R v Thompson

[2025] NSWSC 419

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Thompson [2025] NSWSC 419

Hearing dates:

28-30 April 2025

Date of orders:

2 May 2025

Decision date:

02 May 2025

Jurisdiction:

Common Law - Criminal

Before:

Weinstein J

Decision:

(1) I convict you of the offence of murder contrary to s 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act and impose a sentence of imprisonment of 22 years and 6 months. Without the discount of 10% for your plea of guilty, your sentence would have been 25 years. I impose a non-parole period of 15 years and 6 months.

(2) Pursuant to s 10A of the Sentencing Act, I convict you of the offence of contravening a prohibition or restriction in an ADVO contrary to s 14(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) and impose no further penalty.

(3) I have backdated your sentence for murder to commence on 23 September 2022. Your head sentence will expire on 22 March 2045. You will be eligible for release to parole on 22 March 2038.

(4) Pursuant to s 25C(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), you are advised of the existence of that Act and of its application to the offence of murder for which you have been convicted. Your legal representatives are directed to advise you of the implications of that matter to you.

(5) Pursuant to s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), the publication of the name, or any information leading to the identity of, the deceased’s child, OE, and the child, AB, is prohibited.

Catchwords:

SENTENCING – murder – domestic violence – brutal and frenzied stabbing of former domestic partner – intent to kill – objectively serious offending – background of deprivation and disadvantage – childhood exposure to domestic violence and sexual abuse – significant mental illness – youth – moral culpability diminished – general and specific deterrence

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 18(1)(a)

Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), s 14(1)

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 25C(1)

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 5, 10A, 21A, 25D, 30E, 54B

Cases Cited:

BP v R [2010] NSWCCA 303

Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525; [1990] HCA 18

Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37

Byrne & Cahill v R [2021] NSWCCA 185; 97 MVR 85

Callaghan v R [2006] NSWCCA 58

Clarke-Jeffries v R [2019] NSWCCA 56

DH v R [2022] NSWCCA 200

DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; (2010) 243 FLR 28; [2010] NSWCCA 194

DS v R; DM v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82; [2022] NSWCCA 156

Glynn Kaderavek v R [2028] NSWCCA 92

Hoskins v R [2021] NSWCCA 169

Ith v R [2013] NSWCCA 280

KT v R [2008] NSWCCA 51; 182 A Crim R 571

Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226

Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25

Miller v R [2015] NSWCCA 86

Muldrock vThe Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39

Nasrallah v R (2021) 105 NSWLR 451; [2021] NSWCCA 207

Perkins v R [2018] NSWCCA 62

Quinn v R [2018] NSWCCA 297

R v Cherry [2017] NSWCCA 150

R v DW [2012] NSWCCA 66

R v Erazo [2016] NSWCCA 139

R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56; 239 A Crim R 469

R v Gina Kennedy (a pseudonym) [2022] NSWSC 1999

R v Lloyd [2022] NSWSC 906

R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2

R v MJB [2014] NSWCCA 195

R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8

Tepania v R [2018] NSWCCA 247; 275 A Crim R 233

Texts Cited:

Nil

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Rex (Crown)
Tyrone Thompson (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
B Queenan, C Hodgeman (Crown)
D Carroll (Offender)

Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Koa Legal (Offender)

File Number(s):

2022/87304

Publication restriction:

Nil

JUDGMENT

1. The offender Tyrone Thompson, born in 1999, is before the court for sentence for one count of murder contrary to s 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (the Crimes Act) for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment and for which there is a standard non-parole period of 20 years. The offender is also to be sentenced for contravening a prohibition or restriction in an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (“ADVO”) contrary to s 14(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) which is contained on a s 166 certificate, and for which the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment or 50 penalty units, or both.

2. Mr Thompson pleaded guilty to the murder charge on 1 April 2025.

3. This sentence concerns the brutal stabbing of the offender’s former domestic partner.

4. I now turn to summarise the agreed facts, signed by the Crown and the offender. I note that I am grateful to Mr Queenan and Ms Hodgeman, who appeared for the Crown and Mr Carroll, who appeared on behalf of the offender, for the collaborative and efficient manner in which they conducted the proceedings.

Agreed Facts

5. Between 10:48pm and 10:51pm on 25 March 2022, Tyrone Thompson stabbed Mackenzie Anderson (“the deceased”) at least 78 times with two kitchen knives.

6. The Crown cannot disprove the following, and agrees that it is open to me to make the following findings on the balance of probabilities, which I do:-

1. the deceased had hold of a knife whilst she and the offender argued;

2. the offender attempted to disarm the deceased and, in that process, grabbed the blade of the knife which caused wounds to his hand; and

3. after disarming the deceased, the offender commenced stabbing the deceased.

7. I find that the offender had an intent to kill the deceased when he first stabbed her.

Background

8. The deceased was born in 2000. She had one child, a son OE, who was born in 2020. He was almost 2 years of age at the time of the offence. At the time of the offence, the deceased resided at a unit in the Newcastle area with her son.

9. The deceased and the offender started dating in late 2019. From then, the pair had an on and off domestic relationship until 24 October 2021. Their relationship was marred by domestic violence. The offender pleaded guilty to assaulting and intimidating the deceased and destroying her property on 24 October 2021, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for 9 months with a non-parole period of 4 months and 2 weeks. The non-parole period expired on 9 March 2022.

10. In November/December 2021, the deceased commenced a relationship with Lochie Boreham, which continued until March 2022.

11. At the time of the offence, the offender was subject to bail and parole and was required to live with his mother at her home. His bail conditions prohibited him from drinking alcohol or taking drugs other than those prescribed to him by a medical practitioner.

12. At the time of the offence, an ADVO was in place for the protection of the deceased. The ADVO included conditions prohibiting any contact by the offender with the deceased and any approach to or attendance at her home or workplace.

From 9 March 2022

13. On 9 March 2022, the offender was released to parole.

14. After the offender was released from custody, the deceased told her friends Emily Leaity, Jade Roden and Cassandra Michie that she was afraid that the offender was going to kill her.

15. As soon as the offender was released, he called the deceased. He said that he was coming for her and that he loved her.

16. On 9 March 2022, the deceased posted on social media “im okayyyy, my ex tyrone just got out of jail from what he did to me and is still being weird and harassing me... he couldnt last 24 hours".

17. The deceased showed Alexandra Drydale-Cech messages she had received from the offender on Facebook (originating from the offender's father's account and an account in the offender's name). The messages said that the offender was out of gaol and wanted her telephone number. She blocked both accounts. The offender then started messaging her from another account.

18. On 11 March 2022, the offender changed the cover photo on his Facebook page "Tyrone Thompson" to an image of the deceased's child and changed his bio to "I miss you [OE]". On 12 March 2022, the offender changed the profile picture on his Facebook page "Tyrone Thompson" to an image of his face being held by the hand of the deceased.

19. On 11 March 2022, the offender began communicating with Bree Cox on Facebook. Ms Cox is the former partner of Mr Boreham. The offender sought information about the deceased and Mr Boreham. On 19 March 2022, the offender sent a message to Ms Cox saying "I miss what Lochie took from me."

20. On 19 March 2022, the deceased and the offender were in communication on Facebook Messenger. The deceased told the offender that she had broken up with Mr Boreham because he had cheated on her. On that day the offender changed the cover photo on his Facebook page "Tyrone Thompson" twice, to images of him and the deceased's son.

21. Also on that day, the deceased sent Brittany Norris a Snapchat photograph of herself with the offender. She told Ms Norris that they were at her house and were heading to his mother’s house.

22. On 20 March 2022, the offender, the deceased and her son visited the home of the offender’s mother.

23. On 21 March 2022, the deceased sent Ms Leaity messages on Facebook Messenger which said that she had had sex with the offender and that "It was just sex. I shouldn't have."

24. On 22 March 2022, at about 6:30pm, the deceased, her son and the offender went to Ms Norris's house and stayed for two nights.

25. On 24 March 2022, Tyler Lance arrived at Ms Norris's house and met the offender for the first time. After an hour, the offender, the deceased, her son, and Mr Lance left to travel to the deceased's home via public transport. CCTV footage depicts the offender initiating intimate physical contact with the deceased.

26. At about 3:00pm on 24 March 2022, the deceased arrived home with her son, the offender and Mr Lance. The deceased, the offender and Mr Lance smoked some cannabis and socialised. The offender and the deceased appeared to be happy and were behaving positively towards one another, although the deceased repeatedly told the offender that they were just friends when he tried to cuddle her. The offender was dismissive in his response to the deceased. Later that night, they went to sleep. Mr Lance slept in the lounge room. The deceased and the offender slept in the deceased's bedroom.

25 March 2022

27. On 25 March 2022, the deceased was at her home together with her son, the offender and Mr Lance.

28. Throughout the day, the deceased, the offender and Mr Lance smoked some cannabis.

29. At about 1:30pm, Mr Lance and the offender walked to Centrelink in Mayfield.

30. At about 3:30pm, the offender had a Centrelink appointment. Thereafter he and Mr Lance walked to Coles, where the offender purchased nappies, shampoo and conditioner for the deceased at her request.

31. At about 3:40pm they went to Liquorland and tried to purchase a bottle of vodka but they did not have sufficient funds. They attended a hotel and won $25.74 on a poker machine. They returned to Liquorland and at 4:15pm, purchased a bottle of Absolut vodka.

32. At about 4:30pm they returned to the deceased's apartment. The offender, the deceased and Mr Lance began consuming vodka and soda water.

33. At 6:48pm the offender used the deceased's phone to send Mr Boreham an SMS which read "im bigger than you lol". He had also called Mr Boreham several times and sent him a photograph of himself in the deceased’s bedroom.

34. At 7:14pm the deceased sent two SMS messages to Mr Lance which read, "Lochie sent the message Tyrone sent him to my mum" and "she knows he’s here".

35. The offender called Jessica Blyton using Facebook Messenger several times. At 7:56pm Ms Blyton called back. The offender was yelling, "I fucking hate you. You fucked up my life." The offender sounded angry. The deceased was screaming in the background. She said, "Fuck you Tyrone, give me my phone back”.

36. At about 8:26pm the offender began cuddling up to the deceased and was crying. He had consumed two vodka and soda drinks. The offender told the deceased how much he loved her and told her that she did not appreciate the things he did for her. The offender had another vodka and soda, and the deceased told him to leave her apartment.

37. At 8:27pm the deceased sent an SMS to Mr Lance which read, "don't leave me alone with him here lol". Mr Lance took the offender out onto the rear balcony of the apartment to have a cigarette. He told the offender to move on from the deceased. The offender agreed and they went back inside.

38. At about 9:10pm, the offender began moving knives in the kitchen. He pulled a large knife from a drawer and put it on the kitchen bench. He did not say anything or threaten anyone with a knife at that stage.

39. At about this time, the deceased walked into her bedroom and the offender followed her. He whispered something to her several times. The deceased walked back into the lounge room and the offender followed her. The deceased told Mr Lance that the offender had whispered to her something to the effect that he did not care that Mr Lance was there and that he was not afraid of him.

