R v Sturgess

Case [2025] QCA 150

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Sturgess [2025] QCA 150

PARTIES:

R
v
STURGESS, Shaun Robert
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 58 of 2024
SC No 988 of 2023

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 29 February 2024 (Sullivan J)

DELIVERED ON:

19 August 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

23 April 2025

JUDGES:

Flanagan and Brown JJA and Ryan J

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – IMPROPER ADMISSION OR REJECTION OF EVIDENCE – where the appellant was convicted of murder – where the issue at trial was whether the appellant had the requisite intent for murder (a “murderous intent”) – where the appellant struck the deceased in the back of her head with a sledgehammer – where evidence of the appellant’s prior violence towards the deceased was led at trial – whether admitting the evidence of prior violence occasioned a miscarriage of justice

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – where the appellant was convicted of murder – where the issue at trial was whether the appellant had the requisite intent for murder (a “murderous intent”) – where the appellant struck the deceased in the back of her head with a sledgehammer – where evidence of the appellant’s prior violence towards the deceased was led at trial – where the prosecutor impermissibly invited the jury to use the evidence of prior violence in proof of the appellant’s murderous intent – where the trial judge directed the jury that the evidence of prior violence could not be used in proof of the appellant’s murderous intent – where the trial judge did not direct the jury as to how they might legitimately use the evidence of prior violence – where the appellant contended that the trial judge erred by not directly addressing the Crown Prosecutor’s impermissible submissions to the jury – whether the trial judge’s directions were inadequate to mitigate against the risk of misuse of the evidence and amounted to a wrong decision on a question of law

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – where the appellant was convicted of murder – where the issue at trial was whether the appellant had the requisite intent for the offence of murder (a “murderous intent”) – where the daughter of the deceased and the appellant told police that she heard the appellant threatening the deceased previously – where this evidence was elicited in her section 93A evidence in chief – where, under cross-examination, she volunteered that she did not hear the threat herself but her mother told her about – where the trial judge discussed with counsel a proposed section 93C Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) direction – where both counsel asked the trial judge not to use the daughter’s evidence as an example to which the section…

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AGLC
R v Sturgess [2025] QCA 150
Case
[2025] QCA 150
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal against the conviction and sentence of Sturgess for murder was dismissed by the court. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge's handling of evidence and directions to the jury was sufficient to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The appellant argued that the admission of evidence regarding prior acts of domestic violence led to an unfair bias against him and that the trial judge's directions to the jury did not adequately mitigate against this risk. Additionally, the appellant claimed that the trial judge's failure to directly address the prosecutor's improper submissions to the jury and to clearly outline how the jury could legitimately use evidence of prior violence amounted to a misdirection.

The court found that the trial judge's directions, while not perfect, were sufficient to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The court acknowledged that the prosecutor had improperly invited the jury to use the evidence of prior violence as proof of the appellant’s intent, but determined that the trial judge's overall directions to the jury were adequate to ensure they understood the limited purpose of this evidence. The court also found that the trial judge's failure to directly address the prosecutor's submissions did not constitute a significant error, as the jury was still clearly directed on the proper use of the evidence.

The court concluded that the appellant's conviction was safe and that the trial did not result in a miscarriage of justice. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

