R v Spanos

Case [2007] SASC 409

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v SPANOS

[2007] SASC 409

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Debelle, The Honourable Justice Nyland and The Honourable Justice Layton)

22 November 2007

CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - VERDICT

Special verdicts - appellant charged with possessing methylamphetamine for sale contrary to s 32(1)(e) of Controlled Substances Act 1984 - appellant admitted possession of methylamphetamine - only question for jury was whether drug was intended for sale - verdict of guilty could be reached by more than one route - jury could have found appellant intended to sell drug or that appellant held drug on behalf of another who intended to sell it - whether trial judge erred in not asking jury to answer specific questions or return special verdict to ascertain factual basis for conviction - appeal dismissed.

Controlled Substances Act 1984 s 32(1)(e) and s 32(3); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 354(3), referred to.
Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1; Cunningham v Ryan (1919) 27 CLR 294; Otis Elevators Pty Ltd v Zitis (1986) 5 NSWLR 171; R v Brown and Brian [1949] VLR 177; R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374; Russell v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1948] VLR 118, applied.
Brown v Lizars (1905) 2 CLR 837; Jackson v The Queen (1976) 134 CLR 42; R v Cawthorne [1996] 2 Cr App R (S) 445, [1996] Crim LR 526; R v Clarke and Wilton [1959] VR 645; R v Lindner [1938] SASR 412; R v Low (1991) 57 A Crim R 8; R v Mills (1985) 17 A Crim R 411; R v Morton (1986) 42 SASR 571; R v Petroff (1980) 2 A Crim R 101; R v Solomon and Triumph [1984] 6 Cr App R (S) 120, [1984] Crim LR 433; R v Symons (1988) 142 LSJS 270; 32 A Crim R 370; Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458, considered.

R v SPANOS
[2007] SASC 409

Court of Criminal Appeal:  Debelle, Nyland and Layton JJ

  1. DEBELLE  J:       The facts are recited in the reasons of Layton J.  I turn directly to each of the grounds of appeal.

    Ground 1

  2. The first ground of appeal is that the trial judge erred in not asking the jury to answer specific questions or to return a special verdict in order to ascertain the factual basis for the conviction.  Before addressing that ground, it is convenient to set out some general propositions relating to special verdicts and questions to juries in criminal trials in this State.

    1As a general rule, the jury will be asked to do no more than return a general verdict.

    2The jury has the right in all cases to return a special verdict but cannot be compelled to do so: 2 Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown ch 47 s 3; Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence in Practice (2007) at para 4-465; Cunningham v Ryan (1919) 27…

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AGLC
R v Spanos [2007] SASC 409
Case
[2007] SASC 409
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Spanos, the appellant was convicted of possessing methylamphetamine for sale in contravention of section 32(1)(e) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984. The appellant conceded possession of the drug, leaving the sole question for the jury to determine: whether the drug was intended for sale. The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge should have sought a special verdict from the jury to clarify the basis of their decision. The appeal was heard by the court, which needed to determine whether the trial judge's failure to request a special verdict constituted an error that warranted a dismissal of the appeal.

The legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge erred in not asking the jury to answer specific questions or return a special verdict, which would have provided clarity on the factual basis for the conviction. The court needed to consider whether the absence of a special verdict affected the trial judge's ability to make the necessary findings of fact for sentencing, and whether the trial judge correctly applied the relevant legal principles in the absence of a special verdict. The appellant contended that the trial judge should have sought a special verdict to ascertain whether the drug was intended for sale or held on behalf of another person who intended to sell it. The court needed to assess the validity of these arguments in the context of the trial judge's discretion and the principles of criminal law.

The court concluded that the trial judge applied well-established principles by evaluating the evidence independently and making the necessary findings of fact, which were crucial in sentencing the appellant. The court noted that if questions had been posed to the jury and they had returned a unanimous verdict, the trial judge would have been obligated to sentence the appellant based on the facts found by the jury. However, as no questions were asked of the jury in this case, the trial judge acted within his authority by examining the evidence and making the necessary findings of fact. The appellant did not claim that the judge's findings in sentencing were not supported by the evidence, and thus, there was no basis for the third ground of appeal. The court found that none of the grounds of appeal were substantiated and dismissed the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I agree with the respondent’s submission that if the trial Judge had permitted questions to be asked of the jury, and the jury had unanimously returned with a verdict, the trial Judge would have been bound to sentence the appellant on the facts as found by the jury. However, in the present case, no questions were asked of the jury, and in that respect, the trial Judge applied well-established principles by looking at the evidence for himself and making the necessary findings of fact which were vital in sentencing the appellant. The appellant has not alleged that the Judge’s findings in sentencing were not open on the evidence. Consequently, there is no basis for Ground 3. Conclusion For these reasons none of the grounds of appeal have been made out. I would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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