40. At about 9:30pm the deceased told Mr Lance that she was scared and asked him to have the offender leave. Mr Lance asked the offender to go for a walk with him and they left the deceased’s unit. Mr Lance intended to walk the offender to the nearest train station. As they were walking, the offender walked off in a different direction. He told Mr Lance that he was going to his mother's house and Mr Lance lost sight of him. Mr Lance started walking back to the deceased's apartment.

41. At about 10:10pm, CCTV footage depicts the offender returning to the deceased's apartment complex.

42. The offender climbed up onto the deceased's rear second floor balcony using a ladder and entered her unit via the rear sliding door.

43. At 10:26pm the offender used the deceased's mobile phone to send an SMS to the deceased's mother, Tabitha Acret, which read, "I'm with her" and "she wants me to talk to you". The offender sent Ms Acret numerous SMS messages asking her to speak with him and he attempted to call her numerous times, but Ms Acret would not answer the calls. She wrote back that she did not wish to speak with the offender and wrote that the deceased and offender should not be together and that OE was at risk as a result of any relationship between the offender and the deceased. The last SMS that the offender sent to the deceased’s mother was at 10:33pm.

44. At about this time, Mr Lance called the deceased's mobile phone using Facetime. The offender answered it and told Mr Lance that the offender was back in the apartment and that he had left the front door open for him.

45. Mr Lance returned to the apartment and entered through the unlocked front door. The offender was sitting on OE’s bed using the deceased's mobile phone. The deceased and OE were asleep on the lounge. Mr Lance went to the deceased's bedroom.

46. Several minutes later, the deceased woke up. She walked towards OE's bedroom and said to the offender, "What are you doing on my phone?" The deceased took the phone from the offender. She told him to leave again and said that she was going to call the police.

47. Mr Lance said to the offender, "Come on, man, you got to go. She is on the phone to police. You are scaring Mackenzie." The offender grabbed the keys from the internal dead lock of the front door of the apartment and ran from the complex. The deceased said to Mr Lance, "Go get those keys". He left to follow the offender.

The Deceased's 000 call

48. At 10:39pm, the deceased called 000 and was heard to say, "Where's my keys?" prior to the call terminating. At 10:40pm, the deceased called 000 again. The offender can be heard in the background saying, "Hang up, Mackenzie." The deceased replied, "No. Stay away from me. Stay away from me." The offender said, "Bye." The deceased asked that police attend. The offender said, "Hey, I'm speaking cunt. Hang up." The deceased told him to leave twice. She was put on to the police and could be heard saying to Mr Lance, "Get him, Tyler. Take my keys off him, Tyler." She then told the operator, relevantly:-

1. "My ex-boyfriend's broken in. I've woken up to him in my house. Like, I have an AVO on him."

2. "I think he used a ladder on the back balcony".

3. "My friend's here and then, like, I've woken up. [The offender's] on my phone. He wouldn't get out of the house."

4. "He's just taken my house keys and left."

5. "He came at me with a knife".

6. "[He may have a knife still] because there was two that he had out [and] only one of them is here".

49. At about 10:41pm, CCTV footage depicts the offender walking from the deceased's apartment complex. Approximately 45 seconds later, the footage depicts Mr Lance walking the same route from the deceased's apartment.

50. At 10:45pm, the deceased sent Ms Norris the following messages via Facebook Messenger:-

1. "Brittany".

2. "I've just woken up to tyrone breaking in".

3. "The cunt stole my keys".

4. "He came at me with a knife".

5. "He’s still a fucking freak".

51. At 10:46pm, the deceased sent the offender's mother the following messages via Facebook Messenger:-

1. "Tyrone won’t go home".

2. "He stole my phone and is messaging my mum being creepy and mums called copd".

3. "Cops".

Murder

52. The offender returned to the deceased's apartment.

53. At 10:48pm, the deceased sent an SMS to Mr Lance which read, "tyrone’s back". Mr Lance began running back to her apartment.

54. Leisa Smith, who lived in an apartment near the deceased, was in her bed watching television. She heard a male voice yell, "Fuck ya" very aggressively. She walked out of her unit and her security light came on. She looked over at the deceased’s unit and saw the deceased standing between the blinds and the window for about ten to twelve seconds. The deceased had both of her hands up and she was hitting the window with both her fists clenched. She looked like she was trying to break the window. She looked terrified. Ms Smith went back inside and tried to call police before she telephoned 000 at 10:57pm.

55. Bree Hill, who also lived in an apartment near the deceased heard the offender yelling. She heard him yell, in a loud, angry voice, about five times, "Go on. Stab me again, you dog."

56. Justin Rankmore, Natasha Rankmore, Tyler Rankmore and his seven-year-old sister AB were in an apartment adjacent to the deceased’s unit.

57. Justin Rankmore heard "thumps" like the sound of someone being punched or kicked. In between the thumps he heard the offender yelling loudly "I’ve been stabbed. You stabbed me".

58. AB heard the offender saying, "Stab me, stab me, stab me". She heard banging on the door, banging on the wall and stabbing.

59. Natasha Rankmore heard a faint thumping noise go on for about a minute. She went to the loungeroom to investigate and saw AB very upset.

60. Mr Lance arrived at the deceased's apartment and saw that the internal lights were on. He went up the stairs and attempted to open the closed front door. He opened it about an inch but could not open it any further due to a physical obstruction. He looked inside the gap and saw that the deceased was lying on the floor behind the door. OE was lying on the floor nearby, about a metre inside the unit and was covered in blood. The offender was standing over the deceased and was stabbing her repeatedly with a knife. He was not saying anything. Mr Lance could not open the door any further. He telephoned 000 and ran from the complex.

61. Various witnesses observed and heard the offender following the attack.

62. Leisa Smith returned outside and noticed that the veranda light at the deceased's unit was off and that it was dark. She heard the offender yelling out "Help me, call the police, Mackenzie! Please wake up, she's bleeding out."

63. Justin Rankmore said that the offender knocked on the front door of his unit and yelled, "Call the police. I've been stabbed". Justin Rankmore opened the deceased’s front door. She was lying on the floor about 1 metre away, covered in blood, and motionless. The offender was standing about 1.5 metres away, near the deceased's hip.

64. As the door opened, the offender threw something with his left hand at the wall of the landing and it made a "ting" noise as it hit the wall.

65. The offender was holding up his right hand with his left hand. There was blood on his right hand. Justin Rankmore applied a towel to the offender's hand. The offender said "Grab my son. Get him out of here." Justin Rankmore saw the deceased's child at the doorway of her apartment with his foot stuck in the door. He pushed the door open, and the offender picked the child up and gave him to Natasha Rankmore, who took him inside their apartment.

Police on scene

66. At 10:53pm, SC Noffke and LSC Vaisey arrived on the scene and saw the offender sitting cross-legged at the top of the stairs outside the deceased's unit. He had a towel wrapped around his right hand. He was yelling out words to the effect of "Help me! She's dead".

67. Police attended to the deceased, but she was non-responsive and unconscious. She had numerous stab wounds to her face and torso. The offender spoke to police. Police told him to be quiet so they could determine if the deceased was breathing. The offender yelled, "I'm bleeding out everywhere. Man, can you please help my blood pressure? Officer, can you help my blood pressure, please? I'm pissing out blood." Police ignored him as they were attending to the deceased.

68. The offender sat up and said, "Mackenzie, please wake up". He reached out and shook her. Police told him to get out of the way and he responded, "She's my fucking wife, man." Police said, "We’re trying to figure out if she is still breathing." The offender replied, "I'm bleeding out here. Can you please help pressure?" The offender continued to scream about seeking assistance for his hand.

69. Police examined the deceased and saw a broken knife handle lying on top of the left side of her chest. Other police had arrived, and they moved the deceased into the recovery position by rolling her onto her right side. Police saw further stab wounds to her back. Underneath where she had been laying, police saw a broken knife blade. Police continued to attend to the deceased who remained non-responsive and unconscious.

70. At 11:06pm, an ambulance officer attended to the deceased and confirmed that she was deceased. An ambulance officer then assisted the offender with the injury to his right hand. He had a laceration to his hand which was not arterial and not actively bleeding. He was assessed as "alert, oriented and well perfused."

71. Paramedics smelled alcohol on the offender’s breath, but deemed him oriented and coherent in his actions and not overly intoxicated. The offender was assisted to the ambulance but he was non-compliant. He would not stand up and complained of being weak and numb. The offender was asked if he had taken anything, and he said that he had not.

72. At 11:10pm, DS Ede arrived on the scene. Prior to the ambulance leaving, DS Ede approached and spoke with the offender. Their interaction was recorded on body worn video (“BWV”). He was cautioned and asked what had happened. He said, relevantly, "... we just got into a heated argument about her mum harassing us, right?.. she [had] a fucking knife ... And then I've literally just grabbed the knife, and I just fucking stabbed, stabbed, stabbed ... and just jumped on her head, that's all that's happened."

The Offender en route to Hospital

73. At the conclusion of the conversation, the offender was cautioned again, arrested, and conveyed to the John Hunter Hospital by ambulance with a police officer guarding him and recording him on BWV the entire time. The ambulance notes record that the offender said that he had "smoked a few cones early in the morning" and "had alcohol tonight".

74. The offender told police that he had two or three weak vodka and sodas that evening. He was noted to speak freely and coherently throughout the transport. The offender volunteered, "... her mum was harassing... [the deceased] snatched the phone off me and then she's fucking flipped out and she's like... ‘get the fuck out’... I saw her grab a knife... and then it's, like, fucken, slipped out of her hand...” He later said, "[the deceased] get the fucken knife, and, like, Get the fuck out, like, stop harassing Mum...". In response to a question about the number of blows, he said "It took as many times to stab her till she fucken stopped. That was the end of it."

Offender's version to others

75. The offender arrived at the John Hunter Hospital at about 12:20am on 26 March 2022. In the progress notes it is recorded that the offender "stated grabbed blade" as an explanation for his injuries.

76. At 8:50am, the offender was seen by Dr Liam Rogerson. In response to a query about how his injuries were sustained, the offender responded "Accidentally on a knife".

77. The offender was psychiatrically assessed by Dr Richard Furst on 27 April and 2 May 2022. The offender told Dr Furst that he and the deceased were speaking. The deceased's mother was abusing the deceased and the offender. The deceased was "blowing up". The deceased went and grabbed a knife from the kitchen. The offender tried to grab the knife. The knife slipped through the offender's hand and sliced it open.

78. The offender was psychiatrically assessed by Dr Kerri Eagle on 22 August and 10 October 2023. The offender told Dr Eagle that he used the deceased's phone to message her mother. The deceased was unhappy, and they had a "heated argument". She picked up a knife. He tried to "grab [the knife] off her" and cut his hand. They were in the bedroom. He grabbed the knife and "started stabbing her and stabbing her...".

Events following the murder

79. At the John Hunter Hospital police seized the offender's clothes, face mask and the hospital sheets/blankets he had been using. At 4:07am, Sgt Shepherd attended and acted as the in-field Custody Manager. The offender was read his Part 9 rights. He told police that he was lucid and not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. At 5:30am the offender was assessed by a doctor at the emergency department. Police took a photograph of the injury.

80. On 27 March 2022 the offender was offered the opportunity to participate in an electronically recorded interview. After receiving legal advice, he declined.

