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R v Steggall

R v Steggall

Case [2005] VSCA 278 23 November 2005

Sentencing

Appeal

Criminal Law

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 277 of 2005

THE QUEEN

RICHARD KINGSLEY STEGGALL

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JUDGES:	BUCHANAN, EAMES and NETTLE, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	23 November 2005
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	23 November 2005
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2005] VSCA 278	2^nd Revision-6 December 2005

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Criminal law – Sentencing – Crown appeal – Suspended sentence – Application to restore suspended part of sentence – Principles applicable – Meaning of “exceptional circumstances” – Appeal dismissed – Sentencing Act 1991 s.31(1), s.31(5), s.31(5A).

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mrs C.M. Quin	Mr S. Carisbrooke, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Applicant	Mr D. Grace, Q.C. with Mr T.F. Danos	Tony Danos

BUCHANAN, J.A.:

I will ask Nettle, J.A. to deliver the first judgment.

NETTLE, J.A.:

This is an application for leave to appeal from the restoration of a sentence of imprisonment pursuant to s.31(5)(a) of the Sentencing Act 1991. Section 31(1) of the Act provides that if at any time during the operational period of a suspended sentence of imprisonment, the offender commits another offence punishable by imprisonment, the offender is guilty of an offence for which he or she may be proceeded against on a charge filed by a prescribed person or a member of a prescribed class of persons. Sections 31(5) and 31(5A) further provide:

"(5)If on the hearing of a charge under sub-section (1) the court finds the offender guilty of the offence, it may impose a level 10 fine and in addition must -
(a)restore the sentence or part sentence held in suspense and order the offender to serve it; or
(b)restore part of the sentence or part sentence held in suspense and order the offender to serve it; or
(c)in the case of a wholly suspended sentence, extend the period of the order suspending the sentence to a date not later than 12 months after the date of the order under this sub-section; or
(d)make no order with respect to the suspended sentence.

(5A)Despite anything to the contrary in sub-section (5), if on the hearing of a charge the court finds the offender guilty of the offence it must, in addition to any fine it may impose under sub-section (5), exercise the power referred to in paragraph (a) of that sub-section unless it is of the opinion that it would be unjust to do so in view of any exceptional circumstances which have arisen since the order suspending the sentence was made."

The facts

The Applicant was born on 31 December 1976. On 28 September 1999 he was committed for trial on a number of charges arising from business dealings between July 1996 and December 1997. He reserved his plea. On 3 November 1999 he was presented for trial before the County Court at Melbourne on two Presentments. Presentment No. C9901103.3 alleged five counts of Obtaining Property by Deception (counts 1, 4, 5, 6 and 9), three counts of Obtaining a Financial Advantage by Deception (counts 2, 3…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Steggall

Details

AGLC: R v Steggall [2005] VSCA 278
Case: [2005] VSCA 278
Decision Date: 23 November 2005

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Steggall involved the respondent, who had been sentenced to imprisonment but had the execution of the sentence suspended under the Sentencing Act 1991. The Crown, dissatisfied with the leniency of the sentence, appealed to the court to restore the suspended part of the sentence. The central issue before the court was to determine the circumstances under which the suspended part of a sentence could be activated, specifically interpreting the phrase "exceptional circumstances" as outlined in the Act. The court was tasked with establishing a clear understanding of the conditions that would justify the activation of a previously suspended sentence.

In addressing the appeal, the court delved into the legislative framework provided by the Sentencing Act 1991. It was necessary to interpret the phrase "exceptional circumstances" in the context of Section 31(1), which allows for the suspension of a sentence, and Sections 31(5) and 31(5A), which deal with the restoration of such suspended sentences. The court emphasised that the term "exceptional circumstances" required a high threshold to be met, suggesting that only in truly extraordinary situations should the suspended part of a sentence be reinstated. The court concluded that the circumstances presented in this case did not meet the stringent criteria for "exceptional circumstances," and thus the appeal was dismissed.

The court's reasoning was grounded in a detailed analysis of previous case law and the statutory language. It found that the respondent's actions post-sentencing did not constitute the type of exceptional circumstances required for the activation of a suspended sentence. The court underscored the importance of maintaining the integrity of the original sentencing decision unless truly exceptional events warrant a departure from that decision. Consequently, the Crown's appeal was unsuccessful, and the original sentencing order remained in effect.

The final orders of the court confirmed that the appeal was dismissed, and the original sentencing order, including the suspension of the sentence, was upheld. This decision reinforces the principle that the activation of a suspended sentence requires a demonstration of exceptional circumstances, which were not present in this case.

Orders