R v Sonnet (Ruling No 3) - [2007] VSC 287

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1443 of 2005

THE QUEEN

SEAN SONNET

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Ruling No 3

JUDGE:	KING J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	13 August 2007
DATE OF RULING:	15 August 2007
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Sonnet - Ruling No.3
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2007] VSC 287	First Revision made 4 May 2009

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Application for disqualification for perceived bias – based upon sentencing remarks made in respect of co-offenders – application refused

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr G. Horgan S.C.	Nicholas Cinescu, Solicitor for the Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr. J. Desmond	Robert Stary

HER HONOUR:

An application has been made to disqualify myself in respect of the forthcoming trial of Sean Sonnet. The application is made on the basis of apprehended or perceived bias as a result of sentencing remarks made in the matters of R v Carl Williams and R v Gregory James Anthony Hildebrandt.[1]
[1]R v Williams [2007] VSC 131, R v Hildebrandt, delivered 5 February 2007

As stated in a previous ruling of R v Evangelos Goussis,[2] on a similar application, the law in respect of apprehended bias is well established.[3] It was described by the High Court in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy[4] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in the following terms:

“Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror) . . . , the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver . . ., a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.”

[2][2007]VSC 171

[3]Webb and Hay v The Queen 181 CLR 41, Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1, Reg v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248

[4](2000) 205 CLR 337

That test reflects “the importance of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice and its capacity to ensure that cases are decided impartially”.[5]
[5]R v Doogan [2005] ACTSC 74 para 9

Although counsel for the accused did not specifically refer to all of the cited cases, counsel did rely upon the law contained in my earlier judgment of Goussis as being a correct interpretation of the law. Accordingly it is appropriate to simply restate some of those matters. In Reg v Watson ex-parte Armstrong[6], the court at p.263 stated

"It is of fundamental importance that the public should have confidence in the administration of justice. If fair-minded people reasonably apprehend or suspect that the tribunal has prejudged the case they cannot have confidence in the decision. To repeat the words of Lord Denning Master of the Rolls which have already been cited, justice…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Sonnet (Ruling No 3)

Details

AGLC: R v Sonnet (Ruling No 3) [2007] VSC 287
Case: [2007] VSC 287
Decision Date: 15 August 2007

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter in R v Sonnet (Ruling No 3) involved the defendant, Sonnet, who was subject to a legal application for disqualification of a particular judge. The application arose due to concerns regarding perceived bias, which was based on sentencing remarks made by the judge in relation to co-offenders in a previous case. The application was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland.

The legal issues before the court were whether the judge's prior remarks demonstrated an actual or perceived bias, and if so, whether this bias was sufficient to warrant the judge's disqualification from presiding over Sonnet's case. The court had to consider the principles of judicial impartiality and the standard for determining whether a reasonable observer might think the judge to be biased.

In its ruling, the court examined the judge's sentencing remarks and found that they did not indicate any bias against Sonnet. The remarks were made in the context of sentencing co-offenders and were not directed specifically at Sonnet or any aspect of his case. The court held that the remarks did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and therefore, the application for disqualification was refused. The court emphasised that the standard for perceived bias is high, and the remarks in question did not meet that threshold.

The final orders of the court confirmed the refusal of the application for disqualification, allowing the case to proceed with the originally assigned judge.

Orders