81. At about 5:00pm on 27 March 2022 DS Ede created charges for the offender including the offence of murder.

82. At about 5:55pm on 27 March 2022, the offender underwent surgery on his hand. Photographs were taken of the injury prior to operating. The offender's lacerations were extended in a zig-zag fashion to enhance exposure of the underlying structures. It was determined that he had completely lacerated the FDP tendon in each of his four right fingers and completely lacerated the FDS tendon to the right index and middle fingers. All tendons were repaired and the wounds sutured. The surgeon was of the view that given the location and linear fashion of the lacerations, a single passage of a sharp implement was the likely causative mechanism.

Crime Scene

83. At 1:25am on 26 March 2022, crime scene officers attended and carried out an examination.

84. OE was examined. He was wearing a green coloured t-shirt and disposable nappy. The t­shirt and nappy were bloodstained. There was also blood staining on his hands, head, feet and legs.

Bedroom

85. There were numerous spatter stains on the bedroom's northern wall to the right of the door and on the door itself. Spattered bloodstaining identified the offender's blood was located higher on the wall and door, while spattered bloodstaining lower on the wall was identified as the deceased's blood.

86. The bedroom floor had a combination of drip and spatter staining and an area of saturation staining. This staining was a combination of the deceased’s and the offender's blood.

87. The deceased's mobile phone was found on the floor in the main bedroom in front of the wardrobe. There were bloodstains on the screen and the back of the phone. The DNA recovered from a swab taken from bloodstains on the front of the mobile phone had the same profile as the offender.

88. There was a full baby-bottle of milk just inside the door to the room.

89. There was an A-frame ladder positioned beneath the rear balcony.

90. Crime Scene Officer (“CSO”) McCann was of the view that the incident resulting in bloodshed started in the main bedroom.

Loungeroom

91. On the loungeroom wall, adjacent to the bedroom door were a number of cast-off stains. The DNA recovered from these stains identified that it was the deceased's blood.

92. Transfer bloodstaining was visible on the chaise component of the lounge. Further bloodstaining, including transfer and drip stains, was visible on the carpet adjacent to the chaise.

93. A round dining table was located on the western side of the room, adjacent to the kitchen bench. A black handled knife was located on the table.

94. CSO McCann was of the view that the deceased was likely upright and bleeding in the loungeroom, adjacent to the bedroom door.

Kitchen

95. Several drip stains were located on the top cutlery drawer (slightly to the right of the bent knife) and the tiled floor directly below the cutlery drawers. A swab from one of these drip stains recovered DNA with the same profile as the offender. Swipe marks were located on the top cutlery drawer. The DNA recovered was a mixture from both the offender and the deceased.

96. Below the kitchen drawers, on the tile floor, was a bent knife. The estimated length of the blade if straight was 200mm. The handle measured 120mm. There was bloodstaining on the handle and blade, with a greater amount on the blade. The DNA recovered from the bloodstain on the blade was a mixture of which the major contributor had the same profile as the deceased. The DNA recovered from the bloodstain on the handle was a mixture. The deceased and the offender cannot be excluded as contributors.

97. Linear spatter stains were observed on the top and side of the metal kitchen bin, located at the southern end of the kitchen and adjacent to the cutlery drawer. The DNA recovered was a mixture, including from the deceased. The offender cannot be excluded as a contributor.

98. CSO McCann was of the view that:-

1. The offender and the deceased both had contact with the bent knife discarded in the kitchen after sustaining bleeding injuries;

2. The offender was present in the kitchen, adjacent to and in front of the cutlery drawer whilst dripping blood from his person;

3. The absence of DNA recovered from the deceased in the drip stains indicates that she was not present in the kitchen after she sustained bleeding injuries;

4. The swipe marks on the cutlery drawer indicate that the drawer was handled after both the offender and the deceased had sustained bleeding injuries; and

5. The linear projected bloodstain on the bin is consistent with blood being projected off a thin object such as a knife.

Hallway

99. In the hallway between the playroom and the kitchen and loungeroom, there was bloodstaining on both the northern and southern walls and on the carpet flooring.

100. Opposite the kitchen, in the doorway to the laundry and bathroom, there was further bloodstaining. Drip stains were visible on the tiled floor. A bloodstained hand mark was observed on the wall adjacent to the doorway. A fingerprint was taken and identified as the deceased’s. Below the hand mark were spatter stains. The DNA recovered was a mixture. The major contributor had the same profile as the deceased.

101. In the short hallway between the kitchen and dining/playroom, spatter stains were visible on the carpet and on the northern wall.

102. Dripped blood staining was visible in the thoroughfare between the hallway and the front door. The DNA recovered had the same profile as the deceased.

103. The keys taken by the offender were found on top of the storage cube in the living/playroom area and seized by the CSO. Spatter bloodstains found on top of the storage cube adjacent to the keys were analysed as being the offender's blood.

Front entry

104. A transfer stain and a fingerprint were located on the western wall of the living room, adjacent to the front door. The DNA recovered from the bloodstain was the same as the offender’s. The fingerprint was identified as the offender's.

105. Cast-off stains were present on the interior side of the front door.

106. The front entry was heavily bloodstained. Bloodstaining was predominantly concentrated over the lower half of the interior facing side of the front door and the lower north-west corner and the floor.

107. Projected stains and associated flow patterns were observed on the northern wall. The DNA recovered was a mixture. The major contributor had the same profile as the deceased.

108. In the surrounding area were numerous spatter stains in varying orientations, indicating deposits of blood from multiple events.

109. Swipe marks and transfer stains were located along the leading edge of the front door.

110. The lower section of the internal side of the front door was heavily bloodstained with spatter stains displaying various orientations, swipes, wipes and flow patterns. This indicated that numerous events and movements had occurred in the vicinity, which caused the deposit of blood on the door.

111. The western wall (bordering the front door) was heavily bloodstained with spatter stains displaying various orientations, swipes, wipes, projected stains and flow patterns. This indicated that numerous events and movements had occurred in the vicinity.

112. There were several areas of linear damage to the western wall adjacent to swipe marks likely deposited by bloodstained hair. Three of these were consistent with being caused by a sharp instrument impacting the wall.

113. Numerous swipe marks, consistent with the appearance of fingermarks, surrounded the door handle and deadlock and further swipe marks were present on the interior door handle.

114. The carpet of the front entry was bloodstained.

115. CSO McCann was of the view that:-

1. The deceased was on and near the floor while a protracted incident causing the shedding of her blood occurred in the northwestern corner of the front entry, adjacent to the front door;

2. The offender was upright and bleeding near the front entry of the unit;

3. The offender deposited blood under high energy with the cast-off stains on the interior surface of the front door consistent with upward motion of his right hand under high energy; and

4. The bloodstaining on the interior side of the door was consistent with numerous attempts to open the door by a bloodstained hand.

Front balcony

116. The deceased was located face down on the floor of the landing area between units 3 and 4 with her head closest to the entrance to unit 4. Her clothing items were heavily bloodstained, and further bloodstaining was visible in the hair of the deceased and on all other visible skin surfaces. There were numerous incised and stab wounds to her lower legs, back, arms, hand and head.

117. A bloodied, broken blade and fragments of the handle of a large kitchen knife were located on the balcony.

118. Transfer stains were located above the tiled floor on the exterior wall of the front balcony. Above the transfer stains, spatter stains, impact patterns, projected stains, swipes and wipes were located. Transfer stains were observed on either side of the window. Spatter stains were located on the exterior wall. The DNA recovered from the spatter stains was the same as the offender's.

119. There was linear damage to the exterior wall, within an impact pattern.

120. CSO McCann was of the view that:-

1. The offender was upright and bleeding on the balcony, above the location of the deceased on the floor of the balcony; and

2. The deceased was on the floor whilst further events causing the shedding of her blood occurred on the balcony.

Post-Mortem

121. On 29 and 30 March 2022, a post-mortem was conducted by Forensic Pathologists Drs Leah Clifton and Alexandra Kullen. At the time of death, the deceased was 1.73m in height and weighed 57kg. The direct cause of death was "multiple sharp force injuries".

122. There were 78 sharp force injuries identified involving the head, neck, back, chest, abdomen and upper and lower limbs:-

1. Posterior neck and back – 13 sharp force injuries;

2. Head – 10 sharp force injuries;

3. Lower limbs – 18 sharp force injuries;

4. Left arm – 19 sharp force injuries;

5. Right arm – 9 sharp force injuries; and

6. Anterior chest and abdomen – 9 sharp force injuries.

123. There were 3 penetrating injuries into the thoracic cavity, 2 on the chest and 1 on the back:-

1. The stab wound to the right upper back injured the right lower lung lobe, with an associated 375mL haemothorax; and

2. The stab wound on the medial left upper chest transected the left subclavian vein, and penetrated the apex of the left lung, with an associated 100mL haemothorax.

124. Another stab wound on the left upper chest injured the left lung, and penetrated the pericardial sac, partially transected the aorta, and terminated in the left atrium, with an associated <10mL haemopericardium.

125. There was one penetrating injury into the abdominal cavity which extended through the right lobe of the liver, with a small associated haemoperitoneum.

126. There were peri-mortem abrasions on the face, upper chest, and left aspect of the neck, and discrete peri-mortem abrasions on the head, torso, and upper and lower limbs. Acute, but predominantly sub-acute, bruises were present on the torso and upper and lower limbs.

127. The injuries on the forearms and hands were suggestive of a defensive type pattern of injury. All of the injuries were in keeping with a sustained event. Some of the injuries appeared to be from a single-edged blade, while some appeared to be from a double-edged blade. No indication of serration was seen.

128. These facts above relevant to the matter on the s 166 certificate (which has a date range of between 8 March 2022 to 26 March 2022) have necessarily been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Exhibits

129. Before me are several exhibits. Exhibit 1 is a bundle of documents prepared by the Crown, tendered without objection. The bundle includes:-

1. The indictment;

2. Section 166 Certificate;

3. Statement of Agreed Facts signed on 1 April 2025;

4. Offender’s Criminal History;

5. Offender’s Custodial History;

6. Victim Impact Statements of:-

1. Tabitha Acret, the deceased’s mother, dated 16 April 2025;

2. Matthew Sheehy, the deceased’s step-father, dated 9 April 2025;

3. Alice McEvoy, Alexandra Drydale-Cech and Lily Martinez dated 11 April 2025;

4. Natasha Rankmore dated 10 April 2025; and

5. Tyler Lance dated 24 April 2025.

7. Psychiatric report (redacted) of Dr Kerri Eagle dated 10 October 2023;

8. Parole material:-

1. Sentence Facts for the offences for which the offender was on parole – H 84259546.

2. Breach of parole report dated 11 March 2022 enclosing Statutory Parole Order, Sentence Warrant and Hornsby Local Court outcome 10 March 2022.

3. Stand-over Memorandum dated 23 March 2022.

4. Updated breach of parole report dated 28 March 2022.

5. Revocation Order dated 28 March 2022.

6. Revocation of parole letter dated 4 April 2022.

9. Material relevant to totality:-

1. Sentence Facts H 76077537 – stalk/harass/intimidate law officer & assault law officer committed on 3 January 2023.

2. Sentence Facts H 92657232 – assault law officer committed on 5 January 2023.

3. Extract (judgment) from Goulburn Local Court Hearing transcript 24 August 2023 H 79625453 – assault law officer x 3 committed on 6 January 2023.

