R v Teichmann

Case [2016] QCA 347

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Teichmann [2016] QCA 347

PARTIES:

R
v
TEICHMANN, Jamie Rex
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 227 of 2015
SC No 302 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Queensland – Date of Conviction: 9 September 2015

DELIVERED ON:

23 December 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

6 October 2016

JUDGES:

Margaret McMurdo P and Douglas and Boddice JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, Douglas and Boddice JJ concurring as to the order made, Margaret McMurdo P dissenting

ORDER:

The appeal against conviction is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – where the appellant was convicted of murder – where the Crown case was that the appellant deliberately discharged a loaded shotgun at the head of the deceased at short range with the intention to kill the deceased or do him grievous bodily harm – where the defence case was that the jury could not exclude beyond reasonable doubt a hypothesis consistent with innocence, namely, that the shotgun discharged in the course of a struggle between the appellant and the deceased after the deceased produced the shotgun and threatened the appellant’s life – where the appellant submits the case against him for murder was purely circumstantial as there was no direct evidence he shot the deceased or, if he did so, he did so intentionally, and no direct evidence of an intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm or of any motive for the appellant to kill the deceased – where the appellant submits a consideration of all the evidence was consistent with an accidental killing or killing in self-defence – where the respondent submits the jury were presented with two competing hypotheses, and that there was ample evidence to support the Crown’s hypothesis and to exclude the appellant’s hypothesis beyond reasonable doubt – whether the verdict is unreasonable or insupportable having regard to all the evidence

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – OTHER MATTERS – where the trial Judge directed the jury that certain statements by the appellant, if they were satisfied those statements were false, could be used as evidence of consciousness of guilt of manslaughter – where the appellant submits these directions led to a miscarriage of justice because the directions given to the jury as to the use that might be made of such evidence were inadequate – where the appellant submits his lies could not be established without proof of his guilt and the directions were therefore unnecessary and carried with them the risk of a wholly circular argument as to the appellant’s guilt – where the appellant submits the jury ought to have been directed they would need to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had so lied before using such evidence as consciousness of guilt – where…

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R v Teichmann [2016] QCA 347
Case
[2016] QCA 347
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Teichmann involved an appeal against the appellant's conviction for murder by the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appellant was convicted for deliberately discharging a loaded shotgun at the deceased's head with the intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm. The defence argued that the jury could not exclude beyond reasonable doubt the possibility that the shooting occurred during a struggle between the appellant and the deceased after the deceased threatened the appellant's life with the shotgun. The appellant contended that the case against him was purely circumstantial and that there was no direct evidence he shot the deceased intentionally, nor evidence of any motive.

The court had to determine whether the verdict was unreasonable or insupportable given all the evidence and whether there was a miscarriage of justice due to the trial judge's direction on the appellant's alleged lies being used as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The appellant argued that these directions were inadequate and risked a circular argument regarding his guilt. The respondent maintained that the directions were in accordance with the benchbook and did not involve circular reasoning. The court had to consider whether the alleged lies were capable of amounting to evidence of consciousness of guilt and whether the jury was properly directed on the use of such evidence.

The court concluded that the trial judge's directions to the jury did not result in a miscarriage of justice and did not give rise to a significant risk of wrongful conviction. The directions concerning the appellant's alleged lies were in accordance with the benchbook and did not involve circular reasoning. The jury was properly directed on the use of such evidence as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The verdict of the jury was not unreasonable and was supported by the evidence. The appeal against conviction was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal against conviction is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

