SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v Smith [2020] QCA 23
PARTIES:
R
v
SMITH, Aidan Daniel
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 202 of 2019
DC No 229 of 2019DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Townsville – Date of Sentence: 2 August 2019 (Clare SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
Date of Orders: 19 February 2020
Date of Publication of Reasons: 21 February 2020DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
18 February 2020
JUDGES:
Holmes CJ and Morrison and McMurdo JJA
ORDERS:
Date of Orders: 19 February 2020
1. The application for leave to appeal is allowed.
2. The appeal is allowed.
3. Set aside the sentences imposed on 2 August 2019 and in lieu thereof sentence the appellant to two and a-half years’ imprisonment, suspended as from 19 February 2020 for an operational period of two and a-half years.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to five counts of sexual assault and two counts of rape – where all counts arose from assaults carried out while the complainant, a friend of the applicant, was asleep – where the sentences imposed were as follows: (a) Count 1: one month imprisonment; (b) Counts 2, 3 and 6: six months’ imprisonment; (c) Counts 4 and 7 (rape): three years’ imprisonment; and (d) Count 5: eight months’ imprisonment – where a parole eligibility date was set after serving nine months in custody – where the applicant challenges the sentences on the basis that they are manifestly excessive – where the application concerned only the sentences for rape – whether the sentences for rape are manifestly excessive
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant was assessed by a psychologist – where the psychologist assessed the risk of reoffending as quite low – where a more protected environment than the general population would be appropriate given the applicant’s particular personality issues – where, in reliance upon R v Colless, the point was made that sentences in respect of digital rape may be expected to be less severe than other forms of rape – where, as was said in R v Wark, there is no rigid compartmentalisation of rape offences into two categories, firstly, digital rape and secondly, penile rape – where it is the particular circumstances which will determine the level of criminality and together with other facts the sentence to be imposed – where R v Keevers; R v Filewood is distinguished because the applicant pleaded guilty at an early time, expressed his remorse, apologised to the complainant in the days following the offence and the degree of premeditation was less – where R v Hennessy is of little utility as a yardstick because it involved two rapes, the second of which involved persistence in the face of…
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- AGLC
- R v Smith [2020] QCA 23
- Case
- [2020] QCA 23
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the applicant's cooperation, age, antecedents, and remorse, as well as the need to ensure appropriate supervision in the community. The court distinguished the case from R v Colless, R v Wark, R v Keevers; R v Filewood, and R v HX, as the applicant pleaded guilty at an early time, expressed his remorse, and apologised to the complainant. The court found the sentences for rape to be manifestly excessive.
The court allowed the application for leave to appeal and granted the appeal. The sentences imposed on 2 August 2019 were set aside, and in lieu thereof, the applicant was sentenced to two and a half years' imprisonment, suspended as from 19 February 2020, for an operational period of two and a half years.
Orders
Orders of the court
Date of Orders: 19 February 2020
1. The application for leave to appeal is allowed.
2. The appeal is allowed.
3. Set aside the sentences imposed on 2 August 2019 and in lieu thereof sentence the appellant to two and a-half years’ imprisonment, suspended as from 19 February 2020 for an operational period of two and a-half years.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Noting that the sentence must be one to deter others who were inclined to violate a woman sleeping in her own bed, and recognising the applicant’s co-operation, age, antecedents and remorse, the learned sentencing judge said there was a need to ensure appropriate supervision in the community. Her Honour, in that context, referred to the fact that this was a victim violated whilst unconscious, with an anticipated added burden of fear of the unknown and worry about the extent of what she could not remember.Consideration Counsel for the applicant has advanced a number of matters in support of the contention that the sentences imposed, and in particular those for the two counts of rape, were manifestly excessive. In truth the application concerned only the sentences for rape. In reliance upon R v Colless[13] the point was made that sentences in respect of digital rape may be expected to be less severe than other forms of rape. The passage referred to in Colless is as follows:[14]“While the Criminal Code establishes the same maximum penalty, whether the rape be accomplished by penetration by the penis or digitally, it is reasonable to observe that without additional aggravating features (weapons, extra brutality, threats of serious harm, premeditation, residual injury etc), a rape accomplished digitally may generally be seen to be somewhat less grave than a rape accomplished by penile penetration. That is because it may be less invasive, would not carry a risk of pregnancy, and would ordinarily carry substantially reduced risk of infection …”[13][2010] QCA 26; [2011] 2 Qd R 421.[14]Colless at [17]. I do not consider that the court in Colless was attempting to lay down an overriding principle. The use of phrases such as “may generally be seen” and “somewhat less grave” point very clearly to that conclusion. Rather, it was simply an observation as to factors which might be relevant in the consideration of the offence of rape. As was said in R v Wark[15] there is no rigid compartmentalisation of rape offences into two categories, firstly digital rape and secondly penile rape. In each case “it is the particular circumstances which will determine the level of criminality and together with other facts the sentence to be imposed”. Accepting as a general proposition that penile rape will attract a higher sentence than digital rape or oral rape, there may be cases calling for punishment as great or exceeding those involving penile penetration.[15][2008] QCA 172 at [36]-[38]. Before the sentencing judge, as before this Court, reliance was placed upon two decisions in particular, R v Keevers; R v Filewood[16] and R v HX.[17] The applicant seeks to distinguish those decisions not just by their different facts, but also because each was a sentence imposed after a trial. By contrast the applicant pleaded guilty at an early time, expressed his remorse and made an apology to the complainant in the days following the offence.[16][2004] QCA 207.[17][2005] QCA 91.