4. Sentence Facts H 94296838 – assault law officer committed on 11 May 2023.

5. Sentence Facts H 173610802 – destroy or damage property committed on 25 March 2024.

10. Bundle of prior conduct and background material; and

11. Sentence Facts for the following unrelated matters:

1. H 232846496 – stalk/intimidate & destroy or damage property committed on 6 October 2016.

2. H 68644680 – common assault, stalk/intimidate & destroy or damage property committed on 14 February 2018.

3. H 82059410 – contravene prohibition/restriction in ADVO committed on 6 and 7 August 2021.

4. H 86872514 – contravene prohibition/restriction in ADVO committed on 11 and 12 March 2022.

5. H 87405172 – assault police officer in the execution of duty x 2 committed on 27 March 2022.

130. Exhibit 2 are documents forming part of the Crown psychiatric material bundle.

131. Exhibit 3 was a bundle containing phone records. However, in light of events which transpired and are not relevant to this sentence, the Crown withdrew the tender.

132. Exhibit 4 is the offender’s bundle, tendered without objection. The bundle contains:-

1. A report of Dr Richard Furst, forensic psychiatrist, dated 26 February 2023;

1. Justice Health records referring to Dr Ma;

2. Justice Health records referring to Dr O’Dea;

3. Mr Thompson’s affidavit affirmed on 29 April 2025 which was read in the proceedings without objection. Mr Thompson was not required for cross-examination;

4. Health records from the Hunter New England Local Health District for the period July 2021 to December 2021;

5. Photographs of messages exchanged between the offender and the deceased between 19 and 25 March 2022; and

6. Photographs of messages exchanged between the offender and the deceased’s mother on 25 March 2022.

133. Exhibit 5 is a letter from the offender to the Court dated 29 April 2025.

Evidence

134. I will now summarise some of the documents which are before me.

Exhibit 1

135. The Crown Sentence Summary contains the agreed facts which I have just set out. The offender has a significant criminal history. His custodial history is also significant and records multiple instances of intimidation, damage property and disobey direction.

Victim Impact Statements

136. Five Victim Impact Statements were read, three by others than the victims and the fourth and fifth by the victims themselves.

Tyler Lance

137. Mr Tyler Lance described the pain associated with losing his best friend and his feelings of guilt for not being able to save the deceased. He said that he lost control of his life after the murder of the deceased and continues to struggle with his mental health as a result of the offender’s actions.

138. The Court acknowledges Mr Lance’s continuing suffering and expresses its condolences to him.

Natasha Rankmore

139. Ms Rankmore described the aftermath of the events of the murder and her bravery in attending upon the deceased’s son. She has struggled with mental health issues since that night.

140. The Court also acknowledges Ms Rankmore’s continuing suffering and expresses its condolences to her.

Alice McEvoy, Alexandra Drydale-Cech and Lily Martinez

141. Ms McEvoy, Ms Drydale-Cech and Ms Martinez spoke of the love they shared for their best friend and the ongoing grief and loss they have experienced without her in their life. They have struggled after the murder of their dear friend, something no person should experience, particularly at such a young age.

142. The Court acknowledges too, Ms McEvoy’s, Ms Drydale-Cech’s and Ms Martinez’s ongoing suffering and expresses its condolences to them.

Matthew Sheehy

143. The deceased’s step-father, Mr Sheehy, bravely spoke about the love he had for his step-daughter and her son, and the ongoing grief suffered by his family. The deceased’s actions have shattered his family, who continue to struggle with helplessness, despair and anger. The offender’s criminal act will profoundly impact his family forever.

144. The Court acknowledges the grief and suffering of Mr Sheehy and extends its condolences to him.

Tabitha Acret

145. The deceased’s mother, Tabitha Acret, spoke courageously and movingly about the daughter she loved so dearly. She told the Court about how this terrible crime has forever changed her life and that of her family, including Mackenzie’s brother and Mackenzie’s son. Their lives have been changed beyond recognition. Ms Acret has had to make an effort, not only on her own behalf but on behalf of her family, to survive the trauma caused by the offender, who destroyed the joy, innocence and stability of their family.

146. The Court acknowledges the continuing pain and grief suffered by Ms Acret and her young son and grandson.

147. The Court expresses its gratitude to all the victims for courageously providing their statements which shed light on the deceased’s life, her kindness and good nature and her love for family and friends. As a result of the offender’s brutal actions, Ms Acret’s and Mr Sheehy’s daughter pre-deceased them, which is a parent’s nightmare. The deceased’s young son has been left without a mother, of whom he will have no recollection. Because of the offender’s senseless actions, her friends are left without a member of their chosen family. The death of the deceased is a tragedy for her family and for her friends. It is also a tragedy for the community, which has lost one of its contributing members at a tender age when a long and fulfilling life awaited her. We are less of a community because of the loss of the deceased. On behalf of the community, the Court acknowledges the pain and suffering of each of the victims and expresses its condolences to all who loved and have lost Mackenzie Anderson. Their loss will last across lifetimes.

148. On the application of the Crown, I take into account the Victim Impact Statements of Ms Acret and Mr Sheehy (the deceased’s family) pursuant to s 30E of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“the Sentencing Act”), in connection with the determination of the punishment for the offence, as an aspect of the harm done to the community. I am satisfied that this is appropriate, and I observe that the offender agreed to this course of action.

Report of Dr Kerri Eagle dated 10 October 2023

149. Dr Eagle reported on 10 October 2023, having assessed the offender on 22 August 2023 and again on 10 October 2023. At [237] of her report, Dr Eagle said:-

“Mr Thompson has been diagnosed with a psychotic illness, that has been formulated as schizoaffective disorder. Schizoaffective disorder is a chronic psychotic disorder resulting in relapses of psychosis that are associated with severe mood disturbance, such as manic or depressive episode. Criteria for schizophrenia is also met, such that the disorder can result in negative symptoms (deficits) such as social withdrawal and emotional blunting and is associated with a deterioration in function. Mr Thompson’s presentation appears atypical and complex. He has had some apparent psychotic experiences…the experiences appear to have occurred predominantly in the context of situational crisis and possible substance abuse, including during periods in custody, complicating the diagnosis. There have been some differences in opinion between treating psychiatrists as to whether Mr Thompson had a primary psychotic illness or whether his symptoms were the sequalae of complex trauma. He has not displayed signs of psychosis during my reviews and does not appear to be receiving ongoing treatment with antipsychotic or mood stabilising treatment. It appears likely that his report symptoms are transient and form part of pervasive problems with emotional regulation and his personality structure, rather than a mood or psychotic disorder.”

150. Dr Eagle was of the view that the offender’s previous diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder was “uncertain”. In her view the offender displayed features of complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), Severe Substance Use Disorder and Severe Personality Disorder (both antisocial and borderline personality traits). In her opinion, the offender did not appear to be experiencing a mental health impairment at the time of the commission of the offence. She noted that the “witness evidence of Mr Thompson’s behaviour at the time of the offence and the body worn video of Mr Thompson following the offending did not demonstrate any signs or symptoms suggestive of a psychotic illness or severe mood disturbance”. She also believed that he did not appear to display any signs or symptoms of a mental health impairment during the period leading up to the commission of the offence. She said at [246]:-

“Telephone recordings of calls in March 2022 immediately prior to his release indicate he was composed, logical and coherent, and did not display any signs of psychotic phenomena or mood disturbance…Numerous witness statements were provided regarding Mr Thompson’s conduct leading up to the offence. He sounded motivated to contact the deceased and was threatening towards her ex-partner. No particular reference was made to behaviours that may be considered psychotic in nature.”

151. In this respect, Dr Eagle differed from Dr Furst, to which see below, who was of the view that at the time of the murder Mr Thompson was impaired in his ability to control himself due to his mental health impairment, given evidence of “emotional mobility, impairment of volitional control and related aggressive behaviour and self-harming behaviour” including tearfulness at about the time of the offending.

152. Dr Eagle identified several indicia of disadvantage and deprivation, aside from the mental health diagnosis which she attributed to Mr Thompson. He was noted to be the victim of, and a witness to, significant domestic violence in his family home. He had interrupted and unsatisfactory schooling. She observed that he had been homeless for a lengthy period in his late adolescence, that he attempted suicide on multiple occasions and that he abused alcohol and drugs from a young age. He was sexually abused, at least when he was in year 6 when a teacher tried to touch him.

153. I note here that it was agreed that when the deceased’s apartment was searched, police found documents relating to the offender’s claim for compensation for sexual abuse perpetrated upon him when he was child. It was also agreed that in a telephone call from gaol to his mother on 28 September 2021, the offender discussed a civil claim for sexual abuse that was being pursued on his behalf by Shine Lawyers.

154. There was initially a dispute about the significance of Mr Thompson’s mental health issues and its impact on a proportionate sentence. That dispute was resolved. It was agreed, and I accept on the balance of probabilities, that at the time of the offending Mr Thompson suffered from the significant mental illnesses of complex PTSD and Severe Personality Disorder, and that a working and differential diagnosis had been made prior to that date of schizoaffective disorder.

Parole Material

155. At the time of the offending, the offender was on parole for domestic violence offending against the deceased. On the day of his release to parole he allegedly assaulted his father. His parole was to expire on 23 July 2022, which was revoked (retrospectively) on 25 March 2022, the day of the murder.

Material relevant to totality

156. The offender was convicted of three offences of assault law officer, the events arising out of the same incident in January 2023 at Goulburn Correctional Centre for which he received an aggregate sentence of 30 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 months. There were two additional offences, one of assault law officer in May 2023 and the other of destroy or damage property on 25 March 2024, for which he received an aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 9 months to be served concurrently with the 30-month sentence.

Background material

157. The material relevant to the offender’s background includes a schedule setting out conversations, inter alia, between the offender and various individuals, statements of witnesses, the deceased’s domestic violence evidence in chief (“DVEC”) transcript dated 24 October 2021, a transcript of an Electronically Recorded Interview with Suspected Person with Mr Boreham dated 28 March 2022, and redacted transcripts of the offender’s phone calls to others from Long Bay Correctional Complex prior to the murder.

Sentence Facts for other matters

158. The sentence facts relate to offending against the offender’s mother, another former partner and police (whilst at the John Hunter Hospital under guard).

Exhibit 2

Crown psychiatric material

159. The bundle of psychiatric material relied upon by the Crown are Justice Health documents under the hand of various medical practitioners including mental health practitioners. On admission to the Mental Health Unit at Long Bay Hospital on 1 April 2022, it was noted that the offender had a chronic risk of aggression and impulsive self-harm (including ingesting harmful substances) when unwell. He had a confirmed diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder and cluster B personality disorder, to which he was predisposed due to extensive childhood trauma. He had a history of non-compliance with medications including depot antipsychotics. He was noted to be manipulative.

160. By July 2022, it was noted that Mr Thompson was not exhibiting any psychotic symptoms, although he was observed to be delusional. By August 2022, he was noted to threaten staff with weapons. His presentation was thought to be more consistent with affective dysregulation and the general volatility of a person with significant borderline and antisocial personality disorder. There was no evidence of a psychotic illness and he was not thought disordered. A Forensic Community Treatment Order (“FCTO”) was made on 3 November 2022 by the Mental Health Review Tribunal which expired on 3 November 2023.

