Fesus v The Queen

[2013] NSWCCA 331

Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Fesus v R [2013] NSWCCA 331

Hearing dates:

10 December 2013

Decision date:

20 December 2013

Before:

Ward JA at [1]
Harrison J at [1]
Bellew J at [1]

Decision:

1. The application for review of the bail determination of R A Hulme J is dismissed.

2. Until further order of the Court, there is to be no publication of this judgment, other than to:

(a) the applicant;

(b) the applicant's solicitor and any counsel retained to advise or appear for the applicant;

(c) the Crown Prosecutor;

(d) the Crown Prosecutor's instructing solicitor.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW - Bail - Where applicant charged with murder and refused bail - Where application made for review of bail determination - Whether exceptional circumstances justified grant of bail - Where Crown relied upon circumstantial case along with confessions made by applicant to an undercover operative - Where Crown case not properly described as weak - Exceptional circumstances not made out

Legislation Cited:

Bail Act 1978 (NSW)
Court Suppression and Non-publication
Orders Act 2010 NSW
Criminal Procedure Act 1986

Cases Cited:

R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Steven Fesus - Applicant
Regina - Respondent

Representation:

Counsel:
D Miralis (solicitor) - Applicant
S Dowling SC - Respondent
A Bhalla - Commissioner of Police
Solicitors:
Nyman Gibson Stewart - Applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions - Respondent
Crown Solicitor for NSW - Commissioner of Police

File Number(s):

2013 / 207336002

Publication restriction:

See paragraphs [3] and [4].

 Decision under appeal 

Date of Decision:

2013-10-04 00:00:00

Before:

R A Hulme J

THE COURT

1. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was charged with the murder, on 11 August 1997, of his wife Jodie Melissa Fesus ("the deceased").

1. On 4 October 2013 R A Hulme J refused an application for bail. Pursuant to s. 45 of the Bail Act 1978 ("the Act") the applicant now seeks a review of that decision.

1. It should be noted that when determining the matter at first instance his Honour made orders, on the application of the Commissioner of Police, that until further order:

(i)   there be no publication of the details of the police operation that resulted in the applicant's confession; and

(ii)   there be no publication of submissions made in relation to the Commissioner's application.

1. When the present application came before the Court for hearing, Counsel for the Commissioner of Police appeared and sought that those orders be continued. No objection was taken by either party to that course and orders were made accordingly.

THE NATURE OF THE APPLICATION

1. Section 45(1)(b) of the Act confers a power on this Court to review any decision of the Supreme Court, however constituted, in relation to bail. By virtue of s. 48(3) a review is by way of re-hearing, such that evidence or information in addition to, or in substitution for, evidence or information given or obtained on the making of the original decision may be given or obtained on the review (see DPP v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178 at [2] and the authorities cited therein).

1. With the exception of a DNA report and an additional statement sought to be tendered by the Crown, this Court has before it the same material as was before the primary judge. The DNA report confirms that material found underneath the fingernails of the deceased originated from her, and further confirms that no DNA or fingerprints were found on a "P" plate located in the vicinity where the deceased's body was found. The statement is that of Glee Richardson, dated 4 December 2013. Ms Richardson has made a number of previous statements and is to be called by the Crown to give evidence against the applicant. The statement which the Crown sought to tender goes to the issue of alleged harassment and intimidation of her by the applicant. The applicant's solicitor objected to the tender of that statement and, in the event that the Court chose to admit it, submitted that it was deserving of no weight. In the Court's view, the statement was properly admissible on the application.

THE CROWN CASE

1. The Crown case against the applicant may be summarised as follows.

1. The applicant and the deceased met in early 1995, when the applicant was 25 and the deceased was 16. The deceased was pregnant at the time and gave birth to a daughter in July 1995. In August 1996 she gave birth to the applicant's son.

1. The applicant and the deceased married in May 1997, although it is alleged that their relationship was deteriorating at that time. In particular, it is alleged that the deceased had threatened, and by mid 1997 had made plans, to leave the applicant. It is also alleged that the applicant had told one person that he had chosen to remain with the deceased because of their children, and that he had told another that he would one day kill the deceased. It is further alleged that during January 1997, some months prior to the deceased's death, the applicant enquired as to procedures to be followed if he wished to report his wife missing.