At issue is whether the verdict of the jury was unreasonable and whether a miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the jury being directed that statements of the appellant were capable of amounting to evidence of consciousness of guilt and the jury not being properly directed as to the use that could be made of those statements.Background The appellant was born on 23 January 1975. At the time of the offence he was living in a converted railway carriage on a property at Buaraba in the State of Queensland (“the property”). The deceased also lived on that property. The deceased was found dead on the property on the morning of 16 December 2010. He was aged 35, having been born on 4 April 1975. The deceased had extensive injuries consistent with the discharge of a firearm. His body was located in the doorway of the converted railway carriage. Police had attended the property on the evening of 15 December 2010 as a consequence of information from the police communications unit Ipswich of a reported possible suicide at the property. A perimeter check did not reveal any relevant matters. Police did not enter the property on that evening.Trial The Crown case was that the appellant deliberately discharged a loaded shotgun at the head of the deceased at short range with the intention to kill the deceased or do him grievous bodily harm. The Crown called 29 witnesses at trial. The defence case was that the jury could not exclude beyond reasonable doubt a hypothesis consistent with innocence, namely, that the shotgun discharged in the course of a struggle between the appellant and the deceased after the deceased produced the shotgun and threatened the appellant’s life. The trial Judge directed the jury on the need for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that engaging the trigger was a willed act on the part of the appellant and, further, that self-defence did not apply in the circumstances. The trial Judge also directed the jury that certain statements by the appellant, if they were satisfied those statements were false, could be used as evidence of consciousness of guilt of manslaughter. The jury were directed none of those statements could be used as evidence to prove the mental element of murder.EvidenceEvents prior to death William Mackay met the deceased and his family in 1987. Mackay was renting a unit out the back of a house purchased by the deceased’s parents. In 2006, Mackay and the deceased spent time in custody together for drug offences. On his release, Mackay lived on the property. The deceased lived with his parents. Mackay said the deceased suffered from mood swings. He would have good and bad days. Mackay lived in the converted railway carriage on the property from 2006. It contained one bedroom. If others stayed they slept on a mattress on the floor of the combined lounge kitchen. The deceased came to live on the property in about January 2010. The deceased just turned up at the property one day. Mackay had no notice. Mackay was not happy. The deceased was drunk and off his head on drugs. The deceased was very upset and angry about not being able to see his children. The deceased slept on the mattress when he came to the property. For a short period, another person called Paul Lee also lived on the property.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The trial Judge directed the jury on the need for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that engaging the trigger was a willed act on the part of the appellant and, further, that self-defence did not apply in the circumstances. The trial Judge also directed the jury that certain statements by the appellant, if they were satisfied those statements were false, could be used as evidence of consciousness of guilt of manslaughter. The jury were directed none of those statements could be used as evidence to prove the mental element of murder.EvidenceEvents prior to death William Mackay met the deceased and his family in 1987. Mackay was renting a unit out the back of a house purchased by the deceased’s parents. In 2006, Mackay and the deceased spent time in custody together for drug offences. On his release, Mackay lived on the property. The deceased lived with his parents. Mackay said the deceased suffered from mood swings. He would have good and bad days. Mackay lived in the converted railway carriage on the property from 2006. It contained one bedroom. If others stayed they slept on a mattress on the floor of the combined lounge kitchen. The deceased came to live on the property in about January 2010. The deceased just turned up at the property one day. Mackay had no notice. Mackay was not happy. The deceased was drunk and off his head on drugs. The deceased was very upset and angry about not being able to see his children. The deceased slept on the mattress when he came to the property. For a short period, another person called Paul Lee also lived on the property. Mackay said as soon as the deceased came to the property in January 2010 he started abusing him, calling him names. Mackay thought the deceased hated him and had turned against him. At one point the deceased appeared from a shed behind the carriage carrying a tomahawk. The deceased put the tomahawk down on the table outside the carriage where Mackay was sitting in a chair. The deceased said he ought to smash Mackay with the tomahawk. The deceased was holding the tomahawk up near his head across his body. Mackay felt very scared and threatened and had no idea why the deceased was doing it. Mackay had not had any argument with him. Mackay said he jumped up and left the table and later saw the deceased walk back around the shed. He heard a chainsaw start up and saw the deceased in the shed cutting the tyres of the ride-on mower. Mackay asked the deceased what was wrong with him. The deceased said “I hate the lot of you, my parents and you”. The deceased then hopped into a utility and drove away. Mackay found broken items in the shed, including broken glass bottles. Mackay said later that night, the deceased returned to the property. He was continuing to be abusive towards Mackay. He was obviously drunk. Mackay left the property. He was in fear of his life. Mackay rang the deceased’s mother the next day and told her what had happened. The deceased’s sister arrived at the property and took Mackay and his dogs back to the deceased’s parents’ house. Mackay stayed there for two weeks. Mackay did not want to go back to the property whilst the deceased was still there.

Decision

Reasons for decision

This conclusion accords the special respect and legitimacy to be afforded to the jury’s verdict. The primacy of that verdict was reiterated in R v Baden Clay:[48]“65.It is fundamental to our system of criminal justice in relation to allegations of serious crime tried by jury that the jury is ‘the constitutional tribunal for deciding issues of fact’. Given the central place of the jury in the administration of criminal justice over the centuries, and the abiding importance of the role of the jury as representative of the community in that respect, the setting aside of a jury’s verdict on the ground that it is ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of s 668E(1) of the Criminal Code is a serious step, not to be taken without particular regard to the advantage enjoyed by the jury over a court of appeal which has not seen or heard the witnesses called at trial. Further, the boundaries of reasonableness within which the jury’s function is to be performed should not be narrowed in a hard and fast way by the considerations expressed in the passages from the reasons of the Court of Appeal explaining its disposition of the appeal.66.With those considerations in mind, a court of criminal appeal is not to substitute trial by an appeal court for trial by jury. Where there is an appeal against conviction on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable, the ultimate question for the appeal court ‘must always be whether the [appeal] court thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.”[48](2016) 334 ALR 234 at 246 [65] – [66].Conclusions There was no miscarriage of justice in the trial Judge’s direction to the jury in relation to the appellant’s alleged lies, evidence of consciousness of guilt and the use to be made of such evidence. There is no basis to conclude those directions gave rise to a significant risk an innocent person has been wrongly convicted of the offence. The verdict of the jury was not unreasonable. A consideration of the evidence amply supports a conclusion that it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of all of the elements necessary to establish guilt of the offence of murder. I would order that the appeal be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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