161. In January 2023, it was noted that the offender had a very complicated background of developmental trauma and had made multiple prior suicide attempts. In April 2023, it was noted that the offender expressed little if any remorse, and that the impression was that he had a prominent underlying cluster B personality structure. In August 2023, it was noted that his schizoaffective disorder was not then under control because of ongoing compliance issues with antipsychotic medications. On 11 August 2023, the Mental Health Review Tribunal determined that the offender had severe chronic treatment resistant schizoaffective disorder and that he was then symptomatic. His mental state had recently worsened and he was under intensive supervision as he was self-harming, collecting his faeces and was mentally unstable. It was ordered that his original FCTO continue.

162. By 25 August 2023, a Mental Health transfer to segregation noted that Mr Thompson had a diagnosis of cluster B personality disorder to which he was predisposed due to extensive childhood trauma. He had a historical diagnosis of complex PTSD, generalised anxiety disorder and schizoaffective/bipolar disorder. With the benefit of time and a longitudinal assessment, the treating team was of the view that the offender did not suffer from either schizophrenia or bipolar affective disorder.

Exhibit 4

Report of Dr Richard Furst dated 26 February 2023

163. Dr Richard Furst, forensic psychiatrist, reported on 26 February 2023 following assessments with the offender on 27 April and 2 May 2022. Relevantly, he set out the offender’s background as follows.

164. Mr Thompson experienced learning and behavioural difficulties at school and was put in a special needs class. He commenced a trade program in high school and remained in that program in Year 10 and 11. He had input from school counsellors at each of the schools he attended.

165. Mr Thompson was exposed to domestic violence in his family home until his parents separated in 2006 or 2007, when he was about seven years old. His father, who had problems with drug abuse and was apparently diagnosed with schizophrenia, was the primary aggressor and was violent toward Mr Thompson. His mother had a history of depression and anxiety. She fled to a local refuge, where he lived with her and his brother on the Central Coast. He left home at the age of 16 and was homeless for approximately 18 months thereafter, when he frequently lived in a car. He had at least one further period of homelessness after that time.

166. Mr Thompson did not drink or use drugs in his early to mid-teens. He began to drink alcohol in 2017, often in a binge pattern, at about age 17.

167. After Mr Thompson turned 18 years old, he reported experiencing significant mental health problems. He presented to Gosford Hospital in October 2019 and the mental health unit at Wyong Hospital in 2020, each time in a mental health crisis reporting suicidal thoughts. He also attempted suicide whilst in custody.

168. On 26 July 2021, the day after he was released from custody (for offending relating to his former partner with whom he has a child), he was admitted to the Hornsby Ku-Ring-Gai Hospital when his presentation was suggestive of psychosis.

169. Between his release and his re-arrest on 26 October 2021, Mr Thompson said he was drinking “now and again”. He said that he smoked cannabis intermittently and that he used cocaine in October 2021.

170. His mental health deteriorated in the latter months of 2021 and the beginning of 2022, coinciding with his return to custody and the cessation of paliperidone palmitate and olanzapine in December 2021. Since March 2021, he had been prescribed various antipsychotic and antidepressant medications, mood stabilisers and various medications to assist with nightmares.

171. Dr Furst diagnosed Mr Thompson with schizoaffective disorder and personality disorder (borderline and antisocial features). He noted that in 2021 Mr Thompson was displaying signs and symptoms of psychosis, including severe mood disturbance, irrational thinking, auditory and visual hallucinations, delusions of reference and bizarre thoughts about psychic abilities. Dr Furst stated that Mr Thompson’s capacity to control himself was most likely impaired due to his underlying mental health problems.

Justice Health records referring to Dr Ma

172. The Justice Health records, commencing in July 2022, and which refer to Dr Ma, contain a history relating to Mr Thompson’s treatment and symptoms in custody referable to this offending. They demonstrate that Mr Thompson has had varied and erratic moods and behaviours in custody. It appears that he had only been partially compliant with his medication regime, and that he was regularly agitated or restless, particularly in relation to his conditions in segregation. He was also noted to have displayed aggression, emotional dysregulation and disinhibition. The records refer to multiple historical diagnoses including schizoaffective disorder, complex PTSD and Cluster B personality disorder.

Justice Health records referring to Dr O’Dea

173. The Justice Health records referring to Dr O’Dea contain a Mental Health Review Tribunal determination dated 11 August 2023. The reasons for that determination included that Mr Thompson had severe chronic treatment resistant schizoaffective disorder, that he was symptomatic at that time and that his mental state had recently worsened, that he was under intensive supervision as he was self-harming, collecting his faeces and was mentally unstable. He was only partially compliant with his medication and refused to take an adequate dose of his antipsychotic medication.

174. The remainder of these records were consistent with the records referring to Dr Ma, but include one instance where Mr Thompson was found hanging in his cell from a noose made out of his sheets. He was presumed to have been hanging for one minute. There was a more recent entry on 5 March 2025 which noted that Mr Thompson was having delusions about being poisoned by microplastics, which he believed were “changing him into a female”.

Affidavit of Mr Thompson affirmed on 29 April 2025

175. In his affidavit, upon which he was not cross-examined, the offender says that he has spent the majority of his period on remand at the High Risk Management Unit at Goulburn Correctional Centre where he has been classified as A1EHR (extreme high risk). His cell conditions are very spartan, and there is little natural light. He is limited in his access to telephones. He is yet to have an in person visit. It is fair to say that the conditions of his custody are very strict. It is agreed that during the entirety of his time in custody the offender has never had an opportunity to interact with any other inmate.

Health Records from Hunter New England Local Health District

176. The records span between July and December 2021 most of which were when Mr Thompson was in the community. They pre-date the offending by some months. They demonstrate a significant history of mental illness, including numerous episodes of psychosis and various paranoid delusions. I have noted some pertinent details from those records below.

177. On 26 July 2021, the offender presented to Hornsby Hospital with suicidal ideation and symptoms of psychosis. He was treated at that hospital until 30 July 2021.

176. On 18 August 2021, Mr Thompson reported delusions about the government having full control of him and the government being controlled by the Kardashians. He spoke of a microchip tracker in his arm, and stated that Scott Morrison would speak to him through an earpiece implanted in jail and tell him what to say. Similar delusions were recorded on other occasions.

177. A mental health clinical review on 30 August 2021 noted “PTSD – CHILDHOOD ABUSE”.

178. On 28 September 2021, Mr Thompson was admitted to hospital after being brought in by police. He presented with psychotic symptoms and repeated delusions about the government. Polysubstance abuse was noted. His diagnosis was recorded as schizoaffective disorder with secondary diagnoses of borderline and antisocial traits.

179. On 29 September 2021, it was recorded that Mr Thompson had experienced persecutory delusions, that he was non-adherent to his medication regime, that he had previously attempted suicide, and that he was at risk of harm to himself and others and required hospitalisation. A week later he had a mental health treatment plan approved by the Mental Health Review Tribunal. Long-term psychotherapy in the community was recommended, which was said to be critical for treatment of his personality vulnerabilities which led to emotional dysregulation and impulsivity, which put him at risk of further interpersonal issues and a propensity towards engaging in illegal behaviour. Mr Thompson then believed that he did not require certain medications.

180. I note that there is a complex history in relation to Mr Thompson’s paranoia, delusions and psychotic symptoms. On various occasions, Mr Thompson is noted to report symptoms associated with these conditions and then deny the existence of those symptoms or conditions.

Messages between the offender and the deceased

183. The messages span the period between 19 and 25 March 2022, which is the date of the murder of the deceased. They are consistent with consensual communication notwithstanding the extant ADVO.

Messages between the offender and the deceased’s mother

184. These messages were exchanged between the offender and the deceased’s mother on 25 March 2025, the day of the murder of the deceased. The messages are consistent with the agreed facts.

Exhibit 5

185. In his letter to the Court, the offender expresses remorse for his actions and says that no words can undo the pain and devastation caused by his actions. He says that he loved the deceased and her son. He described a difficult relationship with the deceased. He says that his memory of the night of the murder is unclear but that he had not intended to kill the deceased. There was a struggle with a knife and when it cut his hand, things then got out of control.

186. Mr Thompson says that he did not have a good upbringing as he grew up in a household that had violence and alcohol. He does not offer that information as an excuse but rather by way of explanation. He says that he takes responsibility for his actions and acknowledges that there were opportunities to prevent the outcome. He says that he will carry the guilt and shame for the rest of his life.

Factual findings

187. I sentence the offender on the basis of the facts which have been agreed between the parties, and which I have set out above.

Objective Seriousness

188. The Crown submitted that the seriousness of the criminality of the offending must be informed by the background which led up to the offence on 25 March 2022. He submitted that the relationship between the offender and the deceased was marred not only by domestic violence, but also the deceased’s fear of the offender and her attempts to end her relationship with him, which the offender refused to accept. I am satisfied of these matters beyond reasonable doubt.

189. The following is taken from documentary evidence tendered by the Crown. Early in the relationship, which commenced in late 2019, the deceased was fearful of the offender. Prior to the offender going into custody for unrelated matters, the deceased had expressed fear of the offender, including a concern that he was going to kill her. Further, the deceased told the offender that the relationship was over whilst he was in custody. Shortly after his release from custody, he told another former partner that he would kill the deceased. In October 2021, the offender was jealous of the deceased’s prior relationship and threatened to kill her previous boyfriend. Two weeks later, the offender committed offences against the deceased, arising from the offender alleging that the deceased had cheated on him. The deceased referred to the offender having a knife, and the offender threatened to kill the deceased. There was then an ADVO in place for the protection of the deceased. However the offender tried to have the deceased remove the ADVO and threatened to kill himself if she refused. The deceased told the offender that she wanted nothing to do with him. Even whilst in custody, the offender continued to be jealous and possessive of the deceased. He made threats toward the deceased’s new boyfriend.

190. The Crown submitted that the Court would find that the offender had an intention to the kill the deceased, from the following matters which are set out in the agreed facts above. The factors relied upon by the Crown are as follows:-

1. The offender had earlier come at the deceased with a knife;

2. The deceased was trying to escape from the unit;

3. The offender stabbed the deceased at least 78 times using two different kitchen knives;

4. The frenzied attack lasted approximately 2 minutes;

5. The offender was yelling at the deceased during the attack;

6. The attack was of such ferocity that one of the kitchen knives snapped;

7. Comments made by the offender to DS Ede that “and then I’ve literally just grabbed the knife, and I just fucking stabbed, stabbed, stabbed…and just jumped on her head, that’s all that’s happened”;

8. Comments made by the offender en route to the hospital that “it took as many times to stab her till she fucken stopped. That was the end of it”;

9. The offender was above the deceased, who was on the floor, during at least some of the attack; and

10. The location of the “sharp force injuries” were significantly focused on the head, neck and back of the deceased.

191. To that I would add the observations of a neighbour that during the attack the deceased had both of her hands up and was hitting the window with both her fists clenched as if she was trying to break the window and looking terrified.

192. I observe that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender had an intention to kill the deceased at the time of the first stab wounds he inflicted upon the deceased, ie after he took the knife from the deceased’s hand and he suffered a hand injury.

