R v Sinfield

Case [2023] QCA 190

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Sinfield [2023] QCA 190

PARTIES:

R
v
SINFIELD, Frederick Ronald
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 243 of 2019
SC No 1367 of 2019

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Maryborough – Date of Conviction: 6 September 2019 (Davis J)

DELIVERED ON:

19 September 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

18 May 2023

JUDGES:

Flanagan and Boddice JJA and Ryan J

ORDER:

The appeal against conviction be dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant was convicted of murder – where the Crown case depended on circumstantial evidence, in particular, evidence of post offence conduct and lies it said reflected a consciousness of guilt of the offence – where the appellant argued that there were innocent explanations for the post offence conduct and lies – where the appellant argued that the circumstantial evidence was not so cogent or compelling as to convincingly establish to a jury that the facts could not be accounted for upon a rational hypothesis other than murder – where the appellant contended the Crown had not excluded, beyond reasonable doubt, the possibility that the deceased had been killed by someone other than the appellant, namely an intruder or intruders, who had entered her home to steal from her

R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35, considered
R v Miller (2021) 8 QR 221; [2021] QCA 126, cited
R v Mirotsos[2022] QCA 76, considered

COUNSEL:

C K Copley for the appellant
M A Green for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Martin Law for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. FLANAGAN JA:  I agree with Ryan J.

  2. BODDICE JA:  Ryan J has extensively summarised the relevant evidence and the issues at trial.  That summary, which I gratefully adopt, allows me to briefly state my reasons for dismissing the appeal.

  3. Whilst there were features of the evidence which could be consistent with the deceased’s residence being the subject of entry by an unknown person at the time the deceased suffered the fatal injuries, an independent assessment of the evidence as a whole supports the conclusion that it was open to the jury to exclude any such hypothesis beyond reasonable doubt.

  4. Once that hypothesis was excluded, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who inflicted the fatal injuries to the deceased and that he did so with, at least, an intention to do grievous bodily harm.

  5. The verdict of the jury was not unreasonable.

    Order

  6. I would order that:

    1.The appeal be dismissed.

  7. RYAN J:  On 6 September 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, the appellant was convicted of the murder of Norma Ludlam, aged 75.  He appeals against his conviction.[1]

    [1]On the date of his conviction for murder, the appellant pleaded guilty to other offences committed upon the…

Continue reading R v Sinfield

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
R v Sinfield [2023] QCA 190
Case
[2023] QCA 190
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Sinfield involved the appellant, who was convicted of murder. The dispute in the case was the appellant's conviction, which he sought to appeal. The court hearing the appeal was the High Court of Australia. The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the verdict was unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence and whether the circumstantial evidence was so cogent or compelling as to convincingly establish to a jury that the facts could not be accounted for upon a rational hypothesis other than murder.