His submissions were to the following effect (my emphasis):(a)If you [the jury] accept what he said to police, “in its unadulterated form”, that he did not intend to kill her, you would find him not guilty. If you’re not quite persuaded by him, but you’re left in some state of reasonable doubt that in fact he might be telling the truth, you’ve got to give him the benefit of that doubt. Or worse, if you reject him, then the prosecution must persuade you that when he struck her, he had the specific intent to kill her or to do her an injury which the law defines as grievous bodily harm – not intend to hit her, not intend to hurt her, not intending to grievously or seriously injure her but intending the specific intent as defined by the Code.(b)People when they do these things might have no intent at all. There might be nothing more in their mind than some expletive (“You …” insert the expletive); or nothing in their head at all.(c)The grievous bodily harm in this case is almost indistinguishable from death, because if you are aiming a sledgehammer at the head, the line between acting with an intention to do grievous bodily harm (that is, intending permanent brain damage, or an injury that was likely to endanger her life) and acting with an intention to kill is so artificial as to be non-existent. He must have had a specific intention to do death/grievous bodily harm when he swung – not just a mindless, angry swing.(d)You’ll find his interview raw and honest and believable and credible.(e)The evidence of the acts of previous domestic violence are relevant as background but they do not really inform you greatly about intent.[25]“… You’ve heard acts of domestic violence referred to in this case. My submission to you, you’re allowed to hear all of that now. That’s all relevant as background, but it doesn’t inform you greatly about intent. What happened in 2017 – and it does sound like a very volatile incident, my learned friend says, “It was over a piece of broccoli”. It’s not over a piece of broccoli. Listen to his interview. His daughter was suicidal. There was a hole in the wall. His daughter gave evidence there was a hole in the wall. She doesn’t remember or said she didn’t remember what that was about. But the incident arose in those circumstances. He quite frankly tells police about what he did – grabbed a handful of her hair, took her to the ground. He admits all of that openly …And he, so affected by that episode of violence which seems like an isolated one – that’s what [D1] says – there was no other physical violence, it was all verbal. But so affected by that, he goes down to the shed and hangs himself, and wishes he died, even when interviewed by the police in 2020, wishes he had, because then of (sic) this would have happened. You do put aside feelings of sympathy. I think the prosecutor said you shouldn’t have any sympathy. Well, you’d be inhuman not to. We are humans. We have sympathy. We care. This is tragic. Two children have lost their mother and effectively, their father. But… what you do have to do is put that to one side objectively and dispassionately determine whether you’re satisfied beyond reasonable doubt this man had that intent.”(f)He corrected the prosecutor’s argument at [61] above that the jury had to decide whether the appellant acted with a relevant intention or not, by contending (accurately) that if the jury could not decide between those two options, then they would not be at the point at which they could convict the appellant of murder.(g)He invited the jury to accept the appellant’s statements during his “raw and emotional” interview with police, in which he denied an intention to kill. He argued that the prosecutor was cherry-picking from the interview and misleading the jury by taking statements out of context. He argued that the appellant was at a loss to explain what thought processes were going on at the relevant time.[26] He had no intention to kill his wife. He was not mentally there.[27][25]AB 48/42 – AB 49/19.[26]AB 54.[27]AB 55.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The defence response to the prosecution opening was to emphasise that the only issue for the jury was whether the appellant had the intention, required by law, for murder, when he struck his wife.Trial evidence The appellant had not been working in the year leading up to the killing. He had previously worked “fly-in; fly-out” on a mine site. Although the evidence about it was not precise, it seems that he had been in residential rehabilitation for drug and alcohol issues on three occasions in the 12 months before he killed the deceased and had previously been in inpatient mental health treatment for mental illness. Before turning up to the house on 28 April 2020, the deceased told a friend [F1] that she had seen a solicitor that day and that she and the appellant had disagreed about the split of their property. The solicitor confirmed that the deceased had been to see him about the property split. During their consultation, the deceased told the solicitor that, in 2017, the appellant belted her in the kitchen of their home, and she retaliated by hitting him with a saucepan. She said the appellant then took himself up to the “back shed” and hanged himself. She followed him there and cut him down. Since then, the appellant had been in and out of mental health hospitals. He had been diagnosed with severe depression and anxiety and she believed he would not pass a medical