193. The Crown submitted that the matter lies above the mid-range of objective seriousness, and said that the following factors are relevant to the assessment of objective seriousness:-

1. The relationship between Mr Thompson and the deceased was marred by domestic violence;

2. Mr Thompson had only been released from custody on 9 March 2022, just over two weeks before the offence;

3. Mr Thompson was the subject of an apprehended violence order for the protection of the deceased;

4. Mr Thompson returned to the unit on two occasions, having already been asked to leave by the deceased (resulting in her calling 000 between the first and second occasion);

5. Mr Thompson stabbed the deceased at least 78 times using two different kitchen knives; and

6. At the time of doing so, Mr Thompson had an intention to kill the deceased.

194. The Crown accepted that there was no premeditation.

195. Mr Carroll candidly conceded that the offending was extremely serious. He accepted that as the offence was committed in breach of an ADVO to which the offender was subject, this increases the contextual seriousness of the offending: see R v Cherry [2017] NSWCCA 150 per Johnson J at [80]; R v Lloyd [2022] NSWSC 906 per Bellew J; R v Gina Kennedy (a pseudonym) [2022] NSWSC 1999 per N Adams J at [144]. He observed that the acts which led to the death of the deceased were frenzied and moved between three locations in the deceased’s apartment.

196. Mr Carroll contended that the offending falls within the mid-range of objective seriousness. He submitted that there was no premeditation and that the offending commenced after argument, in which the deceased help up a knife, that the offender attempted to disarm the deceased by grabbing the blade of the knife which caused his hand wound, and following which the offender stabbed the deceased repeatedly. I have already said that I accept that this occurred, on the balance of probabilities.

197. Mr Carroll submitted that the Court would concur with the conclusion of Dr Furst that:-

“…[Mr Thompson’s] capacity to control himself was most likely impaired as a product of his underlying mental illness/mental health impairment.

…the factors that triggered his loss of control (in an emotionally unstable individual prone [to] such loss of control, especially when untreated), were his text message exchange/conflict with Tabatha at around 10:30pm; an ensuing argument with [the deceased] in the minutes that followed; then the apparent action of [the deceased] arming herself with a knife and stabbing his hand.

…I believe that his offending actions relate to loss of control and that Mr Thompson did not care about the consequences of killing [the deceased] in her own home and in front of the young son and neighbours because he was ‘out of control’.

…I am aware of the opinion that Mr Thompson’s untreated psychiatric illness made him vulnerable to emotional liability and related extreme behaviour, impairing his capacity to control himself on the night…”

198. There is no dispute between the parties that the offender’s significant mental illness should not be included in my determination of objective gravity.

199. In DS v R; DM v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82; [2022] NSWCCA 156, Beech-Jones CJ at CL, N Adams J and Cavanagh J definitively dealt with the concepts of both objective seriousness and moral culpability and their interaction. The Court said at [95]-[96]:-

“[95] In relation to moral culpability, it has long been accepted that “[w]here the state of a person’s mental health contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way, the offender’s moral culpability may be reduced” (Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 at [177]) with potential consequential effects upon the weight to be afforded to the various sentencing factors, including denunciation and general deterrence. This form of connection between the offence and its commission might be described as “a” causal connection, but it need not be the direct or precipitating cause (see Moiler v R [2021] NSWCCA 73 at [59] per Button J with whom Basten JA and Davies J agreed) (emphasis added).

[96] It follows that an offender’s mental impairment is a matter that can affect both an assessment of moral culpability and objective seriousness. However, while a mental impairment “may” affect an assessment of the objective seriousness of an offence it will not necessarily do so, even if it is said that there is “a” causal connection between the impairment and the offence. The critical factors are the nature of the impairment, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the degree of connection between the former and the latter. The most obvious such circumstance is where the mental impairment is effectively a constituent element of the crime, such as manslaughter involving a substantial impairment within the meaning of s 23A of the Crimes Act. Another example may be where an offender damaged property during a period of psychosis or while suffering delusions but in circumstances that fall short of that which might establish a mental illness defence. In such a case, it could be said that the objective seriousness of the offending was reduced perhaps substantially. Such an offence would not be premediated or planned, and the offender would not have sought or derived any advantage from their offending or possessed any malice in doing do. On the other hand, where an offender suffered from depression that impaired their decision making, it is very difficult to accept that the objective seriousness of a sexual assault they committed is somehow reduced even though it might be said that their depression materially contributed to their inability to overcome their own impulse to commit the offence. Such circumstances might warrant a reduction in their moral culpability which would in turn warrant further consideration be given to the weight attached to various sentencing factors, although it would not necessarily result in a reduction in their sentence.”

200. In the present case, I agree with the parties that Mr Thompson’s mental illness ought not to inform the question of objective seriousness. Rather, I will take it into account when determining his moral culpability. Here, the nature of his long-standing mental illness has been variously diagnosed as schizoaffective disorder and/or complex PTSD with symptoms of dissociation and chronic suicidal ideation with Severe Substance Use Disorder and Severe Personality Disorder. Dr Eagle noted that Mr Thompson has a complex presentation which has caused different psychiatrists to form different views as to his diagnostic formulation. However, it appears clear based on contemporaneous evidence that Mr Thompson was not psychotic and did not suffer severe mood disturbance at the time of the offending. He was apparently functioning, albeit erratically, in the community in the time leading up to the murder. I cannot find on all the evidence that Mr Thompson’s mental illness caused an inability to overcome the impulse to commit the offence, which he knew to be wrong.

201. I have taken into account the agreed facts, the additional facts that I have found and the submissions of counsel noted above.

202. Whilst counsel made submissions as to where on the scale of seriousness the offending sits, I observe that there is no obligation on a Court to indicate where on a notional scale of objective seriousness the offending lies. In DH v R [2022] NSWCCA 200, Yehia J said at [58]-[60]:-

“[58] Some degree of confusion remains as to whether a sentencing judge is obliged to indicate “where on the scale of seriousness each offence falls” when dealing with an offence which carries a standard non-parole period. The applicant submitted that the sentencing judge was obliged to utilise the concept of mid- range offending [emphasis added] and assess where on the scale of seriousness the offending for the offences which carried a standard non-parole period lay.

[59] To be clear, there is no such obligation or requirement. In Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 (Muldrock) at [29] the High Court said that the standard non-parole period legislation:

“is not to be understood as suggesting either the need to attribute particular mathematical values to matters regarded as significant to the formulation of a sentence that differs from the standard non-parole period, or the need to classify the objective seriousness of the offending. It does require the judge to identify fully the facts, matters and circumstances which the judge concludes bear upon the judgment that is reached about the appropriate sentence to be imposed”.

[60] The assessment of objective seriousness of an offence is an essential element of the process of instinctive synthesis, a purpose of which is the imposition of a proportionate sentence: Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCA 44 at [46]; R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354; Khoury v R [2011] NSWCCA 118. A sentencing judge is required to identify all the factors relevant to the objective seriousness of an offence but is not required to nominate a point on the scale of seriousness by reference to a notional mid-point. The use of descriptors such as “low end of the middle of the range”, “upper end of the middle of the range” or, “just below or above the midpoint” add nothing of value to the process of instinctive synthesis and the determination of a proportionate sentence.” (endnote omitted) [emphasis in original]

203. I do not propose to make any finding on a notional scale. I have taken into account the legislative guideposts of the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period. The offending is by its nature, objectively serious.

Aggravating Factors

204. The Crown submitted that the offence involved the actual or threatened use of a weapon: s 21A(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act, but he accepted that this factor would not aggravate the sentence in the present case. Mr Carroll conceded that this factor was present but agreed that it would not be aggravating in the circumstances, which I accept.

205. The Crown submitted that Mr Thompson’s prior record, which included matters of domestic violence, is a matter to be taken into account on sentence, although it was not an aggravating factor pursuant to s 21A(2)(d) of the Sentencing Act, which I also accept.

206. The Crown submitted, and Mr Carroll conceded, that the offence was committed in the presence of a child: s 21A(2)(ea) of the Sentencing Act, and that it was committed in the home of the deceased: s 21A(2)(eb) of the Sentencing Act, both of which were aggravating features of the offending.

207. The Crown submitted, and it is not in dispute, that the offender was on conditional liberty at the date of the offending. He was on parole for the offence of assaulting and intimidating the deceased and destroying her property, which parole ended on 23 July 2022, and which aggravates the offending: s 21A(2)(j) of the Sentencing Act.

Mitigating Factors

208. The offender pleaded guilty to the offence on 1 April 2025, but it is agreed that because of the lack of court availability he was prepared to plead guilty at least 14 days prior to his trial.

209. I observe that to the extent that the offender may have been intoxicated or drug affected at the time of the murder, I do not take it into account as a mitigating factor: s 21A(5AA) of the Sentencing Act.

Subjective Circumstances

Plea of Guilty

210. It is agreed between the parties that the offender is entitled to a discount of 10% on account of his plea of guilty pursuant to s 25D(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act.

211. Mr Carroll submitted that the plea also provides some evidence of contrition and remorse and could be considered both as an important step towards rehabilitation and as an indication of acceptance of responsibility for the offending.

Prior Criminal History

212. It is agreed that the offender’s history of prior offending disentitles him to leniency.

Remorse

213. Whilst I acknowledge that the offender’s letter of 29 April 2025 contains an expression of remorse, it is untested. In my opinion, the offender has satisfied the requirements of s 21A(3)(i) of the Sentencing Act by providing evidence that he has accepted responsibility for his actions and acknowledging the injury, loss and damage caused by his actions. However, I remain circumspect and give it less weight, as the offender’s expression of remorse is qualified to an extent by his failure to comprehend, in particular, the profound effect of his actions upon the deceased’s son. He appears too, to shift some blame onto the deceased. That said, in my view it may be that this is the beginning of his journey of personal growth and self-awareness.

Time in custody

214. The offender has been in custody since his arrest on 25 March 2022, although it is not entirely referable to this offending, to which see above.

Youth

215. Mr Carroll submitted that Mr Thompson’s youth was a relevant factor on sentence. The Crown accepted that the offender’s youth was a matter to be taken into account on sentence, but he submitted that general deterrence and denunciation should not cede to the offender’s youth given the seriousness of the offending.

216. The topic of youth was revisited by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Byrne & Cahill v R [2021] NSWCCA 185; 97 MVR 85. There the Court reaffirmed the general principles relating to the role of youth in determining an appropriate penalty for serious offending. The following principles emerge as relevant to sentencing (and see BP v R [2010] NSWCCA 303 (BP)):-

1. The age of the offender. Here the offender was 22 years of age at the date of the offence;

2. The actual degree of maturity – or immaturity;

3. The fact that, generally speaking, “…emotional maturity and impulse control develop progressively during adolescence and early adulthood and may not be fully developed until the early to mid-twenties…” (BP per Hodgson JA at [19]); and

4. Any specific insight into the mental or psychological condition of the offender which might have affected his decision-making in this context. I deal below with the offender’s mental and psychological condition.