1. There is also some evidence of what might described as general disharmony in the relationship between the applicant and the deceased which manifested itself in arguments and physical violence. On the Crown case, the applicant was a possessive and jealous person who held a suspicion that the deceased was seeing other men, and that she had suffered the miscarriage of a child of whom he was not the father.

1. On 11 August 1997 the applicant and the deceased visited friends, at which time an argument arose over who should be responsible for changing their son's nappy. An altercation ensued in which the applicant tripped the deceased causing her to stumble whilst holding the baby, to which she retaliated by punching the applicant. The deceased then told the female friend whom she was visiting that she intended to leave the applicant. The female friend described the applicant as "fuming" for the rest of the day, up to and including the time he and the deceased left the premises between 7 pm and 8 pm that evening. This was the last time at which the deceased was seen alive, although there is evidence that she spoke with her mother at about 8.47 pm that evening and discussed plans for the forthcoming weekend. It is alleged by the Crown that the applicant has given inconsistent accounts of the extent to which he was arguing with the deceased during the course of the evening.

1. On the morning of 12 August 1997 the applicant, who was employed as a security guard, went with his two children to a club at which he had been working. He left his children with a female attendant at the front desk and proceeded into the office. He obtained a document containing the times of the shifts he had worked, re-wrote the shift times on another document, and sent it by facsimile to the security firm for which he worked. There is evidence which is capable of supporting a conclusion that none of this was necessary, and that no request had been made to forward any information regarding shifts worked by the applicant. It is the Crown case that the applicant acted in this way in order to account for a period during which he was not at home, and the deceased was not in his company.

1. After leaving the club, the applicant visited his parents and arrived back home at about 11.00 am. He claimed that upon arrival the deceased was not present, although there was no sign of a break in or similar disturbance, nor was there any evidence of the deceased having left a note. Neighbours observed the applicant cleaning his car in the course of the morning following his return from his parents. According to statements the applicant made to police, he spent the balance of that day cleaning his house. He made no attempt to contact the deceased until the following day.

1. On the afternoon of 12 August 2007 the female friend of the deceased whom she had visited on 11 August telephoned to enquire as to the deceased's welfare. The applicant spoke with her and told her that the deceased was not at home. He expressed concern at the whereabouts of the deceased, but refused to act upon a suggestion that he report her missing, stating that she had not been absent for a sufficiently long period to justify such a report being made.

1. Motivated by concern for the deceased's welfare, her friend then attended the applicant's premises and spoke with him. The applicant told her that he had only telephoned his mother in an attempt to ascertain the deceased's whereabouts.

1. At about midday the following day, 13 August 1997, the applicant spoke with the deceased's mother. He told her that he had gone to work on the previous morning leaving the deceased in bed, and that the deceased was not at home when he had returned. The applicant also said that the deceased had taken nothing but a handbag and that, in particular, she had taken no clothes with her. The applicant then telephoned the deceased's sister and expressed concern to her that the deceased's mother may have thought that he "had done something".

1. The applicant then swapped shifts with another work colleague so as to enable him to work at Narellan on the evening of 13 August 1997. He told police that he did so in order to be able to go to Narellan to look for the deceased. Police investigations have not identified any connection between the deceased and the Narellan area which might support the applicant having some reasonable belief that a search of that area would prove fruitful.

1. The applicant reported the deceased missing at 2.30 pm on 13 August 1997. At that time, he told police that none of her clothes were missing and cited, as an identifying feature, a tattoo on her left breast.

1. In the company of a work colleague, Kerry Smith ("Smith") the applicant travelled to Narellan on the evening of 13 August. After their shift had concluded, they went back to the applicant's premises. According to the applicant, it was at that time that he discovered a bag which, he claimed, had not been there when he had earlier left the house. He claimed that the bag had been packed by the deceased whilst he had been at work earlier in the evening.