The court found that the evidence, viewed as a whole, bore no other reasonable hypothesis than that the appellant murdered the deceased. The court concluded that the possibility that someone other than the appellant killed the deceased did not rise above the level of conjecture. The court held that the jury’s verdict was a reasonable one, supported by the evidence, and that there was no significant possibility that an innocent person had been convicted. The court dismissed the appeal against conviction. The court found that the evidence established that fatal head injuries were inflicted upon the deceased as she lay in bed, in the bedroom of her home, overnight on 3/4 July 2015. The court held that the possibility that the deceased was killed by someone other than the appellant did not rise above the level of conjecture. The court found that the circumstantial evidence was so cogent or compelling as to convincingly establish to a jury that the facts could not be accounted for upon a rational hypothesis other than murder.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction. The court held that the evidence, viewed as a whole, bore no other reasonable hypothesis than that the appellant murdered the deceased. The court found that the possibility that someone other than the appellant killed the deceased did not rise above the level of conjecture. The court held that the jury’s verdict was a reasonable one, supported by the evidence, and that there was no significant possibility that an innocent person had been convicted. The court dismissed the appeal against conviction.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal against conviction be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the reasons which follow, the evidence, viewed as a whole, bore no other reasonable hypothesis than that the appellant murdered the deceased. The possibility that someone other than the appellant killed the deceased did not rise above the level of conjecture. In my view, the jury’s verdict was a reasonable one, supported by the evidence. There is no significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted. I would dismiss the appeal.The evidence The evidence established that fatal head injuries were inflicted upon the deceased as she lay in bed, in the bedroom of her home, overnight on 3/4 July 2015. As to the possibility that the deceased was killed by someone other than the appellant, there had been two “break and enters” on or about 9 April 2015, around the corner from the deceased’s house. The offender or offenders had entered via a slit in a flyscreen. One of the deceased’s screen doors had a similar slit in its screen, although there was evidence that it was caused by the appellant while he was repairing the door. Two bottles of alcohol, a purse and a mobile phone were stolen from one house. Two bottles of alcohol were stolen from the other. Police seized the appellant’s mobile phone on 4 July 2015. The phone’s call log had a single entry – a call to emergency services at 1.51 pm on 4 July 2015. The log of calls made to and from the phone before then had been deleted. The deceased was not included in the stored contacts on the defendant’s phone. However, forensic analysis of the phone revealed that the deceased and her land line number had been stored in the appellant’s contacts, then deleted. Also, the records of telephone contact between the deceased and the appellant showed almost daily contact between the appellant’s mobile or land line, and the deceased’s land line, between 7 June 2015 and 3 July 2015 – with the last contact at 8.46 pm on 3 July 2015, from the appellant’s mobile to the deceased’s landline. That call lasted 13 seconds. The deceased did not telephone the appellant on 2, 3 or 4 July 2015. The appellant did not telephone the deceased on 4 July 2015. Mr and Mrs Gatt lived two houses away from the deceased and almost across the road from the appellant. After the break in at their house (one of the two break-ins referred to above), the Gatts installed a CCTV to capture movement at the front of their house. The evidence against the appellant included footage captured by the Gatts’ CCTV. The evidence at trial also included CCTV footage from business venues.The deceased’s treatment and death The deceased was treated in the Emergency Department (ED) of the local hospital. She arrived at the ED at 2.42 pm on 4 July 2015. Having regard to her injuries and neurological state, it was decided to treat her conservatively and palliatively. She was pronounced dead at 6.28 pm on 6 July 2015.Post-mortem examination and cause of death Dr Ong, pathologist, performed an autopsy on the deceased. He gave detailed evidence of the results of the autopsy. For the purposes of this appeal, it is enough to note the following:(a)The deceased was underweight. She appeared thin and frail.(b)A small green plastic object, resembling a leaf with a stalk, and some crystal-like material was adhered to her head hair.(c)She had a prolapsed anus: her rectum (the immediate lining inside the anus) protruded through the anal opening. The lining was susceptive to tearing and bleeding. It was more fragile than the external layers of skin.(d)She was prescribed a drug-thinning medication (Warfarin).(e)Her head injuries included –(i)A laceration, 2.6 centimetres long, on her left temple; slightly curved and pointing downwards; which had been more likely caused by a blunt object rather than by an object with a sharp edge, like a knife.(A) It would be expected to bleed extensively.(ii)A depressed (caved-in) skull fracture, underneath the laceration, measuring 1.7 x 1 centimetre, with another fracture, 0.7 centimetres long, at the centre.(A) The shape of the fracture suggested that the laceration above it was caused by a “weapon” with a blunt edge.(B) On the basis that the deceased had a degree of osteopenia, force towards the severe end (on range of mild, more great and severe) was required to cause the depressed fracture.(C) It could have been caused by a blow or a fall, onto a protruding object.(D) The dura was intact.(iii)A stellate shaped injury, 4 x 5 x 2.5 centimetres behind the ear, with necrotic margins and a malodorous smell (indicating infection).(A) It would be expected to bleed even more extensively than the laceration in (i).(iv)Bruising of the temporalis muscle, underneath the injury in (iii).(v)An ‘O’ shaped skull fracture/puncture defect, underneath the bruised muscle in (iv), measuring 3.8 x 3 centimetres – roughly the same size as a 50-cent piece – with radiating fractures from the defect, one of which joined the depressed fracture in (ii) and the other extending posteriorly for 4 centimetres.(A) Force at the severe end of the scale would be required to cause the fracture.(B) It was very likely that the impacting object was a similar shape to the shape of the fracture – though not necessarily of the same size: it might be smaller.(C) The dura was torn and there was a defect in the brain substance beneath this injury. The defect measured 6 x 8 centimetres and was up to 3.5 centimetres deep. There was unhealthy necrotic brain tissue – in keeping with underlying infection. Surrounding the defect was subarachnoid haemorrhage (superficial haemorrhage on the brain surface).(vi)Superficial skin loss, 8 x 3.5 centimetres, located above and behind the injury at (iii).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Crown’s suggestion that the killer was known to the deceased – based on the absence of evidence of her dog’s activity – was contradicted by Ms Clarke’s evidence. Also, anyone could have befriended the dog. There was no evidence that the dog was aggressive per se. Further, the CCTV evidence from the Gatts’ house was inconclusive.Consideration In determining the inference to draw, and the strength of the inference to draw, from a circumstantial Crown case such as the present case, a jury must consider the circumstances as a whole – not in a piecemeal way. The appellant’s arguments about his lies and post offence conduct, and the “innocent” inference to be drawn from them, had to be viewed in the context of the evidence as a whole. There was no real challenge to the evidence of the appellant’s lies and post-offence conduct, at trial or on appeal. The appellant’s lie about seeing the deceased on the floor through her bedroom window was only consistent with the appellant attempting to paint a false, innocent picture of how he came to be aware of the seriously injured deceased. Further, that lie has to be viewed in the context of the evidence of his statements about the number of attempts he said he made to raise the deceased that morning, contrasted with: (a) the evidence that he made no attempt to reach her by telephone; and (b) the evidence which persuasively established that he would have been aware that the house was always left open. Indeed, he told Mr Evans that he entered the deceased’s house on 4 July 2015 through the back door which was left open for the dog. To use the word used by the appellant about this evidence, the appellant did “embellish” his statements to Wheeler about how he came to find the deceased, but that embellishment was in furtherance of his false narrative. From the appellant’s perspective, it was not a pointless lie – it served (so he thought) to create some distance between him and the deceased. It was not reasonably explicable by reference to panic or shock. Nor was anything to be made of the fact that it was not repeated to the paramedics. Conveying to the paramedics that he knew very little about the deceased was only consistent with his desire to distance himself from her. It was not reasonably explicable by reference to his panic, shock, or confusion. While it might not have been a smart lie – because he told the triple 0 operator that he knew about, for example, the deceased’s health; or because he did not keep it up; or because others knew how close they were – that did not make it pointless. It was explicable as part of the appellant’s efforts to paint himself to authority figures as not closely connected to the deceased. Delaying his entry to the deceased’s house after being there with Mr Hazelden, who also could not raise the deceased, had to be viewed in the context of –(a)the appellant making no telephone call to the deceased on 4 July 2015; and(b)the inference to be drawn that the appellant was aware that the house was left open, if not his explicit statement to Mr Evans revealing his knowledge that the back door was left ajar for the dog; and(c)the evidence that the house was in fact open and the appellant’s own statements that he entered it through the back door.