217. In Clarke-Jeffries v R [2019] NSWCCA 56 Bellew J (Simpson AJA and Campbell J agreeing) summarised the principles that govern the sentencing of youthful offenders, citing KT v R [2008] NSWCCA 51; 182 A Crim R 571:-

“[49] The principles which govern the sentencing of youthful offenders are well known. They include the following:

1. considerations of general deterrence and principles of retribution are, in most cases, of less significance than they would be when sentencing an adult for the same offence;

2. in recognition of the capacity for young people to reform and mould their character to conform to society’s norms, considerable emphasis is placed on the need to provide an opportunity for rehabilitation;

3. the law recognises the potential for the cognitive, emotional and/or psychological immaturity of a young person to contribute to their breach of the law;

4. allowance will be made for an offender’s youth, and not just his or her biological age; and

5. where the immaturity of an offender is a significant factor in the commission of an offence, the criminality involved will be less than if the same offence was committed by an adult.”

218. In Miller v R [2015] NSWCCA 86, Schmidt J reiterated the well-recognised principle that the capacity for young people to reform and mould their character to conform to society’s norms is usually greater than that of an older offender. In the result, considerable emphasis is usually placed on the need to provide young offenders with the opportunity for rehabilitation. In that case, the appellant was 20 years old. Her Honour went on to say that it is also well settled that the law recognises the potential for the cognitive, emotional and/or psychological immaturity of a young person to contribute to their breach of the law. Notwithstanding that comment, her Honour said that the greater the objective gravity of an offence, the less likely it is that retribution and general deterrence will cede to the interests of rehabilitation.

219. In this case, in my opinion, the offender’s subjective case points to emotional immaturity and impulse control which likely contributed to his breach of the law. The psychiatric documents are replete with references to “risk of aggression and impulsive self-harm” and like expressions. The frenzied nature of the attack re-enforces my view. Amongst the likely causes are his compromised childhood, the significant mental health issues he has suffered which were largely treatment resistant (to which see below) and his youth, which in my view likely had an effect on his decision-making on the day of the offending. I accept for the purpose of this sentence that the offender’s immaturity contributed to his breach of the law and that more emphasis must be put on an opportunity for him to rehabilitate than would be the case with an older, more mature offender. Having said that, retribution, denunciation and deterrence, in the circumstances of this particular objectively serious domestic violence offending, cannot give way to the interests of rehabilitation.

Mental Health/Disadvantage

220. The Crown submitted that the Court would not find that the state of Mr Thompson’s mental health materially contributed to the commission of the offence, and that Mr Thompson’s moral culpability is not reduced on that account. He accepted that the offender’s difficult upbringing would be a matter taken into account by the Court.

221. Mr Carroll submitted that Mr Thompson’s exposure to familial physical abuse, instability and neglect from an early age would have compromised his capacity to mature and learn from experience. It was submitted that Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 (“Bugmy”) principles apply such that the weight to be given to specific and general deterrence would be moderated.

222. It is not in dispute that the offender was a witness to and the victim of domestic violence from a very early age. He escaped his violent, schizophrenic drug addicted father with his mentally ill mother and lived in a refuge at an early age. That the offender was the victim of domestic violence from such a young age, is a cruelly ironic feature of this case. Also at an early age, no doubt because of his vulnerability, he was the victim of at least one sexual assault or indecent assault from a person who he trusted, a teacher at school. Unsurprisingly, he had interrupted schooling and was placed in special classes for performance and behavioural issues. He turned to alcohol and drugs. He became homeless for an extended period. He developed significant mental health issues, which were (and remain) treatment resistant. He turned to crime and was incarcerated from an early age.

223. In my opinion, the offender’s mental health issues and background of deprivation and disadvantage are closely related, and I will therefore deal with them together. Whilst I accept that the offender used drugs from time to time, on all of the evidence, I am unable to say much about his illicit drug use, other than to say that Dr Eagle believed him to have a Severe Substance Use Disorder, which I accept. I also accept that he suffers from complex PTSD which incorporates those who experience symptoms of PTSD but also have more enduring changes in mental state that are associated with repeated severe trauma, usually from childhood. Complex PTSD requires the criteria for PTSD to be satisfied but includes additional disturbances of self-organisation, emotional dysregulation, interpersonal difficulties and negative self-concept. Functional impairment is a necessary feature of both diagnoses. I accept too that Mr Thompson has a Severe Personality Disorder characterised by both antisocial and borderline personality traits marked by emotional and interpersonal instability, impulsive self-destructive behaviour (including suicidal behaviour), inappropriate intense anger, paranoid ideation and severe dissociative symptoms. I accept that his presentation is complex, and I accept too his treating doctors’ opinions that when viewed longitudinally, he does not suffer from psychosis. Clearly, Mr Thompson is suffering from significant unresolved mental health issues.

224. As to the offender’s well-documented exposure to domestic violence, I note the comments of Fullerton J in Perkins v R [2018] NSWCCA 62 at [99]:-

“The insidious effects of exposure to family and domestic violence on children in their formative years, and the potential for that exposure to play out in unforeseen ways as a young child develops from adolescence into adulthood, are well researched and documented.”

225. To all of this must be added the sexual abuse suffered by the offender at a time when he was particularly vulnerable. I observe that the courts have long recognised that psychological and emotional damage to children from sexual abuse can be assumed: R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8 at [56]; R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56; 239 A Crim R 469 at [110]; R v MJB [2014] NSWCCA 195 at [49]; R v Erazo [2016] NSWCCA 139 at [44].

226. In Nasrallah v R (2021) 105 NSWLR 451; [2021] NSWCCA 207 at [99]-[102] Hamill J said:-

“[99] The impact of violence and sexual offences on victims is well understood and documented. In R v MJB, Adamson J observed “that the damage done to children who are victims of sexual assault by adults was well known and could be assumed”. The pervasive effects of child sexual abuse were again acknowledged in R v Gavel:

“[C]hild sex offences have profound and deleterious effects upon victims for many years, if not the whole of their lives: R v CMB [2014] NSWCCA 5 at [92]. Sexual abuse of children will inevitably give rise to psychological damage: SW v R [2013] NSWCCA 255 at [52]. In R v G [2008] UKHL 37; [2009] 1 AC 92, Baroness Hale of Richmond (at [49]) referred to the ‘long term and serious harm, both physical and psychological, which premature sexual activity can do’. The absolute prohibition on sexual activity with a child is intended to protect children from the physical and psychological harm taken to be caused by premature sexual activity: Clarkson v R [2011] VSCA 157; 32 VR 361 at 364 [3], 368–372 [26]–[39].”

[100] In Stanton v R, Beech-Jones J (Cavanagh and Harrison JJ agreeing) noted:

“The court is entitled to have regard to the well-known fact that the victims of child sexual assault very frequently suffer long-term, and serious, psychological consequences. Moreover, those consequences are not limited to the obviously, at face value, more serious offences.”

[101] The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (“RCIRCSA”) also contributed to the understanding of the impacts of child sexual abuse with the release of its final report and recommendations in 2017. The Commission’s conclusions, based on a body of academic research and the experiences of witnesses called in the course of the lengthy hearings and private sessions, analysed the adverse and multifaceted effects of child sexual abuse on “survivors”. The impacts on participants in the RCIRCSA were summarised as follows:

“After mental health, relationship difficulties were the impacts most frequently raised by survivors in private sessions, including difficulties with trust and intimacy, lack of confidence with parenting, and relationship problems. Education and economic impacts were also frequently raised.

For many people, these diverse impacts are interconnected in complex ways, making it difficult to isolate the specific impacts of child sexual abuse. These interconnected impacts can be experienced at the same time or consecutively, as a cascade of effects over a lifetime. For instance, we heard from many survivors that they developed addictions after using alcohol or other drugs to manage the psychological trauma of abuse, which in turn affected their physical and mental health, sometimes leading to criminal behaviour and relationship difficulties.”

[102] This Court has echoed RCIRCSA conclusions that “what was previously regarded as low level sexual abuse can have catastrophic effects on children” in several decisions: BT v R [2019] NSWCCA 147 at [11] and see, for example, O’Sullivan v R [2019] NSWCCA 261 at [14], R v Cattell (2019) 280 A Crim R 502; [2019] NSWCCA 297 at [111].” [emphasis added]

227. I do not doubt that the domestic violence, interrupted and disadvantaged schooling, sexual abuse and homelessness endured by the offender were substantial risk factors for the development of his mental health issues. It follows that they are linked. In my opinion, the offender’s significant and unresolved mental health issues are so intertwined with the elements of disadvantage set out above, that his mental health issues cannot be sensibly disentangled from the deprivation he suffered in his early life. It has all compromised his capacity to mature and learn from experience: Bugmy at [43].

228. In my view, as I have already stated, Mr Thompson’s mental health diagnoses did not cause him to offend. However, as has been elsewhere noted, the language of the common law and its interaction with concepts relating to mental health is often unhelpful. In Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226, Hamill J said at [114]:-

“…a sentencing Judge dealing with evidence of an offender’s mental condition or intellectual impairment ought not to approach the task in an unduly technical or restrictive way. The issue to be determined is not the same as deciding the issue of causation in a civil case. The issue is whether the fact of the disorder mitigates the punishment that ought to be visited upon the offender. In one respect, this involves an assessment of whether the moral culpability of an offender is reduced because their mental condition contributed directly or indirectly to the commission of the offence. In other respects, the impact of an offender’s mental condition is not conditional upon any link (causative or otherwise) between the condition and the offending. For example, the condition may mean that the offender is not an appropriate vehicle for a sentence containing a large component of general (or specific) deterrence. Further, incarceration may be more onerous as a result of an offender’s difficulties. Those matters do not require the judge to find any link or connection between the condition and the commission of the crimes.”

229. There, his Honour was referring to the language and concepts set out in the well-known passage of DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; (2010) 243 FLR 28; [2010] NSWCCA 194 at [177], where McClellan CJ at CL summarised the principles to be applied in sentencing an offender who was suffering from a mental condition at the time of committing the offence, to the following effect:-

1. It might reduce his moral culpability (and consequently the need to denounce the crime);

2. It might render him a less appropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed;

3. It might mean that a custodial sentence weighs more heavily upon him;

4. It might reduce the significance of specific deterrence; and

5. Conversely, it may mean that because of a person’s mental illness, they may present more of a danger to the community and there may be a need to give greater consideration to the protection of the public, and to specific deterrence.

230. In this particular case, as will be seen, in my opinion the offender’s mental health issues in combination with other factors reduces his moral culpability, and it makes his custody more onerous.

231. In my opinion there is a clear association between the offender’s mental health issues, his childhood exposure to domestic and family violence, his early exposure to alcohol and other drugs, his difficult schooling and his episodic homelessness, that whilst perhaps may not amount to causation comes very close. In my view, there is at least an indirect material contribution between the offender’s mental health and background of deprivation and the offending.

232. In my opinion, in all of the offender’s circumstances, and because of the combination of the disadvantages he has suffered, he had limited emotional resources and he was unable to make choices in the same way as an average person at the time of the offending.

233. I must determine whether the disadvantage and adversity suffered by Mr Thompson reduces his moral culpability. In my opinion, there is more than ample indicia, which I do not arrange in any hierarchy. In this case there is evidence to establish the offender’s background of significant deprivation, and I give it full weight in this sentencing exercise: Bugmy at [44]; see also Hoskins v R [2021] NSWCCA 169 per Brereton JA at [57].

