R v RCC

Case [2002] NSWCCA 347


NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION:     Regina v RCC [2002]  NSWCCA 347

FILE NUMBER(S):
60838/00

HEARING DATE(S):    6 February 2002

JUDGMENT DATE:      25/09/2002

PARTIES:
Regina
v
RCC

JUDGMENT OF:        Wood CJ at CL Sully J Dowd J   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:       District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):     00/31/0259

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:   Kirkham DCJ

COUNSEL:
DML Woodburne - Crown
AP Cook - Appellant

SOLICITORS:
SE O'Connor - Crown
DJ Humphreys - Appellant

CATCHWORDS:
Inconsistent verdicts - absence of obvious reason for jury to convict on one and not other counts - danger of compromise and wrongful conviction.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Criminal Appeal Act 1912
Evidence Act 1906 (W.A.)

DECISION:
(1) The first ground of appeal upheld (2) Appeal allowed (3) Conviction of the appellant upon ground 6 of the indictment be quashed and entered in lieu judgment of acquittal.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

60838/00

WOOD CJ
SULLY J
DOWD J

Wednesday 25 September 2002

Regina v RCC

Judgment

  1. WOOD CJ at CL:  I have read in draft the judgments of Sully J and Dowd J in this matter.  For the reasons expressed by Mr Justice Sully, I am of the view that the appeal should be allowed, the conviction of the appellant on count 6 of the indictment quashed, and in lieu a judgment of acquittal entered. 

  2. SULLY J:  I have read the draft judgment of Dowd J.  There is nothing that I wish to add to what his Honour has written respecting the essential facts, the essential principles of law, or the second ground of appeal.

  1. I have reached, however, and for the reasons following, a conclusion different from that of his Honour upon the first ground of appeal.

  1. The complainant's allegations which gave rise to counts 3, 4 and 5 of the indictment were clear, uncomplicated and vivid.  The nature of the allegations was such that, in my opinion, there was no room for a supposition that the complainant was honestly mistaken in her recollection of the incidents of which she gave her relevant evidence.  The allegations  were of an unbroken continuum of violence on a particular date, namely 12 June 1999.  The allegations were uncorroborated save for the evidence of bruising allegedly sustained by the complainant as a result of the incidents.  The allegations were denied, simply and comprehensively, by the appellant.

  1. That the jury found the appellant not guilty on all of counts 3, 4 and 5 is, in my opinion, explicable upon either of two bases. The first possibility is that the jury viewed with positive disfavour the relevant evidence of the complainant.  The second possibility is that the jury did not so regard the complainant's own evidence, but could see no reason to exclude a reasonable possibility that the sworn denials of the appellant were true.  On either approach, the jury had a reasonable doubt overall as to the guilt of the appellant as charged in counts 3, 4 and 5.

  1. Much the…

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Details
AGLC
R v RCC [2002] NSWCCA 347
Case
[2002] NSWCCA 347
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, who was represented by counsel, was convicted on counts 3, 4 and 5 of the indictment but acquitted on counts 1, 2 and 6. The appellant appealed against his conviction on the grounds that the verdict was unreasonable and there was no evidence to support it. The appeal raised questions about the reliability of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, and the consistency of the verdicts. The High Court of Australia was required to determine whether the verdicts were inconsistent and if so, whether there was an obvious reason for the jury to convict on some counts and acquit on others. The court also had to consider whether the risk of compromise and wrongful conviction was significant enough to warrant a new trial.

The court found that the verdicts were inconsistent as the jury had acquitted the appellant of charges that were closely related to those on which he was convicted. The court noted that the jury had accepted some of the appellant's evidence and rejected other parts of it, which suggested that there was no obvious reason for the inconsistency. The court held that the risk of compromise and wrongful conviction was significant in this case, given the serious consequences of a criminal conviction and the potential for prejudice against the appellant due to the nature of the charges. The court also found that the trial judge had not adequately addressed the issue of inconsistent verdicts in his summing up to the jury.