1. According to the applicant, he and Smith then drove around looking for the deceased before attending the police station at 12.30 am on 14 August to report the finding of the bag on the previous evening. He did not take the bag with him when he attended the police station. In a further conversation with the deceased's sister later that day, the applicant again queried whether the deceased's mother thought that he was involved in the disappearance. In another conversation with the deceased's sister on 16 August 1997, the applicant stated that he had thought the deceased had returned to the house when he had been at work on the evening of August 13 because he had caught her inside the house before she left through a back door.

1. On 25 August 1997 the deceased attended a Centrelink office for the purpose of applying for assistance in his capacity as sole parent of the two children. He was required, for those purposes, to complete two application forms. On the first, he nominated the date of separation from the deceased as 11 August 1997. On the second, in reference to a request for the provision of information about his wife, he checked the box marked "deceased". At this point, the deceased was still reported as missing and her body had not been recovered.

1. On the evening of 13 September 1997 there was a sighting of a person alleged to be the applicant in the vicinity of the area in which the deceased's body was ultimately found. On that same morning, or alternatively on the morning of the following day, another witness observed a motor vehicle bearing the partial registration "SIS" being driven from the area in which the deceased was later found to have been buried. The registration of the applicant's vehicle included those letters. Enquiries with the registered owners of all other vehicles bearing the same partial registration have eliminated the possibility of any of those other vehicles being present in the vicinity at the time.

1. On the evening of 14 September 1997 an anonymous male telephoned police from a public telephone and provided directions to an area where he said there were human remains. The deceased's body was found at the area nominated and conveyed to the Glebe Mortuary for examination.

1. On 18 September 1997, at a time when the deceased had not been identified, the deceased asked to view her body. He attended with a neighbour for that purpose at about 2.00 pm on that same day. He enquired of the attendant at the morgue whether the deceased had been strangled. The attendant did not respond. Moreover, having viewed the tattoo on the deceased's breast, the applicant asked the attendant to check the deceased's neck for a birthmark. According to the deceased's mother, no such birthmark existed.

1. Upon returning from viewing the deceased's body, the applicant had a conversation with the wife of the neighbour who had attended with him. In the course of that conversation he questioned whether, if a person was strangled, there would be evidence of his fingerprints. He also questioned whether, if he had rolled over in his sleep and touched the deceased's neck at some point, there would be evidence of his fingerprints.

1. Evidence from a Forensic Pathologist confirms that the findings on autopsy are consistent with the deceased having died from strangulation or smothering, although the extent of decompositional change rendered it difficult to form a more definitive opinion. However, in the opinion of the Forensic Pathologist, no alternative cause of death was evident.

1. At some point, the investigation into the deceased's death was closed. However, it was reopened in January 2013 and in the ensuing 6 months police conducted a covert operation. In a conversation with an undercover police officer on 8 July 2013, after initially denying that he had killed the deceased, the applicant admitted that he had strangled her from behind. In a subsequent interview with police he claimed that his earlier admissions were false.

THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. Section 9C of the Act is in the following terms:

9C Murder

An authorised officer or court is not to grant bail to a person in respect of an offence of murder unless the authorised officer or court is satisfied that exceptional circumstances justify the grant of bail.

THE MEANING OF "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES"

1. The meaning of the term "exceptional circumstances" in s. 9C has been the subject of previous consideration. In R v Wright [2005] NSWSC 588 Rothman J (at [22] and following) made the following relevant observations:

"22. The use of the term "exceptional circumstances" means that the circumstances need to be exceptional but not necessarily special. 'Special' is defined by the Macquarie Dictionary as:

"Relating or peculiar to a particular person, thing instance;

Having a particular function, purpose, of a distinct or particular character;

Being a particular one, extraordinary or exceptional."

Thus the distinction between "special" and "extraordinary" may be more illusory than substantial.

23. The Macquarie Dictionary defined the word "exceptional" as:

"Forming an exception or unusual instance, unusual; extraordinary.

Exceptionally good, as of a performance of product;

Exceptionally skilled, talented or clever."

24. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word "exceptional" as:

:Of the nature of or forming an exception; out of the ordinary course; unusual, special".

25. Thus it would seem that if a court or authorised officer is satisfied that one or more factors either singularly or combined produce a circumstance or situation out of the ordinary or unusual...sub-section 9D(1) of the Act...(will be satisfied). "Special" on the other hand, seems to imply a unique situation or one which pertains only to that individual".

1. In the recent decision of R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178 this Court (Rothman J, Fullerton J and Beech-Jones J) summarised the authorities relating to exceptional circumstances (commencing at [23]). Having referred to those passages of the decision in Wright set out at [29] above, the Court said (commencing at [24]):

"The need to satisfy the Court of special or exceptional circumstances, however, does not constitute a prohibition on the granting of bail: R v Young [2006] NSWSC 1499 at [19], per Johnson; R v Newby (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Sully J, 27 January 2006, unreported). In Young, Johnson J said:

'[18] The concept of exceptional circumstances is, of course, not defined in the Bail Act 1978. It is a term that is used, from time to time, in statutes to place limits upon the exercise of various powers: cf R v Steggall [2005] VSCA 278; (2005) 157 A Crim R 402 at paragraph 12. It is helpful, however, to refer to the ordinary meaning of the word 'exceptional' in the Macquarie Dictionary:

'Forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary.'

[19] Section 9C does not constitute a prohibition on granting bail in cases of murder. Cases of alleged murder, of course, can vary considerably. It is no doubt for that reason that in the second reading speech, emphasis was placed upon the need for a case-by-case examination. The context in which the term 'exceptional circumstances' is used is relevant to the construction of the term. The statutory context in which the term 'exceptional circumstances' appears in s.9C involves the existence of a murder charge against the applicant. Elsewhere in the Bail Act, in s.30AA, the term 'special or exceptional circumstances' is used in the context of an applicant who has been convicted of an offence on indictment and is appealing to the Court of Criminal Appeal. That difference in statutory context is not insignificant involving, as it does, bail determinations at different points along the path of the criminal justice process.

[20] It seems to me that exceptional circumstances may be found in a case by the coincidence of a number of features. These can include features subjective to the particular applicant, features which bear upon the nature of the alleged offence and features which emphasise that, absent this particular test, the applicant is otherwise a person who will answer bail.'

A similar approach was taken by McClellan CJ at CL in R v Pirini (Supreme Court of New South Wales, 8 September 2009, unreported), in which his Honour said:

'All of the matters in s 32 must be considered. A primary consideration when determining whether to grant bail is whether the accused will attend to answer the charge at a later trial. However, the court must also be concerned with the protection of witnesses other persons including relatives of a victim and the protection and welfare of the community. These considerations must be balanced with the likely period of incarceration of an individual before trial.'

This approach was adopted by Price J in R v Medich [2010] NSWSC 1488. It is well to remember that the provisions of s 9D of the Bail Act were inserted by the Parliament in circumstances where the second reading speech included the following passage:

'Exceptional circumstances will be left to the Court on individual case-by-case basis. However, as a general guide it might include cases including a battered wife, or a strong self-defence case or a weak prosecution case. It might also include a case in which the defendant is in urgent need of medical attention or has an intellectual disability, or a case in which the Court is satisfied the offender poses no threat to the victim or the community.'

As is clear from the foregoing judgment, the approach, for some period, has been that exceptional circumstances may be disclosed by a combination of factors or a particular factor which takes the circumstances of the offender and the grant of bail out of the ordinary: see also R v Gregory William Jacobs (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Rothman J, 30 April 2008, unreported); R v PDR (No 2) (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Rothman J, 30 July 2007, unreported).

The approach that exceptional circumstances may be disclosed by a combination of factors taking the applicant or the circumstances of the offending out of the ordinary was recently applied by this Court in R v Chehab, where the Court (Latham, Fullerton and Adamson JJ), said:

"[6] What constitutes, or might constitute, exceptional circumstances is a question of fact to be determined referable to considerations personal to the applicant for bail or the circumstances of the particular case. Where the preconditions to the operation of s 9D(1) are met, the applicant for bail (in this case the respondent to the bail review) has the evidential burden of establishing circumstances sufficiently exceptional to warrant bail being granted."

It is the foregoing approach that is applied by the Court in this application. It has been remarked that, in dealing with the provisions of s 8A of the Bail Act, while the applicant for bail bears an onus to satisfy the Court that bail should not be refused, greater attention should be focused on whether the Crown case is a strong one or a weak one. In any event, the strength of the Crown case is a factor contained in s 32(1)(a)(iii) of the Bail Act as one of the criteria to be considered, its relevance being that, in cases where the Crown case is particularly strong, there may be greater reason for the person charged not to appear in court. Conversely, if the Crown case were particularly weak, there may be good reason to be satisfied that the person will probably appear.

Nevertheless, it is not the function of the Court, on a bail application, to determine the guilt, or likely conviction, of the applicant for bail.

Further, exceptional circumstances may be disclosed by the nature of the offence itself, or, in the case of the application of s 9D of the Bail Act, a comparison between the current offence and any earlier offence that renders the provision applicable or the period of time between the offences".

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PRESENT CASE

1. The applicant's solicitor relied principally upon six matters as amounting to exceptional circumstances. Those matters were as follows:

(i)   the lack of strength of the Crown case;

(ii)   the fact that the deceased's murder occurred some time ago and was therefore "out of the ordinary";

(iii)   the fact that there was a "real question" surrounding the confessional statements made by the applicant to the undercover operative;

(iv)   the absence of any prior convictions on the part of the applicant;

(v)   the forensic evidence of the cause of death;

(vi)   the delay which would be occasioned in obtaining a trial date.

.

1. Properly viewed, the matters relied upon in (i), (iii), and (v) all go to the one issue, namely the strength or otherwise of the Crown case.

1. It was the Crown's position that none of the matters relied upon, either alone or in combination, amounted to exceptional circumstances.

The Crown case

1. It will be apparent from the summary set out at [7] to [27] above that leaving aside the issue of the applicant's confessional statements, the Crown case is a circumstantial one. Some of the submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant appeared to amount to the proposition that the fact that a case is circumstantial automatically leads to the conclusion that it is weak. That proposition is of no merit, be it generally or in the particular context of the present case. The nature and extent of the particular circumstances relied upon by the Crown against the applicant, which are set out above, are such that when viewed as a whole, they do not support a conclusion that the Crown case is weak.

1. Much was made by the applicant's solicitor of the confessional statements made by the applicant to undercover police. In essence it was submitted that an analysis of the evidence established that "immense pressure and strong inducements" had been placed upon the applicant which, it was said, rendered the confessional statements unreliable. Although not put in specific terms, the essence of the submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant appeared to be that it was highly likely, if not inevitable, that the evidence of such statements would ultimately be excluded. In this regard, the applicant referred the Court to a number of authorities which, it was submitted, supported the proposition that the techniques used by the police in the present case were unfair and had the capacity to elicit a false confession. Those authorities included R v Mentuck (2000) MBQB 155; 47 WCB (2d) 526; R v Hart (2012) NCLA 61; R v Gallagher [2013] NSWSC 1102. There was, before the Court, a DVD of the conversation in which the confessional statements were made. The applicant urged the Court not to view the DVD and in these circumstances, the Court has not done so.

1. It is sufficient to make three observations in relation to the applicant's reliance on this aspect of the matter.

1. Firstly, just as it is not the Court's function on an application such as the present to determine the guilt or likely conviction of the applicant. It is similarly not the Court's function to predict, much less determine, whether evidence which is relied upon by the Crown will be admitted. There are a number of reasons for that, not the least of which is that on an application such as this, the Court does not have the benefit of the entirety of the evidence.

1. Secondly, the authorities relied upon by the applicant are of limited assistance, for the simple reason that the factual circumstances of each of them differ from those in the present case. The decision in Gallagher provides a clear example. None of the primary factors which resulted in the exclusion of confessional material in that case form part of the evidence in the case of the applicant. It is important to bear in mind that decisions on the facts of one case do not really aid in the determination of another, and observations which are made by judges in the course of deciding issues of fact should not be treated as laying down rules of law (see Knight v Maclean [2002] NSWCA 314 at [61] per Heydon JA, citing Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491 at 503 per Windeyer J).

1. Thirdly, even if the confessional statements are ignored, it remains the position, for the reasons previously expressed, that the circumstantial case relied upon by the Crown is not properly described as a weak one.

1. Finally, the applicant's solicitor sought to rely upon matters arising from the evidence of the Forensic Pathologist concerning the deceased's cause of death. In particular, it was asserted that the Forensic Pathologist had originally stated that strangulation with a broad ligature might result in death without discernable injuries, but had recently added to his opinion by stating that manual strangulation might produce a similar result. It was submitted that this late addition had come about as a result of the applicant having admitted to police that the deceased was killed by manual strangulation, and that such opinion was deserving of no weight. In this regard, the applicant relied, in particular, upon the time which had passed since the autopsy was conducted, which, it was submitted, was of such a length that the Forensic Pathologist would have no memory the autopsy being conducted.

1. There is no merit in these submissions. Any lack of memory of the autopsy on the part of the Forensic Pathologist would be at least capable of being overcome by the contemporaneous records (which are presumably still available) recording the findings made at the time of the autopsy.

Delay between the deceased's death and the applicant's arrest

1. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the present case was out of the ordinary given that some 16 years had elapsed between the deceased's death and the arrest of the applicant. Although such a circumstance may, in some cases, be exceptional, the Court does not regard it as so in the present case, be it of itself, or in combination with the other matters relied upon. In particular, and leaving aside the submissions concerning the evidence of the Forensic Pathologist, it was not suggested that the period between the death of the deceased and the arrest of the applicant had any adverse effect upon the cogency or reliability of the other evidence relied upon by the Crown.

The likely delay in obtaining a trial date

1. In written submissions the applicant's solicitor argued that it was possible that a trial would not take place until early to mid 2016. This was said to be due to a number of factors including:

(i)   the necessity to seek production of a large amount of material pertaining to the undercover operation;

(ii)   the delays arising from anticipated claims, by the NSW Police, for public interest immunity in respect of the material in (i);

(iii) the necessity to deal with contested applications pursuant to ss. 91 and/or 93 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and the consequent delay in obtaining a date for a committal hearing; and

(iv)   the anticipated length of the committal hearing.

1. In the course of the hearing of the application, the applicant's solicitor submitted that the projected delay was, in his experience, common in matters of this nature. If that were correct, it would follow that such delay was not exceptional. In any event, it is not the experience of this Court that delays of this magnitude are at all commonplace. Moreover, the matters advanced as giving rise to such expected delay were necessarily speculative, and would appear to represent an unduly pessimistic view of the likely progress of the proceedings through the committal process.

The absence of prior convictions on the part of the applicant

1. It is common ground that the applicant has no prior convictions. That is not a circumstance which is necessarily uncommon, even in the case of an allegation of murder. It is not, in the Court's view, exceptional.

Other matters

1. The primary focus of the applicant's oral submissions were the matters set out in [31] above. However, passing reference was made to other factors, including:

(i)   the applicant's need to properly prepare his defence;

(ii)   the difficulty in preparing that defence in light of the distance between his place of custody and his solicitor's office;

(iii)   the fact that he had no passport;

(iv)   his strong employment history; and

(v)   his strong family and community ties.

1. All of those matters are relevant considerations having regard to the provisions of s. 32 of the Act. The Court has considered them. Generally speaking however, they are all matters which commonly apply to applicants for bail. They do not, either of themselves or in combination, constitute exceptional circumstances.

1. Given the conclusions reached, it is not necessary to further consider the weight to be given to the statement of Glee Richardson which was tendered by the Crown.

1. Given that the applicant is yet to face trial, and in light of the issues which may arise at any trial regarding the applicant's confessional statements, the Court considers, having regard to the provisions of s. 8(1)(e) of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 NSW, that it is in the interests of justice for an order to be made restricting the publication of this judgment, and that such public interest significantly outweighs the public interest in open justice. Accordingly, publication of this judgment will, until further order of the Court, be restricted to the legal representatives of the parties.

ORDERS

1. For the foregoing reasons, the Court makes the following orders:

(1)   The application for review of the bail determination of R A Hulme J is dismissed.

(2)   Until further order of the Court, there is to be no publication of this judgment, other than to:

(a)   the applicant;

(b)   the applicant's solicitor and any counsel retained to advise or appear for the applicant;

(c)   the Crown Prosecutor;

(d)   the Crown Prosecutor's instructing solicitor.

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Decision last updated: 25 June 2024