234. I note the oft cited quote of Simpson J, as her Honour then was, in R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2 at [69]:-

“I am not prepared to accept that an offender who has the start in life that the respondent had bears equal moral responsibility with one who has had what might be termed a "normal" or "advantaged" upbringing. Common sense and common humanity dictate that such a person will have fewer emotional resources to guide his (or her) behavioural decisions.”

235. This is such a case. In my opinion, taking into account the limited emotional resources of the offender, and the trauma he has experienced, his moral culpability is reduced. It is important that the victims understand that this finding does not extinguish Mr Thompson’s moral culpability for the murder of the deceased. He bears responsibility for the commission of that offence. My finding is that his moral culpability is diminished, which I will take into account as a matter to synthesise on sentence.

General Deterrence and Denunciation

236. As Mr Thompson’s crime involved the unlawful taking of a life, the sentence imposed must reflect the community’s denunciation of his actions. The criminal law gives significant weight to general deterrence, denunciation and community protection when sentencing an offender who takes the life of a partner (or former partner) as it does with domestic violence generally: Quinn v R [2018] NSWCCA 297 per Hoeben CJ at CL. Further, the weight given to general deterrence in a case concerning domestic violence is substantial, notwithstanding an offender’s mental health issues: Glynn Kaderavek v R [2028] NSWCCA 92 at [12] per Hamill J.

237. In my opinion, in the circumstances of this case, general deterrence has a significant role to play.

Prospects of Rehabilitation and Personal Deterrence

238. The offender’s prospects of rehabilitation are largely unexplored on the evidence. That a resolution of his mental health diagnosis appears to have been achieved whilst in custody gives some, perhaps feint promise that he will be appropriately treated in the future so that he can begin on the long road to rehabilitation. His previous domestic violence offending in combination with his Severe Personality Disorder diagnosis is such that personal deterrence has a role to play in this sentencing exercise.

Hardship in custody

239. Mr Carroll submitted that the offender has been subject to extremely onerous jail conditions as a consequence of his mental health diagnosis and protection issues, and he submitted that I could infer that the offender’s behavioural issues were inextricably linked to his mental health issues and situational distress.

240. The offender has been held between the Mental Health Screening Unit and the High Risk Management Unit. Mr Carroll submitted that he has effectively been segregated for the totality of his remand and has had no contact with other inmates, limited time outside his cell and periods of limited or no contact with his family. He is required to be handcuffed whenever he is moved within the jail and all his movements are co-ordinated with Corrective Services Immediate Action Team. Mr Carroll submitted that it can be easily inferred that the circumstances of his incarceration are causing a significant decline in his mental health.

241. The Crown submitted that to the extent the offender’s hardship in custody is related to his behavioural issues, it would not be open to make a finding that the offender’s behaviours whilst in custody (which led to his classification as a high-risk prisoner such that he had to be transferred out of Long Bay Correctional Centre) were a direct consequence of any mental health impairment. He observed that the offender has been in segregation because he has made threats against Corrective Services staff. I note that Justice Health documents indicate, the offender’s diagnosis aside, that the offender has experienced periods of severe emotional dysregulation that have been said to have been caused by his personality structure and possible neurodiversity.

242. I do not doubt that the offender has had to be in a high security environment because of his dangerousness. He has been violent and threatening from time to time. However, it is no doubt also true that the offender has significant mental health issues that have not responded to treatment, and which have caused him to be aggressive and suicidal. Whatever be his ultimate diagnosis, his mental health has been unstable throughout his period in custody, which has made his custody more onerous than that of the average inmate.

243. Whilst I accept that the custodial environment will be more onerous for Mr Thompson for this reason alone, I observe that the extent of the effect is difficult to determine with any precision, and it is but one matter to take into account when instinctively synthesising his sentence.

Commencement Date/Totality/Accumulation

244. The balance of Mr Thompson’s parole (which he breached by this offending) concluded on 23 July 2022. Whilst in custody for this matter, he was sentenced for intimidate and assault law officer from 5 April 2023 to 4 October 2025 (non-parole period expiring 4 December 2024) and for assault law officer and damage property from 5 June 2024 to 4 March 2025 (non-parole period expiring 4 December 2024), the latter being entirely concurrent with the former. Mr Queenan submitted that the offender has thus been in custody on the present matter alone for two periods: 23 July 2022 to 5 April 2023 (8 months and 14 days) and 4 December 2024 to 2 May 2025 (4 months and 30 days), a total of 13 months and 13 days. He submitted that the sentence should therefore commence from 21 March 2024. He candidly observed that as the offender had served some period for the balance of parole and notwithstanding his interim sentences (which related to his behaviour in custody when he was very unwell), I have the discretion to backdate to take into account any period the Court considers appropriate: Callaghan v R [2006] NSWCCA 58; R v DW [2012] NSWCCA 66; Ith v R [2013] NSWCCA 280.

245. Mr Carroll observed that the offender has been bail refused since 25 March 2022, the date of the offending. He has been subject to several jail sentences in the Local Court since that date for separate offences. He submitted that it is open to the court to commence any sentence from 25 March 2022 or very shortly thereafter. He submitted that the criminality of the murder, and the necessary lengthy sentence to be imposed, would completely subsume the relatively minor criminality for which he served sentences during the period on remand. He submitted that a sentence date commencing on 25 March 2022 or shortly after would satisfy totality, allow the Court flexibility with respect to any finding of special circumstances and avoid a crushing sentence.

246. Taking into account all matters, and in recognition of the offender’s parole, his two sentences imposed for offending whilst in custody, and totality issues, I propose to commence Mr Thompson’s sentence on 23 September 2022.

Section 166 Certificate offending

247. As indicated earlier, I have been asked to deal with a related offence on a s 166 certificate, being knowingly contravene a prohibition/restriction in an ADVO. The maximum penalty for that offence is 2 years. The facts for this offending are the facts leading up to the murder. The offending is objectively very serious, particularly as it occurred in the context of escalating domestic violence offending over four years.

248. As the murder entirely comprehends the breach of the ADVO, and bearing in mind the principle of totality, I find that a penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate. I propose to convict the offender and impose no further penalty pursuant to s 10A of the Sentencing Act.

Life sentence

249. The Crown did not submit that a life sentence is called for in the circumstances of this case. Taking into account the circumstances of the offence and the offender, I am not satisfied pursuant to s 61(1) of the Sentencing Act that the offender’s culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of a life sentence.

Special circumstances

250. The Crown accepts that sentencing courts have a wide discretion when finding special circumstances, but his primary submission was that Mr Thompson does not require an extended period of supervision on parole, bearing in mind that in light of the gravity of the offence for which the offender is to be sentenced, applying the statutory ratio would provide adequate time for supervision.

251. Mr Carroll submitted that the offender’s subjective circumstances warrant a finding of special circumstances.

252. The offence carries a standard non-parole period of 20 years imprisonment. I observe that this is neither a starting point nor an end point for arriving at an appropriate and proportionate sentence. Rather, I have had regard to all relevant factors including the legislative guideposts of the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period.

253. Given the terms of s 54B(3) of the Sentencing Act, I indicate that my reasons for deviating from the standard non-parole period are the special circumstances that I find, that is the reduction in the offender’s moral culpability, the onerous nature of his custody, his youth, the offender’s significant psychiatric needs and the need for extended supervision with respect to the management of his likely accommodation and mental health requirements over his lifetime. I have deviated to a ratio of 68.6% because of special circumstances.

254. To the extent that it may be observed that I should avoid overweighing or double counting when dealing with special circumstances, factors may be – and in this case are – relevant to both the total sentence and the length of the non-parole period. In Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525; [1990] HCA 18 at 531, Mason CJ and McHugh J said:-

“Once this is accepted, it follows that the considerations which the sentencing judge must take into account when fixing a minimum term will be the same as those applicable to the setting of the head sentence. Obviously, the weight to be attached to these factors and the way in which they are relevant will differ due to the different purposes behind each function.”

255. I find special circumstances for the reasons stated.

Comparable cases

256. I have considered the bundle of broadly comparable cases provided to me by Mr Queenan and the statistics provided to me by Mr Carroll. As always, the different objective and subjective factors in those cases make any true comparison difficult. I make similar comments about the statistics.

Threshold

257. Having considered all the possible alternatives, I am satisfied that the s 5 threshold of the Sentencing Act has been crossed. Due to the seriousness of the offending, I find that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate. No submissions were put otherwise.

Sentence

258. I have taken into account the various purposes of sentencing under s 3A of the Sentencing Act. They include ensuring the offender is punished for his conduct, deterring crime, protecting the community, promoting an offender’s rehabilitation, making an offender accountable for his actions, denouncing an offender’s conduct and recognising the harm done to victims of an offence in the community. As always, the facts and circumstances of the present offence and this offender highlight how the various purposes of sentencing pull in competing directions – especially given in my opinion Mr Thompson’s urgent need for psychiatric review to deal with his significant mental health issues (however described) and his background of deprivation so as to achieve rehabilitation.

259. As the High Court said of s 3A in Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 at [20]:-

“The purposes there stated (in s3A) are the familiar, overlapping and, at times, conflicting, purposes of criminal punishment under the common law (Veen v The Queen (No 2) at [476–477]). There is no attempt to rank them in order of priority and nothing in the Sentencing Act to indicate that the court is to depart from the principles explained in Veen v The Queen (No 2) [at 476] in applying them.”

260. The instinctive process of sentencing requires consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances as they are known to the Court, including the facts surrounding the commission of the offence, matters affecting relative seriousness, the offender’s subjective circumstances and other aspects which bear upon the question of sentence, including the guideposts of the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period and the factors referred to in s 21A of the Sentencing Act. The sentencing Court is required to identify the factors relevant to the sentencing discretion and then to make a value judgment as to the appropriate sentence in all the circumstances: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25.

261. As I have said, in determining an appropriate sentence I have kept in mind the legislative guideposts of the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and the statutory non-parole period of 20 years.

262. I intend to proceed to sentence the offender by way of a term of full-time imprisonment. Taking all matters into account, as I am satisfied that no alternative other than a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate, the next step is to determine the appropriate sentence in the quantitative sense. Having considered all of the matters I have referred to in this sentence judgment, I impose a sentence of imprisonment of 22 years and 6 months after a discount of 10% for the early plea of guilty. Without the discount, the sentence would have been 25 years. I impose a non-parole period of 15 years and 6 months.

Orders

263. Mr Thompson, please stand.

1. I convict you of the offence of murder contrary to s 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act and impose a sentence of imprisonment of 22 years and 6 months. Without the discount of 10% for your plea of guilty, your sentence would have been 25 years. I impose a non-parole period of 15 years and 6 months.

2. Pursuant to s 10A of the Sentencing Act, I convict you of the offence of contravening a prohibition or restriction in an ADVO contrary to s 14(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) and impose no further penalty.

3. I have backdated your sentence for murder to commence on 23 September 2022. Your head sentence will expire on 22 March 2045. You will be eligible for release to parole on 22 March 2038.

4. Pursuant to s 25C(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), you are advised of the existence of that Act and of its application to the offence of murder for which you have been convicted. Your legal representatives are directed to advise you of the implications of that matter to you.

5. Pursuant to s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), the publication of the name, or any information leading to the identity of, the deceased’s child, OE, and the child, AB, is prohibited.

6. Mr Thompson, do you understand the orders I have made?

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