R v Simpson

Case [1999] QCA 156


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1999] QCA 156
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 461 of 1998

Brisbane

[R v. Simpson]

THE QUEEN

v.

RAYMOND JOHN SIMPSON

(Applicant) Appellant

Davies J.A. Pincus J.A. White J.

Judgment delivered 7 May 1999

Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, all concurring as to the orders made.

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED.
APPEAL ALLOWED TO THE EXTENT ONLY OF REDUCING THE 14 YEAR

SENTENCES IMPOSED BELOW TO 12 YEARS.

CATCHWORDS: 

Criminal law - sentence - charges under s. 229B Criminal Code of maintaining an unlawful relationship of a sexual nature with a child under the age of 16 years - whether sentence of 14 years imprisonment manifestly excessive.

R v G [1997] QCA 479 (C.A. No. 380 of 1997, 21 November 1997)
Morrison (C.A. No. 391 of 1997, 26 June 1998)
Counsel:  Mr M Shanahan for the applicant/appellant.
Mrs L Clare for the respondent.
Solicitors:  Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant/appellant.
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the
respondent.
Hearing Date:  22 March 1999.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DAVIES JA

Judgment delivered 7 May 1999

  1. I agree with the judgment of Pincus JA and with his reasons. I also agree with the comments of White J.

    REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A.

    Judgment delivered 7 May 1999

  2. This is an application for leave to appeal. The applicant, having been convicted on pleas of guilty of sexual offences against boys, complains that sentences of 14 years imprisonment were excessive. There were five complainants, who will be designated by the letters A to E; their ages were 12, 13, about 15, 14 and 15 years respectively, when the offences commenced. Commission of the offences began in 1981, continued till 1987, recommenced in 1993 and ceased in 1997. The total length of time over which commission of the offences extended was about 11 years.

  3. In relation to two of the complainants, B and C, there were charges under s. 229B of the Code of maintaining an unlawful relationship of a sexual nature with a child under the age of 16 years. In addition to those two counts, there were allegations of individual offences against complainants B and C. As to complainants A, D and E there were no charges of maintaining under s. 229B, but only allegations of individual offences.

  4. Before coming to the details of the basis upon which the applicant (now aged 36 years) was sentenced, it is necessary to discuss a more general point. In relation to complainants B and C, the prosecutor informed the judge that there were numerous sexual acts not specifically charged and they were those which constituted the offences of maintaining. With respect to the other three complainants, the decision of this Court in R v. D [1996] 1 Qd.R. 363, is authority for the view that where specific sexual offences against a complainant are charged, it is impermissible to take into account allegations of uncharged instances of sexual misconduct, for the purpose of determining…

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AGLC
R v Simpson [1999] QCA 156
Case
[1999] QCA 156
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Simpson involves an application for leave to appeal by the applicant, who was convicted on pleas of guilty of multiple sexual offences against boys. The applicant argues that the sentences of 14 years imprisonment imposed on him were excessive. The victims, referred to as A to E, were aged between 12 and 15 years old when the offences began, with the crimes spanning from 1981 to 1997. The applicant was charged under section 229B of the Criminal Code for maintaining unlawful sexual relationships with two of the complainants, B and C, while only individual offences were charged against the others. The applicant, now aged 36, sought to challenge the severity of his sentence.

The central legal issues in this case revolve around the appropriateness of the 14-year imprisonment sentence, considering the nature and duration of the offences, and the relevance of uncharged instances of sexual misconduct in determining the sentence. The court had to consider the sentencing principles applicable to sexual offences, particularly those involving children, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The court agreed with the judgment of Pincus JA and the comments of White J, affirming that the sentences imposed were not manifestly excessive. The court emphasized the need to differentiate between charged offences and uncharged instances of sexual misconduct when determining the sentence, in line with the decision in R v. D. The court found that the sentences reflected the gravity of the offences and the impact on the victims, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the sentences as appropriate and proportionate to the crimes committed.

No additional orders were made beyond dismissing the appeal and affirming the sentences imposed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

PINCUS J WHITE J
I agree with the judgment of Pincus JA and with his reasons. I also agree with the comments of White J. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - A. Judgment delivered 7 May 1999 This is an application for leave to appeal. The applicant, having been convicted on pleas of guilty of sexual offences against boys, complains that sentences of 14 years imprisonment were excessive. There were five complainants, who will be designated by the letters A to E; their ages were 12, 13, about 15, 14 and 15 years respectively, when the offences commenced. Commission of the offences began in 1981, continued till 1987, recommenced in 1993 and ceased in 1997. The total length of time over which commission of the offences extended was about 11 years. In relation to two of the complainants, B and C, there were charges under s. 229B of the Code of maintaining an unlawful relationship of a sexual nature with a child under the age of 16 years. In addition to those two counts, there were allegations of individual offences against complainants B and C. As to complainants A, D and E there were no charges of maintaining under s. 229B, but only allegations of individual offences. Before coming to the details of the basis upon which the applicant (now aged 36 years) was sentenced, it is necessary to discuss a more general point. In relation to complainants B and C, the prosecutor informed the judge that there were numerous sexual acts not specifically charged and they were those which constituted the offences of maintaining. With respect to the other three complainants, the decision of this Court in R v. D [1996] 1 Qd.R. 363, is authority for the view that where specific sexual offences against a complainant are charged, it is impermissible to take into account allegations of uncharged instances of sexual misconduct, for the purpose of determining sentence: pp. 403, 404. It is necessary to make this point because some of the information before the Court with respect to complainant A was suggestive of the occurrence of sexual acts other than those (five in number) which were specifically charged. The matter first came before the primary judge on 30 October 1998 when the applicant was arraigned and pleaded guilty. The judge was then told of recent receipt of a report by a psychiatrist, Dr Majumdar, in which it was stated that the applicant claimed that he was not a paedophile and that the complainants "came to him and instigated the activities". The prosecutor told the judge on 30 October that these points were in dispute and sentencing was adjourned so that evidence could be called. The matter came before the court again on 24 November 1998 when counsel for the applicant said there were two medical reports to be put in; they turned out to be that from Dr Majumdar just mentioned and a further report obtained by the Crown, from Dr Fama. Counsel for the applicant below said that he did not require complainants to be called for cross-examination on victim impact statements and that the sentencing could proceed. The implication was that the issues which had caused the adjournment, and in particular the question whether it was the complainants who instigated the events in question, had disappeared.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PINCUS J, WHITE J

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