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions on counts 3, 4 and 5. The court ordered a new trial for the appellant on those counts. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that verdicts are consistent and reliable, particularly in cases where the accused faces serious charges and the potential for prejudice is high. The court also highlighted the need for trial judges to properly address the issue of inconsistent verdicts when summing up to the jury.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant had been arrested on 10 March 2000, and refused bail but was released on bail on 27 March 2000. He remained on bail until 20 August 2000, but was then refused bail and remained in custody until sentence on 1 December 2000, being a total of one hundred and twenty two days in custody.The Facts for the Several Offences The appellant and the complainant in counts 1 and 3 – 6, a casually employed nurse, MJS, had lived together in a de facto relationship since August 1998. The complainant’s daughters, CS (the alleged victim in count 2) and JL were also living with the couple. They were aged three and seven respectively. Count one concerned events which were alleged to have occurred on 21 March 1999, following the return of the appellant and MJS from cutting wood together. MJS alleged that the appellant was drunk and pushed her away from him following an altercation between them, as a result of which she hit her head against a cupboard door, which caused a shooting sharp pain to her head and a burst blood vessel in her right eye. MJS attended Coonabarabran Hospital on 24 March 1999, as a result of the injury, and was attended by Dr Ianuzzi, whom she told the injury was caused by her sneezing. Dr Ianuzzi observed a subconjunctival haemorrhage of the right eye. On 26 March 1999, MJS attended Dr Devine for review of the injury, as she was experiencing bad headaches. She repeated to Dr Devine that the injury was not caused by a blow or injury to the head. In evidence Dr Devine stated that two typical causes of such an injury are straining, such as a woman pushing in labour or a severe cough and external pressure usually sustained through a sport injury or through an assault. He said it was possible, but unlikely, that such an injury could be caused by a blow to the back of the head. On about 23 March 1999, MJS told a colleague, Leanne Roberts who had observed the bloodshot eye, that the injury was the result of her sneezing. In cross-examination in the trial, MJS asserted that she had told Roberts that the appellant caused the injury. MJS reported the first assault to the Police on 20 April 2000, the complaint being made in a statement to a Det Hughes. The second count involved an allegation of assault on MJS’s daughter. On 11 June 1999, the appellant and MJS were visiting the appellant’s parents where MJS’s daughter, CS, was being minded by the appellant’s parents. MJS sat on the lounge watching television whilst waiting for the appellant to finish his beer, so that they could go home. Whilst there, an altercation broke out between MJS and the appellant concerning her daughter’s behaviour. The appellant swore at CS and when MJS endeavoured to excuse the child the appellant swore at her as well. As a result of CS’s whinging, the appellant hit CS on the back with a game board with which the child had been playing. The appellant was then alleged to have picked the child up, kicked her on the tailbone and thrown her by the arm approximately three to four metres into the corner of the kitchen area. The incident was alleged to have occurred in the presence of the appellant’s mother, Doreen Clarke, who in evidence denied that she witnessed any of these events. She was sitting in the lounge room at the time of this alleged incident.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In August 1999 MJS commenced civil proceedings in the Local Court against the appellant concerning the damage caused by the appellant to MJS’s car during the incident which had occurred on 11 June 1999.Evidence of Bruising Roberts gave evidence that she had observed bruising on the back of the legs of MJS, on her arm and near her neck whilst they were on a journey to Gilgandra which she remembered because the vehicle in which they travelled had struck a kangaroo. She said that the journey had taken place on the 15 June 1999, that is three days after the alleged bathroom incident. However, she agreed in cross-examination that she had sworn in an affidavit that the collision with the kangaroo had been on the 13 April 1999. Another friend of MJS also observed bruising on MJS during the Gilgandra kangaroo trip, describing the bruising as being:“Down her left side, the right side of her face and on the top of her arm”.She also agreed that she had said previously the day in question was the 13 April 1999. The mother of MJS said that she saw bruising on MJS’s right leg on 16 June 1999, but that two days earlier she agreed that she had not been shown any bruising. The father of MJS gave evidence that he observed bruises on MJS on the afternoon of 14 June 1999.Complaints to Police On 14 June 1999, MJS spoke to a Const Boltie about a hypothetical assault but when asked if she wanted to lay charges against anyone she asked whether she would receive twenty four hours protection. She was told that this was not possible and this was the reason she did not proceed to lay charges. On 9 February 2000, MJS spoke to a Const Frazer concerning a restraining order against the appellant. On 10 February 2000, MJS made a statement to the police, detailing the incident relating to count 2. MJS also reported in that statement the details relating to count 3. On 20 April 2000, MJS gave a further statement to a Det Hughes outlining the assault in count 1.The Appellant’s Case The incident concerning the board game was on 11 June 1999 and occurred when MJS was sitting on the lounge, and the appellant asked MJS about what was happening concerning dinner as the two children were cranky and hungry. The appellant said that MJS had said that she had eaten at work and that she did not want to buy dinner and the girls would eat when they arrived at home. The appellant’s evidence was that MJS became cranky and walked out to the backdoor with the two girls, putting the children in the back seat while the appellant was leaning against the left hand guard of the car, and that MJS told him she was going home and that she had “the shits”. The appellant said that MJS walked passed him and pushed the appellant, and that he fell onto the car causing a little dent, and that that night he stayed at his parents’ place. The appellant said that while MJS was present at his parents’ home, the children had been fighting and crying over the board game, and that he had taken it away from them and that the girls had cried a little.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WOOD CJ SULLY J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WOOD CJ SULLY J

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