examination if he had to go back to work. He was in receipt of “disability insurance” under his “super”. After killing the deceased, the appellant went to a tavern, where he bought and consumed alcohol, and then travelled by taxi to a suburb of Brisbane. The taxi driver thought he was pretty drunk. While in the back of the taxi, he said, among other things, “I’m in trouble … It’s all over … My life’s fucked mate …”. The appellant travelled to the house of a friend [A]. He arrived at [A’s] around 7.30/8 pm, “pissed”. He talked “rubbish” until about midnight/12.30 am on 29 April 2020. The appellant stayed with [A] that night. The next morning, he said to [A], “I’ve killed her”. He told [A] that he told the deceased not to come around. He was drunk and not in the mood. He said she rocked up out of the blue and was “in his ear”, and then “he just, fucking, fed it to her”. [A] thought the appellant might have “boxed” the deceased “or something, you know, to shut her up”, based on his gestures. The appellant did not mention a weapon to [A]. Police arrived at [A’s] house, just after midnight on 30 April 2020. Whilst being transported by police to a police station on 30 April 2020, the appellant was asked whether he would like to tell his “side of the story” and he said, or made statements to the following effect (my emphasis):(a)“I don’t have much to say … Apart from fucked it right up.”(b)When asked what he could tell police about the suspicious death of the deceased, he said, “It, yeah, it just unfolded … It. I clubbed her, I, yeah … [Police: You clubbed her. What do you mean by that? Obviously, I wasn’t there] … I wasn’t there either, if you know what I mean. I just [indistinct]”.(c)“I bludgeoned her … With a four pounder [a hammer] … it was down there because I had to knock a bit of bloody shelving around.”(d)“I never wanted to do anything like that. It’s just fucked.”(e)He hit the deceased on the back of her neck/base of her head.(f)“I didn’t wanna kill her, hey.” [Police: Why did you hit her?]. “We b-, we been, we’ve been this way for ages. And she’s a narcissist, not that it’s gonna fuckin’ matter now. She’s a, yeah, she’s, she drove me to this basically.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There was no request from either counsel for redirections.Consideration of grounds of appealPreliminary matter – the trial at which the appellant was convicted of murder was a re-trial The trial at which the appellant was convicted was a re-trial – as this Court was informed by the Crown at the appeal and as was apparent from statements made by counsel to the trial judge.[49][49]For example, defence counsel informed his Honour that the appellant’s election (to give or call evidence) would “be the same as last time unless something untoward happens” (AB 269/38 – 46). Also, the parties gave the learned trial judge an extract from a summing up by Hindman J about the appellant’s post-offence conduct (AB 393). In fact, it was a second re-trial; that is, the appellant’s third trial. A review of the court files revealed that trial 1, on a single count of murder (as a domestic violence offence) (indictment 729/22), commenced on 6 June 2023 before Hindman J. On day 8, the jury were discharged because they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Trial 2 commenced before Wilson J on a new indictment charging murder (as a domestic violence offence), alternatively manslaughter (as a domestic violence offence) (indictment 988/23) on 25 September 2023 but mis-tried on day 2, before the Crown case closed. Trial 3, at which the appellant was convicted, also proceeded on indictment 988/23. Counsel were the same at all three trials and it was plain from the transcript of trial 3 that they had discussions between themselves about evidence and necessary directions, as is entirely appropriate. In this appeal, the respondent Crown did not invite the Court to consider the way in which the previous trials had been conducted. But it is reasonable to infer that defence counsel’s decisions at trial 3 were informed by the fact that he had “achieved” a hung jury at trial 1. Indeed, he conveyed that he was adopting the strategy he’d adopted at trial 1 when he provided the prosecutor with a copy of his “address points” document and said, “I’m happy for you to have it. You’ve heard my closing”.[50][50]AB 280/7 – 9.Ground 1 Ground 1 was expressed as follows:(a)A miscarriage of justice occurred because of the way in which the evidence of an earlier alleged episode of violence was placed before the jury:(i)While the evidence was claimed to be led as “relationship evidence”, the specific use to which it was put under that head was not properly identified, nor could one rationally be identified;(ii)Notwithstanding the Crown Prosecutor’s concession that the evidence was not being used on a propensity basis, his submissions to the jury invited precisely that form of reasoning;(iii)The directions given to the jury by the learned Trial Judge were inadequate to mitigate against the risk of misuse of the evidence. Elaborating on ground 1 in his written submissions, the appellant said at [25]:“The Crown Prosecutor’s submission [inviting propensity reasoning as to intention] needed to be called out and addressed by the learned trial judge. The jury needed to be told in unequivocal terms – and by explicit reference to the dangerously wrong submissions made by the Crown Prosecutor – that they could not reason in that way.”