R v Stirling - [2022] QCA 44

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Stirling [2022] QCA 44

PARTIES:

R
v
STIRLING, Scott Gregory
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 276 of 2020
DC No 2405 of 2019

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 27 November 2020 (Rinaudo DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

1 April 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

30 July 2021

JUDGES:

Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Applegarth J

ORDER:

Dismiss the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where after a trial in the District Court over five days the appellant was found guilty by a jury, by majority verdicts, of one count of arson (count 1) and four counts of endangering property by fire (counts 2-5) – where the appellant appeals against his convictions upon the ground that on each count the verdict was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the whole of the evidence – whether upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to find that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of each count

Criminal Code (Qld), s 461, s 462

Coughlan v The Queen (2020) 267 CLR 654; [2020] HCA 15, cited
R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35, cited
R v Webb; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1990] 2 Qd R 275, cited

COUNSEL:

J R Hunter QC for the appellant
D Nardone for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Fisher Dore Lawyers for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

FRASER JA: A building at 9 Pritchard Road, Virginia was destroyed by a fire which started in the afternoon of Sunday 24 September 2017. Four adjacent buildings were damaged by the fire.
After a trial in the District Court over five days the appellant was found guilty by a jury, by majority verdicts, of one count of arson (count 1) and four counts of endangering property by fire (counts 2-5). The appellant appeals against his convictions upon the ground that on each count the verdict was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the whole of the evidence.
It was formally admitted at the trial that the business Automotive Repair Parts Pty Ltd trading as All Bumpers and Headlights (ABH) leased business premises at 9 Pritchard Road, Virginia, the appellant’s wife “bought the business…[ABH] on the 1^st of October 2015”, the appellant’s wife was the director and secretary of ABH, and the appellant was the general manager of ABH. The business of ABH involved the acquisition of second-hand bumper bars and headlights, the repair and improvement of those products in a building at the premises, and the sale of the refurbished products. The appellant focussed upon the production and sale of the refurbished bumper bars and headlights and he managed the employees. The appellant’s wife was primarily responsible for administration and accounts.
Count…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Stirling

Details

AGLC: R v Stirling [2022] QCA 44
Case: [2022] QCA 44
Decision Date: 1 April 2022

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Stirling, the appellant appealed against convictions of one count of arson and four counts of endangering property by fire. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appellant contended that the jury's verdict was unreasonable and insupportable given the evidence presented at trial.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the jury was reasonably open to conclude, based on the whole of the evidence, that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of each charge. The appellant argued that there were significant inconsistencies in the prosecution's case and that there were alternative explanations for the events that were not disproven.

The court found that the evidence, when viewed in its entirety, permitted the jury to reasonably conclude that the appellant was guilty of each count. The court noted that the appellant had attempted to enlist others to set fire to the building, that he was alone in the section of the building where the fire started, and that he stood to benefit financially from the fire. The circumstantial evidence, when taken together, provided a strong basis for the jury's conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed, and the original convictions were upheld. The court found that the jury's verdict was not unreasonable or insupportable when considering the whole of the evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

Dismiss the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent submits that when this evidence is considered in the context of the evidence already discussed, the jury could consider that the appellant’s internet inquiries in February 2017 reflected his having then contemplated setting fire to the building. In light of the fact the appellant undertook these searches about seven months before the date of the fire and the indication in the searches that there was in fact a fire in one of the nearby suburbs, relatively little weight should be attributed to this aspect of the circumstantial case against the appellant.Count 1: Conclusion The appellant argues it is improbable that he would start a fire in the building when he and his wife were in the building and other business premises were in very close proximity. It is relevant in this respect to record that it was uncontroversial at trial that there was “a massive load of combustible material” inside the building; when that was put to the appellant, he answered, “Of course.”[55] In addition, the evidence reveals that there was also a large amount of combustible material (racks of bumpers) between the building and adjacent buildings. In these circumstances, if the appellant set fire to the building he created significant risks of serious injury to himself and his wife, to anyone who happened to be near the building or near or in any of the adjacent buildings when the fire took hold, and also to the firefighters who would be called to the scene. It could readily be inferred that the appellant knew of those risks, given that he was intimately familiar with the building, its contents, and the closeness of the adjacent buildings, and was in the process of responding to notices issued by the relevant fire authorities to remove great volumes of the combustible material.[55]Transcript 26 November 2020 at 4 - 29. For reasons already given, however, the jury could attribute no weight to the appellant’s denials on oath and find that on 20 September 2017 the appellant asked Mr Parker to set fire or to help the appellant set fire to the building and that, after Mr Parker refused to do so, the appellant asked Mr Campbell if he knew anyone who wanted to burn the building. Upon that footing, any hypothesis consistent with the appellant’s innocence would involve the remarkable coincidence that the building was accidentally destroyed by fire shortly after the rejection of the appellant’s attempts to enlist someone to set fire to the building. The apparent weakness of any hypothesis consistent with the appellant’s innocence is stretched beyond breaking point when regard is also had to the circumstances that the fire started at or about the time when the appellant was alone in the section of the building where the fire started, the appellant was then under substantial pressure as a result of ABH’s financial inability to pay outstanding wages to its full time staff and other overdue debts, and the appellant then knew ABH held substantial insurance covering the risk of fire at its business premises.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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CITATION:	R v Stirling [2022] QCA 44
PARTIES:	R v STIRLING, Scott Gregory (appellant)
FILE NO/S:	CA No 276 of 2020 DC No 2405 of 2019
DIVISION:	Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:	Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT:	District Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 27 November 2020 (Rinaudo DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:	1 April 2022
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:	30 July 2021
JUDGES:	Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Applegarth J
ORDER:	Dismiss the appeal.
CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where after a trial in the District Court over five days the appellant was found guilty by a jury, by majority verdicts, of one count of arson (count 1) and four counts of endangering property by fire (counts 2-5) – where the appellant appeals against his convictions upon the ground that on each count the verdict was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the whole of the evidence – whether upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to find that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of each count Criminal Code (Qld), s 461, s 462 Coughlan v The Queen (2020) 267 CLR 654; [2020] HCA 15, cited R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35, cited R v Webb; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1990] 2 Qd R 275, cited
COUNSEL:	J R Hunter QC for the appellant D Nardone for the respondent
SOLICITORS:	Fisher Dore Lawyers for the appellant Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent