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R v Stanford, Marcus

R v Stanford, Marcus

Case [2016] NSWSC 1174 24 August 2016

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Supreme Court

New South Wales

Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Stanford, Marcus [2016] NSWSC 1174
Hearing dates: 23 August 2016
Decision date: 24 August 2016
Before: R A Hulme J
Decision:
Imprisonment for a fixed term of 1 year 3 months

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – accessory after the fact to murder – factors relevant to assessment of seriousness of offence – murder of extreme seriousness but acts of accessory limited - Crown acceptance offence towards lower end of range – plea of guilty and other mitigating factors – no practical utility in allowing parole period – fixed term sentence imposed
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 349(1)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A
Cases Cited: R v Cowen [2008] NSWSC 104
R v Dileski [2002] NSWCCA 345; 132 A Crim R 345
R v Do (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 7 May 1997, unrep)
R v Farroukh and Farroukh (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 29 March 1996, unrep)
R v Faulkner [2000] NSWSC 944
R v Gersteling [2004] NSWSC 502
R v Johnson [2014] NSWSC 1254
R v Mirad [2004] NSWSC 701
R v Phan [2001] NSWSC 1069; 126 A Crim R 257
R v Quach [2002] NSWSC 1205
Category: Sentence
Parties: Regina
Marcus Stanford
Representation:
Counsel:
Mr P Kerr (Crown)
Mr B Neild (Offender)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
Catherine Hunter

File Number(s): 2015/167544

Judgment

HIS HONOUR: Ms Stephanie Clare Scott was murdered by Vincent Stanford at Leeton on 5 April 2015. His identical twin brother, Marcus Stanford ("the offender"), has pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact to that murder.
The offence of being an accessory after the fact to murder is one that carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years (s 349(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)).
There is a wide variation in the possible degrees of culpability of a person who commits this offence: R v Farroukh and Farroukh (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 29 March 1996, unrep). It may be committed by someone who helps the principal offender to dispose of the body (e.g. R v Faulkner [2000] NSWSC 944 and R v Quach [2002] NSWSC 1205); or to hide or get rid of incriminating evidence (e.g. R v Gersteling [2004] NSWSC 502 and R v Cowen [2008] NSWSC 104); or to get away from the crime scene, or the jurisdiction (e.g. R v Mirad [2004] NSWSC 701). It may be committed by someone who deliberately tells lies to cover up the crime, or the identity of the principal offender (e.g. R v Phan [2001] NSWSC 1069; 126 A Crim R 257 and R v Dileski [2002] NSWCCA 345; 132 A Crim R 345). There are other forms of assistance that may be given as well but the critical thing is that, with knowledge of the primary offence, the offender does something which has a tendency to assist the principal to avoid justice by escaping…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Stanford, Marcus

Details

AGLC: R v Stanford, Marcus [2016] NSWSC 1174
Case: [2016] NSWSC 1174
Decision Date: 24 August 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Stanford, Marcus, involved a defendant who pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact to a murder. The court was tasked with determining the appropriate sentence for the defendant. The murder in question was of extreme seriousness, but the defendant's involvement was limited to assisting the principal offender after the crime had been committed. The Crown agreed that the offence was towards the lower end of the range in terms of seriousness, and the defendant's plea of guilty and other mitigating factors were considered.

The court considered various factors relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of the offence. These included the nature of the defendant's involvement, the extreme seriousness of the murder, and the Crown's concession regarding the lower end of the range. Additionally, the court took into account the defendant's guilty plea and other mitigating circumstances. The court determined that there was no practical utility in allowing parole, leading to the imposition of a fixed term sentence.

In reaching its decision, the court carefully weighed the various mitigating factors against the gravity of the offence. The court concluded that a fixed term sentence was appropriate, given the defendant's limited role as an accessory after the fact and the mitigating factors presented. The court also noted that the Crown's concession on the seriousness of the offence and the defendant's guilty plea were significant considerations in the sentencing process. The final orders of the court reflected this balanced approach, imposing a fixed term sentence that took into account both the seriousness of the offence and the defendant's mitigating circumstances.

Orders