R v Svensson; ex parte

Case [2002] QCA 472


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Svensson; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2002] QCA 472

PARTIES:

R
v

SVENSSON, Kenneth Roy
(respondent)
EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF
QUEENSLAND
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 221 of 2002
DC No 920 of 2002
DC No 921 of 2002

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Sentence appeal by A-G (Qld)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED EXTEMPORE ON:

5 November 2002

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

5 November 2002

JUDGES:

de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P, and Davies JA
Separate reasons for judgment of the members of the court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1. Allow the appeal and vary the sentences imposed in the District Court as follows:

(a) on the first indictment in respect of counts one and two, order that the imprisonment be suspended after 12 months for three years;

(b) on the first indictment, in respect of counts three and four, order that the imprisonment be suspended after 12 months for four years;

(c)   on the second indictment, order that the imprisonment of three years be suspended after 12 months for three years.

2.  Order that a warrant issue for the arrest of the respondent to lie in the Registry until 4 pm, 12 November 2002, pending any necessary execution

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – APPEAL BY ATTORNEY-GENERAL OR OTHER CROWN LAW OFFICER – APPLICATIONS TO INCREASE SENTENCE – OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON – where the Attorney-General appeals against sentences imposed on the respondent, who, when in his 40’s and 50’s, sexually abused boys aged 15, 16 and 17 and a half years – where sentence submitted by the Prosecutor was for 2 ½ to 3 ½ years but where trial Judge wholly suspended the sentence because of the accused’s health problems

CRIMINAL LAW – JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT – SENTENCE – FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT – PURPOSE OF SENTENCE – RELEVANT PRINCIPLES – where, given the nature of the offending, the respondent’s physical condition should not exclude actual imprisonment – where a sex offender substantially removed in age from his young victim cannot escape condign punishment by suggesting the victim was at or close to an “age of consent”

R v Gilles [2002] 1 Qd R 404, considered
R v Irlam; ex parte A-G (Qld)
[2002] QCA 235, CA No 157 of 2002, CA No 173 of 2002, 28 June 2002, followed

COUNSEL:

T Martin SC for the respondent
M J Copley for the appellant

SOLICITORS:

Gilshenan & Luton for the respondent
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the appellant

THE CHIEF JUSTICE:  The Honourable the Attorney-General appeals against sentences imposed on the respondent, who, when in his 40s and 50s, sexually abused boys aged respectively 15 years, 16 years and 17 and a half years.

It is that substantial age discrepancy which I believe assumes considerable significance in this case.  The 15 year old left school to accept employment in the respondent's…

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Details
AGLC
R v Svensson; ex parte [2002] QCA 472
Case
[2002] QCA 472
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Attorney-General appealed against the sentences imposed on the respondent, who was convicted of sexually abusing boys aged between 15 and 17 and a half years when he was in his 40’s and 50’s. The trial judge had wholly suspended the sentence on account of the accused’s health problems, despite the prosecutor submitting a sentence of 2 ½ to 3 ½ years. The appeal was brought by the Attorney-General, who argued that the respondent’s health issues should not exclude him from actual imprisonment, given the nature of the offending. The appeal raised the issue of whether the trial judge was correct in wholly suspending the sentence, and whether the respondent’s health issues should have been taken into account when determining the sentence.
The court found that the trial judge had erred in wholly suspending the sentence. The court held that the respondent’s physical condition should not exclude actual imprisonment, given the nature of the offending. The court also found that the respondent’s suggestion that the victims were at or close to an “age of consent” did not absolve him of condign punishment. The court held that a sex offender substantially removed in age from his young victim cannot escape condign punishment by suggesting the victim was at or close to an “age of consent”. The court allowed the appeal and varied the sentences imposed by the District Court. The sentences were varied so that the imprisonment would be suspended after 12 months for three years in respect of the first indictment in respect of counts one and two, and four years in respect of counts three and four. The imprisonment of three years on the second indictment was also suspended after 12 months for three years. The court also ordered that a warrant issue for the arrest of the respondent to lie in the Registry until 4 pm, 12 November 2002, pending any necessary execution.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Allow the appeal and vary the sentences imposed in the District Court as follows:

(a) on the first indictment in respect of counts one and two, order that the imprisonment be suspended after 12 months for three years;

(b) on the first indictment, in respect of counts three and four, order that the imprisonment be suspended after 12 months for four years;

(c) on the second indictment, order that the imprisonment of three years be suspended after 12 months for three years.

2. Order that a warrant issue for the arrest of the respondent to lie in the Registry until 4 pm, 12 November 2002, pending any necessary execution

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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