degree of methylamphetamine intoxication and the apparently psychotic state of mind resulting from it. However, the evidence as a whole requires the findings which I have made.
It follows from what I have said that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused killed Ms Sheridan with the intention required for murder and that he did so voluntarily and without lawful excuse. I find the accused guilty of murder on count one.
I find that the accused wounded Ms Barty intending to cause her grievous bodily harm. His actions were voluntary and without lawful excuse.
I find the accused not guilty of attempted murder on count two, but guilty of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm as charged on count three.