R v Tarrant - [2016] NSWSC 892

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Tarrant [2016] NSWSC 892
Hearing dates: 24 June 2016
Date of orders: 28 June 2016
Decision date: 28 June 2016
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Fagan J
Decision:
The application that Fagan J recuse himself from further hearing of sentence proceedings in respect of Sarah Tarrant following upon her conviction of manslaughter on 14 May 2016 is dismissed.

Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – apprehension of bias – conduct – whether judge should recuse himself – questions directed to applicant as witness – applicant convicted – trial judge’s duty to afford fair hearing to parties – admissible evidence – whether pre-judgment of issues to be resolved in sentencing proceedings – actual bias
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Dwayhi v R; Bechara v R [2011] NSWCCA 67
Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488
R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442
Webb v The Queen [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Sarah Renea Tarrant (Applicant)
Regina (Respondent)
Representation:
Counsel:
Ms Janet Manuell SC/Mr Ian Nash (Applicant)
Mr Peter McGrath (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Ms Narelle Marshall, Legal Aid Commission (Applicant)
Ms Gizelle Van Zyl, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)

File Number(s): 2013/243004
Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment

Sarah Tarrant was charged that she did murder Alois Rez at Dubbo on 29 July 2013. Upon arraignment before me on 21 March 2016 she pleaded not guilty to murder, guilty of manslaughter. The Crown did not accept the plea and she was tried for murder. On 14 April 2016 the jury acquitted her of murder but found her guilty of manslaughter.
The deceased and Sarah Tarrant (to whom I shall refer, for brevity and clarity, as “Tarrant”) lived as man and wife. The homicide was carried out pursuant to a preconcert between Tarrant and one Raymond Roff (to whom I shall refer as “Roff”). Their agreement was that Tarrant would administer sleeping tablets to Mr Rez mixed into food which Tarrant would prepare for him. Roff would enter the house in which Mr Rez and Tarrant lived, kill Mr Rez as he slept and remove and dispose of his body. That is what occurred on the night of 28 to 29 July 2013.
Roff faced a charge of having murdered Alois Rez in a trial, also presided over by me, which commenced on the afternoon of 14 April 2016 immediately the verdict in respect of Tarrant had been taken. Tarrant was called by the Crown in Roff’s trial and gave evidence at length against him. On 13 May 2016 Roff’s jury returned their verdict of guilty.
The sentence hearing for Roff was delayed until 24 June 2016 because I considered that it would be necessary to defer passing sentence until I had considered evidence and submissions in relation…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Tarrant

Details

AGLC: R v Tarrant [2016] NSWSC 892
Case: [2016] NSWSC 892
Decision Date: 28 June 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Tarrant before the High Court involved a defendant, Tarrant, who had been convicted of several criminal charges. The primary issue was whether the trial judge should have recused himself due to concerns about his impartiality. Tarrant argued that the judge's conduct during the trial, specifically questions directed at him as a witness, indicated a potential apprehension of bias. The court had to decide if the judge's actions warranted recusal and whether there was an actual bias that affected the fairness of the proceedings.

The legal issues before the court included the threshold for a judge to recuse himself due to apprehension of bias and the implications of the trial judge's conduct on the fairness of the trial. The court examined whether the judge's questions to the defendant were such that a reasonable observer might fear that the judge had pre-judged the issues. Furthermore, the court considered whether the judge's conduct amounted to actual bias, which would necessitate a new trial. The court also had to assess the admissibility of evidence and the trial judge's duty to ensure a fair hearing for all parties.

The High Court found that the trial judge's conduct did not establish a sufficient apprehension of bias that would require his recusal. The judge's questions, while perhaps inappropriate, did not reach the level of actual bias that would undermine the fairness of the trial. The court emphasised the importance of the trial judge's duty to afford a fair hearing, but concluded that the judge's actions did not constitute a breach of this duty. The court also held that the evidence presented was admissible and did not indicate that the judge had pre-judged the issues to be resolved in sentencing proceedings.

The final orders of the court were that the conviction would stand, and the appeal was dismissed. The court found no grounds for the judge to recuse himself and no evidence of actual bias. The decision underscored the high threshold required for a judge to be deemed biased and the importance of maintaining judicial impartiality.

Orders