SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v SEA [2023] QCA 56
PARTIES:
R
v
SEA
(applicant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 290 of 2021
SC No 114 of 2021DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Sentence Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Rockhampton – Date of Sentence: 7 October 2021 (Crow J)
DELIVERED ON:
Date of Order: 23 March 2023
Date of Publication of Reasons: 31 March 2023DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
23 March 2023
JUDGES:
Dalton JA and Boddice AJA and Bradley J
ORDER:
Date of Order: 23 March 2023
Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of maintaining a sexual relationship with a child, 58 counts of rape, eight counts of attempted rape, one count of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12, 28 counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under 12, under care, lineal descendant, 20 counts of making child exploitation material and 26 counts of common assault – where the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the maintaining count and was convicted but not further punished in respect of the remaining counts – where the complainant was the applicant’s daughter – where the sentencing judge had express regard to the applicant’s early plea of guilty, prejudicial upbringing and lack of prior criminal history – where the sentencing judge categorised the offending as the most serious form of offending – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive
Ibbs v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 447; [1987] HCA 46, cited
R v Mahony & Shenfield [2012] QCA 366, considered
Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14, citedCOUNSEL:
The applicant appeared on her own behalf
C M Cook for the respondentSOLICITORS:
The applicant appeared on her own behalf
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
DALTON JA: The applicant was 37 to 38 years old at the time of the offending dealt with by the primary judge. She was 40 at the time of sentence. She had no criminal history. She pleaded guilty to 234 counts of sexual offending against children, mostly her own daughter, at a time when that child was four to five years old. Some counts were also against a seven year old child of whom her co‑offender was the father. These counts against her daughter were the particulars of a maintaining count in respect of her daughter.
The applicant came from a broken home and says her father was violent towards her and her sister. She left school in Grade 12 due to becoming pregnant. She began taking drugs in high school. She used amphetamines from age 17, along with heavy alcohol use. Although she had a qualification in aged care administration and had done work in that area, she has spent most of her life unemployed.…
Continue reading R v Sea
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- R v Sea [2023] QCA 56
- Case
- [2023] QCA 56
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues revolved around whether the sentence of life imprisonment was excessive given the mitigating factors and the nature of the crimes. The applicant argued that the sentence was disproportionate, but the court had to weigh the severity of the crimes against the mitigating factors. The court found that the applicant's crimes were of an extreme and persistent nature, involving a gross breach of trust and depravity against her own daughter. Despite the mitigating factors, the court concluded that the sentence of life imprisonment was appropriate given the nature of the crimes.
The court's reasoning was that the severity of the crimes, the breach of trust, and the vulnerability of the victim warranted a severe sentence. The early plea of guilty and lack of prior criminal history were considered, but they did not outweigh the egregious nature of the crimes. The sentencing judge's categorisation of the offending as the most serious form of offending was deemed appropriate, and the sentence did not lead to an error. The difference in the applicant's offending compared to others was acknowledged by allowing an earlier parole eligibility date. The sentence of life imprisonment was deemed neither unreasonable nor plainly unjust.
The final orders of the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The sentence imposed was held to be not manifestly excessive, and the applicant's appeal was refused. The judges concurred with the decision to dismiss the appeal and the reasons provided.
Orders
Orders of the court
Date of Order: 23 March 2023
Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The sentencing judge found that whilst the applicant’s offending involved a lesser number of offences, over a shorter period of time, and a lesser number of complainants, than SN, the level and type of abuse committed by the applicant, directly against her own daughter, was of such a high level that it was properly to be characterised as being conduct in the most serious form of offending.Consideration A consideration of the applicant’s offending supports a conclusion that a sentence of life imprisonment for the maintaining count fell within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. The applicant’s offending involved extreme and persistent depravity, committed against her own daughter, when only four and five years of age. The conduct involved the grossest form of breach of trust by a parent. The conduct persisted despite obvious pain and pleas for it to stop. The conduct was recorded, and the child was made to make statements suggestive of enjoyment. Whilst it is undesirable to categorise offending as the most serious, as there is always the possibility of others committing even worse offending, the sentencing judge’s categorisation did not lead to error in the present case. The applicant’s offending involved criminality of such depravity, committed in circumstances of such an egregious breach of trust against a helpless child, as to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment, notwithstanding early pleas of guilty and a lack of prior criminal history. Further, the difference in the applicant’s offending to that of SN was appropriately acknowledged by the allowance for an earlier parole eligibility date in the applicant’s case. The sentence of life imprisonment was neither unreasonable nor plainly unjust.Conclusion The sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. BRADLEY J: I joined in the order refusing leave to appeal. I concur with the reasons recorded by my colleagues.